



Guilielmus Fieles fecit







TO THE RIGHT  
VVORTHY, AND MY  
HONORABLE COSEN  
M<sup>r</sup>.SAMSON LENNARD  
Esquire.

SIR



*He first fruits of these  
my Labours in this  
Booke of VV I S-  
DOME I dedicated  
to the late renowned  
Prince HENRY,  
who if there were no other reasons, yet  
might iustly challenge them, because hee  
was my Prince, to whom first and especi-  
ally I held my selfe in all dutie and obedi-  
ence to be bound; But the subiect of this  
booke conteyning much matter fit for a  
Prince.*

Gen Res. Allen. 28. Lennard = 1615

1031453 ¶

Prince

## THE EPISTLE

Prince to know, I thought it a sin to thinke of any other protector than him whom it most concerned, & who was best able to defend me. God hauing changed his earthly crowne into a crowne of glorie, England hath lost a hope, Religion and the State a prop, and this Booke a Patron, which instantly vpon his death, comming to a new impressiõ, with some additions, seemes to seeke for new helps. And why should it seeke farther than to your worthy selfe, to whom nature, & dutie, and desert, and all the bands that may any way tie loue and affection haue euer bound me? And so much the rather because there wants not honor in you to giue countenance, nor iudgment to censure a worke of this nature. For honour, can there be a greater, than to be honourable in all your children, than to liue to see my Lord your son invested into an ancient Baronie euen in your owne time,

## DEDICATORY.

time, and him, and the rest of your honorable progenie descended from so many great Princes, and euen the most renowned and victorious Kings of this land? As for your selfe, although you haue not respected the degree of knight-hood, yet it hath pleased HIS MAIESTIE to dignifie you with greater honor, euen an honor seldome or neuer granted by any King or Prince heretofore, not only to ranke you aboue all Knights, but to giue you the precedence of men of greater place than any Knight whatsoeuer. These reasons thus concurring with your iudicious grauity, & the subiect so well suting to the wisdom of your selfe, (for AV SAGE LA SAGESSE 'as CHARRON himselfe saith in his Epistle to the Duke ESPERNON) I should haue wronged your worth, wronged this worke of WISDOME, and my selfe most of all; to deprive this booke of so wor-

## THE EPISTLE

thy a Patron; so worthy a Patron the honor of this booke, and my selfe of so good a meanes to grace the WISDOME of this worke. But my purpose is not (as perhaps some will take it) to pay your fauours with flatterie, which I can by no meanes sufficiently remunerate. Nor by circumstances to commend that, which I can neuer enough commend, but rather derogate from the worth therof by commending too little: Leauing therefore the worke to speake for it selfe, and my labours heerein for my selfe; both this, and all my service I humbly present vnto you. And so wishing you all happinesse in this life, with increase of honor, and length of daies, and daies that neuer shall end in the life to come. I rest

Your worships in all  
dutie to be commanded

SAMSON LENNARD.



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OF



# OF WISDOME

Three Books.

## THE PREFACE.

*Where the Name, Subiect, Purpose, and  
Method of this Worke is set downe,  
with an Aduertisement to  
the Reader.*

**I**T is required at the first entry into this Worke, that wee know what this Wisdome is; and since it beareth that name and title, how we purpose to speake thereof. All men in generall at the first view of the simple word it selfe, doe easily conceiue and imagine it to be some quality, sufficiency, or habit, not common or vulgar, but excellent, singular, and eleuated aboue that which is common and ordinarie, be it good or euill: For it is taken and vsed (though perhaps improperly) in both kinds: *Sapientes sunt vt faciant mala: They are wise to doe euill:* Hierem. 4.  
Eccl. lib. 5.  
M. 1. aply.

<sup>1</sup>  
Of the word  
Wisdome.

## The Preface.

*euill*: and signifieth not properly a good and laudable qualitie, but exquisite, singular, excellent in whatsoeuer it be. And therefore we doe as well say a wise Tyrant, Pirat, Theefe; as A wise King, Pilot, Captaine: that is to say, Sufficient, prudent, aduised; not simply and vulgarly, but excellently: For there is opposit vnto Wisdome not onely follie, which is an irregularitie or loosenesse of life, and Wisdome a regularity or moderation, well measured and proportioned: but also common basenesse and vulgar Simplicities: For Wisdome is high, strong, and excellent; yea, whether it be in good or euill it containeth two things: Sufficiency, that is, Prouision or furniture for whatsoeuer is required and necessary; and that it be in some high degree of excellency. So that you see what the simpler sort imagine Wisdome to be at the first view and the simple sound of the word; whereby they conclude, That there are few wise men. that they are rare as euery excellencie is; and that to them by right it appertaineth to command and gouerne others; that they are as Oracles: from whence is that saying, *Beleeue others, and referre thy selfe to the wise.* But well to define this thing and according to truth, and to distinguish it into his true parts, all men know not, neither are they of one accord, nor is it easie; for otherwise doe the common people, otherwise the Philosophers, otherwise the Diuinespeake thereof. These are the three floores and degrees of the world. The two latter proceed by order, and rules, and precepts: the former confusedly and very imperfectly.

2

The diuision  
of Wisdome.

Now then wee may say, That there are three sorts and degrees of wisdome, Diuine, Humane, Mundane, which correspond vnto God; Nature pure and entire;  
Nature

## The Preface.

Nature vitiated and corrupted. Of all these sorts and euery of them doe all these three orders of the world, which before we speake of, write and discourse, euery one according to his owne maner and fashion ; but properly and formally the common sort, that is to say, the world of worldly wisdom, the Philosopher of humane, the Diuine of diuine wisdom.

Worldly wisdom, and of the three the more base, <sup>3</sup>  
(which is diuers according to the three great Cap- <sup>Worldly</sup>  
taines and Leaders of this inferiour world, Opulencie, <sup>wisdom.</sup>  
Pleasure, Glorie, or rather Auarice, Luxurie, Ambition : *Quicquid est in mundo est concupiscentia oculorum, concupiscentia carnis, superbia vite ; All that is in the world is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life:* for which cause it is called by Saint Iames, *Terrena, Animalis, Diabolica ; Earthly, Sensual,* <sup>1. Iohn 3.</sup>  
*Deuiliſh*) is reprooned by Philosophie and Diuinitie, which pronounceth it follie before God : *Stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi : God hath made the wisdom of this world foolishnesse.* Of this wisdom therefore we speake not in this Booke, except it be to dispraise and condemne it.

Diuine wisdom, and of the three the highest, is defined and handled by Philosophers and Diuines, but <sup>4</sup>  
somewhat diuersly. As for the common or worldly <sup>Diuine</sup>  
wisdom I disdaine it, and passe by what soeuer may be <sup>wisdom.</sup>  
spoken thereof as prophane and too vnworthie in this Treatise to be read. The Philosophers make it altogether Speculatiue, saying, That it is the knowledge of the principles, first causes, and highest power to iudge of all things, euen of the most Soueraigne, which is God himselfe : and this wisdom is Metaphysicall, and resideth wholly in the vnderstanding, as being the chiefe

## The Preface.

Thom. 1. 2.  
gaest. 57. 2.  
2. q. 19.

chiefe good and perfection thereof : it is the first and highest of the five intellectuall vertues, which may be without either honestie, action, or other morall vertue. The Diuines make it not altogether so speculatiue, but that it is likewise in some sort Practique ; for they say, That it is the knowledge of Diuine things, from which there ariseth a iudgement and rule of humane actions ; and they make it two-fold, The one acquired by studie, and comes neere to that of the Philosophers ; which I am to speake of : The other infused and giuen by God, *De sursum descendens, Comming from above.* This is the first of the seuen gifts of the holy Ghost, *Spiritus Domini, Spiritus sapientia, The spirit of God is the spirit of wisdom.* Which is not found but only in those that are iust and free from sinne, *In maleuolam animam non introibit sapientia, Wisedome cannot enter into a wicked heart.* Of this Diuine wisdome likewise our purpose is not heere to speake, it is after some sort and measure handled in my first Veritie, and in my Discourses of Diuinitie.

Sap. 1.

5  
Humane.

Wisdome  
according to  
the common  
sort.

It followeth therefore, that it is Humane wisdome which in this booke we are to deliuer vnto you, and whereof it takes the name, and of which in this place wee must giue some brieft and generall view, which may be as an Argument and Summarie of this whole worke. The common descriptions are diuers and insufficient ; Some and the greatest part thinke that it is onely a wisdome, discretion, and aduised carriage in a mans affaires and conversation. This may well be called common, as respecting nothing but that which is outward and in action, and considereth not at all any other thing than that which outwardly appeareth. It is altogether in the eyes and cares of men, without any respect

## *The Preface.*

respect or very little of the inward motions of the minde: so that according to their opinion wisdom may be without essentiall pietie or probitie, that is, a beautifull cunning, a sweet and modest subtiltie. Others thinke that is a rude, vnreasonable, rough singularity, a kinde of sullen frowning and frampole austeritie in opinions, maners, words, actions and fashion of life; and therefore they call them that are wounded and touched with that humor, Philosophers, that is to say, in their counterfet language, fantastickall, diuers, different and declining from the customes of other men.

Now this kinde of wisdom according to the doctrine of our booke is rather a follie and extrauagancie. You must therefore know, that this wisdom whereof wee speake is not that of the common people, but of Philosophers and Diuines, whereof both haue written in their morall learnings. The Philosophers more at large, and more professedly as being their true and proper dish they feed on, and formall subiect they write of, because they applie themselves to that which concerneth Nature and Action. Diuinitie mounteth much higher, and is occupied about vertues infused, Contemplatiue and Diuine, that is to say, about Diuine wisdom and Beleefe. So that Philosophers are more staied, dispersed more certaine, and more common, ruling and instructing not onely the particular knowledge or actions of men, but the common and publike, teaching that which is good and profitable to Families, Corporations, Common-weales, Empires. Diuinitie is more sparing and silent in this point, looking principally into the eternall good and saluation of euery one. Again, the Philosopher handleth this subiect more sweetly and pleasingly, the Diuine more

According to  
Philosophers  
and Diuines.

A comparison  
between  
Diuinitie and  
Philosophie.

austerely



## The Preface.

austerely and drily. Againe, Philosophie which is the elder (for Nature is more ancient than grace, and the Naturall than the Supernaturall) seemeth to perswade gratioously, as being willing to please in profiting, as the Poet speaketh :

Horace.

*Simul & iucunda & idonea dicere vita,  
Lectorem delectando pariterq; monendo :  
Of pleasant and of necessarie things to write,  
Together yeld both counsell and delight.*

It is enriched with discourses, reasons, inuentions, examples, similitudes, decked with speeches, Apophthegmes, sententious mots, adorned with Eloquence and Art. Theologic, which came after, altogether austere, it seemeth to command and imperiously like a Master to enioine. And to conclude, the vertue and honestie of Diuines is too anxious, scrupulous, deiect, sad, fearefull and vulgar. Philosophie, such as this Booke teacheth, is altogether pleasant, free, bucksome, and if I may so say, wanton too; and yet notwithstanding, puissant, noble, generous, and rare. Doubtlesse the Philosophers haue herein beene excellent, not only in writing and teaching, but in the rich and liuely representation thereof in their honourable and heroicall liues. I vnderstand heere by Philosophers and Wise men, not onely those that haue carried the name of Wise men, such as *Thales, Solon*, and the rest of that ranke, that liued in the time of *Cyrus, Cresus, Pisistratus*; nor those that came afterwards, and haue publickly taught it, as *Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aristippus, Zenon, Anaxagoras*, all chiefe Professours apart, and many other their Disciples different and diuided in sects; but also all those great men who haue made singular and exemplarie profession of vertue and wisdom,

## The Preface.

wisdomes, as *Phocion, Aristides, Pericles, Alexander*, whom *Plutarch* called as well a Philosopher as a King, *Epaminondas*, and diuers other Greekes: The *Fabrichj, Fabij, Camilli, Catones, Torquati, Reguli, Leli, Scipionis*, Romans, who for the most part haue been Generals in armies. And these are the reasons why in this my Booke I doe more willingly and ordinarily follow the aduice and sayings of Philosophers, not in the meantime omitting or rejecting those of the Diuines: For both in substance they doe all agree, and are very seldome different, and Diuinitie doth nothing disdain to employ, and to make good vse of the wise sayings of Philosophie. If I had vndertaken to instruct the cloister, and the retired life, that is, that profession which attendeth the secrets Euangelicall, I must necessarily haue followed *adamus* the aduice of the Diuines: but our Booke instructeth a ciuill life, formeth a man for the world, that is to say, to humane wisdomes, not diuine.

We say then naturally and generally both with the Philosopher and the Diuine, that this humane wisdomes is a kinde of law or reason, a beautifull and noble composition of the entire man, both in his inward part and his outward, his thoughts, his words, his actions, and all his motions. It is the excellencie and perfection of man as he is man, that is to say, according to that which the first fundamentall and naturall law doth require; as wee say, That that worke is well wrought and excellent, that is compleat and perfect in all the parts thereof, and wherein all the rules of Art haue beene obserued; that man is accounted a wise man, that best knoweth after the best and most excellent manner to play the man, that is to say, (to give a

6

A generall  
description  
of humane  
wisdomes.

A

more

## *The Preface.*

more particular picture thereof) that knowing himselfe and the condition of man, doth keepe and preserve himselfe from all vices, errors, passions and defects as well inward and proper to himselfe, as outward and common to other men, maintaining his spirit pure, free, vniuersall, considering and iudging of all things without band or affection, alwayes ruling and directing himself in all things according to nature, that is to say, that first reason and vniuersall law and light inspired by God, and which shineth in vs, vnto which he doth apply and accommodate his owne proper and particular light, living in the outward view of the world, and with all men according to their lawes, customes and ceremonies of the countrey where he is, without the offence of any, carrying himselfe, wisely and discreetly in all affaires, walking alwaies vprightly, constant, comfortable, and content in himselfe, attending peaceably whatsoever may happen, and at the last death it selfe. All these parts or qualities, which are many, for our better ease and facility may be drawen to foure principall heads; Knowledge of our selues, Liberty of spirit pure and generous, Imitation of Nature, (this hath a very large field, and alone might almost suffice) True contentment. These can no where be found but in him that is wise: and he that wanteth any of these cannot be wise. He that hath an erroneous knowledge of himselfe, that subiecteth his minde to any kinde of seruitude, either of passions or popular opinions, makes himselfe partiall; and by enthralling himselfe to some particular opinion is deprived of the liberty and iurisdiction of discerning, iudging and examining all things. Hee that strineth against Nature, vnder what pretence soeuer it be, following rather opi-  
nion

## The Preface.

nion or passion than reason; he that carrieth himselfe troubledly, disquietly, malcontent, fearing death, is not wise. Behold heere in a few words the picture of Humane wisdom and folly, and the sum of that which I purpose to handle in this Worke, especially in the Second Booke; which expressly containeth the rules, treatise, and offices of Wisdom, which is more mine than the other two, and which I once thought to have published by it selfe. This verball description of Wisdom is represented vnto the eye even at the entrance or threshold of this Booke by a woman all naked, in a place void and empty, resting her selfe vpon nothing, in her pure and simple nature beholding her selfe in a glasse, her countenance cheerefull, merry and manly, vp-right, her feet close ioyned, vpon a square pillar, and imbracing herselfe, hauing vnder her feet inchained foure other women-as slaues vnto her, that is to say, *Passion* with a changed and hideous countenance; *Opinion* with wandering eyes, inconstant, giddy, borne vpon the heads of the people; *Superstition*, astonished and in a trance, and her hands fastened the one to the other; *Virtue* or Honesty and Pedanticall Science with a sullen visage, her eye-lids eleuated reading in a Booke, where was written, *Yea, No*. All this needs no other explication, than that which heereafter followeth, but heereof more at large in the Second Booke.

To attaine vnto this wisdom there are two means, the first is in the originall forming and first temper, that is to say, in the temperature of the seed of the Parents, the milke of the Nurse, and the first education; where-by a man is sayd to be either well borne, or ill borne, that is to say, either well or ill formed and disposed vnto wisdom. A man would little thinke of what pow-

7  
Two waies  
to attaine this  
wisdome.

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er and importance this beginning is, for if men did know it, there would be more care taken, and diligence vsed therein than there is. It is a strange and lamentable thing, that so reachlesse a carelesnes should be in vs of the life and good life of those whom we desire to make our other selues, when in matters of lesse importance we take more care, vse more diligence, more counsell than we should, neuer thinking of our greatest affaires and most honourable, but by hazard and peradventure. Who is hee that taketh counsell with himselfe, or endeuoureth to doe that which is required for the preserving and preparing of himselfe as he ought to the generation of male-children, healthfull of spirit, and apt for wisdom? For that which serueth for the one, serueth for the other, and Nature after one manner attendeth them all. This is that which men thinke of least, yea little or not at all (in the act of generation) doth it enter into their thoughts to frame a new creature like themselves, but only like beasts to satisfie their lustfull pleasures. This is one of the most important faults and of greatest note in a Commonwealth, whereof there is not one that thinketh or complaineth, neither is there concerning it either law, or rule, or publicke aduice. It is most certaine, that if men did heerein carry themselves as they ought, we should haue other men, of more excellent spirit and condition than we haue amongst vs. What is required heerein, and to the first nourishment and education, is briefly set downe in our Third Booke, Chap. 14.

8  
Acquired.

The second meanes to attaine wisdom is the study of Philosophie, I meane not of all the parts thereof, but Morall (yet not forgetting the naturall) which is the light, the guide, the rule of our life, which explaineth

## The Preface.

neth and representeth vnto vs the law of Nature, instructeth man vniuersally in all things, both publike and priuate, alone and in companie, in all domesticall and ciuill conversation, taketh away all that sauage nature that is in vs, sweetneth and tameth our naturall rudenesse, crueltie and wildnesse, and worketh and fashioneth it to wisdome. To be brieft, it is the true science of man; all the rest in respect of it, is but vanitie, or at the leastwise not necessarie or little profitable: for it giueth instructions to liue and to die well, which is all in all; it teacheth vs perfect wisdome, an apt iudicious well aduised honestie. But this second meane is almost as little practised and as ill employed as the first: for no man careth greatly for this wisdome, so much are all giuen to that which is worldly. Thus you see the two principall meanes to attaine to wisdome, the Naturall and Acquired. Hee that hath been fortunate in the first, that is to say, that hath been fauourably formed by Nature, that is, of a good and sweet temperature, which bringeth forth a great goodnesse in nature, and sweetnes in maners, hath made a faire march without great paine to the second: But that man with whom it is otherwise, must with great and painfull studie of the second beautifie and supply that which is wanting, as *Socrates* one of the wisest sayd of himselfe, That by the studie of Philosophie he had corrected and reformed his naturall infirmities.

There are contrariwise two formall lets or hindrances to wisdome, and two counter-meanes or powerfull wayes vnto follie, Naturall and Acquired. The first, which is naturall, proceedeth from the originall temper and temperature, which maketh the braine either too soft, moist, and the parts thereof grosse and  
materiall,

9  
The lets to  
Wisdome, &  
means to fol-  
ly are two.  
I  
Naturall,

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materiall ; whereby the spirits remaine sottish, feeble, lesse capable, plaine diminished, obscure, such as that is, for the most part, of the common sort of people ; or too hot, ardent, and drie, which maketh the spirits foolish, audacious, vicious. These are the two extremes, *Sottishnesse* and *Follie*, Water and Fire, Lead and Mercurie, altogether improper or vnapt to wisdom, which requireth a spirit full of vigor and generous, and yet sweet, pliant, and modest : but the second is more easily amended by discipline than the former.

2  
Acquired.

The second, which is Acquired, proceedeth either from no culture and instruction, or from that which is euill, which amongst other things consisteth in an obstinate and sworne preiudicate preuention of opinions, wherewith the minde is made drunken, and taketh so strong a tincture, that it is made vnapt and vncapable to see or to finde better whereby to raise and enrich it selfe. It is said of these kinde of men, That they are wounded and stricken, that they haue a hurt or blow in the head : vnto which wound if likewise learning be joined, because that puffeth vp, it bringeth with it presumption and temeritie, and sometimes armes to maintaine and defend those anticipated opinions : it altogether perfecteth the forme and frame of follie, and maketh it incurable. So that naturall weaknes, and acquired preuention are two great hinderances ; but science, if it doe not wholly cure them, which seldome it doth, strengthneth them and maketh them invincible, which turneth not any way to the dishonour of learning (as a man may well thinke) but to the greater honour thereof.

10  
Of Learning.

Science or Learning is a very good and profitable staffe or waster, but which will not be handled with all hands ;



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hands; and he that knowes not well how to rule it, receiue thereby more hurt than profit. It besorteth & maketh foolish (saith a great learned writer) the weak and sicke spirit, it polisheth and perfecteth the naturally strong and good. The feeble spirit knowes not how to possesse science, how to handle it, and how to make vse thereof as he should: but contrariwise is possessed and ruled by it, whereby hee submits himselfe and remaines a slaue to it, like a weak stomacke ouercharged with more victuals than it can digest. A weak arme wanting power and skill well to wield a waister or staffe that is somewhat too heauie for it, wearieth it selfe and fainteth. A wise and courageous spirit ouermastereth his wisdom, enioyeth it, vseth it, and employeth it to his best aduantage, enformeth his owne iudgement, rectifieth his will, helpeth and fortifieth his naturall light, and maketh himselfe more quicke and actiue; whereas the other is made thereby more sortish more vnapt, and therewithall more presumptuous: so that the fault or reproch is not in learning, no more than that wine or other good drugg is faulty which a man knoweth not how to apply and accommodate to his owne needs: *Non est culpa vini, sed culpa bibentis.* *The fault is not in the wine, but in the infirmitie of him that drinkes it.* Now then against such spirits weak by nature, preoccupied, puffed vp, and hindred by acquired wisdom I make open warre in this Booke, and that oftentimes vnder the word *Pedante*, not finding any other more proper, and which by many good Authours is vsed in this sense. In it owne Greeke Originall it was taken in the better sense, but in other later languages, by reason of the abuse, and bad cariage of such men in the profession of their learning, it is accounted

Of the word  
*Pedante* or  
Schoole-  
master.



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base, vile, questuous, contentious, opinatiue, vaine-glorious and presumpruous, by too many practised, and vsed but by way of iniurie and derision, and is in the number of those words that by continuance of time haue changed their signification, as *Tyrant*, *Sophister*, and diuers other. *Le sieur de Bellay*, after the rehearfall of many notorious vices, concludeth as with the greatest, *But of all the rest, Knowledge pedanticall I detest.* And in another place;

*Sayd I thou didst liue but to eat and drinke,  
Then poore were my reuenge, thy faults scantie :  
But that which most doth make thy name to stinke,  
Is, to be short, thou art a Pedantie.*

An aduertisement.

It may be some will take offence at this word, thinking it likewise toucheth them, and that I thereby haue a will to tax or scosse the Professors and Teachers of learning; but let them bee pleased to content themselues with this free and open declaration which I here make, That it is no part of my meaning to note by this word any gown-men or learned profession whatsoeuer: yea I am so farre from it, that Philosophers are in so high esteeme with me, that I should oppose my selfe against my selfe, because I account my selfe one of them, and professe the same learning: only I touch a certaine degree and qualitie of spirits, before deciphered, that is, such as haue naturall capacitie and sufficiencie after a common and indifferent maner, but afterwards not well tilled, preoccupied, possessed with certaine opinions: and these are men of all fortunes, all conditions, and goe as well in short garments as in long gownes: *Vulgum tam eblamidatos, quam coronam voco*, I reckon amongst the vulgar sort, as well Kings and crownes, as Pedantes and clownes. If any man can furnish me with any other

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other word as significant as this to expresse these kinde of spirits, I will willingly forgoe this. After this my declaration, he that findeth himselfe agrieved, shal but accuse and shew himselfe too scrupelous. It is true that a man may finde other opposites to a wise man besides a *Pedante*, but it is in some particular sense, as the common, prophane, vulgar sort of people; and often times I vse these opposits: but this is as the low is opposite to the high, the weake to the strong, the valley to the hill, the common to the rare, the seruant to the master, the prophane to the holy; as also a foole, which indeed according to the true sound of the word, is his truest opposite: but this is a moderate man to an immoderate, a glorious opinatiue man to a modest, the part to the whole, the preiudicate and tainted to the neat and free, the sicke to the sound: but this word *Pedante* in that sense wee take it, comprehendeth all these and more too, for it noteth and signifieth him that is not only vnlike and contrary to a wise man, as those before mentioned, but such a one as arrogantly and insolently resisteth it to the face, and as being armed on all sides raiseth himselfe against it, speaking out of resolution and authoritie. And forasmuch as after a sort hee feareth it, by reason that hee seeth himselfe discovered euen from the top to the bottome, and his sport troubled by it, hee persecuteth it with a certaine intestine hatred, hee taketh vpon him to censure it, to defame it, to condemne it, accounting and carrying himselfe as the truly wise, though he be a foole without peere and an ignorant selfe-conceited Gull.

After the purpose and argument of this Worke, we come to the order and method thereof. There are II  
three Books: The first is wholly in the knowledge of The method  
of this Booke.  
our

## The Preface.

our selues and humane condition, as a preparatiue vnto wisdom, which is handled at large by fīue maine and principall considerations, each one including in it diuers others. The Second Booke containeth in it the treatises, offices, and generall and principall rules of wisdom. The Third, the particular rules and instructions of wisdom, and that by the order and discourse of foure principal and morall vertues, *Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, Temperance*; vnder which foure is comprised the whole instruction of the life of man, and all the parts of dutie and honestie. Finally, I heere handle this matter, not Scholarlike or Pedantically, nor with enlarged discourse, and furniture of Eloquence or other Arte; (For wisdom (*qua si oculis ipsis cerneretur mirabiles excitaret amores sui*) If it could be seen with our corporall eyes, would stirre vp in vs an admirable desire thereof) needs no such helps to commend it selfe, being of it selfe so noble and glorious) but rudely, openly, and ingenuously, which perhaps will not please all. The propositions and verities are compact, but many times drie and sower, like Aphorismes, ouertures and seeds of discourse.

Some thinke this Booke too soole-hardie and free to contradict and wound the common opinions, and are offended therewith, whom in foure or fīue words I thus answer: First, that wisdom which is neither common nor vulgar hath properly this libertie and authoritie, *Iure suo singulari*, to iudge of all, (it is the priuiledge of a wise and spirituall man, *spiritualis omnia dijudicat, & à nemine indicatur*, The spirituall man iudgeth all, and is iudged of none) and in iudging to censure and condemne (as for the most part erroneous) common and vulgar opinions. What then should she doe?

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doe? for the case standing thus, it can not be, but she must incurre the disgrace and enuie of the world. In another place I complaine of these kinde of men, and reprove their popular weaknesse and semine daintinesse as vnworthy, being ouer-tender and delicate, to vnderstand any thing of worth, and altogether vn-capable of wisdom. The hardest and hardiest propositions are best besitting a hardie and eleuated spirit, and there can nothing seeme strange vnto him that doth but know what the world is. It is weaknesse to be astonished at any thing, we must rowze vp our hearts, confirme and strengthen our mindes, harden and invre ourselues to heare, to know, to vnderstand, to iudge of all things seeme they neuer so strange. All things are agreeing and well besitting the palat of the spirit, so a man be not wanting vnto himselfe, and neither do anything, or yeeld his consent to whatsoeuer is not good and truly faire, no though the whole world perswade him vnto it. A wise man sheweth equally in them both his courage, his delicates are not capable of the one or the other, there being a weaknesse in them both.

Thirdly, in all that I shall propose, my meaning is not to binde any man vnto it, I onely present things, and lay them out as it were vpon a stall; I grow not into choler with any man that giues me no credit, or dislikes my ware, that were to play the *Pedante*. *Passion* witnesseth that it is not reason so to do, and he that out of passion doth any thing out of reason can not doe it. But why are they angrie with me? Is it because I am not altogether of their opinion? Why, I am not angrie with them because they are not of mine. Is it because I speake something which is not pleasing to their taste,

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raſte, or to the palat of the vulgar ſort ? Why therefore I ſpeake it. I ſpeake nothing without reaſon, if they knew how to vnderſtand it, how to reliſh it. If they can bring better reaſon to diſproue mine, I will hearken vnto it with delight and thanks to him that ſhall ſhew it me. But yet let them not thinke to beat me downe with authorities, multitudes, and allegations of other men, for theſe haue but ſmall credit in my iuriſdiction, ſaue in matter of Religion, where only authoritie preuailes without reaſon. This is authorities true Empire, reaſon onely bearing ſway in all other Arts without it, as *S. Auguſtine* doth very well acknowledge. For it is an vniuſt tyrannie and an enraged follie to ſubieſt and inthrall our ſpirits to beleeuē and to follow whatſoeuer our Anceſtours haue ſayd, and what the vulgar ſort hold to bee true, who know neither what they ſay, nor what they doe. There are none but fooles that ſuffer themſelues to bee thus led by the noſes : and this Booke is not for ſuch, which if it ſhould popularly bee receiued and accepted of the common ſort of people, it ſhould faile much in it firſt purpoſe and deſignment. Wee muſt heare, conſider, make account of our ancient Writers, not captiuate our ſelues vnto them but with reaſon. And if a man would follow them, what ſhould he doe ? for they agree not among themſelues. *Ariſtotle* who would ſeeme to bee the moſt ſufficient amongſt them, and hath aduentured to challenge & to cenſure all that went before him, hath vttered more groſſe abſurdities than them all, and is at no agreement with himſelfe, neither doth hee know many times where hee is ; witneſſe his Treatiſes of the Soule of man, of the Eremitic of the world, of the Generation of the windes and  
waters,

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water, and so forth. It is no cause of wonder or astonishment, that all men are not of one opinion; but it were rather strange and woonderfull, that all men were of one opinion: for there is nothing more blissing Nature and the spirit of man that varieth. That wife Divine *Paul* giveth vs this liberte, in that he Rom. 14. willetli every man to abound in his owne vnderstanding, not iudging or condemning that man that doth otherwise, or thinke otherwise. And he speaketh it in a matter of greater moment and more sickliss; not in that which consisteth in outward action and obseruation, wherein we say we are to conforme our selues to the common sort; and to that which is prescribed and accustomed to be done, but also in that which concerneth Religion, that is, the religious obseruance of vnto and dayes: whereas all that libertie and boldnesse of speech which I challenge vnto my selfe, is but in thoughts, iudgements, opinions, in which no man is quarter-master but he that hath them; every man about himselfe.

Notwithstanding all this, many things which may seeme too sharpe and briske; too rude and difficult for the simpler sort (for the stronger and wiser haue stomacks warme enough to concoct and digest all) I haue for the loue of them explicated, enlightened and sweetned in this third Edition, reviewed, and much augmented.

I would willingly aduertise the Reader that shall vndertake to iudge of this Worke, to take heed that he fall not into any of these seuen ouersights, as some others haue done; that is: To referre that vnto law and dutie, which is proper vnto action; that vnto action, which is onely to be censured; that to resolution and deter-

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determination, which is only proposed, consulted of, and problematically and Academically disputed; that to me and mine opinions, which I deliuer from report, and is the opinion of another man; that to the outward state, profession, and condition, which is proper to the spirit and inward sufficiencie; that to religion and faith, which is but the opinion of man; that to grace and supernaturall inspiration, which is proper to naturall and morall vertue and action. All passion and preoccupation being taken away, hee shall finde in these seuen points well vnderstood how to resolute himselfe in his doubts, how to answer all obiections, made by himselfe or by others, and informe himselfe touching my intencion in this Worke. And if neuerthelesse after all this, hee will neither rest satisfied and contented, nor approoue what I haue written, let him boldly and speedily disprooue it (for only to speake ill, to bite, to slander the name of another man, though it be easie enough, yet it is base and pedanticall) and

he shall as speedily receiue either a free confession and assent, (for this Booke doth glory and feast it selfe in the truth and ingenuitie thereof) or an examination of the impertinencies and follies thereof.

I would willingly subscribe the R. order that shall  
understand. **S. I. N. F.** The order that shall  
shall not any of these things, as I have  
last have done; that is: To respect the law and  
duty, which is respect and action; that the action  
which is to be done; that the action and  
duty.

The subiect and order of  
these three Books.

**T**He First Booke teacheth the knowledge  
of our selues and our humane condition,  
which is the foundation of Wisdome, by  
five great and principall considerations  
of man, and conteineth 62. Chapters.

*821*  
The Second conteineth the principall rules of  
Wisdome, the priuileges and proper qua-  
lities of a wise man, and hath 12. Chap-  
ters.

The Third, in a Discourse of the foure Morall  
vertues, Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude,  
Temperance, setteth downe the particu-  
lar instructions of Wisdome in 43. Chap-  
ters.



The subject and order of  
these three Books.

The First Book teaches the knowledge  
of our selves and our humane condition,  
which is the foundation of Wisdome, by  
the great and principall considerations  
of man, and contains 22. Chapters.

*John Evelyn his Book 1668*

The Second contains the principall rules of  
Wisdome, the principall and best dis-  
course of a wise man, and hath 12. Chap-  
ters.

The Third is a Discourse of the four Morall  
virtues, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude,  
Temperance, (which handles the particu-  
lar instructions of Wisdome in 43. Chap-  
ters.



OF  
WISDOME,  
THE  
FIRST BOOKE:

*Which is the knowledge of our selues  
and our humane condition.*

An Exhortation to the studie and  
*knowledge of our selues.*

THE PREFACE TO THE  
*First Booke.*



THE most excellent and diuine counsell,  
the best and most profitable aduertise-  
ment of all others, but the least practi-  
sed, is to study and learne how to know  
our selues: This is the foundation of  
Wisdom and the high way to whatso-  
euer is good; & there is no folly com-  
parable to this, To be painful and dili-  
gent to know all things els whatsoeuer rather than our selues:  
For the true science and studie of man, is man himselfe.

God, Nature, the wise, the world, preach man and exhort  
him both by word and deed to the studie and knowledge of  
himselfe. God eternally and without intermission behold-  
eth, considereth, knoweth himselfe. The world hath all the  
lights thereof contracted and vnited within it selfe, and the

*The knowledge  
of our selues,  
the first thing.*

2

*Enioyned to all  
by all reason.*

B

eies

eies open to see and behold it selfe. It is as necessarie for man to learne how to know himselfe, as it is naturall vnto him to thinke, or to beere vnto himselfe: Nature hath enioyned this worke vnto all. To meditate & to entertain our thoughts therèin is a thing aboue all things easie, ordinarie, naturall; it is the food, sustentation, life of the spirit, *Cuius viuere est cogitare: Whose life is cogitation.* Now where can a man begin or continue his meditations more truly, more naturally than with himselfe? Is there any thing that toucheth him more neerely? Doubtlesse, to studie other learnings, and to forget our selues, is a thing both vnnaturall and vnuilt. The true & principall vacation of euery man is to imploy his thoughts vpon himselfe, & to tie himselfe vnto himselfe: for so doth euery thing els, setting bounds and limits to their other businesse and desires. And thou man which wilt seeme to containe the whole vniuers, to know all things, to controll, to iudge, neither knowest nor endeourest the knowledge of thy selfe; and so going about to make thy selfe skilfull & a ludge of Nature, thou prouest the only foole of the world: thou art of al other the most beggerly, the most vaine & miserable; and yet most proud and arrogant. Looke therefore into thy selfe, know thy selfe, hold thy selfe to thy selfe, thy spirit and will which is elswhere employed, reduce it vnto thy selfe. Thou forgettest thy selfe, and lovest thy selfe about outward things; thou betrayest and disrobest thy selfe; thou lookest alwaies before thee; gather thy selfe vnto thy selfe, and shut vp thy selfe within thy selfe: examine, search, know thy selfe.

*Nosce teipsum: nec te quasi ueris extra;*

*Respice quod nomen.*

*Tecum habita & noris quam sis tibi curta supellex,*

*Tu te consule.*

*Teipsum concute, nunquid uitiorum*

*Infueris olim natura, aut etiam consuetudo mala.*

*Know well thy selfe, and seeke to know no more;*

*And what thou art not, shame the same therefore.*

*Looke truly to thy selfe, then shalt thou see*

*How short abode thou hast, aduised therefore bee.*

*Examine still thy conscience, which doth witness beare,*

*What vice or euill is (by nature) sowed there.*

By

By the knowledge of himselfe man arriueth sooner & better to the knowledge of God, than by any other meanes, both because he findeth in himselfe better helps, more marks and footsteps of the diuine nature, than in whatsoever besides he can any way know, and because he can better vnderstand and know that which is in himselfe than in another thing. For-  
*maſti me & poſuiſti ſuper me manum tuam, ideo mirabilis facta eſt ſcientia tua, id eſt, tui, ex me: Thou haſt formed me, and put thy hands vpon me, therefore thy ſcience is become maruellous in me, that is ſcientia tui, ex me: the ſcience of thee in me.* And therefore there was engrauen in letters of gold ouer the porch of the Temple of *Apollo* the god (according to the *Panims*) of Knowledge & Light, this ſentence, KNOW THY SELFE, as a ſalutation and aduertifment of God vnto all; ſignifying vnto them, that he that would haue acceſſe vnto that *Divinitie*, and entrance into that Temple, muſt firſt know himſelfe, and could not otherwiſe be admitted. *Si te ignoras, o pulcher- rima, egredere, & abi poſt hanc tuas. If thou know not who thou art, o thou the faireſt among women, get thee forth, and follow thy kids.*

The ladder to the knowledge of the diuine nature.

Pſalm.

Cantic.

To become truly wiſe, and to leade a life more regular and pleaſant, there needs no other inſtruction but from our ſelves: and doubtleſſe, if we were good ſcholars, there are no books could better inſtruct vs, than we teach our ſelves. He that ſhall call to mind; and conſider the exceſſe of his paſſed choler, euen how farre this feuer and frenſie hath caried him, ſhall better be perſwaded of the ſoule deformitie of this paſſion, than by all the reaſon that *Ariſtotle* or *Plato* can alledge againſt it: and ſo of all other paſſions and motions of the ſoule whatſoeuer. He that ſhall call to minde how often he hath miſcaried in his iudgement, and been deceiued by his memorie, ſhall learne thereby to truſt it no more. He that ſhall note how often he hath held an opinion, and in ſuch ſort vnderſtood a thing euen to the engaging of his owne credit, and the ſatisfying of himſelfe and any other therein, and that afterwards time hath made him ſee the truth euen the contrarie to that he formerly held, may learne to diſtruſt his owne iudgement, and to ſhake off that importunate arrogancie and querulous preſumption; a capitall enemy to diſcipline & truth.

4  
Diſpoſition vnto wiſdome.

He that shal wel note and consider all those evils that he hath run into, that haue threatned him; the light occasions that haue altered his courses and turned him from one estate to an other; how often repentances and mislikes haue come into his head; will prepare himselfe against future changes, learne to know his owne condition; will preferue his modettie, containe himselfe within his owne ranke, offend no man, trouble nothing, nor enterprise any thing that may passe his owne forces: And what were this but to see *justice* and *peace* in eue-ry thing? To be briefe, we haue no cleerer looking glasse, no better booke than our selues, if as we ought we doe studie our selues, alwayes keeping our eyes open ouer vs, and pry- ing more narrowly into our selues.

5  
*Against such as*  
*miskenne them-*  
*selues.*

But this is that which we thinke least of, *Nemo in se tentat descendere*: No man doth trie himselfe in abasing, or humbling himselfe: whereby it commeth to passe that we fall many times to the ground, & tumble headlong into the same fault, neither perceiuing it, nor knowing to what course to betake vs: we make our selues fooles at our owne charges. Difficul- ties in eue-ry thing are not discerned, but by those that know them: and some degree of vnderstanding is necessary euen in the marking of our owne ignorance. We must knocke at the doore to know whether the doore be shut: for when men see themselves resolu- ed & satisfied of a thing, and think they suf- ficiently vnderstand it, it is a token they vnderstand nothing at all: for if we know our selues well, we would prouide farre better for our selues and our affaires; nay, we should be asha- med of our selues and our estate, and frame our selues to be others than we are. He that knowes not his owne infirmities, takes no care to amend them; he that is ignorant of his owne wants, takes as little care to prouide for them; he that feesles not his owne evils and miseries, aduise- th not with himselfe of helps, nor seeks for remedie. *Deprehendas te oportet priusquam emendes*: sanitatis initium sentire sibi opus esse remedio. Thou must of necessity know thy selfe, before thou amend thy selfe: it is the very first beginning of health, to acknowledge the sicknesse, and that thou hast need of remedie. And heere beholde our unhappi- nesse: for we thinke all things goes well with vs, and we are in safetie, and we liue in content with our selues, and so double  
our

our miseries. *Socrates* was accounted the wisest man of the world, not because his knowledge was more compleat, or his sufficiency greater than others, but because his knowledge of himselfe was better than others; in that he held himselfe within his owne ranke, and knew better how to play the man. He was the king of men, as it is said, that he that hath but one eye is a king in respect of him that hath neuer an eye; that is to say, doubly deprivied of his sense: for they are by nature weake and miserable, and therewithall proud, and feeble not their miserie. *Socrates* was but purblind; for being a man as others were, weake and miserable, he knew it, and ingenuously acknowledged his condition, and liued, and gouerned himselfe according vnto it. This is that which the Truth it selfe spake vnto those which were full of presumption, and by way of mockery said vnto him, Are we blind also? If yewere blind, saith he, that is, if you thought your selues blind, you should Ioh 9. see, but because ye thinke ye see, therefore you are blind; therefore your sinne remaineth. For they that in their owne opinion see much, are in truth starke blinde; and they that are blinde in their owne opinion see best. It is a miserable thing in a man, to make himselfe a beast by forgetting himselfe to be a man. *Homo enim cum sis, id fac semper intelligas. Seeing thou art a man, doe alwayes that which becomes a man.* Many great personages as a rule or bridle to themselves haue ordained that one or other should euer buz into their eares that they were men. O what an excellent thing was this, if it entred aswell into their hearts, as it sounded in their eares? That the Mot of the *Atheniens* to *Pompey* the Great, Thou art so much a God, as thou acknowledgedst thy selfe to be a man, was no ill saying: for at the least to be an excellent man, is to confesse himselfe to be a man.

The knowledge of our selues (a thing as difficult and rare as to misdeeme and deceiue our selues ealie) is not obtained by any other, that is to say, by the comparison, rule, or example of another; 6  
False means  
to know our  
selues.

*Plus alijs de te quam tu tibi credere noli. Doe not belcne others more of thy selfe, then thou thy selfe knowest of thy selfe.* much lesse also by our speech and iudgement, which oftentimes commeth short to discerne, and we disloyall and feare-

full to speake : nor by any singular act, which sometimes vnwares hath escaped a man, pricked forward by some new, rare, and accidentall occasion, and is rather a trick of *Fortune*, or an eruption of some extraordinary lunacy, than any production of fruit traly ours. A man iudgeth not of the greatnesse or depth of a riuer, by that water which by reason of some sudden inundation of neighbour-riuers ouerfloweth the banks: One valiant act makes not a valiant man, nor one iust a iust man. The circumstances and source of occasions doth import much and alter vs, and oftentimes a man is prouoked to doe good by vice it selfe : So hard a thing is it for man to know man. Nor likewise by all those outward things that are outwardly adiacent vnto vs, as offices, dignities, riches, nobility, grace, and applause of the greatest peeres and common people. Nor by the cariages of a man in publicke places is a man knowen ; for as a king at chesse so he standeth vpon his guard, he bridleth and contracteth himselfe ; feare, and shame, and ambition, and other passions make him play that part that you see : But truely to know him we must looke into his inward part, his priuy chamber, and there not how to day, but euery day he carieth himselfe. He is many times a different man in his house from that he is in the countrey, in the palace, in the market place ; another man amongst his domesticall friends from that he is amongst strangers : when he goeth forth of his house into some publicke place, he goeth to play a Comedy, and therefore stay not thou there, for it is not himselfe that plaieith, but another man, and thou knowest him not.

7  
*Tene mouri.*

The knowledge of a mans selfe is not acquired by all these foure meanes, neither must we trust them, but by a true, long, and daily study of himselfe, a serious and attentiu examination not only of his words, and actions, but of his most secret thoughts (their birth, progresse, continuance, repetition) and whatsoeuer is in him, euen his nightly dreames, prying narrowly into him, trying him often and at all howres, pressing and pinching him euen to the quicke. For there are many vices hid in vs and are not felt for want of force and meanes ; so that the venemous serpent that is benumbed with cold, suffereth himselfe to be handled without danger : neither doth



doth it suffice afterwards to acknowledge the fault by tale or peccemeale, and so thinke to mend it by marring it, but he must in generall reacknowledge his weakenesse, his misery, and come to a vniuersall amendment and reformation.

Now if we will know man, we must take more than ordinary paines in this first booke, taking him in all senses, beholding him with all visages, feeling his poulse, sounding him to the quicke, entring into him with a candle and a snuffer, searching and creeping into euery hole, corner, turning, closet, and secret place, and not without cause. For this is the most subtile and hypocriticall couert and counterfeit of all the rest, and almost not to be knowen. Letvs then consider him after five manners set downe in this table, which is the summe of the booke:

The Proposition  
on the division  
of this Booke

There are five consi- derations of man & humane condi- tion:	The first, Naturall, of all the parts whereof he is composed, and their appurtenances.	
	The second, Naturall & Morall, by comparison of man with beasts.	
	The third, of his life in declining state.	
	The fourth, Morall, of his manners, humours, condicions, which are referred to five things:	1 Vanitie.
		2 Weaknesse.
	The fifth, Naturall and Morall, of the differences that are betweene men in their	3 Inconstancie.
		4 Misericie.
		5 Presumption.
		1 Natures.
		2 Spirits and sufficiencies.
		3 Charges and degrees of superi- ritie, inferioritie.
		4 Professions and condicions of life, aduantages and Naturall disaduantages
		Acquied. Casuall.

## The first consideration of Man,

Which is naturall, by all the parts and  
members whereof he is  
composed.

## CHAPTER I.

Of the frame or formation of Man.



It is twofold and to be considered after a twofold maner, the first and originall, once immediatly by God in his supernatural creation; the second and ordinary in his naturall generation. According to that description which *Moyſes* ſetteth downe touching the workmanſhip & creation of the world

(the boldeſt and richeſt piece of worke that euer man brought vnto light; I meane the hſtorie of the nine firſt chapters of *Genefis*, which is of the world newly borne and reborne) man was made of God, not onely after all other creatures, as the moſt perfect, but the maſter & ſuperintendent of all, *Ut preſſit piſcibus maris, volatibus cœli, beſtis terre.* That he might rule ouer the fiſh of the ſea, the fowles of the aire, and the beaſts of the earth. And in the ſelfe ſame day wherein the foure-footed beaſts of the earth that come neereſt vnto him were created (although thoſe two that reſemble him moſt are for the inward parts the Swine, for the outward the Ape) but alſo after all was done and ended, as the cloſing vp, ſeale, and ſigne of his works, he hath alſo there imprinted his armes, and his pourtraiſe it, *Ex: implumque Dei quiſquis eſt in imagine parua. Signatum eſt ſuper nos lumen vultus tui.* We are all ex:amples or ſimilitudes of almighty God. The light of his countenance is ſealed vpon vs, as a ſummary recapitulation of all things, and an epitome of the world, which is all in man, but gathered into a ſmall volume, whereby he is called, The little world, as the whole vniuers may be called, The great man: as the tie and l gament of Angels and beaſts, things heauenly and earthly,  
ſpiritual

I  
Man made  
laſt  
Gen. 1.2.  
&c.

spirituall and corporall: and in one word, as the last hand, the accomplishment, the perfection of the worke, the honor and miracle of Nature. The reason is, because God hauing made him with deliberation, counsell and preparation, & dixit, *Faciamus hominem ad imaginem & similitudinem nostram*, and he said, *Let vs make man in our image, according to our likenesse*, he rested. And this rest also was made for man: *Sabbatum propter hominem, non contra*. The Sabbath is for man, not man for it. And afterward he had nothing to make new, but make himselfe man; and that he did likewise for the loue of man: *Propter nos homines & propter nostram salutem*. For vs men and for our saluation Whereby wee see, that in all things GOD hath aimed at man, finally in him and by him, *breuius manu*, In a short summe or summarily, to accommodate all vnto himselfe, the beginning and end of all.

Secondly, he was created all naked, because more beautiful than the rest, being pure, neat, and delicate, by reason of his thin humours well tempered and seasoned.

Thirdly, vpright, but little touching the earth, his head directly tending vnto heauen, whereon he gazeth, and sees and knowes himselfe as in a glasse, quite opposite vnto the plant, which hath it head and root within the earth, so that man is a diuine plant, that flourisheth & growes vp vnto heauen: a beast as in the middle betwixt a man and a plant, goes as it were athwart, hauing his two extreames towards the bounds or extremities of the horizon more or lesse. The cause of this vprightnesse in man, besides the will of his Master-workman; is not properly the reasonable soule, as we see in those that are crooked backed, crupshouldered, lame; nor in the straight line of the back-bone, which is likewise in serpents, nor in the naturall or vitall heat, which is equalled or rather greater in diuers beasts, although all these may perhaps serue to some purpose; but this vpright gate is due and belonging to man, both as he is man the holiest and diuine creature,

<sup>2</sup>  
Naked.

<sup>3</sup>  
Vpright.

*Sanctius his animal mens, q̄ capacius alia:*

A more sacred creature, and of a farre higher capacitie. and as king in this lower region. To small and particular royalties there belong certainemarks of Maiestie, as we see in the crowned Dolphin, the Crocadile, the Lion with his collar,

ler,

ler, the colour of his haire, and his eies; in the Eagle, the king of the Bees: so man the vniuersall king of these lower parts walketh with an vpriight countenance as a master in his house ruling, and by loue or force taming every thing.

His body was first framed of virgin earth, and red, from whence he tooke his proper name *Adam*, for the appellatiue was *Isa*: and that being not yet moistned with raine, but with the water of the fountaine

— *Mixtam fluminalibus undis*

*Finxit in effigiem.*

*Hee was made of earth and water.*

By reason the body is the first born or elder than the soule, as the matter than the forme; the house must bee made and trimmed before it be inhabited, the shoppe before the workman can vse it. Afterwards the Soule was by diuine inspiration infused, and so the body by the soule made a living creature, *Inspirans in faciem eius spiraculum vite &c.* He breathed in his face, breath of life.

In that ordinary and naturall generation and formation, which is made of the seed in the wombe of the woman, the selfe same order is obserued: The body is first formed as well by the elementary force of the *Energie* and forming vertue which is in the seed, aiding in some sort the heat of the matrix, as the celestiall, which is the influence and vertue of the

Sunne, *Sol & homo generant hominem.* The sunne and man doe engender man. In such order that the seuen first daies the seed of the father and mother do mingle, vnite, and curdle together like creame, and are made one body, which is the conception, *Nonne sicut lac mulsisit me, & sicut caseum me coagulasti?* Hast thou not milked mee like milke, and hast thou not coagulated, and curdled mee as cheefe? The next seuen daies this seed is concocted, thickned, and changed into a masse of flesh and indigested formelesse blood, which is the proper matter of a humane bodie. The third seuen daies following, of this masse or lump is made and fashioned the bodie in grosse; so that about the twentieth day are brought forth the three noble and heroicall parts, the *Liner*, *Heart*, *Braine*, distant an ouall length, or as the *Hebrewes* say, holding themselves by thin

*commissures* or ioynts, which afterwards fill themselves with flesh

4  
How framed,  
Gen. 2.

5  
He is made in  
the matrix.

Conceiued of co-  
agulated seed.

Changed.

Formed in  
27<sup>th</sup> day.

flesh after the fashion of an ant, where there are three grosser parts ioyned by two thin. The fourth seuen daies which end neere thirtie, the whole body is ended, perfected, ioyned, organized; and so it beginnes to be no more an *Embrion*, that is, vnperfect in shape, but capable, as a matter prepared to it forme, to receiue the soule; which faileth not to insinuate and inuest it selfe into the bodie towards the seuen and thirtieth or fortieth day after the five weekes ended. Doubling this terme, that is to say, at the third moneth, this infant indowed with a soule, hath motion and sense, the haire and nailes begin to come. Tripling this terme, which is at the ninth moneth, he commeth forth, and is brought into the light. These termes or times are not so iustly prefixed, but that they may either be hastened or prolonged, according to the force or feebleneste of the heat both of the seed and of the matrix; for being strong it hasteneth, being weake it sloweth: wherby that seed that hath lesse heat and more moisture, whereof women for the most part are conceived, requireth longer time, and is not endowed with a soule vntill the fortieth day or after, and mooueth not till the fourth moneth, which is neere by a quarter more late than that of the male children.

*Ioyned, organized.*  
*First seven daies which end neere thirtie*  
*with fit instruments for sense.*  
*Indowed with soule, motion.*  
*Brought forth.*

## CHAP. II.

### The first and generall distinction of man.

**M**AN as a prodigious creature is made of parts quite contrarie and enemies to themselves. The soule is a little God, the bodie as a beast, as a dunghill. Neuertheless, these two parts are in such sort coupled together, haue such need the one of the other to performe their functions, *Alterius sic altera poscit opem res, & coniuuat amice.* So one thing doth aske the fellowship and help of another: and doth as it were friendly coniuireit; and doe so with all their complaints embrace each other, that they neither can continue together without warres, nor separate themselves without grieffe and torment; and as holding the Woolfe by the eares, each may say to other, *I can neither liue with thee nor without thee, Nec tecum nec sine te.*

*The division of man in two parts.*

But againe, for asmuch as there are in this soule two parts  
very

*Into three  
parts.*

very different, the high, pure, intellectuall, and diuine, where in the beast hath no part, and the base, 'sensitive, and brutish, which hath bodie and matter, and is as an indifferent meane betwixt the intellectuall part and bodie; a man may by a distinction more morall and politike, note three parts and degrees in man: The *Spirit*, the *Soule*, the *Flesh*: where the *Spirit* and *Flesh* hold the place of the two extreames, as heauen and earth; the *Soule* the middle region, where are ingendred the Metheors, tumults and tempests. The *Spirit* the highest and most heroicall part, a diminutive, a sparke, and image, and deaw of the Diuinitie, is in man as a King in his Common-weale, it breatheth nothing but good, and heauen to which it tendeth; the *Flesh* contrariwise as the dregs of a people besotted and common linke of man tendeth alwaies to the matter and to the earth; the *Soule* in the middle, as the principall of the people betwixt the best and the worst, good and euill, is continually sollicit by the spirit and the flesh, and according vnto that part towards which it applieth it selfe, it is either spirituall and good, or carnall and euill. Heere are lodged all those naturall affections, which are neither vertuous nor vicious, as the loue of our parents and friends, feare of shame, compassion towards the afflicted, desire of good reputation.

*3  
The visible  
thereof.*

This distinction will helpe much to the knowledge of man, and to discerne his actions, that he mistake not himselfe as it is the maner to doe, judging by the barke and outward appearance, thinking that to be of the Spirit which is of the Soule, nay of the flesh; attributing vnto vertue that which is due vnto nature, nay vnto vice. How many good and excellent actions haue beene produced by passion, or at least by a naturall inclination, *Ut seruiant genio, & suo indulgent animo*? That they may serue their humour, and satisfie their pleasure.

#### CHAP. III.

*Of the bodie, and first of all the parts thereof  
and their places.*

*1  
The division  
of the body.*

THE body of man consisteth of a number of parts inward and outward, which are all for the most part round and orbicular,

orbicular, or comming neere vnto that figure.

The inward are of two sorts: the one in number and quantitie spread thorow the whole body, as the *bones*, which are as the bases and vpholding pillars of the whole building, and within them for their nourishment the *marrow*; the *muscles* for motion and strength; the *veines* issuing from the *liver* as chanelles of the first and naturall blood; the *arteries* comming from the heart as conduits of the second blood more subtile and vitall. These two mounting higher than the *liver* and the *heart* their originall sources, are more strait than those that go downwards, to the end they should helpe to mount the blood; for that narrowness more straitned, serues to raise the *humours*; the *sinewes* proceeding by couples, as instruments of sense, motion, and strength of body, and conduits of the animall spirits, whereof some are soft, of which there are seuen paires which serue the senses of the head, *Sight*, *Hearing*, *tast*, *speech*; the other are hard, whereof there are thirtie couples, proceeding from the reins of the back to the muscles; The *Tendrels*, *Ligaments*, *Grissels*; The foure *Humours*, *Blood*, *Choler* which worketh, prouoketh, penetrateth, hindred obstructions, casteth forth the excrements, bringeth cheerefulness; *Melancholy* which prouoketh an appetite to every thing, moderateth sudden motions; *Fleame* which sweetneth the force of the two *Cholers*, and all other heats; The *Spirits* which are as it were the fumigations that arise from the naturall heat and radical humor, and they are in three degrees of excellencie, the *Naturall*, *Vitall*, *Animall*; The *Fat* which is the thickest and grossest part of blood.

The other are singular (saue the kidneys and stones, which are double) and assigned to a certaine place. Now there are foure places or regions, as degrees of the bodie, shops of nature, where she exerciseth her faculties and powers. The first and lowest is for generation, in which are the priuy parts seruing thereunto. The second neere vnto that, in which are the intralles, *viscera*, that is to say, the *stomacke* yeelding more to the left side, round, straiter in the bottome than at top, hauing two orifices or mouthes, the one aboue to receiue, the other beneath, which answereth the bowels, to cast forth and discharge it selfe. It receiueh, gathereth together, minglerh, concocteth

2  
Inward and  
many.

3  
Singular.  
Four regions of  
the bodie.

1

2

concocteth the victuals and turnes them into *Chyle*, that is to say, a kinde of white *Sac* fit for the nourishment of the bodie, which is likewise wrought within the *Meserique* veines by which it passeth vnto the *Liu*er. The *Liu*er hot and moist inclining towards the right side, the store-houise of blood, the chiefe or rather fountaine of the veines, the seat of the naturall nourishing faculty, or vegetatiue soule, made and ingendred of the blood of that *Chyle*, which it draweth from the *Meserique* veines, and receiueth into it lap by the *vena porta*, which entreth into the concavities thereof, and afterwards is sent and distributed thorow the whole body by the helpe of the great *vena cava*, which ariseth from the bunch and branches thereof, which are in great number as the riuers of a fountaine. The *Spleene* towards the left side which receiueth the discharge and excrements of the *Liu*er : The *Reines*, the *Entralles* which though they are all in one, yet are distinguished by six differences and names, equalling seuen times the length of a man, as the length of a man is equalled by seuen foot. In these two first parts or degrees which some take to be but one (although there are two faculties very different, the one generatiue for the continuance of the kinde, the other nutritiue for every particular person, and they make it to answer to the lowest and elementary part of the world, the place of generation and corruption) is the concupiscible soule.

3

The third degree compared to the *Aetherian* region, separated from the former by the *Diaphragma* or *Midrise*, and from that above by the narrowness of the throat ; in which is the irascible soule, and the pectorall parts *Præcordia*, that is to say, the *Heart*, very hot, placed about the fift rib, hauing his point vnder the left pap or dug, the originall fountaine of the *Arteries*, which are alwayes mooued, and cause the *Pulse* to beat, by which as by channels it sendeth and distribureth thorow the whole bodie the vitall blood, which it hath concocted, and by it the spirit and vertue vitall. The *Lungs*, of substance very soft and spongeous, supple to draw to and inforce forth like a paire of bellows, instruments both of respiration whereby the heart is refreshed, drawing vnto it the blood, the spirits, the aire, and disburthening it selfe of those



those fumes and excrements which oppresse it, and of the voice by meane of the rough *Arterio*.

The fourth and highest, which answereth to the celestially region, is the head which containeth the *Braine*, colde and spongeous, wrapped within two skinned, the one more hard and thicke which toucheth the brainpan, *Dura mater*; the other more ealie and thin which includeth the Braine, *Pia mater*: from it do issue and are deriued the *Sinowes* and marow that descendeth and falleth downe into the reines of the backe. This *Braine* is the seat of the reasonable soule, the source of sense and motion, and of the most noble animall spirits, composed of the vitall, which being raised from the heart by the *Arteries* vnto the braine are concocted and reconcocted, elaborated and made subtile by the helpe of the multiplicity of small *Arteries*; as fillets diuersly wouen and interlaced by many turnings and windings, like a labyrinth or double net, *Rete mirabile*; within which this vitall spirit being retained and sojourning, often times passing and repassing, is refined and perfected, and becomes a creature, spirittuall in an excellent degree.

The outward and visible parts, if they be single, are in the middle as the *Nose* which serueth for respiration, smell, and the comfort of the braine, and the disburthening thereof, in such sort that by it the aire entereth and issueth both downe into the lungs and vp into the braines. The *Mouth* which serueth to eat and to speake, and therefore hath many parts seruiceable thereunto; without, the lips; within, the tongue soft and very subtile which iudgeth of saours; the *Teeth* which bruise and grinde the victuals; the *Nauity*, the two sincks or wayes to ease and disburden the body.

If they be double and alike, they are collaterals and equal, as the two *eyes*, planted in the highest stage as centinels, composed of many and diuers parts; three *humors*, seuen *tunicles*, seuen *muscles*; diuers colours, of many fashions and much art. These are the first and most noble outward parts of the bodie, in beautie, vtilitie, mobilitie, actiuitie, yea in the action of loue *de l'oeil de l'ame*, they are to the visage that which the visage is to the body, they are the face of the face: and because they are tender, delicate and precious, they are fenced

4

3

Outward parts  
singular.

4

Double and e-  
qual.

ced and rampaired on all parts with *skinner, lids, browes, haire*. The *eares* in the selfe same height that the eyes are, as the scouts of the body, Porters of the spirit, the Receiuers and Iudgers of sounds which alwayes ascend; they haue their entrance oblique and crooked, to the end the aire and the sound should not enter at once, whereby the sense of hearing might be hindred and iudge the woorse. The *armes and hands*, the worke-masters of all things and vniuersall instruments. The *legs and feet*, the props and pillars of the whole building.

## CHAP. IIII.

*Of the singular properties of the body of man.*

1  
Peculiar pro-  
perties in the  
body of man.

THE body of man hath many singularities, and some peculiar and proper vnto themselves, not common with other creatures. The first and principall are speech, vpright stature, the forme or feature, the port or cariage, whereof the wise, yea the Stoicks themselves made such account, that they were wont to say, That it was better to be a foole in a humane shape, than wise in the forme of a beast. The hand is a miracle (that of the Ape is not to be termed a hand.) His naturall nakednesse, laughter, crying. The *Sense* of tickling, haire on the lower lid of the eye, a vilible navell, the point of the heart on the left side. The toes of the feet not so long as the fingers of the hand. Bleeding at nose, a strange thing considering that he carieth his head vpright, and a beast downwards. To blush for shame, wax pale for feare. To be an ambitexter; disposed at all times to the sports of *Venus*. Not to moue the eares, which bewrayeth in beasts the inward affections, but man doth sufficiently make them knownen, by his blushing, palenesse, motion of the eyes and nose.

2  
Peculiar pro-  
perties by way  
of excellency.

The other properties are likewise peculiar vnto man, but not wholly but by way of excellency; for they are also in beasts, but in a lesse degree, that is to say, multitude of muscles and haire in the head. The pliant facility of the body and the parts thereof to all motion and euery sense. The eleuation of the breasts. The great abundance of the braine, The greatnesse of the bladder. The forme of the foot long forward, short backward. The quantity and pure subtilty of

of the blood. The inobility and agility of the tongue. The multitud e and variety of dreames, insomuch that he seemeth the only dreamer. Sneezing. And to be short the many motions of the eyes, the nose, the lips.

There are also habits proper and peculiar, but different; some are gestures, motions, and artificiall and affected countenances; others are so proper and naturall, that they that haue them neither feele them nor know them in themselves, as to go slooping: but all haue that which proceedeth not so much from reason, as a pure, naturall and ready impulsion, that is, to put forth a mans hands before him when he falleth.

*Disorderly habits.*

CHAP. V.

*Of the goods of the bodie: Health: Beantie, &c.*

THE goods of the body are Health, Beauty, Cheerefulness, Strength, Vigor, a prompt readinesse and disposition: but of all these Health is the first, and passeth all the rest. Health is the most beautiful and rich present that Nature can bestow vpon vs, and aboue all other things to be preferred, not only Science, Nobility, Riches, but Wisedome it selfe, which the austereſt amongst the wise doe affirme. It is the only thing that deserueth our whole imployment, yea our life it selfe to attaine vnto it; for without it life is no life, but a death, vertue and wisedome grow weake and faint. What comfort can all the wisedome of the world bring to the greatest man that is, if he be thorowly stricken with an *Apoplexie*? Doubtlesse there is nothing to be preferred before this bodily health, but *Honestie* which is the health of the *Soule*. Now it is common vnto vs with beasts, yea many times it is greater and far more excellent in them than in vs: and notwithstanding it be a gift of nature, *gandeant bene nati*, Let him reioice in it, that haue the hap to be well borne, given in the first formation, yet that which afterward followeth, The milke, Good government, which consisteth in sobriety and moderate exercises, lightnesse of heart, and a continuall auoidance of all passions, do preserue it much. Griefe and sickenesse are the contraries vnto it, which are the greatest if not the only cuils that follow man, whereof we shall speake hereafter. But in the

*The praise of Health.*

C

preseruatiō

preservation hereof, beasts likewise simply following nature, which hath giuen them health, do farre exceed men, they often times forgetting themselves, though afterwards they pay dearly for it.

2  
*Beautie.*

Next followeth Beautie, a good of great account in society of men. It is the first meane of reconciling or vniting one to another, and it is very likely that the first distinction that hath beene of one man from another, and the first consideration that giueth preheminance to one aboue another, hath beene the aduantage of beauty. It is likewise a powerfull quality, there is none that surmounteth it in credit, or that hath so great a part in the society of men; for there is none so barbarous, none so resolute, that hath not been beaten by it. It presenteth it selfe vnto the view, it seduceth and preoccupateth the iudgement, it makes deepe impressions, and presseth a man with great authority; and therefore *Socrates* called it a short tyranny, and *Plato* the priuiledge of Nature: for it seemeth that he that carieth in his countenance the fauours of Nature imprinted in a rare and excellent beauty, hath a kinde of lawfull power ouer vs, and that we turning our eies towards him, he likewise turneth our affections, and enthralleth them in despight of our selues. *Aristotle* sayth that it appertaineth to those that are beautifull to command; that they are venerable next to the Gods themselves; that there are none, but such as are blinde, but are touched with it. *Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar*, three great Commanders, haue made great vse thereof in their greatest affaires, yea *Scipio* the best of them all. *Faire* and good are neere neighbours, and are exprest by the selfe same words both in *Greece* and in the Scriptures. Many great Philosophers haue attained to their wisdom, by the assistance of their beauty. It is likewise considerable and much required in beasts themselves.

3  
*The distinction  
of Beauty.*

There are in Beauty diuers things to be considered: That of men is properly the forme and feature of the body, as for other beauties they belong vnto women. There are two sorts of beauties, the one settled, which moueth not at all, and it consisteth in the due proportion and colour of the members, a body that is not swolne or puffed vp, wherein the sinewes and veines appeare not from far, nor the bones presse  
not

not the skin, but full of blood and spirit, and in good state, hauing the muscles eleuated, the skin smooth, the colour vermillion: the other moueable, which is called a good grace, and is the true guiding or cariage of the motion of the members, and aboue all, the eyes. The former beauty of it selfe is as it were dead, this actiue and full of life. There are beauties that are rude, fierce, sowre, others that are sweet, yea though they be fading.

Beauty is properly to be considered in the visage. There is nothing more beautifull in man than his soule; and in the body of man than his visage, which is as it were the soule abreuuiated, that is, the paterne or image of the soule; that is, her Escuchion with many quarters, representing the collection of all her titles of honour, planted and placed in the gate and forefront, to the end that men may know that heere is her abode and her palace. By the countenance it is that we know the person of a man; and therefore arte which imitateth nature, takes no care to represent the person of man, but only to paint or carue the visage. 4  
Of the visage.

There are many speciall singularities in the visage of man, which are not in beaſts, (for to say the truth they haue no visage) nor in the rest of the body of man; As the number and diuerſitie of the parts and formes of them, in beaſts there is neither chin, nor cheekes, nor forehead, much leſſe any forme or faſhion of them. Variety of colours, as in the eye onely there is blacke, white, greene, blew, red, cryſtalline. Proportion, for the ſenſes are there double, anſwering the one to the other, and in ſuch a maner, that the greatneſſe of the eye is the greatneſſe of the mouth, the largeneſſe of the forehead the length of the noſe, the length of the noſe that of the chin and lips. An admirable diuerſitie of countenances, and ſuch, that there are hardly found two faces in all reſpects like one another: this is a chiefe point of workemanſhip, which in no other thing can be found. This variety is very profitable, yea neceſſarie for humane ſociety; firſt to know one another, for infinite euils, yea the diſſipation of humane kinde muſt needs follow, if a man ſhould miſtake himſelfe by the ſemblance and ſimilitude of diuers viſages, yea it would be a conſuſion worſe than that of *Babel*. A man would take his 5  
Seven ſingularities in the viſage of man.

daughter for his sister, for a stranger, his enemy for his friend: If our faces were all a like, we should not discern a man from a beast; and if they were not all vnlike one another, we could not know how to discern a man from a man. Besides, it was an excellent arte of Nature to place in this part some secret that might giue contentment to one another thorow the whole world: for by reason of this varietie of faces, there is not a person that in some part is not beautifull. The dignity and honour of it round figure, forme vpriight and eleuated on high, naked and vncovered without haire, feathers, scales, as in other creatures, looking vp vnto heauen. Grace, sweetness, a pleasant and decent comlinesse, even to the giuing vp of a mans *Soule*, and the rauishing of his will, as hath bene shewed before. To be briefe, the visage is the throne of beautie and loue; the seat of laughter and kissing, two things very proper and agreeable vnto man, the true and most significant symboles of amitie and good discretion. Finally, it is apt for all alterations, to declare the inward motions and passions of the soule, as Ioy, Heauinesse, Loue, Hatred, Enuie, Malice, Shame, choler, Iealousie, & so forth. It is as the hand of a diall which noteth the houres and moments of time, the wheelles and motions themselves being hid within. And as the aire which receiueh all the colours & changes of the time, sheweth what the weather is, so saith one, the aire of a mans countenance. *Corpus animum tegit & detegit, in facie legitur homo. The Body couereth, and discouereth the soule, and man is knowne euen by his face.*

*A description of the beautie of the face.*

The beauty of the face consisteth in a large, square, well extended and cleere front, eye-browes well ranged, thin and subtile, the eye well diuided, cheerefull, sparkling: as for the colour I leaue it doubtfull, the nose leane, the mouth little, the lips coralline, the chinne short and dimpled, the cheekes somewhat rising and in the middle the pleasant *gelasim*, the eares round and well compact, the whole countenance with a liuely tincture white and vermillion. Neuerthelesse, this description of Beauty is not generally receiued, the opinions of Beauty are different according to the diuersity of nations. With the Indians the greatest Beautie consisteth in that which we account the greatest deformitie, that is, in a tawny colour,

colour, thicke and swollen lips, a flat and large nose, teeth spotted with blacke or red, great eares and hanging, a little low forehead, dugs great and pendent, to the end they may giue their little ones sucke over their shoulders, and to attaine to this forme of beauty, they vse all manner of arte. But not to wander so farre, in *Spaine* the chiefe beauty is leane and neatly compr; in *Italie* fat, corpulent and solid: the soft, and delicate, and flattering, please the one, the strong, vigorous, fierce, and commanding the other.

The Beautie of the bodie, especially the visage, should in all reason demonstrate and witness the beauty of the soule, 7  
The beauty of  
the soule and  
bodie. (which is a quality and rule of opinions and iudgements, with a certaine stedfastnesse and constancie) for there is nothing that hath a truer resemblance, than the conformity and relation of the body to the spirit: and when this is not, wee must needs thinke, that there is some accident that hath interrupted the ordinary course, as it comes to passe, and wee often times see it: for the milke of the Nurse, the first institution, conuersation bring great alterations to the originall nature of the soule, whether in good or euill. *Socrates* confessed that the deformitie of his body did iustly accuse the naturall deformitie of his soule, but that by industrie and institution he had corrected that of the soule. This outward countenance is awake and dangerous suretie, but they that belie their owne physiognomie, are rather to be punished than others, because they falsifie and betray that good promise that Nature hath planted in their front, and deceiue the world.

## CHAP. VI.

## Of the vestments of the Bodie.

There is great likelihood that the custome or fashion of going naked, as yet continued in a great part of the world, was the first and originall amongst men, and that of couering and adorning the bodie with garments was artificiall, and inuented to helpe and enlarge nature, as they which by artificiall light goe about to increase the light of the day: for nature hauing sufficiently provided for all other creatures a couering, it is not to be beleued that she hath hand-



led man worse than the rest, and left him 'only indigent, and in such a state that he could not helpe himselfe without forren succours, and therefore those reproches that are made against Nature as a stepmother, are vniust. If men from the beginning had bene clothed, it is not likely that they would euer haue disrobed themselves and gone naked, both in regard of their health, which could not but be much offended with that change, and shame it selfe: and neuertheless, it is done and obserued amongst many nations. Neither can it be alledged that we clothe our selues either to couer our nakednesse or priuy parts, or to defend vs against colde (for these are the two reasons pretended; for against heat there is no appearance of reason) because Nature hath not taught vs, that there is any thing in our nakednesse that we should be ashamed of; it is we that by our owne fault and fall haue tolde it our selues: *Quis indicauit tibi quod nudus esses, nisi quod ex ligno quod praeceperam tibi ne comederes comedisti: Who told thee that thou wast naked, vntilste thou hast eaten of the tree, whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eate:* and Nature hath already sufficiently hid them, put them farre from our eies, and couered them. And therefore it is lesse needfull to couer those parts only, as some doe in those countries wherethey goe all naked, and ordinarily are not couered: for why should he that is the lord of all other creatures, not daring to shew himselfe naked vnto the world, hide himselfe vnder the spoiles of another, nay adorne himselfe? As for colde and other particular and locall necessities, wee know that vnder the selfe same aire, the selfe same heauen, one goes naked, another apparelled; and we haue all the most delicate part vncouered: and therefore a wandring person being asked, How he could go so naked in Winter, answered, That our faces are alwaies naked, and he was all face: Yea many great personages haue euer gone with their heads vncouered, *Massinissa; Caesar, Hannibal, Sennarus*, and many nations there are, which go to the warres and fight all naked: and the counsell that *Plato* giueth for the continuance of health is, neuer to couer either head or feet. And *Varro* saith, that when it was first ordained that men should vncouer their heads in the presence of the gods and of the magistrate, that it was rather  
for



for healths sake, and to harden themselves against the iniuries of the times, than for reuerence. Lastly, the inuention of couers and houses against the iniuries of heaven and men, is more ancient, more naturall, more vniuersall, than of garments, and common with many creatures, but an indoltrious search for victuall more naturall than either. Of the vse of garments and aliments heereafter. Lib. 3. c. 43.

## CHAP. VII.

## Of the Soule in generall.

**B**Ehold heere a matter of all others most difficult, handled The Preface.  
and discoursed by the wisest of all Nations, especially *Egyptians, Greeks, Arabians* and *Latines*, by our latter Writers more shallowly as all other Phylosophy, but with great diuersitie of opinions, according to the diuersitie of Nations, Religions, Professions, without any certaine accord or resolution. The generall knowledge and discourse thereof may be referred to these ten points: The definition, Essence or Nature, Faculties, and Actions, Vnitie or Pluralitie, Source, Entrance into the bodie, Residence therein, Seat, Sufficiency to exercise her functions, the End and Separation from the body.

It is first very hard to define, or truly to say what the soule is, as generally all other formes because they are things relative which subsist not of themselves, but are parts of a whole, The Definition  
is difficult. and this is the reason why there is such and so great diuersity of definitions of them, whereof there is not any receiued without contradiction. *Aristotle* hath confuted twelue that were before him, and could hardly make good his owne.

It is easie to say what it is not: That it is not *Fire, Aire, Water*; Nor the temperature of the *Four*e Elements, or qualities, or humors, which is alwaies changeable, without which a creature is and liues; and besides that, this is an accident, the *Soule* a substance. Again, *Metals* and things inanimate have likewise a temperature of the *four*e Elements and first qualities. Neither is it blood, (for there are many things animate and liuing without blood, and many creatures die without the shedding of a drop of blood.) Nor the beginning and cause of motion (for diuers things inanimate mooue, as the Easie to say  
what it is not.

adamant moueth the iron, amber or iet straw; medicines and roots of trees being cut and dried draw and moue.) Neither is it the act, or life, or *Energie*, or perfection (for that word *Entelechia* is diuersly taken and interpreted) of a liuing body: for all this is but the effect or action of the *Soule*, and not the *Soule* it selfe, as to liue, to see, to vnderstand is the action of the *Soule*. And it would likewise follow, that the *Soule* should be an accident not a substance, and could not subsist without that body whereof it is the act and perfection, no more than the couer of an house may be without the house, and a relation without his correlative. To be briefe, it is to say what the soule doth and is to another, not what it is in it selfe.

3  
H. rd to say  
what it is.

But to say what the *Soule* is, is very difficult: A man may simply say that it is an essentiall quickning forme, which giueth to the plant the vegetatiue or growing life; to a beast a sensible life, which comprehendeth the vegetatiue; to a man an intellectuall life, which comprehendeth the other two, as in numbers the greater contains the lesse, and in figures the *Pentagon* contains the *Tetragon*, & this the *Trigon*. I call it the intellectuall soule rather than the reasonable, which is comprehended in the intellectuall as the lesse in the great: for the reasonable in some sense and measure, according to the opinion of the greatest Philosophers and experience it selfe, is likewise in beasts, but not the intellectuall as being more high. *Sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus. Like a horse and mule in whom there is no understanding.* The *Soule* then is not the beginning or source, that word doth properly belong to the soueraigne first author, but an inward cause of life, motion, sense, vnderstanding. It moueth the body, and it selfe is not moued; as contrarily, the body is moued, and moueth not at all: it moueth I say the body, and not it selfe, for nothing but God moueth it selfe; and whatsoever moueth it selfe is eternall and Lord of it selfe: and in that it moueth the body it hath it not of it selfe, but from an higher cause.

4  
The nature and  
essence of the  
soule.

Concerning the nature and essence of the *Soule*, I mean a humane *Soule* (for the *Soule* of a beast is without all doubt corporall, materiall, bred and borne with the matter, and with it corruptible) there is a question of greater importance than it seemeth: for some affirme it to be corporall, some incorporall:

corporall : and this is very agreeable to reason , if a man be not opinatiue. That it is corporall, see what the grounds are ; *Spirus* and Diuels, good and ill, which are wholly separated from all matter are corporall according to the opinion of all Philosophers and our greatest Diuines, *Tertulian, Origen, S. Basil, Gregory, Augustine, Damascene* ; how much more the Soule of man, which hath society and is vnited to a matter ? Their resolution is, that whatsoeuer is created, being compared vnto God, is grosse, corporall, materiall, and only God is incorporall ; that every spirit is a body and hath a bodily nature. Next vnto authoritie almost vniuersall the reason is irrefragable. Whatsoeuer is included in this finite world is finite, limited both in vertue and substance, bounded with a superficies, inclosed and circumscribed in a place, which are the true and naturall conditions of a bodie : for there is nothing but a bodie which hath a superfiціаль part, and is barred and fastened in a place. God only is wholly infinite, incorporall, the ordinary distinctions, *circumscriptione, definitiue, eff. eline*, are but verball, and in nothing either helpe or hurt the cause : for it alwayes stands good that spirits are in such sort in a place, that at the selfesame time that they are in a place they can not be elsewhere ; and they are not in a place either infinite, or very great, or very little, but equall to their limited and finited substance and superficies. And if it were not so, spirits could not change their place, nor ascend or descend, as the Scripture affirmeth that they doe : and so they should be immouable, indiuisible, indifferently in all. Now if it appeare that they change their place, the change conuicteth that they are mouable, diuisible, subiect vnto time and to the succession therof, required in the motion and passage from one place to another, which are all the qualities of a bodie. But because many simple men vnder this word corporall, do imagine visible, palpable, and thinke not that the pure aire, or fire without the flame or coale are bodies, haue therefore likewise affirmed, That spirits both separated and humane are not corporall, as in truth they are not in that sense : for they are of an inuisible substance, whether aire, as the greatest part of Philosophers and Diuines affirm, or celestiall, as some *Hebrewes* and *Arabiques* teach, calling by

In homil. l. de  
spir. l. 1. de lib.  
arb. Hom. de  
trinitate.

by the selfe same name both the heauen and the spirit an essence proper to immortalitie; or whether (if they will haue it so) of a substance more subtile and delicate, yet they are alwayes corporall, since limited by place, moouable, subiect to motion and to times. Finally, if they were not corporall, they should not be passible and capable of suffering as they are: the humane receiueth from his bodie pleasure and displeasure, sorrow and delight in his turne, as the bodie from the spirit and his passions many good qualities, many bad, vertues, vices, affections, which are all accidents: and all as well the spirits separated and Diuels, as humane, are subiect to punishment and torments. They are therefore corporall: for there is nothing passible, that is not corporall, and it is only proper vnto bodies to be subiect to accidents.

3  
The faculties  
and actions of  
the Soule.

Now the *Soule* hath a great number of vertues and faculties, as many almost as the body hath members: There are some in plants, more in beasts, most in man, to know, to liue, to feele, to mooue, to desire, to allure, to assemble, to retaine, to concoct, to digest, to nourish, to grow, to reiect, to see, to heare, to taste, to smell, to speake, to breath, to ingender, to thinke, to reason, to contemplate, to consent, dissent, to remember, iudge; all which are no parts of the *Soule*: for so it should be diuisible, and should consist vpon accidents, but they are her naturall qualities. The actions come after and follow the faculties, and so there are three degrees, according to the doctrine of Great *S. Denys* followed of all, that is, we must consider in spirituall creatures three things, *Essence, Facultie, Operation*: By the latter which is the action we know the faculty, and by it the essence. The actions may be hindered and wholly cease without any preiudice at all vnto the soule, and her faculties, as the *Science* and faculty of Painting remaineth entire in the Painter, although his hands be bound, and so be made vnable to paint: But if the faculties themselves perish, the *Soule* must needs be gone, no otherwise then *Fire* is no longer fire hauing lost the facultie of warming.

The vniuers of  
the soule.

The essence and nature of the *Soule* being after a sort explicated, one of the busiest questions that belongeth vnto the *Soule* offereth it selfe to our consideration, that is, whether there

there be in a creature especially in man one soule or many? Touching which point there are diuers opinions, but may be reduced into three. Some of the *Greekes*, and almost all the *Arabiques* imitating them, haue thought (not onely in euery particular man, but generally in all men) that there was but one immortall *Soule*. The *Egyptians* for the most part held an opinion quite contrary, that there was a pluralitie of foules in euery creature, all diuers and distinct, two in euery beast, and three in man; two mortall, the vegetatiue & sensible, and the third intellectuall, immortall. The third opinion as the meane betwixt the two former, and most followed, being held by many of all nations is, that there is but one *Soule* in euery creature, not more. In euery of these opinions there is some difficultie. I leaue the first as being already sufficiently confuted and reiected. The pluralitie of foules in euery creature and man, on the one side seemeth very strange and absurd in Philosophie, for that were to giue many formes to one and the same thing, and to say that there are many substances and subiects in one, two beasts in one, three men in one; on the other side it giueth credit and helpeth much our beleefe touching the immortalitie of the intellectuall *Soule*, for there being three foules, there can follow no inconuenience, that two of them should die, and the third continue immortall. The vnitie of the *Soules* seemeth to resist the immortalitie thereof; for how can one and the same indiuisible, be in a mortall part and an immortall? as neuerthelesse *Aristotle* would haue it. Doubtlesse it seemeth that of necessity the *Soule* must be either altogether mortall, or altogether immortall, which are two very foule absurdities. The first abolisheth all religion and sound Philosophie: the second maketh beasts likewise immortall. Neuerthelesse it seemes to be more true that there is but one *Soule* in euery creature, for the plurality and diuersity of faculties, instruments, actions, neither derogateth any thing at all, nor multiplieth in any thing this vnitie, no more than the diuersitie of riuers the vnitie of one spring or fountaine, nor the diuersitie of effects in the Sunne, to hear to enlighten, to melt, to drie, to whiten, to make blacke, to dissipate the vnitie and simplicitie of the Sunne; for should they, there would be a great number

number of soules in one man and Sunnes in one world. Neither doth this essentiall vnitie of the *Soule* any thing hinder the immortalitie of the humane *Soule* in her essence, notwithstanding the vegetatiue and sensitiue faculties, which are but accidents, die, that is to say, cannot be exercised without the body, the *Soule* not having a subiect or instrument whereby to doe it, but the third intellectuall *Soule* is alwaies well, because for it there is no need of the body, though whilst it is within it, it make vse thereof to exercise it selfe; insomuch that if it did returne vnto the body, it were only againe to exercise her vegetatiue and sensitiue faculties, as we see in those that are raised vnto life to liue heere below, not in those that are raised to liue elsewhere, for such bodies need not to liue by the exercise of such faculties: Euen as there is no want or decay in the Sunne, but it continueth in it selfe wholly the same, though during a whole eclips it neither shine nor warme, nor performe his other effects in those places that are subiect vnto it.

The source of  
the soule.

Hauiug shewed the vnitie of the soule in euery subiect, let vs see from whence it commeth, and how it entreth into the body. The originall beginning of soules is not held to be the same of all, I meane of humane soules; for the vegetatiue and sensitiue, of Plants and Beasts, is by the opinion of all, altogether materiall, and in the seed, for which cause it is likewise mortall. But concerning the *Soule* of man there are foure celebrated opinions. According to the first, which is of the *Stoicks* held by *Philo Iudeus*, and afterward by the *Manichæes*, *Priscilianists*, and others, it is transferred and brought forth as a part or parcell off the substance of God, who inspireth it into the bodie, alleaging to their best aduantage the word, of *Moyse*, *Inspirauit in faciem eius spiraculum vitæ: He breathed in his face, breath of life.* The second opinion, held by *Tertullian*, *Apollinaris*, the *Luciferians* and other Christians, affirmeth that the *Soule* proceedeth and is deriued from the soules of our parents with the seed, as the *Soule* of a beast. The third opinion, which is that of the *Pythagorians* and *Platonists* held by many *Rabbins* and Doctors of the *Iewes*, and afterwards by *Origen* and other Doctors, teacheth that the  
of men haue beene from the beginning all created of  
God,

God, made of nothing and reserved in heaven, afterwards to be sent into the lower parts, as need should require, and that the bodies of men are formed and disposed to receive them, and from hence did spring the opinion of those that thought that the soules of men here below, were either well or ill handled, and lodged in bodies either sound or sicke, according to that life which they had led about in heaven, before they were incorporate. And truly the master of Wisdom himselfe sheweth, that the *Soule*, of the two, was the elder, and before the body, *Exampuer, bonam indolem sortitus, imo bonus cum esset, corpus incontaminatum reperi. I was a boy, who by lot obtained a good disposition and nature, yea even being good, I obtained also an undefiled body.* The fourth opinion received and held through all Christendome is, that they are all created of God, and infused into bodies prepared, in such manner that the creation and infusion is done at one and the same instant. These foure opinions are all affirmatiue, but there is a fifth much retained which determineth nothing, and is content to say, that it is a secret vnknown vnto men; of which opinion was *S. Austen, Greg.* and others, who neuertheless thought the two latter affirmatiue opinions more like to be true than the former.

De orig. Epist.  
18 157.

Let vs now see when and how the *Soule* entreteth into the bodie, whether altogether at one instant, or successiue; I meane the humane *Soule*: for of that of a beast there is no doubt, since it is naturall in the seed, according to *Aristotle* (whom most do follow) that is by succession of times and by degrees, as an artificiall forme which a man maketh by pieces, the one after the other; the head, afterwards the throat, the bellie, the legs in so much that the vegetatiue and sensitive *Soule* altogether materiall and corporall, is in the seed, and with the descent of the parents, which fashioneth the bodie in the matrix: and that done the reasonable *Soule* arriueth from without. And therefore there are neither two nor three soules, neither together nor successiue, neither is the vegetatiue corrupted by the arriual of the sensitive, nor the sensitive by the arriual of the intellectuall; but it is but one *Soule* which is made, finished and perfected in that time which nature hath prescribed. Others are of opinion, that the soule

6  
The entrance of  
the soule into  
the body.

entreteth



entrench with all her faculties at one instant, that is to say then, when all the bodie is furnished with organs, formed, and wholly finished, and that vntill then there was no *Soule*, but only a naturall vertue and *Energie*, an essentiall forme of the seed, which working by the spirits which are in the sayd seed, with the heat of the matrix and materiall blood, as with instruments, do forme and build vp the body, prepare all the members, nourish, moue and increase them: which being done, this *Energie* and seminall forme vanisheth and is quite lost, so that the seed ceaseth to be seed, losing it forme, by the arriual of another more noble, which is the humane *Soule*, which causeth that which was seed, or an *Embryon*, that is, a substance without shape, to be no longer seed, but a man.

7  
The residence  
of the Soule in  
the Bodie.

The *Soule* being entred into the bodie, we are likewise to know what kinde of existence therein it hath, and how it is there resident. Some Philosophers not knowing what to say, or how to ioyne and vnite the *Soule* with the bodie, make it to abide and reside therein, as a Master in his house, a Pilot in his ship, a Coach-man in his coach: but this were to destroy all, for so the *Soule* should not be the forme, nor inward and essentiall part of a creature, or of a man, it should haue no need of the members of the bodie to abide there, nor any feeling at all of the contagion of the body; but it should be a substance wholly distinct from the bodie, of it selfe sublisting, which at it pleasure might come and goe, and separate it selfe from the body, without the distinction and diminution of all the functions thereof, which are all absurdities. The *Soule* is in the bodie, as the forme in the matter, extended and spread thorowout the body, giuing life, motion, sense to all the parts thereof, and both of them together make but one *Hypostasis*, one intire subiect, which is the creature, and there is no meane or middle that doth vnite and knit them together: for betwixt the matter and the forme there is no middle, according to all Philosophie. The *Soule* then is all in all the bodie; I adde not (though it be commonly sayd) and all in euery part of the bodie: for that implieth a contradiction, and diuideth the *Soule*.

8  
The seat and  
instruments of  
the soule.

Now notwithstanding the *Soule*, as it is sayd, be diffused and spread thorow the whole bodie, yet neuerthelesse, to excite



cite and exercise it faculties, it is more specially and expressly in some parts of the bodie, than in others; in which it is sayd to haue place, yet not to be wholly there, lest the rest should be without Soule without forme. And as it hath foure principall and chiefe faculties, so men giue it foure seats, that is, those foure regions, which we haue noted before in the composition of the body, the foure first principall instruments of the soule, the rest referre themselves vnto them, as also all the faculties to these, that is to say, the ingendring faculty to the ingendring parts, the naturall to the liuer, the vitall to the heart, the animall and intellectuall to the braine.

We are now come to speake in generall of the exercise of the faculties of the Soule, whereunto the soule of it selfe is wise and sufficient, insomuch that it faileth not to produce that which it knoweth, and to exercise it functions as it ought, if it be not hindered, and that the instruments thereof be well disposed. And therefore it was well and truly said of the wise, That Nature is wise, discreet, industrious, a sufficient mistresse which maketh a man apt to all things: *Insta sunt nobis omnium artium, ac virtutum semina, magisterq; ex occulto Deus producit ingenium.* We haue, as it were, sown in vs the seed of all arts and vertues, and God as a good master doth produce, extend, and teach our wit: which is easily shewed by induction. The vegetatiue soule without instruction formeth the body in the matrix with excellent art, afterwards it nourisheth it, and makes it grow, drawing the victuall vnto it, retaining and concocting it, afterwards casting out the excrements, it ingendreth and reformeth the parts that faile; these are things that are seene in plants, beasts, and men. The sensitive Soule of it selfe without instruction, maketh both beasts and men to moue their feet, their hands, and other members; to stretch, to rub, to shake, to moue the lips, to presse the dug, to cry, to laugh. The reasonable, of it selfe, not according to the opinion of Plato, by the remembrance of that which it knew before it entred into the body; nor according to Aristotle, by reception and acquisition, comming from without by the senses, being of it selfe as a white paper, void of impression, although that serue to good purpose; but of it selfe without instruction, imagineth, vnderstandeth, retaineth, reasoneth, discourseth.

But

9  
The sufficiency  
of the Soule for  
the exercise of  
his faculties.

But because this of the reasonable *Soule* seemeth to be more difficult than the other, and woundeth in some sort *ArsTotle* himselfe, it shall be handled again in his place, in the discourse of the intellectuall *Soule*.

10  
The separation  
of the body two-  
fold.

1. Naturall and  
ordinary.

It remaineth that wee speake of the last point, that is, of the separation of the *Soule* from the body, which is after a diuers sort and maner; the one, and the ordinary is naturall by death, and this not the same in beasts and men: for by the death of beasts, the *Soule* dieth, and is annihilated, according vnto that rule, by the corruption of the subiect the forme perissheth, the matter remaineth: by the death of man the *Soule* is separated from the body, but is not lost, but remaineth inasmuch as it is immortall.

2. The immor-  
talitie of the  
*Soule*

The immortality of the *Soule* is a thing vniuersally, religiously, (for it is the principall foundation of all religion) and peaceably receiued and concluded vpon throughout the world, I meane by an outward and publike profession, seriously and inwardly, not so, witnesse so many Epicures, Libertines, and mockers, in the world: yea the *Saduces*, the greatest Lords of the Iewes, did not sticke with open mouth to denie it; though a thing profitable to be beleueed, and in some sort proued by many naturall and humane reasons, but properly and better established by the authority of religion than any other way. It seemeth that there is in a man a kinde of inclination and disposition of nature to beleuee it, for man desireth naturally to continue and perpetuate his being, from whence likewise proceedeth that great, yea furious care and loue of our posterity and succession. Again two things there are that giue strength thereunto, and make it more plausible, the one is the hope of glory and reputation, and the desire of the immortalitie of our name, which how vaine soeuer it be, carrieth a great credit in the world: the other is an impression, that vice which robbeth a man of the view and knowledge of humane iustice, remaining alwaies opposite to the diuine iustice, must thereby be chastised, yea after death: so that besides that a man is altogether carried and disposed by nature to desire it, and consequently to beleuee it, the Iustice of God doth conclude it.

3  
The proffe.

From hence we are to learne that there are three differen-  
ces

ces and degrees of *Soules*, an order required euen to the perfection of the vniuerse. Two extreames, the one is that which being altogether materiall, is plunged, and ouerwhelmed in the matter, and inseparable from it, and therewithall corruptible, which is the *Soule* of a beast: the other quite contrary, is that which hath not any commerce, or societie with the matter or body, as the soule of immortall Angels or Diuels. In the middle as the meane betwixt these two, is the humane soule, which is neither wholly tied to the matter, nor altogether without it, but is ioyned with it, and may likewise subtilst and liue without it. This order and distinction is an excellent argument of immortalitie; for it were a *vacuum*, a defect, a deformitie too absurd in nature, dishonourable to the authour, and a kinde of ruine to the world, that betwixt two extreames, the corruptible and incorruptible, there should be no middle; that is partly the one and partly the other: there must needs be one that ties and ioynes the two ends or extreames together, and that can be none but man. Below the lowest and wholly materiall, is that which hath no *Soule* at all, as stones; about the highest and immortall, is the eternall only God.

The other separation not naturall nor ordinary, and which is done by strange impullions and at times, is very difficult to vnderstand, and perplex. It is that which is done by extasies and rauishments, which is diuers and done by different means: for there is a separation that is diuine, such as the Scripture reporteth vnto vs, of *Daniel*, *Zachary*, *Esdra*, *Ezechiel*, *S. Paul*. There is another that is daemonicall, procured by diuels, and good spirits and bad, as we reade of many, as of *Iohn D'uns*, called *Lescot*, who being in his extasie a long time held for dead, was caried into the aire, and cast downe vpon the earth; but so soone as he felt the blow that he receiued by the fall, he came to himselfe: but by reason of the great store of blood which he lost, his head being broken, he died outright. *Cardan* telleth it of himselfe, and of his fathery and it continueth authentiquely verified in many and diuers parts of the worl<sup>d</sup>, of many, and those for the most part of the vulgar sort, weake and women possessed, whose bodies remaine not only without motion, and the beating of

4

2. *Natural*.

D

the

the heart and arteries, but also without any sense or feeling of the greatest blowes, either with iron or fire, that could be giuen them, and afterwards their soules being returned they haue felt great paine in their limmes, and recounted that which they haue seene and done in places far distant. Thirdly, there is a humane separation, which proceedeth either from that malady which *Hipocrates* calleth *Sacer*, commonly called The falling sicknes, *Morbus comitialis*, the signe whereof is a foming at the mouth, which is not in those that are possessed; but in stead thereof they haue a stinking sauor, or it is occasioned by stiptickes, stupifying and benumbing medicines; or ariseth from the force of imagination, which enforcing and bending it selfe with too deepe an attention about a thing, carrieth away the whole strength and power of the Soule. Now in these three kinds of extasies or rauishments, *Diuine*, *Diabolicall*, *Humane*, the question is, Whether the Soule be truly and really separated from the body; or if remaining in it, it be in such sort employed and busied about some outward thing which is foorth of the bodie, that it forgetteth it owne bodie; whereby followeth a kinde of intermission and vacation of the actions and exercise of the functions thereof. Touching the diuine extasie, the *Apostle* speaking of himselfe and his owne act, dares not define any thing, *Si in corpore vel extra corpus nescio, Deus scit. Whither in the body, or without, I know not, God knoweth.* An instruction that may serue for all others, and for other separations of lesse qualitie. Touching the *Demoniacall* extasie, as not to feele a blow be it neuer so great, to report what hath beene done two or three hundred leagues off, are two great and violent coniectures of a true separation from the bodie, but not altogether necessarie: for the diuell can so alienate and occupie the soule within the body, that it shall not seeme to haue any action or commerce with the bodie for some certaine time, and in that time so besotteth the soule by presenting things vnto the imagination that haue beenedone as farre off, that a man may speake and discourse thereof: for to affirme that certainly the Soule doth wholly depart and abandon the bodie, Nature is too bolde and foolehardie: to say that it doth not wholly depart, but that the imaginatiue or intellectuall is carried

ried out, and that the vegetatiue soule remaineth, were more to intangle our selues ; for so the *Soule* in it essence should be diuided, or the accident only should be carried out, and not the substance. Touching the humane extasie, doubtlesse there is no separation of the *Soule*, but only a suspension of the patent and outward actions thereof.

What becomes of the *Soule*, and what the state thereof is after the naturall separation by death, diuers men thinke diuersly: and this point belongeth not to the subiect of this booke. The *Metempsychose* and transanation of *Pythagoras* hath in some sort been embraced by the *Academicks*, *Stoicks*, *Egyptians*, and others ; but yet not of all in the same sense: for some doe admit it only for the punishment of the wicked, as we reade of *Nebuchadnezzar*, who was changed into a beast by the iudgement of God. Others, and some great, haue thought that good soules, being separated, become Angels, the wicked, Diuels. It had beene more pleasing to haue said, Like vnto them ; *Non nubent, sed erunt sicut Angeli. They marry not, but shall be as the Angels of God.* Some haue affirmed, that the soules of the wicked, at the end of a certaine time, were reduced to nothing. But the trueth of all this we must learne from Religion, and diuines, who speake heerof more cleerely.

II  
*The state of the Soule after death.*

# CHAP. VIII.

*Of the Soule in particular ; and first of the vegetatiue facultie.*

After this generall description of the *Soule*, in these ten points, we must speake thereof more particularly, according to the order of the faculties thereof, beginning at the basest, that is, the Vegetatiue, Sensitiue, Apprehensible or Imaginatiue, Appetible, Intellectiue, which is the soueraigne *Soule* and truly humane. Vnder euery one of these three are diuers others which are subiect vnto them, and as parts of them, as we shall see, handling them in their ranke.

I  
*The faculties of the Soule.*

Of the vegetable and basest *Soule*, which is euen in plants, I will not speake much ; it is the proper subiect of Physicians, of health and sicknesse. Let me only say, that vnder this there are contained other three great faculties, which follow

2  
*Of the vegetabile and her subalternals.*

one the other : for the first serueth the second, and the second the third, but the third neither of the former. The first then is the nourishing facultie, for the conseruation of the *Individuum* or particular person, which diuers others doe serue, as the *Attrahē* of the victuall, the *Concoctiue*, the *Digestiue*, separating the good & proper, from the naught and hurtfull, the *Retentiue* and the *Expulsiue* of superfluities : The second, the increasing or growing facultie, for the perfection and due quantitie of the *Individuum* : The third, is the *Generatiue*, for the conseruation of the kinde. Whereby we see, that the two first are for the *Individuum*, and worke within in the bodie ; the third is for the kinde and hath it effect and operation without in another body, and therefore is more worthy than the other, and commeth neerer to a facultie more high, which is the *Sensitive*. This is a great height of perfection, to make another thing like it selfe.

## CHAP. IX.

Of the *Sensitive* facultie.

Six things required to the exercise of this facultie.

1

2

3

4

5

**I**N the exercise of this facultie and function of the Senses these six things do concur, whereof foure are within and two without. That is to say, the *Soule*, as the first efficient cause. The faculty of *Sense* (which is a qualitie of the *Soule*, and not the *Soule* it selfe) that is, of perceiuing and apprehending outward things ; which is done after a five-fold maner, which we call *The five Senses* (of this number we shall speake hereafter) (that is to say, *Hearing*, *Seeing*, *Smelling*, *Tasting*, *Touching*. The corporall instrument of the *Sense*, whereof there are five, according to the number of the *Senses* ; the Eye, the Eare, the high concauitie of the Nose, which is the entrance to the first ventricles of the braine, the Tongue, the whole Skin of the body. The *Spirits* which ariseth from the braine the fountaine of the sensitive *Soule*, by certaine sinewes in the said instruments, by which spirit and instrument the soule exerciseth her facultie. The sensible *Species*, or object offered vnto the instruments, which is different according to the diuersitie of the sense. The object of the eye or sight according to the common opinion is colour, which is an adhe-

rētē

rent quality in bodies, whereof there are six simple, as White, Yellow, Red, Purple, Greene and Blew; some adde a seventh, which is blacke; but to say the truth, that is no colour, but a priuation, being like vnto darkenesse, as the other colours more or lesse vnto the light. Of compound colours the number is infinite: but to speake more truly, the true obiect is light, which is neuer without colour, and without which the colours are inuisible. Now the light is a quality which cometh forth of a luminous body, which makes both it selfe visible and all things els; and if it be terminated and limited by some solide body, it reboundeth and redoubleth it beames: otherwise if it passe without any stop or termination, it can not be seene except it be in the root of that light or luminous bodie from whence it came, nor make any thing els to be seene. Of the Eare or Hearing, the obiect is a sound, which is a noise proceeding from the encounter of two bodies, and it is diuers: the pleasant and melodious sweeteneth and appeaseth the spirit, and for it sake the body too, and driues away maladies from them both: the sharpe and penetrant doth contrariwise trouble and wound the spirit. Of Tasting the obiect is a saueur or smacke, whereof there are six diuers simple kindes, *Sweet, Soure, Sharpe, Tart, Salt, Bitter*; but there are many compounds. Of smell, the obiect is an odour or sent, which is a fume rising from an odoriferous obiect ascending by the nose to the first ventricles of the braine: the strong and violent hurteth the braine, as an ill sound the eares: the temperate and good doth contrariwise reioyce, delight and comfort. Of the sense of Touching, the obiect is heat, cold, drouth, moisture either pleasant and polite, or sharpe and smarting, morion, rest, tickling.

The middle or space betwixt the obiect and the instrument, which is the Aire neither altered nor corrupted, but such as it ought to be.

So that sense is made, when the sensible species presenteth it selfe by the middle to an instrument sound and well disposed, and that therein the spirit assisting, receiueth it and apprehendeth it in such sort, that there is there both action and passion; and the senses are not purely passive: for notwithstanding they receiue, and are stricken by the obiect,



yet neuerthelesse in some sense and measure they doe worke or react in apprehending the species and image of the object proposed.

3

In former times and before *Aristotle*, they did make a difference betwixt the sense of *Seeing* and the rest of the senses, and they all held, that the sight was active, and was made by emitting or sending forth of the eye the beames thereof vnto the outward objects, and that the other senses were passive, receiving the sensible object: but after *Aristotle*, they are made all alike, and all passive, receiving in the organ or instrument, the kinds and images of things, and the reasons of the Ancients to the contrary are easily answered. There is more and more excellent matter to be deliuered of the senses hereafter.

4

Now besides these five particular senses which are without, there is within the common sense; where all the diuers objects apprehended by it, are assembled and gathered together, to the end they may afterward be compared, distinguished, and discerned the one from the other, which the particular senses could not doe, being euery one attentue to his proper object, and not able to take knowledge thereof, of his companion.

## C H A P. X.

*Of the senses of Nature.*

1  
The importance  
of the naturall  
senses.

ALL knowledge is begun in vs by the senses; so say our Schoole-men: but it is not altogether true, as we shall see heereafter. They are our first masters: it beginneth by them, and endeth with them: they are the beginning and end of all. It is not possible to recoile farther backe: euery one of them is a captaine and soueraigne lord in his order, and hath a great command, carrying with it infinite knowledges. The one dependeth not, or hath need of the other, so are they equally great, although the one haue a farre greater extent, and traine, and affaires, than the other, as a little king is as well a soueraigne in his little narrow command, as a great in his great estate.

2

The number.

It is an opinion amongst vs, that there are but five senses of



of Nature, because wee marke but five in vs ; but yet there may very well be more . and it is greatly to be doubted that there are ; but it is impossible for vs to know them, to affirme them, or to denie them, because a man shall neuer know the want of that sense which he hath neuer had. There are many beasts which liue a full and perfect life, which want some one of our five senses ; and a creature may liue without the five senses, saue the sense of *Feeling*, which is only necessary vnto life. We liue very commodiously with five, and yet perhaps we do want one, or two, or three, and yet it can not be knownen. One sense can not discouer another : and if a man want one by nature, yet he knowes not which way to affirme it. A man borne blinde can neuer conceiue that he seeth not, nor desire to see, nor delight in his sight : it may be he will say that he would see, but that is because he hath heard say and learned of others, that it is to be desired : the reason is because the senses are the first gates, and entrances to knowledge. So man not being able to imagine more than the five that he hath, he can not know how to iudge whether there be more in Nature ; yet he may haue more. Who knoweth whether the difficulties that we finde in many of the works of Nature, and the effects of creatures, which we can not vnderstand, doe proceed from the want of some sense that wee haue not ? Of the hidden properties which we see in many things, a man may say that there are sensible faculties in Nature proper to iudge and apprehend them ; but yet he must confesse that we haue them not, and that that ignorance of such things proceedeth from our owne default. Who knoweth whether it be some particular sense, that discouereth in the Cocke the houre of mid-night and morning, and that moues him to crow ? Who taught some beasts to chuse certaine herbes for their cure, and many such like woonders as these are ? no man can affirme or denie, say this it is, or that it is.

Some haue assayed to giue a reason of this number of the five senses, and to prooue the sufficiency of them, by distinguishing and diuersly comparing their outward obiects ; <sup>their sufficiency</sup> 417. which are, either all neere the bodie or distant from it : if neere, but yet remaining without, it is the sense of Touching ;

if they enter, it is Taste; if they be more distant and present by a right line, it is the Sight; if oblique and by reflexion, it is the Hearing. A man might better haue sayd thus, That these five senses being appointed for the seruice of an entire man, some are entirely for the bodie, that is to say, *Taste* and *Touching*; that, in that it entreteth; this, in that it remains without. Others first and principall for the soule, as sight and hearing: the Sight for inuention, the Hearing for acquisition and communication, and one in the middle, for the middle spirits, and ties of the soule and body, which is the *Smell*. Againe, they answer to the foure Elements, and their qualities: The sense of *Feeling* to the earth; of *Hearing* to the aire; of *Taste* to the water and moillure; the *Smell* to the fire. The *Sight* is a compound, and partakes both of water and fire, by reason of the bright splendor of the eie. Againe they say that there are so many senses, as there are kinds of sensible things, which are colour, sound, odour, taste or saueur, and the fift which hath no proper name, the obiect of *Feeling*, which is heat, cold, rough, plaine, and so forth. But men deceiue themselves, for the number of the senses is not to be iudged by the number of sensible things, which are no cause that there are so many. By this reason there should bee many more, and one and the same sense should receiue many diuers heads of obiects, and one and the same obiect be apprehended by diuers senses: so that the tickling of a feather, and the pleasures of *Venus* are distinguished from the five Senses, and by some comprehended in the sense of *Feeling*: But the cause is rather, for that the spirit hath no power to attaine to the knowledge of things, but by the five Senses, and that Nature hath giuen it so many, because it was necessary for it end and benefit.

4  
Comparison.

Their comparisons are diuers in dignity and nobility. The Sense of *Seeing* excelleth all the rest in five things: It apprehendeth farther off, and extendeth it selfe euen to the fixed starres. It hath more variety of obiects, for to all things & generally in all, there is light & colour, the obiects of the eie. It is more exquisite, exact and particular euen in the least and finest things that are. It is more prompt and sudden, apprehending euen in a moment and without motion, euen the heauens themselves:

themselves: in the other senses there is a motion that requireth time. It is more diuine, and the marks of Diuinity are many. Liberty incomparable aboue others, whereby the eie seeth, or seeth not, and therefore it hath lids ready to open and to shut: power not to turmoile it selfe, and not to suffer it selfe to be seene; Actiuitie and abilitie to please or displease, to signifie and insinuate our thoughts, willes and affections: for the eye speaketh and striketh, it serueth for a tongue and a hand; the other Senses are purely passiue. But that which is most noble in this Sense is, that the priuation of the obiekt thereof, which is darknesse, brings feare, and that naturally; and the reason is, because a man findeth himselfe robbed of so excellent a guide: and therefore whereas a man desireth company for his solace, the Sight in the light is in place of companie. The sense of Hearing hath many excellent singularities, it is more spirituall, and the seruice thereof more inward. But the particular comparisn of these two, which are of the rest the more noble, and of speech, shall be spoken in the Chapter following. As for pleasure or displeasure, though all the Senses are capable thereof, yet the Sense of Feeling receiueth greatest griefe, and almost no pleasure; and contrarily the Taste great delight, and almost no griefe. In the organ and instrument, the Touch is vniuersall, spread thorow the whole bodie, to the end the bodie should feele heat and colde; the organs of the rest are assigned to a certaine place & member.

From the weaknesse and incertitude of our senses comes ignorance, error and mistakings: for sithens that by their meanes and mixture we attaine to all knowledge, if they deceiue vs in their report, we haue no other helpe to sticke vnto. But who can say, or accuse them, that they do deceiue vs, considering that by them we begin to learne and to know? Some haue affirmed that they do neuer deceiue vs, and when they seeme to doe it, the fault proceedeth from some thing els; and that we must rather attribute it to any other thing than to the senses. Others haue sayd cleane contrary, that they are all false, and can teach vs nothing that is certaine. But the middle opinion is the more true.

Now whether the Senses be false or not, at the least it is certaine that they deceiue, yea ordinarily enforce the dis-

5  
The weaknesse  
and vncertain-  
nesse of the  
Senses.

6  
The morall de-  
fect of the Spi-  
rits  
course, and senses.

course, the reason, and in exchange are againe mocked by it. Do then but consider what kinde of knowledge and certaintie a man may haue, when that within, and that without is full of deceit and weakenesse, and that the principall parts thereof, the essentiall instruments of science doe deceiue one another. That the senses doe deceiue and enforce the vnderstanding, it is plaine in those senses whereof some do kindle with furie, others delight and sweeten, others tickle the *Soule*. And why do they that cause themselves to be let blood, lanced, cauterised and burnt, turne away their eies, but that they do well know that great authoritie that the Senses haue ouer their reason? The sight of some bottomlesse depth, or precipitate downfall, astonisheth euen him that is settled in a firme and sure place: and to conclude, doth not the Sense vanquish and quite overcome all the beautifull resolutions of vertue and patience? So on the other side, the senses are likewise deceiued by the vnderstanding, which appeareth by this, that the *Soule* being stirred with Choler, Loue, Hatred, or any other passion, our senses doe see and heare every thing others than they are, yea sometimes our senses are altogether dilled by the passions of the *Soule*, and it seemeth that the *Soule* retireth and shutteth vp the operation of the Senses, and that the spirit being otherwise employed, the eie discerneth not that which is before it, and which it seeth: yea, the sight and the reason iudge diuersly of the greatnesse of the Sunne, the Starres, nay of the figure of a staffe any thing distant.

7  
The senses common to man and beast, but diuersly.

In the Senses of Nature the beasts haue as well part as we, and sometimes excell vs: for some haue their hearing more quicke than man, some their sight, others their smell, others their taste: and it is held, that in the sense of Hearing, the Hart excelleth all others; of Sight, the Eagle; of Smell, the Dogge; of Taste, the Ape; of Feeling, the Tortois: neuertheless, the preheminance of that sense of Touch is giuen vnto man, which of all the rest is the most brutish. Now if the Senses are the meanes to attaine vnto knowledge, and that beasts haue a part therein, yea sometimes the better part, why should not they haue knowledge?

8

But the Senses are not the only instruments of knowledge neither

neither are our Senses alone to be consulted or beleueed: for if beasts by their Senses iudge otherwise of things than we by ours, as doubtlesse they doe; who must be beleueed? Our spetle cleanseth and drieth our wounds; it killeth the Serpent; What then is the true qualitie of our spetle? To drie and to cleanse, or to kill? To iudge well of the operation of the senses, wee must be at some agreement with the beasts, nay with our selues: for the eie pressed downe and shut, seeth otherwise than in it ordinary state; the eare stopt, receiueth the objects otherwise than when it is open: an infant seeth, heareth, tasteth, otherwise than a man; a man than an old man; a sound than a sicke; a wise than a foole. In this great diuersitie and contrarietie what shall we holde for certaine? Seeing that one sense belieth another, a picture seemeth to be held vp to the view, and the hands are folded together.

CHAP. XI.

*Of Sight, Hearing, and Speech.*

**T**Hese are the three most rich and excellent iewels of all those that are in this muster, and of whose preheminentie it is disputed. Touching their Organes, that of the Sight in it compolition and forme is admirable, and of a liuely and shining beautie, by reason of the great varietie and subtilitie of so many small parts or pieces; and therefore it is sayd that the eye is one of those parts of the bodie which doe first begin to be formed, and the last that is finished: and for this verie cause it is so delicate, and sayd to be subiect to six score maladies. Afterwards comes that of Speech, which helpeth the sense of Hearing to many great aduantages. For the seruice of the bodie the Sight is most necessary, and therefore doth more import a beast than Hearing. But for the spirit, the Hearing challengeth the vpper place. The Sight serueth well for the inuention of things, which by it haue almost all bene discovered, but it bringeth nothing to perfection. Again, the Sight is not capable but of corporall things and particular, and that only of their crust or superficial part; it is the instrument of ignorant men and vnlearned, *qui mouen-*

*I  
A comparison  
of these three.*

*tar ad id quod adest, quodque presens est. Who are moued with the present object.*

2  
The preemi-  
nencie of hea-  
ring.

The Eare is a spirituall Sense, it is the Intermedler, and Agent of the vnderstanding, the instrument of wise and spirituall men, capable not only of the secrets and inward parts of particular bodies, whereunto the Sight arriueh not, but also of the generall kindes, and of all spirituall things and diuine, in which the Sight serueth rather to disturbe than to helpe: and therefore we see not only many blinde, great and wise, but some also that are deprived of their sight to become great Philosophers: but of such as are deafe we neuer heard of any. This is the way by which a man entresth the fortreffe, and makes himselfe master of the place, and imploieth his spirit in good or ill, witnesse the wife of King *Agamemnon*, who was contained in her dutie of chastitie by the sound of a Harpe: and *Dauid* by the selfe same meane chased away the euill spirit from *Saul*, and restored him to health: and that skilfull player of the Flute, that sweetned the voice of that great Oratour *Gracchus*. To be brieft, Science, Trueth, and Vertue haue no other entrance into the Soule, but by the Eare: Christianitie it selfe teacheth that faith and saluation commeth by Hearing, and that the Sight doth rather hurt, than helpe thereunto; that faith is the beliefe of those things that are not seene, which beliefe is acquired by hearing; and it callerh such as are apprentices or nouices therin, Auditors, *αὐδῆται*, catechised. Let me adde this one word, that the Hearing giueth succour and comfort in darkenes, and to such as are asleepe, that by the sound they may be awaked, and so provide for their preferuation. For all these reasons haue the wisest so much commended Hearing, the pure and virgin gardian from all corruption, for the health of the inward man, as for the safety of a Citie, the gates and walles are garded that the enemie enter not.

3  
The force and  
authoritie of  
Speech.

Speech is peculiarly giuen vnto man, an excellent present and very necessary, in regard of him from whom it proceedeth: it is the interpreter and image of the Soule, *animi index*, & *speculum*, the messenger of the heart, the gate by which all that is within issueth forth, and committeth it selfe to the view, all things come forth of darknesse and secret corners into

into the light, and the spirit it selfe makes it selfe visible: and therefore an ancient Philosopher said once to a child, Speake that I may see thee, that is to say, the inside of thee. As vessels are knowen whether they be broken or whole, full or empye, by the sound, and mettrals by the touch; so man by his speech. Of all the visible parts of the body which shew themselves outward, that which is neerest the heart is the tongue by the root thereof; so that which comes neerest vnto our thought, is our speech: for from the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. In regard of him which receiveth it, it is a powerfull master, an imperious commander, which entrencheth the fortresse, possesseth it selfe of the possessor, stirreth him vp, animateth, exasperateth, appealeth him, maketh him sad, merrie, imprinteth in him whatsoeuer passion, it handleth and feedeth the Soule of the hearer, and makes it pliable to euery sense; it makes him blush, wax pale, laugh, crie, tremble for feare, mad with choler, to leape for ioy, and pierceth him thorow with passion. In regard of all, Speech is the hand of the spirit, wherewith, as the bodie by his, it taketh and giueth, it asketh counsell and succour and giueth it. It is the great Intermedler and Huckster: by it we traffike, *Merx a Mercurio*, peace is handled, affaires are managed, Sciences and the good of the spirit are distributed, it is the band and cement of humane society (so that it be vnderstood: For, saith one, A man were better to be in the companie of a dog that he knoweth, than in the companie of a man whose language he knoweth not, *Ut externus alieno, non sit hominis vice.*) As a stranger vnto a stranger, and not in place of a man. To be brieft, it is the instrument of whatsoeuer is good or ill, *Vita & mors in manibus lingua*: Life and death is in the power of  
Of a good and  
 euill tongue.
the tongue: There is nothing better, nothing worse than the tongue. The tongue of a wise man is the doore of a royall Cabinet, which is no sooner opened, but incontinently a thousand diuersities present themselves to the eie, euery one more beautifull than other, come from the *Indies, Peru, Arabia*; So a wise man produceth and rangeth them in good order, sentences, and Aphorismes of Philosophie, similitudes, examples, histories, wise sayings drawn from all the mines, and treasures old and new, *Qui profert de thesauro suo noua &*  
vetera,



Proverb.

*vetera, who brings forth of his treasure old and new things, which serue for a rule of good maners, of policie, and all the parts both of life and of death, which being applied in their times and to good purpose, bring with it great delight, great beautie and vtility, Mala aurea in lectis argenteis, verba in tempore suo. Like golden apples in beddes of siluer, so are words spoken in due season. The mouth of a wicked man is a stincking and contagious pit, a slanderous tongue murdereth the honour of another, it is a sea and vniuersitie of euils, woorse than fetters, fire, poison, death, hell, Uniuersitas iniquitatis, malum iniquitatum, venenum mortiferum, ignis incendens omnia, mors illius nequissima, vilis potius infernus quam illa. The generalitie of iniquitie, an vnquiet euill, a deadly poison, a fire consuming all, whose death is most wicked and more vnprofitable then hell it selfe.*

4  
The correspondency of Hearing & Speech.

Now these two, Hearing and Speech answer and are accommodated the one to the other, there is a great alliance betwixt them, the one is nothing without the other, as also by nature in one and the same subiect, the one is not without the other. They are the two great gates, by which the soule doth trafficke, and hath her intelligence: By these two, the soules are powred the one into the other, as vessels when the mouth of the one is applied to the entrie of the other: So that if these two gates be shut, as in those that are deafe and dumbe, the spirit remaineth solitary and miserable: Hearing is the gate to enter, by it the spirit receiueh all things from without, and conceiueh as the female: Speech is the gate to goe forth, by it the spirit acteth and bringeth forth as the male. From the communication of these two, as from the stroke of two flints or irons together, there comes forth the sacred fire of truth, for they rubbing and polishing the one the other, they shake off their rust, and purifie and cleanse themselves, and all maner of knowledge comes to perfection. But Hearing is the first, for there can nothing come forth of the soule, but that which first entreteth, and therefore he that by nature is altogether deafe, is likewise dumbe. It is necessary that first the spirit be furnished with moueables and vrensi-les, by the sense of Hearing, to the end it may by speech distribute them, so that the good and ill of the tongue and almost of the whole man, dependeth vpon the care: He that heares well,



well, speakes well, and he that heares ill, speakes ill. Of the vse and gouernment of the tongue heereafter. *Lib. 3. Chap. 43.*

CHAP. XII.

*Of the other faculties, Imaginative, Memorative, Appetitive.*

THE fantasticke or imaginative facultie, hauing recollected, and withdrawn the kinds and images apprehended by the senses, retaineth and reserueth them; in such sort that the objects being absent and far distant, yea a man sleeping, and his senses being bound and shut vp, it presenteth them to the spirit and thought, *Phantasmata idola, seu imagines dicuntur*, The Phantasmes are called Idols, images and representations of things, and doth almost worke that within in the vnderstanding, which the object doth without in the sense.

The memorative faculty is the Gardian and Register of all the species or kinds and images, apprehended by the sense, retired and sealed vp by the imagination.

The Appetitive faculty seeketh and pursueth those things, which seeme good and conuenient.

CHAP. XIII.

*Of the Intellectiue faculty and truly humane.*

TWO things are to be knowen, before we enter into this discourse, the seat or instrument of this intellectuall faculty, and the Action. The seat of the reasonable soule, *vbi sedet pro tribunali, where he sitteth as in his throne or tribunall seat*, is the braine and not the heart, as before Plato and Hippocrates it was commonly thought, for the heart hauing feeling and motion, is not capable of wisdom,

*The seat and instrument of the reasonable Soule.*

Now the braine which is farre greater in man then in all other creatures, if it be well and in such maner made and disposed, that the reasonable soule may worke and exercise it powers, it must come nere vnto the forme of a ship, and must not be round, nor too great nor too little, althoug the greater

ter be lesse vitious. It must be composed of a substance and parts subtile, delicate and delicious, well ioyned and vnitied without separation, hauing foure little chambers or ventricles, whereof three are in the middle, ranged in front, and collaterals betweene and behinde them, drawing towards the hinder part of the head; the fourth is alone, wherein is framed the preparation and coniunction of the vitall spirits, afterwards to be made animall and caried to the three ventricles before, wherein the reasonable soule doth exercise it faculties, which are three, *Understanding, Memory, Imagination*, which doe not exercise their powers apart and distinctly, each one in each ventricle, as some haue commonly thought, but in common all three together in all three, and in euery of them, according to the maner of the outward senses, which are double and haue two ventricles, in each of which the senses do wholly worke, whereby it comes to passe that hee that is wounded in one or two of these ventricles (as he that hath the pallsie) ceaseth not neuerthelesse to exercise all the three; though more weakly which he could not doe, if euery facultie had his chamber or ventricle apart.

2  
*The reasonable  
Soule is organ-  
icall,*

Some haue thought that the reasonable *Soule* was not organically, that is, had no need of any corporall instrument to exercise it functions, thinking thereby the better to proue the immortality of the *Soule*. But not to enter into a labyrinth of discourse, ocular and ordinarie experience disproueth this opinion, and conuinceth the contrary; For it is well known that al men vnderstand not, nor reason not alike and after one maner, but with great diuersity, yea one and the same man may bee so changed, that at one time hee may reason better than at another, in one age, one estate and disposition better than in another, such a one better in health than in sicknesse, and another better in sicknesse than in health, one and the same man, at one and the same time, may bee strong in iudgement and weake in imagination. From whence can these diuersities and alterations proceed, but from the change and alteration of the state of the organ or instrument? From whence cometh it that drunkennes, the bite of a mad dog, a burning fieur, a blow on the head, a fume rising from the stomacke, and other accidents peruert and turne topsie tur-

uy

by the iudgement. intellectuall spirit, and all the wisdom of Greece, yea constraîne the *Soule* to dislodge from the body? These accidents being purely corporall cannot touch nor arrive to this high spirituall faculty of the reasonable soule, but only to the organs or instruments, which being corrupted, the *Soule* cannot well and regularly act and exercise it functions, & being violently inforced, is constrained either to absent it selfe, or depart from the body. Againe, that the reasonable soule should haue need of the seruice of the instruments, doth no way preiudice the immortality thereof: for God maketh vse therof, & accommodates his actions; & as according to the diuersity of the aire, region and climate, God brings forth men very diuers in spirit and naturall sufficiency, as in *Greece* and *Italy* men more ingenious, than in *Muscovy* and *Tartarie*: So the spirit according to the diuersity of the organickall dispositions, and corporall instruments, discourseth better or worse. Now the instrument of the reasonable *Soule*, is the braine, and the temperature thereof, wherof wee are to speake.

Temperature is the mixture and proportion of the foure first qualities, Hot, Cold, Dry, Moist, and it may be a fifth besides, which is the Harmony of these foure. Now from the Temperature of the braine proceedeth all the state and action of the reasonable *Soule*, but that which is the cause of great misery vnto man, is, that the three faculties of the reasonable *Soule*, Vnderstanding, Memory, Imagination, do require and exercise themselves by contrary temperatures. The temperature which serueth, and is proper to the vnderstanding is drie, whereby it comes to passe that they that are stricken in yeeres, doe excell most in their vnderstanding that are yoong, because in the braine as yeeres increase, so moisture decreaseth. So likewise melancholike men, such as are afflicted with want, and fast much (for heauinesse and fasting are driers) are wise and ingenious, *Splendor siccus, animus sapientissimus, vexatio dat intellectum*: heat and drieth refines the wit, affliction giues vnderstanding. And beaſts that are of a drie temperature, as *Ants*, *Bees*, *Elephants*, are wise and ingenious, as they that are of a moist temperature are stupid and without spirit, as *Swine*: And the Southerne people

3  
*Of the temperature of the braine, and the faculties thereof.*

*The vnderstanding dry. Old age.*

*Southerners.*

ple of the world are drie, and moderate in the inward heat of the braine, by reason of their violent outward heat.

2  
The Memory  
moist,  
Infancy.  
Septentrionalis.

The temperature of the memory is moist, whereof it is that infants haue better memory than old men, and the morning after that humidity that is gotten by sleepe in the night, is more apt for memory, which is likewise more vigorous in Northerne people. I heere vnderstand a moisture that is not waterish or distilling, wherein no impression may bee made, but airie, viscous, fat and oily, which easily receiueth, and strongly retaineth, as it is scene in pictures wrought in oile.

3  
The imagination  
in the  
Youth.

The temperature of the imagination is hot, from whence it commeth that franticke men, and such as are sicke of burning maladies, are excellent in that that belongs to imagination, as *Poetry*, *Diuination*, and that it hath greatest force in young men, and of middle yeeres (Poets and Prophets haue flourished in this age) and in the middle parts betwixt North and South.

The middle  
region.

4  
A comparison  
of the tempera-  
tures.

By this diuersity of temperatures it commeth to passe, that a man may be indifferent in all the three faculties, but not excellent; and that he that is excellent in any one of the three, is but weake in the rest: that the temperatures of the memory and vnderstanding are very different and contrary, it is cleere, as dry and moist; as for the imagination, it seemeth not to be so contrary from the others, because heat is not incompatible with drouth and moisture: and yet notwithstanding experience sheweth, that they that excell in imagination, are sicke in vnderstanding and memory, and held for fooles and madde men: but the reason thereof is because the great heat that serueth the imagination, consumeth both the moisture which serueth the memory, and the subtilty of the spirits and figures which should be in that drinelle which serueth the vnderstanding, and so it is contrary, and destroyeth the other two.

5  
Three only tem-  
peratures.

By that which hath beene spoken it appeareth, that there are but three principall temperatures, which serue and cause the reasonable *Soule* to worke, and distinguish the spirits, that is to say, Heat, Drinelle, Moisture: Colde is not actiue, nor serueth to any purpose, but to hinder all the motions and functions.

Etions of the Soule : and when we finde in some authors, that Colde serueth the vnderstanding, and that they that haue colde braines, as Melancholike men and the Southerne, are wise and ingenious ; there Colde is taken not simply, but for a great moderation of heat : for there is nothing more contrary to the vnderstanding and to wisdom, than great heat, which contrariwise serueth the imagination. According to the three temperatures, there are three faculties of the reasonable Soule ; but as the temperatures, so the faculties receiue diuers degrees, subdivisions and distinctions:

There are three principall offices and differences of vnderstanding, to Infer, to Distinguish, to Chase : these Sciences which appertaine to the vnderstanding, are Schoole-Diuinity, the Theorike of Physicke, Logicke, Philosophy naturall and morall. There are three kindes of differences of memory, easily to receiue and lose the figures, easily to receiue and hardly to lose, hardly to receiue and easily to lose. The Sciences of the memory are Grammar, the Theorike of the Law, Positiue Diuinity, Cosinography, Arithmeticke. Of the imagination there are many differences, and a farre greater number than either of the memory or vnderstanding : to it doe properly appertaine, Inuentions, Merry-conceits and Iests, Tricks of subtilty, Fictions and Lies, Figures and comparisons, Neatnesse, Elegancy, Gentility : because to it appertaine, Poetry, Eloquence, Musicke, and generally whatsoever consisteth in Figure, Correspondency, Harmony and Proportion.

Hereby it appeareth that the viuacity, subtilty, promptitude, and that which the common sort call wit, belongs to a hot imagination ; solidity, maturity, verity, to a drie vnderstanding. The imagination is active and stirring, it is it that vndertaketh all, and sets all the rest a worke : the vnderstanding is dull and cloudy : the memory is purely passive, and see how : The imagination first gathereth the kinds and figures of things both present, by the seruice of the five senses, and absent by the benefit of the common sense : afterwards it presenteth them, if it will, to the vnderstanding, which considereth of them, examineth, ruminateth, and iudgeth ; afterwards it puts them to the safe custody of the me-

6  
*Subdiuision of the faculties.*

7  
*The propriety of the faculties and their order.*

memory, as a Scriuener to his booke, to the end he may againe, if need shall require, draw them forth (which men commonly call *Reminiscencia*, Remembrance) or els, if it will, it commits them to the memory before it presents them to the vnderstanding: for to recollect, represent to the vnderstanding, commit vnto memory, and to draw them foorth againe, are all works of the imagination; so that to it are referred, the common Sense, the Fantasie, the Remembrance, and they are not powers separated from it, as some would haue it, to the end they may make more than three faculties of the reasonable Soule.

8

*Their comparison in dignity.*

The common sort of people, who neuer iudge aright, doe more esteeme of memory, and delight more in it, than in the other two, because they haue much vse of counting, and it makes greater shew and stirre in the world; and they thinke, that to haue a good memorie is to be wise, esteeming more of Science than of Wisedome; but yet of the three it is the least, being such as may be euen in fooles themselues: for very seldome is an excellent memorie ioyned with vnderstanding and wisedome, because their temperatures are contrary. From this error of the common people comes that ill course, which euery where wee see, in the instruction of our youth, who are alwayes taught to learne by heart (so they terme it) that which they reade in their bookes, to the end they may afterwards be able to repeat it; and so they fill and charge the memory with the good of another, and take no care to awaken and direct the vnderstanding, and to forme the iudgement, whereby he may be made able to make vse of his owne proper good, and his naturall faculties, which may make him wise and apt to all things: so that we see that the greatest scholars, that haue all *Aristotle* and *Cicero* in their heads, are the veriest sorts, and most ynskillfull in publike affaires, and the world is gouerned by those that know nothing. It is the opinion of all the wisest, that the vnderstanding is the first, the most excellent and principall piece of harnesse: if that speed well, all goes well, and a man is wise; and contrariwise, if that miscarrie, all goes a crosse. In the second place is the imagination: the memorie is the last.

*See of this lib.  
3. cap. 14.*

9

All these differences, it may be, will be better vnderstood by

by this similitude, which is a picture or imitation of the reasonable soule. In every Court of iustice there are three orders or degrees; the highest are the Iudges, with whom there is little stirre but great action, for without the mouing or stirring of themselves, they iudge, decide, order, determine of all things: this is the image of iudgement, the highest part of the Soule. The second are the Aduocates and Proctors, in whom there is great stirre and much adoe, without action, for it lies not in their power to dispatch or order any thing, only they hatch and prepare the businesse: this is the picture of the imagination, an vndertaking, vnquiet facultie, which neuer resteth, no not in the profoundest sleepe; and it makes a noise in the braine, like a pot that seetheth, but neuer setteth. The third and last degree is the Scribe or Register of the Court, with whom there is no stirre nor action, but pure passion, as the Gardian or Custos of all things: and this representeth the memorie.

*An image of  
the three fa-  
culties of this soule.*

The action of the reasonable Soule is the knowledge and vnderstanding of all things: The spirit of man is capable of vnderstanding all things, visible, inuisible, vniuersall, particular, sensible, insensible, *Intellectus est omnia: Vnderstanding is all*: but it selfe either it vnderstands not at all, as some are of opinion (witnesse so great and almost infinite opinions thereof, as wee haue seene before by those doubts and objections that haue alwaies crossed it) or very darkely, imperfectly, and indirectly, by reflexion of the knowledge of things vpon themselves, by which it perceiueth and knoweth that it vnderstandeth, and hath power and facultie to vnderstand: this is the maner whereby the spirit knowes it selfe. The first soueraigne Spirit, God, doth first know himselfe, and afterwards in himselfe all things; the latter spirit, Man, quite contrarie, all other things rather than himselfe, and is in them as the eie in a glasse: how then should it act or worke in it selfe without meane, and by a strait line?

10

*The action of  
the reasonable  
Soule.*

But the question is concerning the meane whereby it knoweth and vnderstandeth things. The common receiued opinion that came from *Aristotle* himselfe is, that the Spirit knoweth and vnderstandeth by the helpe and seruice of the Senses, that it is of it selfe as a white emptie paper, that no-

11

*The meane  
whereby it  
worketh.*



thing commeth to the vnderstanding, which doth not first passe the Senses, *Nisi est in intellectu, quod non fuerit prius in sensu.* *There is nothing in the vnderstanding, which is not first in the sense.* But this opinion is false: first because (as all the wisest haue affirmed, and hath beene before touched) the seeds of all sciences and vertues are naturally dispersed and insinuated into our spirits, so that they may be rich and merry with their owne: and though they want that tillage that is fit, yet then they sufficiently abound. Besides, it is iniurious both to God and nature: for this were to make the state of the reasonable Soule worse than that of other things, than that of the vegetatiue and sensitiue, which of themselves are wise enough to exercise their functions, as hath beene said; for beasts without the discipline of the senses know many things, the vniuersals by the particulars, by the sight of one man they know all men, and are taught to auoid the danger of things hurtfull, and to seeke and to follow after that which is fit for them and their little ones. And it were a thing shamefull and absurd, that this so high and so diuine a facultie should begge it good of things so vile and corruptible as the senses, which doe apprehend only the simple accidents, and not the formes, natures, essence of things, much lesse things vniuersall, the secrets of Nature, and all things insensible. Again, if the Soule were made wise, by the aide of the senses, it would follow, that they that haue their senses most perfect and quicke, should be most wittie, most wise; whereas many times we see the cleane contrary, that their spirits are more dull, and more vnapt, and that many haue of purpose deprived themselves of the vse of some of them, to the end the soule might better, and more freely execute it owne affaires. And if any man shall object, that the soule being wise by nature, and without the helpe of the senses, all men must necessarily be wise, and alwaies vnderstand and reason alike: which being so, how commeth it about that there are so many dull pates in the world, and that they that vnderstand, exercise their functions more weakely at one time than at another, the vegetatiue soule farre more strongly in youth, the reasonable soule more weakely than in old age, and in a certaine state of health or sicknesse than at another time? I may answer,



answer, that the argument is not good : for as touching the first, that is, That all men must be wise : I say that the facultie and vertue of vnderstanding is not giuen alike vnto all, but with great inequalitye, and therefore it is a saying as ancient as honorable, euen of the wisest, that the acting vnderstanding was giuen but to few ; and this inequalitye proueth that Science comes not of sense : for as it hath been said, they that excell others in their senses, come short of others in their vnderstanding and Science. Touching the second, The reason why a man doth not exercise his functions alwaies after one maner, is because the instruments whereby the Soule must necessarily worke, can not alwaies be disposed as they should; and if they be for some speciall kind of faculties or functions, yet not for others. The temperature of the braine, by which the Soule worketh, is diuers and changeable ; being hot and moist, in youth it is good for the vegetatiue, naught for the reasonable; and contrarily, being colde and drie, in olde age it is good for the reasonable, ill for the vegetatiue. The braine by a hot and burning maladie being heated and purified, is more fit for inuention and diuination, vnfit for maturitie and soundnesse of iudgement and wisdom. By that which hath bene spoken let no man thinke, that I affirme that the spirit hath no seruice from the senses, which I confesse to be great, especially in the beginning, in the discouery and inuention of things : but I say in the defence of the honor of the spirit, that it is false that it dependeth vpon the senses, and that we can not know any thing, vnderstand, reason, discourse without the sense: for contrariwise all knowledge comes from it, and the senses can doe nothing without it.

The spirit in this vnderstanding facultie proceedeth diuersly, and by order: It vnderstandeth at the first instant, simply and directly a Lion to be a Lion, afterwards by consequents that hee is strong : for seeing the effects of his strength, it concludeth that he is strong. By diuision or negatiue, it vnderstandeth a Hare to be fearefull ; for seeing it hide and hide it selfe, it concludeth that a Hare is not strong, because fearefull. It knoweth some by similitude, others by a collection of many things together.

12

# CHAP. XIII

*Of the humane Spirit, the parts, functions, qualities, reasons,  
invention, verities thereof.*

**T**His humane Spirit, and *Oeconomie* of this great and high intellectuall part of the soule, is a depth of obscurity, full of creeks and hidden corners, a confused and involved labyrinth, and bottomlesse pit, consisting of many parts, faculties, actions, diuers motions, hauing many names, doubts and difficulties.

1 The first office thereof is simply to receiue and apprehend the images and kindes of things, which is a kinde of passion and impression of the Soule, occasioned by the objects and the presence of them; this is imagination and apprehension.

2 The force and power thereof, to feed, to handle, to stirre, to concoct, to digest the things receiued by the imagination, this is reason, *λογικη*.

3 The action and office, or exercise of this force and power, which is to assemble, conioyne, separate, diuide the things receiued, and to adde likewise others: this is discourse, reasoning, *λογικη & διαλεκτικη, quasi διαλογος*.

4 The subtile facilitie, and cheerefull readinesse to doe all these things, and to penetrate into them, is called Spirit, *Ingenium*; and therefore to be ingenious, sharpe, subtile, piercing, is all one.

5 The repetition and action of ruminating, reconcocting, trying by the whetstone of reason, and reworking of it, to frame a resolution more solide: this is iudgement.

6 The effect in the end of the vnderstanding: this is knowledge, intelligence, resolution.

7 The action that followeth this knowledge and resolution, which is to extend it selfe, to put forward, and to aduance the thing knowen: this is will. *Intellectus extensus & pro-motus*.

8 Wherefore all these things, *Understanding, Imagination, Reason, Discourse, Spirit, Iudgement, Intelligence, Will*, are one and the same essence, but all diuers in force, vertue and action: for a man may be excellent in one of them, and weake in another:

another : and many times he that excelleth in Spirit and subtiltie, may be weake in iudgement and soliditie.

I let no man to sing, and set forth the praises and greatnesse of the Spirit of man, the capacitie, viuacitie, quicknesse thereof : let it be called the image of the liuing God, a taste of the immortal substance, a streame of the Diuinitie, a celestiall ray, whereunto God hath giuen reason, as an animated sterne to moue it by rule and measure, and that it is an instrument of a compleat harmonie ; that by it there is a kinde of kindred betwixt God and man : and that he might often remember him, he hath turned the root towards the heauens, to the end he should alwayes looke towards the place of his natiuitie : to be brieft, that there is nothing great vpon the earth but man, nothing great in man but his spirit : if a man ascend to it, he ascendeth aboue the heauens. These are all pleasing and plausible words, whereof the Schooles do ring.

<sup>2</sup>  
The generall  
description and  
commendation  
of the Spirit.

But I desire, that after all this we come to sound and to studie how to know this spirit ; for we shall finde after all this, that it is both to it selfe and to another a dangerous instrument, a ferret that is to be feared, a little trouble-feast, a tedious and importune parasite, and which as a Iugler and plai-<sup>3</sup>  
er at fast and loose, vnder the shadow of some gentle motion, subtile and smiling, forgeth, inuenteth, and causeth all the mischiefs of the world : and the truth is, without it there are none.

The dispraise.

There is farre greater diuersitie of spirits than of bodies, so is there likewise a larger field to enter into, more parts and more formes or fashions to be spoken of : we may make three classes or formes, whereof each one hath many degrees : The first, which is the lowest, are those weake, base, and almost brutish spirits, neere neighbors to beasts themselues, whether by reason of the first temper, that is to say, of the seed and temperature of the braine, either too colde or too moist, as amongst other creatures fishes are the lowest ; or by reason that they haue not been in some sort removed and reuiued, but suffered to rust, and grow dull and stupid. Of these we make no great account, as being vnfit to be ordered and settled into any certaine and constant societie, because both for their owne particular they can not possibly endure it, and it were necessary they should alwaies be vnder the tuition of another,

<sup>4</sup>  
Diuersitie of distinctions of the  
spirits. See heere  
of more Chap.

39.

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other, this is the common and base people, *qui vigilans stertit; mortua cui vita est; prope iam vivo atque videnti; who waking snorteth, whose life is dead, or rather almost alive, and seeing,* which vnderstands not, iudgeth not it selfe. The second which is the highest, are those great and rare spirits, rather diuels than ordinary men, spirits well borne, strong and vigorous. Of these kinde of people, there was neuer age yet could tell how to build a common-weale. The third which is the middle, are all those indifferent spirits, whereof there are infinite degrees: of these almost is the whole world composed. Of this distinction and others, heereafter more at large. But we are to touch more particularly the conditions and nature of this spirit, as hard to be knowen, as a countenance to be counterfeited to the life, which is alwaies in motion.

5

*The particular  
description.  
Agent perpetu-  
all.*

First therefore it is a perpetuall agent, for the spirit cannot be without action, but rather than it will, it forgeth false and phantasticall subiects, in earnest deceiuing it selfe, even to it owne discredit. As idle and vnmanured grounds, if they be fat and fertile, abound with a thousand kinds of wilde and vnprofitable hearbs, vntill they be sowed with other seeds, and women alone without the company of men, bring forth sometimes great abundance of vnformed, indigested lumps of flesh: so the *Spirit*, if it be not busied about some certaine object, it runnes riot into a world of imaginations, and there is no folly nor vanity that it produceth not, and if it haue not a serled limit, it wandreth and loseth it selfe. For to be euery where is to be no where. Motion and agitation is the true life and grace of the *Spirit*, but yet it must proceed from elsewhere, than from it selfe. If it be solitary, and wanteth a subiect to worke on, it creepeth along and languisheth, but yet it must not be enforced. For too great a contention and intention of the *Spirit* ouer bent, and strained, deceiueth and troubleth the *Spirit*.

6

*Vniuersall.*

It is likewise vniuersall, it medleth and mingleth it selfe with all, it hath no limited subiect or iurisdiction. There is not any thing wherewith it plaieth not his part, as well to vaine subiects and of no account, as high and weighty; as well to those we can vnderstand, as those we vnderstand not:

For

For to know that we cannot vnderstand or pierce into the marrow or pith of a thing, but that we must sticke in the bone and barke thereof, is an excellent signe of iudgement, for science, yea truth it selfe, may lodge nere vs without iudgement, and iudgement without them, yea to know our owne ignorance, is a faire testimony of iudgement.

Thirdly, it is prompt and speedy running in a moment from the one end of the world to the other, without stay or rest, stirring it selfe and penetrating through euery thing, 7

*Nobilis & inquietamens homini data est, nunquam se tenet, spargitur vaga, quietis impatiens, nouitate rerum latissima. Non mirum ex illo celestis spiritus descendit, celestium autem natura semper in motu est. A noble and vnquiet minde is giuen vnto man, who neuer withholdeth her motion, inconstant, euery where dispersed, impatient of rest, delighted most with nouelties; No maruell if she descend of a celestiall spirit, for that the nature of celestiall things is to be in perpetuall motion. This great speed and quickenelle, this agility, this twinkling of the eie, as it is admirable, and one of the greatest wonders that are in the spirit, so it is a thing very dangerous, a great disposition and propension vnto folly and madnesse, as presently you shall heare.*

By reason of these three conditions of the spirit, that is, a perpetuall agent without repose, vniuersall, prompt and sudden, it hath been accounted immortall, and to haue in it selfe some marke and sparkle of diuinitie.

The action of the spirit is alwaies to search, ferret, continue without intermission, like one famished for want of knowledge, to enquire and seeke, and therefore *Homer* calles men *ἀλφεύς*. There is no end of our inquisitions: the pursutes of the spirit of man are without limits, without forme: the food thereof is double ambiguitie; it is a perpetuall motion without rest, without bound. The world is a schoole of inquisition; agitation and hunting is it proper dish: to take, or to faile of the prey, is another thing. 8

But it worketh and pursueth it enterprises, rashly, and irregularly, without order, and without measure, it is a wandring instrument, moouable, diuersly turning; it is an instrument of lead and of wax, it boweth and straitneth, applieth it selfe to all, more supple and facill than the water, the aire, *fl. xibilis* 9

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*omni humore obsequentior, & ut spiritus qui omni materia facillior ut tenuior; It is flexible, and more yeelding to every humor, and as the spirit which is more facill and easie to every matter or substance; It is the shoo of Theramenes, fit for all. The cunning is to finde where it is, for it goes alwaies athwart, and crosse, as well with a lie, as with a truth: it sporteth it selfe and findeth a seeming reason for every thing; for it maketh that which is impious, vnjust, abominable in one place, pietie, iustice and honour in another: neither can we name any law or custome, or condition, that is either generally receiued of all, or reiected; the marriage of those that are neere of blood, the murther of infants, parents, is condemned in one place, lawfull in another. Plato refused an embrodered and perfumed robe offered him by Dionysius, saying that he was a man, and therefore would not adorne himselfe like a woman. Aristippus accepted of that robe, saying the outward acoutrement can not corrupt a chaste minde. Diogenes washing his colewarts and seeing Aristippus passe by sayd vnto him, If thou knewest how to liue with colewarts, thou wouldest neuer follow the Court of a Tyrant. Aristippus answered him, If thou knewest how to liue with Kings, thou wouldest neuer wash colewarts. One perswaded Solon to cease from the bewailing the death of his sonnes, because his teares did neither profit nor helpe him. Yea therefore, saith he, are my teares iust, and I haue reason to weepe. The wife of Socrates redoubled her gife, because the Iudges put her husband to death vniustly: What, saith he, wouldest thou rather I were iustly condemned? There is no good, sayth a wife man, but that, to the losse whereof a man is alwayes prepared, *In quo enim est dolor amitteres, & timor amittenda. Equall is the feare of the losse, to the grieve of the thing lost.* Quite contrary, sayth another, we embrace and locke vp that good a great deale the more carefully, which we see leise sure, and alwaies feare will be taken from vs. A Cynique Philosopher demanded of Antigonus the King, a dram of siluer. That, sayth he, is no gift fit for a King. Why then giue me a talent, sayth the Philosopher. And that, saith the King, is no gift for a Cynique. One sayd of a King of Sparta that was gentle and debonaire, Hee is a good man euen to the wicked. How should hee be good*

10  
Reason hath di-  
uers faces.

good vnto the wicked, saith another, if he be not wicked with the wicked. So that we see that the reason of man hath many visages : it is a two-edged sword, a staffe with two pikes, *Ogni medaglia ha il suo verso*. There is no reason but hath a contrary reason, sayth the soundest and surest Philosopher.

Now this volubilitie and flexibilitie proceedeth from many causes ; from the perpetuall alteration and motion of the bodie, which is neuer twice in a mans life in one and the same estate ; from the objects which are infinite, the aire it selfe, and the serenitie of the heauen,

*Talesunt hominum mentes quali pater ipse  
Iupiter auctiferas lustrauit lampade terras,  
Men are, as God giues influence by the Sunne  
Which round about the world doth runne,*

and all outward things : inwardly from those shakings and tremblings which the Soule giues vnto it selfe by the agitation, and stirreth vp by the passions thereof : insomuch that it beholdeth things with diuers countenances ; for whatsoeuer is in the world hath diuers lustures, diuers considerations. *Epictetus* sayd it was a pot with two hands. He might better haue sayd with many.

The reason heereof is, because it entangleth it selfe in it owne worke like the Silke-worme : for as it thinketh to note from farre, I know not what appearance of light, and imaginarie truth, and flies vnto it : there are many difficulties that crosse the way, new sents that inebriate and bring it forth of the way.

12  
*The reason of  
this intangle-  
ment.*

The end at which it aimeth is twofold, the one more common and naturall, which is Truth, which it searcheth and pursueth ; for there is no desire more naturall than to know the trueth : we alway all the meanes we can to attaine vnto it, but in the end all our endeouours come short ; for Truth is not an ordinary booty, or thing that will suffer it selfe to be gotten and handled, much lesse to be possessed by any humane Spirit. It lodgeth within the bosom of God, that is her chamber, her retiring place. Man knoweth not, vnderstandeth not anything aright, in purity and in truth as he ought : appearances doe alwayes compasse him on euery side, which are as well in those things that are false as true. We are borne to search

13  
*The end is ve-  
rity which is  
can neither at-  
taine nor finde,*

*Reads before  
Chap. 9.*



search the truth, but to possesse it, belongeth to a higher and greater power. Truth is not his that thrusts himselfe into it, but his that runnes the fairest course towards the marke. When it fallēs out that he hits vpon a trueth, it is by chance and hazzard, he knowes not how to holde it, to possesse it, to distinguish it from a lie. Errours are receiued into our soule, by the selfe same way and conduit that the truth is the spirit hath no meanes either to distinguish or to chuse: and as well may he play the sot, that telles a trueth as a lie. The meanes that it vseth for the discouery of the truth, are reason and experience, both of them very weake, vncertaine, diuers, waue-  
ring. The greatest argument of truth, is the generall consent of the world: now the number of fooles doth farre exceed the number of the wise, and therefore how should that generall consent be agreed vpon, but by corruption and an applause giuen without iudgement and knowledge of the cause, and by the imitation of some one that first began to dance.

14

*The second end  
Inuention.*

The other end lesse naturall, but more ambitious, is Inuention, vnto which it tendeth as to the highest point of honor, to the end it may raise it selfe and preuaile the more: this is that which is in so high account, that it seemeth to be an image of the Diuinity. From the sufficiency of this inuention, haue proceeded all those works, which haue rauished the whole world with admiration; which if they be such as are for the publike benefit, they haue deified their Authours. Those workes that shew rather finenesse of wit than bring profit with them, are painting, caruing, Architecture, the art Perspective; as the vine of *Zenxis*, the *Venus* of *Apelles*, the image of *Memnon*, the horse of *Asrain*, the wodden pigeon of *Architas*, the cow of *Myron*, the flie and the eagle of *Montroyall*, the spheare of *Sapor* King of the Persians, and that of *Archimides* with his other engins. Now art and inuention seeme not only to imitate Nature, but to excell it, and that not only in the *Indisiduum* or particular (for there is not any bodie either of man or beast, so vniuersally well made, as by art may be shewed) but also many things are done by art, which are not done by nature: I meane besides those compositions and mixtures, which are the true diet, and proper subject of art, those distillations of waters and oiles, made of sim-  
ples,

*The praise of  
Inuention.*



ples, which Nature framed not. But in all this there is no such cause of admiration as we thinke; and to speake properly and truly, there is no inuention but that which God reuealeth: for such as we account and call so, are but obseruations of naturall things, arguments and conclusions drawn from them, as Painting and the art Opticke from shadowes, Sun-dials from the shadowes of trees, the grauing of seales from precious stones.

By all this that hath before bene spoken, it is easie to see how rash and dangerous the spirit of man is, especially if it be quicke and vigorous: for being so industrious, so free and vniuersall, making it motions so irregularly, vsing it libertie so boldly in all things, not tying it selfe to any thing; it easily shaketh the common opinions, and all those rules whereby it should be bridled and restrained as an vniust tyranny: it will vndertake to examine all things, to iudge the greatest part of things plausibly receiued into the world, to be ridiculous and absurd, and finding for all an appearance of reason, will defend it selfe against all, whereby it is to be feared that it wandreth out of the way and loseth it selfe: and we can not but see that they that haue any extraordinary viuacity and rare excellency (as they that are in the highest rooofe of that middle *Classis* before spoken of) are for the most part lawlesse both in opinions and manners. There are very few of whose guide and conduct a man may trust, and in the libertie of whose iudgements a man may wade without temeritie, beyond the common opinion. It is a miracle to finde a great and liuely spirit, well ruled and gouerned: it is a dangerous sword which a man knowes not well how to guide; for from whence come all those disorders, reuolts, herelies and troubles in the world, but for this? *Magni errores non nisi ex magnis ingenijs: nihil sapientie odiosius acumine nimio.* Great errors proceed not but from great wits: nothing is more prejudiciall to wisdom than too much sharpenes of wit. Doubtlesse that man liues a better time, and a longer life, is more happie and farre more fit for the gouernment of a Common-wealth, saith *Thucydides*, that hath an indifferent spirit, or some-what beneath a mediocritie, than he that hath a spirit so eleuated and transcendent, that it serues not for any thing but the torment of himselfe

15  
The Spirit very  
dangerous.

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 himselfe and others. From the firmest friendships doe spring  
 the greatest enmities, and from the soundest health the dead-  
 liest maladies: and euen so, from the rarest and quickest agi-  
 tation of our soules the most desperate resolutions and disor-  
 derly frensies. Wisedome and folly are neere neighbors,  
 there is but a halfe turne betwixt the one and the other, which  
 we may easily see in the actions of madde men. Philosophie  
 teacheth, that Melancholy is proper to them both. Where-  
 of is framed the finest follie, but of the finest wit? And there-  
 fore, sayth *Aristotle*, there is no great spirit without some mix-  
 ture of follie. And *Plato* telleth vs, that in vaine a temperate  
 and sound spirit knocketh at the doore of Poetrie. And in  
 this sense it is, that the wisest and best Poets doe loue some-  
 times to play the foole, and to leape out of the hindges. *In-*  
*sanire iucundum est, dulce desipere in loco: non potest grande &*  
*sublime quidquam nisi mota mens, & quamdiu apud se est.* It is  
 a delightfull thing sometimes to be madde, a sweete matter in some  
 cases to be foolish: The minde vnlasse it be altogether employed, can  
 doe no great matter, or attempt any thing of moment as long as it  
 is wholly collected within it selfe.

16  
 It must be bri-  
 dled, & why.

Seneca.

And this is the cause why man hath good reason to keepe  
 it within narrow bounds, to bridle and binde it with Religi-  
 ons, Lawes, Customes, Sciences, precepts, Threatnings, Pro-  
 mises mortall and immortall, which notwithstanding yet we  
 see, that by a lawlesse kinde of libertie it freeth it selfe, and  
 escapeth all these, so vnruely is it by nature, so fierce, so opi-  
 natue: and therefore it is to be led by art, since by force it  
 cannot. *Natura continet max est animus humanus, in contrarium*  
*atq; arduum nitens, sequiturq; facilius quam ducitur, ut generosi*  
*& nobiles equi melius facili freno reguntur.* The minde of man is  
 naturally stubborne, alwaies inclining to difficult and contrary  
 things, and doth easier follow, than is led by force, like vnto generous  
 horses, that are better governed with an easie bridle, then a cutting  
 bitte. It is a surer way gently to tutor it, and to lay it asleepe,  
 than to suffer it to wander at it owne pleasure: for if it be not  
 well and orderly gouerned, (as they of the highest classis  
 which before we spake of) or weake, and soft and pliant (as  
 those of the lower ranke) it will lose it selfe in the libertie of it  
 owne iudgement: and therefore it is necessary that it be by  
 some

some meanes or other held backe, as hauing more need of lead than wings, of a bridle than of a spurre; which the great Lawyers and Founders of States did especially regard, as well knowing, that people of an indifferent spirit, liued in more quiet and content, than the ouer-quicke and ingenious. There haue been more troubles and seditions in ten yeeres in the on-ly cittie of *Florence*, than in five hundred yeeres in the coun-tries of the *Heluetians* and the *Retians*. And to say the truth, men of a common sufficiencie are more honest, better citi-zens, more pliant, and willing to submit themselues to the yoke of the lawes, their superiours, reason it selfe, than those quicke and cleere sighted men, that cannot keepe themselues within their owne skinnies. The finest wits are not the wisest men.

The *Spirit* hath it maladies, defects, tares or refuse as well as the bodie and much more, more dangerous and more incu-  
rable: but that wee may the better know them, we must di-  
stinguish them: Some are accidentall, and which come from  
elsewhere, and those arise from three causes; the disposition  
of the bodie, for it is manifest that the bodily maladie which  
alter the temperature thereof, do likewise alter the spirit and  
iudgement; or from the ill composition of the substance of  
the braine, and organs of the reasonable *Soule*, whether it be  
by reason of their first formation, as in those that haue their  
heads ill made, either too round, or too long, or too little, or  
by accident of some blow or wound. The second is the vni-  
uersall contagion of vulgar and erroneous opinions in the  
world, wherewith the *Spirit* being preoccupied, tainted,  
and overcome, or which is worse, made drunken, and mana-  
cled with certaine fantasticall opinions, it euer afterwards fol-  
loweth & iudgeth according to them, without regard either  
of farther enquiry, or recoiling backe: from which danger-  
ous deluge all spirits haue not force and strength to defend  
themselves.

The third much more neere, is the maladie and corrupti-  
on of the will, and the force of the passions, this is a world  
turned topsie turuy: the will is made to follow the vnderstan-  
ding as a guide and lampe vnto it; but being corrupted and  
sealed on by the force of the passions (or rather by the fall of

17  
The defect of  
the spirit.

Accidental  
proceeding from  
three causes.

1. The body.

2. The world.

3. The passions.

our first father *Adam* ) doth likewise perhaps corrupt the vnderstanding, and so from hence come the greatest part of our erroneous iudgements: Enuie, Malice, Hatred, Loue, Feare, make vs to respect, to iudge, to take things others than they are, & quite otherwise than we ought, from whence commeth that common crie, Iudge without passion. From hence it is that the beautifull and generous actions of another man are obscured by vile and base misconstructions, that vaine and wicked causes & occasions are feined. This is a great vice and a prooffe of a malignant nature and sicke iudgement, in which there is neither great subtiltie nor sufficiencie, but malice enough. This proceedeth either from the enuy they beare to the glorie of another man, or because they iudge of others according to themselves, or because they haue their taste altered and their sight so troubled, that they cannot discern the cleere splendour of vertue in it native purity. From this selfe same cause and source it commeth, that we make the vertues and vices of another man to preuaile so much, and extend them farther than we ought, that from particularities wee draw consequents and generall conclusions: if he be a friend all sits well about him, his vices shall be vertues: if he be an enemy or of a contrary faction, there is nothing good in him: insomuch that we shame our owne iudgement, to smooth vp our owne passions. But this rests not heere, but goeth yet farther; for the greatest part of those impieties, heresies, errors in our faith and religion, if we looke well into it, is sprung from our wicked and corrupt willes, from a violent and voluptuous passion, which afterwards draweth vnto it the vnderstanding it selfe, *Sedit populus manducare, & bibere &c. quod vult non quod est credit, qui cupit errare*: The people sitteth downe to eat and drinke &c. In such sort that what was done in the beginning with some scruple and doubt, hath been afterwards held and maintained for a veritie and reuelation from heauen: that which was onely in the sensualiitie, hath taken place in the highest part of the vnderstanding: that which was nothing els but a passion and a pleasure, hath beene made a religious matter and an article of faith: so strong and dangerous is the contagion of the faculties of the Soule amongst themselves. These are the three outward causes of the faults and miscariages

Exod. 32.  
2. Paral. 15.  
3. Reg. 15.  
August. lib.  
2. De ciuitate  
Dei.

miscariages of the *Spirit*, iudgement and vnderstanding of man, The body, especially the head, sicke, or wounded, or ill fashioned; The world with the anticipated opinions and suppositions thereof; The ill estate of the other faculties of the reasonable Soule, which are all inferiour vnto it. The first are pitifull, and some of them to be cured, some not: thesecond are excusable and pardonable: the third are accusabable and punishabable for suffring such a disorder so neere them: as this is; those that should obey the law, to take vpon them to giue the law.

There are other defects of the *Spirit*, which are more natural vnto it, and in it. The greatest and the root of all the rest is pride and presumption (the first and original fault of all the world, the plague of all spirits, and the cause of all euils) by which a man is only content with himselfe, will not giue place to another, disdaineth his counsels, reposes himselfe in his owne opinions, takes vpon him to iudge and condemne others, yea even that which he vnderstands not. It is truly said, that the best and happiest distribution that God ever made, is of iudgement, because every man is content with his owne, and thinkes he hath inough. Now this malady proceedeth from the ignorance of our selues. We neuer vnderstand sufficiently and truly the weaknesse of our spirit: but the greatest disease of the spirit is ignorance, not of Arts and Sciences, and what is included in the writings of others, but of it selfe, for which cause this first booke hath beene written.

18  
Natural.

## CHAP. XV.

*Of Memory.*

MEemory is many times taken by the vulgar sort for the sense and vnderstanding, but not so truly and properly: for both by reason (as hath beene sayd) and by experience, the excellency of the one is ordinarily accompanied with the weaknesse of the other, and to say the truth, it is a faculty very profrable for the world, but yet comes far short of the vnderstanding, and of all the parts of the *Soule* is the more delicate, and most fraile. The excellency thereof is not very requisite, but to three sorts of people: Merchants or men of

Trade, great talkers, (for the storehouse of the memory is more full and furnished, than that of inuention, for hee that wants it comes short, and must be faine to frame his speech out of the forge of his owne inuention) and liars, *mendacium oportet esse memorem. It behoueth a liar to haue a good memorie.* From the want of memory proceed these commodities: to lie seldome, to talke little, to forget offences. An indifferent memory sufficeth for all.

## CHAP. XVI.

## Of the Imagination and opinion,

The effects of  
the imagination  
may be many.

**T**He imagination is a thing very strong and powerfull, it is it that makes all the stirre, all the clatter, yea the perturbation of the world proceeds from it (as we haue sayd before, it is either the onely, or at least the most active and stirring facultie of the Soule). The effects thereof are maruelous and strange: it worketh not only in it owne proper bodie and Soule, but in that of another man, yea it produceth contrary effects: it makes a man b'ush, wax pale, tremble, dote, to wauer; these are the least and the best: it takes away the power and vse of the ingendring parts, yea when there is most need of them, and is the cause why men are more sharpe and austere, not only towards themselves but others, witnesse thoseties and bands whereof the world is full, which are for the most part impressions of the apprehension and of feare. And contrariwise, without endeuor, without object, and even in sleepe it satisfieth the amorous desires, yea changeth the sex, witnesse *Lucius Cossinius*, whom *Pliny* affirmeth to haue seen to be changed from a woman to a man, the day of his mariage; and diuers the like: it maketh sometimes ignominiously, yea it killeth and makes abortiue the fruit within the wombe; it takes away a mans speech, and giues it to him that neuer had it, as to the sonne of *Craesus*: it taketh away motion, sense, respiration. Thus we see how it worketh in the bodie. Touching the Soule: it makes a man to lose his vnderstanding, his knowledge, iudgement; it turnes him foole and mad-man, witnesse *Gallus Urbicus*, who hauing ouer-bent his spirits in comprehending the essence and motions of folly, so dislodged

dislodged and disiointed his owne iudgement, that he could neuer settle it againe : it inspireth a man with the foreknowledge of things secret and to come, and causeth those inspirations, prædictions, and marvellous inuentions, yea it rauisheth with extasies : it killeth not seemingly but in good earnest, witnesse that man whose eyes being couered to receiue his death, and vncouered againe to the end he might reade his pardon, was found starke dead vpon the scaffold. To be brieue, from hence spring the greatelt part of those things which the common sort of people call miracles, visions, enchantments. It is not alwayes the diuell, or a familiar spirit, as now adaies the ignorant people thinke, when they can not finde the reason of that they see; nor alwayes the spirit of God (for these supernaturall motions we speake not of heere) but for the most part it is the effect of the imagination, or long of the agent who sayth & doth such things; or of the patient and spectator, who thinks he seeth that he seeth not. It is an excellent thing and necessary in such a case, to know wisely how to discerne the reason thereof, whether it be naturall or supernaturall, false or true, *Discretio spirituum, A discerning of spirits.* And not to precipitate our iudgements, as the most part of the common people do by the want thereof.

In this part and faculty of the soule doth opinion lodge, which is a vaine, light, crude and imperfect iudgement of things drawn from the outward senses, and common report, settling and holding it selfe to be good in the imagination, and neuer arriuing to the vnderstanding, there to be examined, sifted, and laboured; and to be made reason which is a true, perfect and solide iudgement of things: and therefore it is vncertaine, inconstant, fleeting, deceitfull, a very ill and dangerous guide, which makes head against reason, whereof it is a shadow and image, though vaine and vntrue. It is the mother of all mischiets, confusions, disorders: from it spring all passions, all troubles. It is the guide of fooles, fors, the vulgar sort, as reason of the wise and dexterious.

It is not the trueth and nature of things which doth thus stirre and molest our soules, it is opinion, according to that ancient saying, Men are tormented by the opinions that they haue of things, not by the things themselves. *Opinione sapiens,*

3  
The world is  
lead by opinion.



*quàm relaboramini : plura sunt quæ nos tenent, quàm quæ premunt. We are more troubled with the opinion of things, then with the things themselves ; there are more things that hold vs, then which presse or urge vs.* The verity and Essence of things entreteth not into vs, nor lodgeth neere vs of it selfe, by it owne proper strength and authority : for were it so, all things should be receiued of all, all alike, and after the same fashion ; all should be of like credit, and truth it selfe, which is neuer but one and vniforme, should be embraced thorowout the whole world. Now forasmuch as there is so great a variety, yea contrariety of opinions in the world, and there is not any thing concerning which all doe generally accord, no not the wisest and best borne and bred ; it giueth vs to vnderstand, that things enter into vs by composition, yeelding themselves to our mercy and deuotion, lodging themselves neere vnto vs, according to our pleasure, and humour and temper of our soules. That which I belecue, I can not make my companion belecue ; but, which is more what I doe firmly belecue to day, I can not assure my selfe that I shall belecue to morrow : yea it is certaine that at another time I shall iudge quite otherwise. Doubtlesse every thing taketh in vs such place, such a taste, such a colour, as we thinke best to giue vnto it, and such as the inward constitution of the soule is, *omnia munda mundi, immunda immundis. All things are cleane, to the pure and cleane, as also vncleane to the impure and vncleane.* As our apparell and accoutrements do as well warme vs, not by reason of their heat, but our owne, which they preferue, as likewise nourish the coldnesse of the ice and snow ; we doe first warme them with our heat, and they in recompence thereof preferue our heat.

Almost all the opinions that wee haue, wee haue not but from authority : we belecue, we iudge, wee worke, wee liue, we die and all vpon credit, euen as the publike vse and custome teacheth vs ; and we doe well therein : for we are too weake to iudge and chuse of our selues ; no the wise doe it not, as shall be spoken.

*Lib. 1, chap. 1.*

2.

CHAP.



## CHAP. XVII.

## Of the Will.

**T**He Will is a great part of the reasonable soule, of very great importance, and it standeth vs vpon about all things to studie how to rule it, because vpon it dependeth almost our whole estate and good.

*The preeminence and importance of the will.*

It only is truly ours, and in our power; all the rest, vnderstanding, memory, imagination may be taken from vs, altered, troubled with a thousand accidents: not the will.

*The comparison thereof with the vnderstanding.*

Secondly, this is that, that keepeth a man intire, and importeth him much: for he that hath giuen his will, is no more his owne man, neither hath he any thing of his owne.

*Doubtfull if not erroneous.*

Thirdly, this is it whereby we are made and called good or wicked, which giueth vs the temper and the tincture.

As of all the goods that are in man, vertue or honesty is the first and principall, and which doth farre excell knowledge, dexteritie; so wee can not but confesse, that the will where vertue and goodnesse lodgeth, is of all others the most excellent: and to say the trueth, a man is neither good nor wicked, honest nor dishonest, because he vnderstandeth and knoweth those things that are good, and faire, and honest, or wicked and dishonest; but because he loueth them, and hath desire and will towards them. The vnderstanding hath other preeminences: for it is vnto the will as the husband to the wife, the guide and light vnto the traveller, but in this it giueth place vnto the will.

The true difference betwixt these faculties is, in that by the vnderstanding things enter into the soule, and it receiue them (as those words, to apprehend, conceiue, comprehend, the true offices thereof doe import) but they enter not entire and such as they are, but according to the proportion and capacity of the vnderstanding: whereby the greatest and the highest do recoile and diuide themselves after a sort, by this entrance, as the Ocean entreth not altogether into the *Mediterrane* sea, but according to the proportion of the mouth of the Strait of *Gibraltar*. By the will, on the other side, the soule goeth forth of it, and lodgeth and liueth

elsewhere in the thing beloued, into which it transformed it selfe, and therefore beareth the name, the title, the liuerie, being called vertuous, vitious, spirituall, carnall: whereby it followeth, that the will is enobled by louing those things that are high and worthy of loue; is vilified, by giuing it selfe to those things that are base and vnworthy, as a wife honoureth or dishonoureth her selfe by that husband that she hath taken.

Experience teacheth vs, that three things do sharpen our will, Difficultie, Raritie, and Absence, or feare to lose the thing; as the three contrary dull it, Facilitie, Abundance, or Satietie, and daily presence or assured fruition. The three former giue price and credit to things, the three latter ingender contempt. Our will is sharpened by opposition, it opposeth it selfe against deniall. On the other side, our appetite contemneth and letteth passe that which it hath in possession, and runnes after that which it hath not, *Permissum sit uile nefas: quod licet ingratum est, quod non licet acrimus urit: Things permitted we despise, and that which is lawfull we loath, but violently pursue, those things that are prohibited.* Yea it is scene in all sorts of pleasures, *Omnium rerum voluptas ipso quo debet fugare periculo crescit: All pleasures are increased euen with the danger wherewith they ought to be despised.* Insomuch that the two extreames, the defect and the abundance, the desire and the fruition do put vs to like paine. And this is the cause why things are not truely esteemed as they ought, and that there is no Prophet in his owne countrey.

How wee are to direct and rule our willes, shall be sayd heereafter.

## PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS.

### An aduertisement.

Lib. 2. cap. 6.  
 & 7. lib. 3. in  
 the vertues of  
 fortune and  
 temperance.

**T**He matter of the passions of the minde is very great and plentifull, and takes vp a great roome in this doctrine of Wisedome. To learne how to know them, and to distinguish them, is the subiect of this booke. The generall remedies to bridle, rule, and gouerne them, the subiect of the second booke.

booke. The particular remedies of euery one of them, of the third booke, following the method of this booke, set downe in the Preface. Now that in this first booke we may attaine the knowledge of them, we will first speake of them in generall in this first Chapter, afterward in the Chapters following particularly of euery one of them. I haue not seene any that painteth them out more richly, and to the life, than *Le Sieur du Vair* in his little morall books, whereof I haue made good vse in this passionate subiect.

## CHAP. XVIII.

## Of the passions in generall.

**P**assion is a violent motion of the *Soule* in the sensitiue part thereof, which is made either to follow that which the *Soule* thinketh to be good for it, or to flie that which it takes to be euill. 1  
The description  
of passions.

But it is necessarie that we know how these motions are made, how they arise and kindle themselues in vs; which a man may represent by diuers meanes and comparisons: first in regard of their agitation and violence. The Soule which is but one in the bodie hath many and diuers powers, according to the diuers vessels wherein it is retained, the instruments whereof it maketh vse, and the obiects which are presented vnto it. Now when the parts wherein it is inclosed, doe not retaine and occupie it, but according to the proportion of their capacitie, and as farre forth as it is necessarie for their true vse; the effects thereof are sweete, benigne, and well-gouerned: but when contrariwise the parts thereof haue more motion and heat than is needfull for them, they change and become hurtfull; no otherwise than the beames of the Sunne, which wandering according to their naturall libertie, do sweetly and pleasingly warme; if they be recollected and gathered into the concauities of a burning glasse, they burne and consume that they were wont to nourish and quicken. Againe, they haue diuers degrees in their force of agitation; and as they haue more or lesse, so they are distinguished; the indifferent suffer themselues to be tasted and digested, expressing themselues by words and teares; the greater and more 2  
Their agitation.

more violent astonish the soule, oppresse it, and hinder the libertie of it actions. *Cura leues loquuntur, ingentes stupent.* Light cares moue the tongue, but great cause astonishment and silence.

3  
2 Of their vice  
and irregular-  
itie.

Secondly, in regard of the vice, disorder, and iniustice that is in these passions, we may compare man to a Common- weale, and the state of the soule to a state royall, wherein the Soueraigne for the gouernment of so many people hath vnder-magistrates, vnto whom for the exercise of their charges he giueth lawes and ordinances, reseruing vnto himselfe the censuring of the greatest and most important occurrents. Vpon this order dependeth the peace and prosperity of the state: and contrariwise, if the magistrates, which are as the middle sort betwixt the Prince and the people, shall suffer themselves either to be deceiued by facility, or corrupted by fauour; and without respect either of their Soueraigne, or the lawes by him established, shall vse their owne authoritie in the execution of their affaires, they fill all with disorder and confusion. Euen so in man, the vnderstanding is the Soueraigne, which hath vnder it a power estimatiue, and imaginatiue, as a magistrate, both to take knowledge, and to iudge by the report of the senses of all things that shall be presented, and to moue our affections, for the better execution of the iudgements thereof: for the conduct and direction whereof in the exercise of it charge, the law and light of Nature was giuen vnto it: and moreouer, as a helpe in all doubts, it may haue recourse vnto the counsell of the superior and soueraigne, the vnderstanding. And thus you see the order of the happie state heereof: but the unhappie is when this power which is vnder the vnderstanding, and aboue the senses, whereunto the first iudgement of things appertaineth, suffereth it selfe for the most part to be corrupted and deceiued, whereby it iudgeth wrongfully and rashly, and afterwards manageth and mooueth our affections to ill purpose, and filleth vs with much trouble and vnquietnesse. That which molesteth and corrupteth this power, are first the senses, which comprehend not the true and inward nature of things, but only the face and outward forme, carrying vnto the soule the image of things, with some fauourable commendation,

idation, and as it were a fore iudgement and preiudicate opinion of their qualities, according as they finde them pleasing and agreeable to their particular, and not profitable and necessarie for the vniuersall good of man: and secondly, the mixture of the false and indifferent iudgement of the vulgar sort. From these two false aduiselements and reports of the Senses, and vulgar sort, is formed in the soule an inconsiderate opinion, which we conceiue of things, whether good or ill, profitable or hurtfull, to be followed or eschewed, which doubtlesse is a very dangerous guide, and rash mistresse: for it is no sooner conceiued, but presently without the committing of any thing to discourse and vnderstanding, it possesseth it selfe of our imagination, and as within a Citidell, holdeth the fort against right and reason, afterwards it descendeth into our hearts, and remooueth our affections, with violent motiues of hope, feare, heauinesse, pleasure. To be brieue, it makes all the fooles, and the seditions of the soule, which are the passions, to arise.

I will likewise declare the same thing, by another similitude of military policy. The *Senses* are the *Sentinels* of the *Soule*, watching for the preservation thereof, and messengers or scouts to serue as ministers and instruments to the vnderstanding, the soueraigne part of the *Soule*. And for the better performance heereof, they haue receiued power to apprehend the things, to draw the formes, and to embrace or reiect them, according as they shall seeme agreeable or odious vnto their nature. Now in exercising their charge, they must bee content to know, and to giue knowledge to others of what doth passe, not enterprising to remoue greater forces, lest by that meanes they put all into an *alarm* and confusion. As in an army, the *Sentinels* many times by want of the watchword, and knowledge of the desseigne and purpose of the Captaine that commandeth, may be deceived, and take for their succor their enemies disguised which come vnto them, or for enemies those that come to succour: So the Senses by not apprehending whatsoeuer is reason, are many times deceived by an appearance, and take that for a friend which is our enemy. And when vpon this thought and resolution, not attending the commandement of reason, they go about to remoue

move the power concupiscible and irascible, they raise a sedition and tumult in our soules, during which time, reason is not heard, nor the vnderstanding obeyed.

By this time we see their regiments, their rankes, their generall kindes and speciall. Euery passion is moued by the appearance and opinion, either of what is good, or what is ill. If by that which is good, and that the soule do simply so consider of it, this motion is called Loue. If it be present and such whereof the *Soule* in it selfe taketh comfort, it is called pleasure and ioy: if it be to come, it is called desire: if by that which is euill, it is hate: if it be present in our selues, it is sorrow and griefe: if in another, it is pity: if it be to come, it is feare. And these which arise in vs by the obiect of an apparent euill, which we abhor and flie from, descend more deeply into our hearts, and arise with greater difficulty. And this is the first band of that seditious rowt, which trouble the rest and quiet of our soules, that is, in the concupiscible part, the effects whereof notwithstanding they are very dangerous, yet they are not so violent as those that follow them: for these first motions formed in this part, by the obiect which presenteth it selfe, do passe incontinently into the irascible part, that is to say, into that compasse where the soule seeketh the meanes to obtaine or auoid that which seemeth vnto it either good or ill. And then euery as a wheele that is already in motion, receiuing another motion by a new force, turnes with farre greater speede; so the *Soule* being already moued by the first apprehension, ioining a second endeavour to the first, carrieth it selfe with farre more violence than before, and is stirred vp by passions more puissant and difficult to be tamed; inasmuch as they are doubled, and now coupled to the former, vniting themselues, and backing the one the other by a mutuall consent: for the first passions, which are formed vpon an obiect of an appearing good, entring into consideration of meanes whereby to obtaine it, stirre vp in vs either hope or despaire. They that are formed vpon an obiect of an euill to come, stirre vp in vs either feare, or the contrary which is audacitie; of a present euill, choler and courage: which passions are strangely violent, and wholly peruert the reason which they finde already shaken. Thus you see the principall

*The distinction  
of the Passions  
according to  
their obiect and  
subject.  
Of the concupis-  
cible part.*

*In the irascible  
part.*

pall windes from whence arise the tempests of our *Soule*, and the pit whereout they rise is nothing else but the opinion (which commonly is false, wandring, vncertaine, contrary to nature, verity, reason, certainty) that a man hath, that the things that present themselves vnto vs, are either good or ill: for hauing conceiued them to be such, we either follow them, or with violence flie from them. And these are our passions.

## OF PASSIONS IN PARTICULAR.

*As Aduertisement.*

WE will intreat of their natures, that we may thereby see their follies, vanity, misery, iniustice, & that foulneisse that is in them, to the end we may know & learne how iustly to hate them. The counsell that is giuen for the auoidance of them is in the bookes following. These are the two parts of physicke, to shew the malady, and to giue the remedy. It remaineth therefore that heere wee first speake of all those that respect the appearing good, which are loue and the kindes thereof, desire, hope, despaire, ioy; and afterwards all those that respect the ill, which are many, choler, hatred, enuie, ieaousie, reuenge, cruelty, feare, sadnesse, compassion.

*Lib. 3. in the  
vertue of Forti-  
tude and Tem-  
perance.*

## CHAP. XIX.

*Of Loue in generall.*

THE first and chiefe mistresse of all the passions is Loue, which consisteth of diuers subiects, and whereof there are diuers sorts and degrees. There are three principall kinds vnto which all the rest are referred (we speake of the vitious and passionate loue, for of the vertuous, which is Amity, Charity, Dilection, we will speake in the vertue of Iustice) that is to say, Ambition or Pride, which is the loue of greatnesse and honour; Couetousnesse, the loue of riches; and voluptuous or carnall loue. Beholde heere the three gulfes, and precipitate steepes, from which, few there are that can defend themselves: the three plagues and infections of all that we haue in hand, the minde, bodie and goods: the armories of those three captaine enemies of the health and quiet of mankind,

*The distinction  
of loue and com-  
passion.*

*Lib. 3.*

mankinde, the Diuell, the flesh, the world. These are in truth three powers, the most common and vniuersall passions: and therefore the Apostle hath diuided into these three, whatsoever is in the world, *Quicquid est in mundo, est concupiscentia oculorum, aut carnis, aut superbiae vitæ.* All that is in the world, is the lust of the eyes, the concupiscence of the flesh, and the pride of life. Ambition, as more spirituall, so it is more high and noble than the others. Voluptuous loue, as more naturall and vniuersall (for it is euen in beasts themselves, where the rest are not) so it is more violent, and lesse vitious: I say simply violent, for sometimes Ambition excels it: but this is some particular malady. Couetousnesse of all the rest is the sickest and most sottish.

## CHAP. XX.

## Of Ambition.

<sup>1</sup>  
The description.

Seneca.

**A**mbition (which is a thirst after honour and glory, a gluttonous and excessiue desire of greatnesse) is a sweet and pleasing passion, which distilleth easily into generous spirits, but is not without paine got forth againe. We thinke it is our dueties to embrace what is good, and amongst those good things, we account of honour more than them all. See heere the reason, why with all our strength wee run vnto it. An ambitious man will alwayes be the first, he neuer looks backward, but will forward to those that are before him: and it is a greater griefe vnto him to suffer one to go beyond him, than it is pleasure vnto him, to leaue a thousand behind him. *Habet hoc vitium omnis ambitio, non respicit. All ambition hath this vice, not to looke backe.* It is twofold: the one of glory and honor, the other of greatnesse and command: that is profitable to the world, and in some sense permitted, as shall be proued: this pernicious.

<sup>2</sup>  
It is naturall.

The seed and root of ambition is naturall in vs. There is a prouerbe that saith, That nature, is content with a little: and another quite contrarie, That nature is neuer satisfied, neuer content: but it still desireth, hath a will to mount higher, and to enrich it selfe, and it goeth not a slow pace neither, but with a loose bridle it runneth headlong to greatnesse and glory,



glory. *Natura nostra imperij est anida: & ad implendum cupiditatem preceps.* We are naturally greedy of authority and empire, and runne headlong to the satisfying of our desires. And with such force and violence doe some men runne, that they breake their owne necks, as many great men haue done, euen at the dawning as it were, and vpon the point of entrance and full fruition of that greatnesse which hath cost them so deare. It is a naturall and very powerfull passion, and in the end it is the last that leaueth vs: and therefore one calleth it, The shirt of the soule: because it is the last vice it putteth off. *Etiā sapientibus cupido glorie nouissima exiuit.* The last vice which euen Tacitus, the wise abandon as desire of glory.

Ambition, as it is the strongest and most powerfull passion that is, so is it the most noble and haughty; the force and pu-<sup>3</sup>illiance thereof is shewed, in that it mastereth and surmount-<sup>The force and</sup>eth all other things, euen the strongest of the world, yea all o-<sup>primary thereof.</sup>ther passions and affections, euen loue it selfe, which seemeth neuerthelesse to contend with it for the Primacy: As we may see in all the great men of the world, *Alexander, Scipio, Pompey*, and many other, who haue couragiously refused to touch the most beautifull damosels, that were in their power, burning neuerthelesse with ambition, yea that victory they had ouer loue, serued their ambition, especially in *Caesar*, For neuer was there a man more giuen to amorous delights, euen of all sexes, and all sorts of people, witness so many exploits both at *Rome* and in strange countries, nor more carefull and curious in adorning his person; yet ambition did alwaies so carry him, that for his amorous pleasures hee neuer lost an houre of time which he might employ to the enlargement of his greatnesse, for ambition had the soueraigne place in him, and did fully possesse him. Wee see on the other side that in *Marcus Antonius* and others, the force of loue hath made them to forget the care and conduct of their affaires. But yet both of them being weighed in equall ballance, ambition carieth away the price. They that hold that loue is the stronger, say that both the soule and the body, the whole man, is possessed by it, yea that health it selfe dependeth thereupon. But contrariwise it seemeth that ambition is the stronger, because it is altogether spirituall. And in as much as loue pos-  
selleth

selfeth the body, it is therefore the more weake, because it is subiect to satiety, and therefore capable of remedies, both corporall, naturall and strange, as experience sheweth of many, who by diuers meanes haue alaied, yea quite extinguished the force and fury of this passion; but ambition is not capable of satiety, yea it is sharpened by the fruition of that it desireth, and there is no way to extinguish it, being altogether in the soule it selfe and in the reason.

4  
The care of life.

It doth likewise vanquish loue and robbeth it, not onlie of it health and tranquillitie (for glorie & tranquillity are things that cannot lodge together) but also of it owne proper life, as *Agrippina* the mother of *Nero* doth plainly proue, who desiring and consulting with others to make hir sonne Emperour, and vnderstanding that it could not be done, but with the losse of her owne life, she answered, as if ambition it selfe had spoken it, *Occidat modo imperet. It commandeth mee euen now to be slaine.*

5  
The lawes.

Thirdly, ambition enforceth all the lawes, and conscience it selfe; the learned haue said of ambition, that it is the part of euery honest man alwaies to obey the lawes, except it bee in a case of soueraignty for a kingdome which only deserueth a dispensation, being so dainty a mortell, that it cannot but breake a mans fast, *Si violandum est ius, regnandi causa violandum est, in ceteris pietatem colas.* If a man may at any time violate Iustice, it must be to gaine a kingdome, in the rest obserue iustice and pietie.

6  
Religion.

It likewise trampleth vnder foote and contemneth the reuerence and respect of religion, witnesse *Ieroboam*, *Mahomet*, who neuer tooke thought for religion; but tolerated all religions so he might raigne: and all those arch-hereticks who haue liked better to be chiefe leaders in errors and lies with a thousand disorders, than to be disciples of the truth: and therefor saith the Apostle, that they that suffer themselves to bee puffed vp with this passion and affection, make shipwracke, and wander from the faith, piercing themselves thorow with many sorrowes.

7  
It enforceth Nature.

To be short, it offereth violence euen to the lawes of Nature it selfe. This hath beene the cause of so many murders of parents, infants, brothers; witnesse *Abfalon*, *Abimelech*, *Athalas*,

*Atbalias, Romulus, Sei* King of the *Persians*, who killed both his father and brother, *Soliman* the Great Turke his two brothers. So that nothing is able to resist the force of ambition, it beats all to the ground, so high and haughtie is it. It lodgeth only in great mindes, even in the Angels themselves.

Ambition is not the vice or passion of base companions, nor of common or small attempts, and daily enterprises: <sup>8</sup> *It is a lofty* Renowne and glorie doth not prostitute it selfe to so base a *possession.* price; it pursueth not those things that are simply and solely good and profitable, but those that are rare, high, difficult, strange and vnusuall. That great thirst after honour and reputation, that casts downe a man, and makes him a begger, and to ducket and stoop to all sorts of people, & by all meanes yea the most abiect, at what base price seouer, is vile and dishonourable: it is a shame and dishonour so to be honoured. A man must not be greedie of greater glorie than he is capable of; and to swell & to be puffed vp for euery good and profitable action, is to shew his taile while hee lifts vp his head:

Ambition hath many and diuers waies, and practised by diuers meanes: there is one way strait and is open, such as <sup>9</sup> *It hath diuers* *Alexander, Caesar, Themistocles* tooke; there is another oblique and hidden, which many Philosophers and professors of piety haue taken, who goe forwards by going backward, goe before others by going behinde them, not vnlike to wiew-drawers, who draw and goe backward; they would faine bee glorious by contemning glory. And to say the trueth, there is greater glory in refusing and trampling glory vnder foot, than in the desire and fruition thereof, as *Plato* told *Diogenes*. And ambition is neuer better carried, better guided, than by wandering, and vnusuall waies. <sup>10</sup>

Ambition is a folly and a vanitie, for it is as much as if a man should run to catch the smoake in stead of the light, the shadow in stead of the bodie, to fasten the contentment of his minde vpon the opinion of the vulgar sort, voluntarily to renounce his owne liberty, to follow the passions of others, to enforce himselfe, to displease himselfe; for the pleasure of the beholders, to let his owne affections depend vpon the eyes of another; so farre soorth to loue vertue as may be to the liking of the common sort; to doe good not for the loue of <sup>10</sup> *It is a folly.* good

good, but reputation. This is to be like vnto vessels when they are pierced, a man can draw nothing forth before hee giue them a vent.

11  
*Jeus insatiable*

Ambition hath no limits, it is a gulf that hath neither brinke nor bottome; it is that vacuity which the Philosophers could neuer finde in Nature; a fire which encreaseth by that nourishment that is giuen vnto it. Wherein it truly paieth his master: for ambition is only iull in this, that it sufficeth for his owne punishment, and is executioner to it selfe. The wheele of Ixion is the motion of his desires, which turne and returne vp and downe, neuer giuing rest vnto his minde.

12  
*The paines of ambition vaine.*

They that will flatter ambition, say it is a seruant or helpe vnto vertue, and a spurre to beautifull actions; for it quitteth a man of all other sinnes, and in the end, of himselfe too; and all for vertue: but it is so farre from this, that it hideth sometimes our vices, but it takes them not away, but it couereth or rather hatcheth them for a time vnder the deceitfull cinders of a malicious hypocrisie, with hope to set them on fire altogether, when they haue gotten authority sufficient to raigne publicly and with impiety. Serpents lose not their venom, though they be frozen with colde, nor an ambitious man his vices though with a colde dissimulation hee couer them: for when he is arriued to that pitch of height that he desired, he then makes them feeble what he is. And though ambition quit a man of all other vices, yet it neuer taketh away it selfe. An ambitious man putteth himselfe forth to great and honourable actions, the profit whereof returneth to the publike good, but yet he is neuer the better man that performes them, because they are not the actions of vertue but of passion, no though that saying be often in his mouth, We are not borne for our selues but the weale publike. The meanes men vse to mount themselves to high estate, and their carriages in their states and charges, when they are arriued thereunto, do sufficiently shew what men they are, and their owne consciences telles the most that follow that dance, that howsoeuer the publike good be their outward colour, yet their owne particular is that they intend.

Particular aduifements and remedies against this euill you shall finde *Lib. 3. cap. 42.*

## CHAP. XXI.

Of Couetousnesse and her counter-passion.

**T**O loue and affect riches is couetousnesse ; not only the loue and affection, but also euery ouer-curious care and industry about riches, yea their dispensations themselues and liberty, with arte and too much attention procured, haue a sent of couetousnesse : for they are not woorthy an earnest care and attention.

The desire of goods and the pleasure we take in possessing of them is grounded only vpon opinion. The immoderate desire to get riches is a gangrene in our soule, which with a venimous heat consumeth our naturall affections, to the end it might fill vs with virulent humours. So soone as it is lodged in our hearts, all honest and naturall affection which we owe either to our parents or friends, or our selues, vanisheth away. All the rest in respect of our profit seemeth nothing, yea we forget in the end, and contemne our selues, our bodies, our mindes, for this transitory trash, and as the Prouerbe is, We sell our horse to get vs hay.

Couetousnesse is the vile and base passion of vulgar fooles, who account riches the principall good of man, and feare pouerty as the greatest euill, and not contenting themselues with necessary meanes, which are forbidden no man, weigh that is good in a Goldsmiths ballance, when nature hath taught vs to measure it by the ell of necessity. For what greater folly can there be, than to adore that which Nature it selfe hath put vnder our feet, and hidden in the bowels of the earth, as vnworthy to be seene, yea rather to be contemned, and trampled vnder foot ? This is that that the only sinne of man hath torne out of the intrailles of the earth, and brought vnto light, to kill himselfe. *In lucem propter qua pugnaremus excusimus : non erubescimus summa apud nos haberi, qua fuerunt ima terrarum.* We dig out of the bowels of the earth, and bring to light those things for which we would fight ; we are not ashamed to esteeme those things most highly, which are in the lowest and next-most parts of the earth. Nature seemeth euen in the first birth of golde, and wombe from whence it proceedeth,

after a sort to haue prefaged the misery of those that are in louewith it : for it hath so ordered the matter, that in those countreyes where it groweth, there growes with it neither grasse, nor plant, nor other thing that is worth any thing, as giuing vs to vnderstand thereby, that in those mindes where the desire of this mettall growes, there can not remaine so much as a sparke of true honour and vertue : for what thing can be more base, than for a man to disgrace, and to make himselfe a seruant, and a slaue to that, which should be subiect vnto him? *Apud sapientem diuitie sunt in seruitute, apud stultum in imperio. Riches serue a wise man but command a foole.* For a couetous man serues his riches, not they him, and he is sayd to haue goods as he hath a feuer, which holdeth and tyrannizeth ouer a man, not he ouer it. What thing more vile than to loue that which is not good, neither can make a good man, yea is common, and in the possession of the most wicked of the world, which many times peruert good maners, but neuer amend them? Without which so many wise men haue made themselues happy, and by which many wicked men haue come to a miserable end. To be brieue, what thing more miserable than to binde the liuing vnto the dead, as *Mezentius* did, to the end their death might be languishing and the more cruell; to tie the spirit to the excrement and scumme of the earth; to pierce thorow his owne soule with a thousand torments, which this amorous passion of riches brings with it; and to intangle himselfe with the ties and cords of this malignant things, as the Scripture calleth them, which doth likewise terme them thornes, and theeues which steale away the heart of man, snawes of the Diuell, idolatry, and the root of all euill. And truly he that shall see the Catalogue of those enuies and molestations which riches ingender within the heart of man, as their proper thunder-bolt and lightning, they would be more hated than they are now loued. *Desunt sapie multa, auaritie omnia: in nullum auarus bonus est, in se pessimus. Poverty wanteth many things, but couetousnesse all; a couetous man is good to none, and worst of all to himselfe.*

4

The counter-  
passion to cou-  
tousnesse.

There is another contrary passion to this, and vicious, to hate riches, and to spend them prodigally; this is to refuse the meanes to doe well, to put in practise many vertues, and

to

to flie that labour which is farre greater in the true command and vse of riches, than in not hauing them at all; to gouerne himselfe better in abundance than in pouerty. In this there is but one kinde of vertue, which is, not to faint in courage, but to continue firme and constant. In abundance there are many, temperance, Moderation, Liberality, Diligence, Prudence, and so forth. There, more is not exprest, but that he looketo himselfe: heere, that he attend first himselfe, and then the good of others. He that is spoiled of his goods hath the more liberty to attend the more weighty affaires of the spirit: and for this cause many, both Philosophers and Christians, out of the greatnesse of their courage, haue put it in practise. He doth likewise discharge himselfe of many duties and difficulties that are required in the good and honest government of our riches, in their acquisition, conseruation, distribution, vse and employment: but he that quitteth himselfe of his riches for this reason, flieth the labour and businesse that belongs vnto them; and quite contrary doth it not out of courage, but cowardize: and a man may tell him, that he shakes off his riches, not because they are not profitable, but because he knoweth not how to make vse of them, how to vse them. And not to be able to endure riches, is rather weaknesse of minde, than wisdome, saith *Seneca*.

## CHAP. XXII.

## Of carnall Loue.

**C**Arnall Loue is a feuer and furious passion, and very dangerous vnto him that suffereth himselfe to be carried by it: For what becomes of him? He is no more himselfe; his bodie endureth a thousand labours in the search of his pleasure, his minde a thousand helles to satisfie his desires, and desire it selfe increasing, growes into furie. As it is naturall, so is it violent and common to all, and therefore in the action thereof it equallcth and coupleth fooles and wise men, men and beasts together. It maketh all the wisdome resolution, contemplation & operation of the soule beastly and brutish. Hereby, as likewise by sleepe, *Alexander* knew himselfe to

It is strong, natural and common.

be a mortall man, because both these suppress the faculties of the soule.

2  
Why ignominious.

Philosophie speaketh freely of all things, that it may the better finde out their causes, gouerne and iudge of them; so doth Diuinitie, which is yet more chaste and more strait. And why not, since that all things belong vnto the iurisdiction and knowledge thereof? The Sunne shines on the dunghill, and is neither infected, nor annoyed therewith. To be offended with words is a token either of great weaknesse, or some touch or guilt of the same maladie. Thus much bespoken for that which followeth, or the like if it shall happen. Nature on the one side with violence thrusteth vs forward vnto this action; all the motion of the world resoluth and yeelderh to this copulation of the male and female: on the other side it causeth vs to accuse, to hide our selues, to blush for shame, as if it were a thing ignominious and dishonest. We call it a shamefull act, and the parts that serue thereunto our shamefull parts. But why shamefull, since naturall, and (keeping it selfe within it owne bounds) iust, lawfull and necessarie? Yea, why are beasts exempted from this shame? Is it because the countenance seemes foule and deformed? Why foule, since naturall? In crying, laughing, champing, gaping, the visage is more distorted: Is it to the end it may serue as a bridle and a stay to such a kind of violence? why then doth Nature cause such a violence? Or contrariwise: Is it because shame serueth as a spurre, and as sulfure; or that the instruments thereof mooue without our consent, yea against our willes? By this reason beasts likewise should be bashfull: and many other things moue of themselves in vs without our consent, which are neither vicious nor shamefull: not only inward and hidden (as the pulse & motion of the heart, arteries, lungs, the instruments and parts that serue the appetite, of eating, drinking, discharging the braine, the bellie, and their shuttings and openings, are besides, nay many times against our willes, (witnesse those sneesings, yawnings, teares, hoquets and fluxions, that are not in our owne power, and this of the bodie: the spirit forgetteth, remembreth, beleeueth, misbeleeueth, and the will it selfe, which many times willet that which we would it willed not) but outward and apparant:



apparant: the visage blusseth, waxeth pale, wanne, the bodie groweth fat, leane, the haire turneth gray, blacke, white, growes, stands on end, without and against our consent. Is it that heereby the pouertie and weaknesse of man may be the more truely shewed? that is as well scene in our eating and drinking, our griefs, wearinesse, the disburdening of our bodies, death, whereof a man is not ashamed. Whatsoeuer the reason be, the action in it selfe and by nature is noe way shamefull, it is truely naturall; so is not shame: witnesse the beasts. Why say I beasts? The nature of man, sayth Diuinitie, mainteining it selfe in it first originall state, had neuer knowen what shame was, as now it doth; for from whence cometh shame but from weakenesse, and weakenesse but from sinne, there being nothing in nature of it selfe shamefull? The cause then of this shame not being in nature, we must seeke it elsewhere. It is therefore artificiall. It is an inuention forged in the closet of *Venus* to giue the greater prise to the businesse, and to inkindle the desire thereof the more. This is with a little water to make the fire burne the cleerer, as *S*mithes vse to doe, to inflame the desire to see what it is that is hidden; to heare and know what it is that is muttered and whispered. For to handle things darkely as if they were mysteries, and with respect and shame, giueth taste and estimation vnto them. Contrariwise, a loose, free and open permission and commoditie, derogateth from the woorth, and taketh away the true relish and delight thereof.

This action then in it selfe, and simply taken, is neither shamefull nor vicious, since it is naturall and corporall, no more than other the like actions are: yea, if it be well ordered, it is iust, profitable, necessarie at the least, as it is to eat and drinke. But that which doth so much discred it, is, that moderation is seldome kept therein, and that to attaine thereunto, we make great stirres, and many times vse bad meanes, whereby it draweth after it, if it go not before, many evils all worse than the action it selfe. The charge riseth aboue the principall, and this is to fish (as it is sayd) with threds of golde and purple. And all this is purely humaine. Beasts that follow simple nature, are quit from all these troubles. But the art of man on the one side sets a strait gard about it, planteth

<sup>3</sup>  
In which sense  
vicious.

at the gate shame to giue it a relish : on the other side ( ô the coulinage of men ! ) it inflameth and sharpneth the desire, it deuileth, remoueth, troubleth, turneth all toplic turuie to attaine vnto it, ( witnesse Poetrie, which sporteth not it selfe in any thing so much as in this subiect ) and findeth every entrance vnto it to be better, than by the gate, and the lawfull way, and followeth every wandring way, rather than the common way of mariage.

## CHAP. XXIII.

## Desires, Concupiscence.

1  
*The bottom'esse  
depth of desire.*

Here arise not so many billowes and waues in the sea, as desires in the heart of man : it is a bottomlesse depth, it is infinite, diuers, inconstant, confused, and irresolute, yea many times horrible and detestable, but ordinarily vaine, and ridiculous in it owne desires.

2  
*Their distinction.  
Naturall necessary, lib. 2.  
cap. 6.  
Not naturall.*

But first it shall not be amisse to distinguish them. Some are naturall, and they are iust and lawfull : they are likewise in beasts, they haue their limits and bounds, a man may see the end of them; and liuing according to those, there is no man a begger. Of these shall be spoken heereafter more at large : for ( to say the truth ) these are not passions. Others are besides nature proceeding from our opinions and fantasie artificiall, superfluous, which we may, for distinctions sake, call concupiscences or Lusts. These are purely humane, beasts know not what they are, only man is immoderate in his appetites : these are without limits, without end, and are naughty but confusion. *Desideria naturalia finita sunt, ex falsa opinione nascentia, ubi desinant non habent. Nullus enim terminus falso est : via eunti aliquid extremum est, error immensus est. Naturall desires haue their bounds, but those which grow of a false opinion are without end; For in that which is false there is no limit : he that traueleth in his right way, comes to an end of his iourne; But he that is out of his way, knowes not whether he wanders.* And therefore liuing according to these, there is no man can be rich and contented. Of these it is properly that we haue spoken in the beginning of this Chapter, and that we farther intend in this matter of the passions, It is for these that a man sweats,

Seneca,

sweats, and trauels, *Ad supernacua sudatur*, that a man iourneyeth by sea and by land, goeth to warre, killes himselfe, drownes, betrayes, loseth himselfe : and therefore it was well sayd, That concupiscence is the roote of all euill. Now it falleth out many times (a iust punishment) that when a man seeketh how to satisfie his desires, and to glut himselfe with the goods and pleasures of Fortune, he loseth and is deprived of those of Nature : and therefore *Diogenes* hauing refused that money that *Alexander* offered him, desired him to giue him that he had taken from him, to go out of the Sunne.

CHAP. XXIII.

Hope, Despaire.

O Vr desire and concupiscences gather heat and redouble their force by hope, which inflameth with the soft and gentle aire thereof our foolish desires, kindleth in our mindes a fire, from whence ariseth a thicke smoake, which blindeth our vnderstanding; carrieth with it our thoughts, holds them hanging in the clouds, makes vs dreame waking. So long as our hopes endure, or desires endure with them : it is a play-game wherewith Nature busieth our mindes. Contrariwise, when despaire is once lodged neere vs, it tormenteth our soules in such sort, with an opinion of neuer obtaining that wee desire, that all businesse besides must yeeld vnto it. And for the loue of that which wee thinke neuer to obtaine, wee lose euen the rest of whatsoeuer wee possesse. This passion is like vnto little children, who to be reuenged of him that hath taken one of their play-games from them, cast the rest into the fire. It is angry with it selfe, and requirereth of it selfe the punishment of it owne follie and infelicitie. After those passions that respect the apparent good, come we to those that respect the euill.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Cholier.

CHolier is a foolish passion which putteth vs wholly out of our selues, and with seeking the meanes to withstand *The description.*  
and

and beat backe the euill which it threatneth vs, or hath already procured vs, maketh the blood to boile in our hearts, and stirreth vp furious vapors in our spirits, which blinde vs and cast vs headlong to whatsoeuer may satisfie the desire which wee haue of reuenge. It is a short fury, a way to madnesse: by the prompt and ready impetuosity and violence thereof, it carrieth and surmounteth all passions. *Repentina & vis uersa eum est. Sudden and violent is the force thereof.*

2  
The causes liber.  
of.

- 1 The causes that dispose and mooue vnto choler are first weaknesse of spirit, as we see by experience in women, olde men, infants, like men, who are commonly more cholericke than others. *Inualidum omne, natura querulum est. All weak things are full of complaint.* A man deceiueth himselfe to think that there is courage where there is violence: violent motions are like the endeouours of children and olde men, who runne when they thinke to goe: for there is nothing more weak than an immoderate motion: and a great imbecillity is it in a man to be cholericke. Secondly the malady of the minde, whereby it is made ouer-tender to beare blowes; as the vlcerate parts of the bodie, where the sound being interestred therein, are astonished and wounded with light matters. *Nusquam sine quarela agra tangitur. Sore things are neuer touched without complaint.* The losse of a penny, or the omission of a gaine, puts into choler a couetous man; a laughter or glance of his wife stirres this passion in a ialous man. Thirdly, lust, vaine nicenesse, selfe-loue, which makes a man anxious and angry, puts him into choler for the least cause that may be. *Nulla res magis iracundiam alit quam luxuria. Nothing doth more nourish anger then luxury.* This loue of trifles, of a glasse, a dogge, a bird, is a kinde of folly that troubleth vs much, and stirres vp this cholericke passion in vs. Fourthly, too much curiositie, *Qui nimis inquirat, seipsum inquietat. He that searcheth too much, disquieteth himselfe.* This is to seeke occasions, and out of the lightnesse of the heart to cast a man into choler, not attending any cause thereof. *Sape ad nos ira uenit, saepe uis nos ad illam. Anger often commeth vnto vs, we often to it.* Fifthly, lightnesse in beleeuing what comes first to the eare. But the principall and formall cause is, an opinion of contempt and misusage, either by word, deed, countenance. These ate the reasons whereby

we pretend to iustifie our choler.

The signes and symptomes are very manifest, and more than of any other passion; and so strange, that they alter and change the whole estate of man; they transforme and disfigure him, *ut sit difficile virum magis detestabile vitium, aut deforme.* So that it is difficult to know, whether it be a more detestable or deformed vice. Some of them are outward, the face red and deformed, the eyes fity, the looks furious, the eare deafe, the mouth foaming, the heart panting, the pulse beating, the veines swollen, the tongue stammering, the teeth gnashing, the voice loud and hoarse, the speech imperfect, and to bee briefe, it puts the whole body into a fire and a feuer. Some haue broken their veines, suppress their vrine, whereby present death hath ensued. What then can the estate of the spirit be within, when it causeth so great a disorder without. Choler at the first blow driueth away and banisheth reason and iudgement, to the end it may wholly possesse the place; afterwards it fillles all with fire, and smoake, and darknesse, and noise, like vnto him that puts the matter out of the house and then sets fire and burnes himselfe aliue within; or like vnto a ship, that hath neither sterne, nor Pilot, nor sailes, nor oares, which commits it fortune to the mercy of the waues, windes, and tempest in the middelt of a furious sea.

The effects thereof are great, many times miserable and lamentable. Choler first enforceth vs to iniustice, for it is kindled and sharpened by a iust opposition, and by the knowledge that a man hath of the little reason he hath to be angry. Hee that is moued to anger vpon a false occasion, if a man yeeld him any good reason why he should not be angry, he is presently more incensed euē against the truth and innocency it selfe, *Pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas ira, quasi argumentum sit iuste irascendi grauius irasci.* The iniquity of anger doth make vs more stubborn, as if it were an argument and prooffe of iust anger, to be greuously angry. The example of *Piso* is very notable and prooues this true, who excelling otherwise in vertue (the history is very well known) being moued to choler, did vnjustly put three to death, and by a subtil accusation caused them to be found guilty, only because they acquitted one as vnguiltly whom hee by his former sentence had condemned.

ned. It is likewise sharpened by silence and cold reple; as gathering thereby that it proceedeth out of a contempt both of him and his cho'er; which is proper vnto women, who many times are angrie to the end they may stirre vp that passion in another, and increase their choler euen to fury, when they see that a man vouchsafeth not to nourish that humour in them, by chiding with them. So that *Choler* sheweth it selfe to bee more sauage than a beast, since neither by defence or excuse, nor by silence and patience without defence, it will not bee woon nor pacified. The iniustice thereof is likewise in this, that it will be both a iudge and a party, that it will that all take part with it, and growes to defiance with as many as will seeme to contradict it. Secondly, forasmuch as it is inconsiderate and heady, it casteth vs headlong into great mischiefs, and sometimes euen into those which we most flie, & doe wish and would willingly procure another man, *Na penas dum exigit, It is punished, whilst it punisheth*, or farre worse. The passion is fitly compared to great ruines, which burst themselves in pieces vpon that which they fall, it pursueth with such violence the ill of another, that it heeds not the auoiding of it owne. It intrappeth and intangleth vs, makes vs to speake and to do things, shamefull, vncomely, vnworthy our selues. Lastly, it carrieth vs so beyond our selues, that it makes vs to doe things scandalous, dangerous, and irreuocable, murders, poisonings, treasons, whereby follow great and too late repentances: witnesse *Alexander* the great after he had slaine *Clytus*, and therefore *Pythagoras* was wont to say, that the end of *Choler* was the beginning of repentance.

5 This passion feedes vpon it selfe, flattereth and tickleth it selfe, with a perswasion that it hath reason, that it is iust, excusing it selfe vpon the malice and indiscretion of another, but the iniustice of another cannot make that iust, nor the losse that wee receiue by another make that profitable vnto vs: it is too rash & inconsiderate to do any thing that is good, it would cure an euill with an euill; for to yeeld the correction of an offence to *Choler*, is to correct a vice by it selfe. Reason which should haue the command ouer vs, needs no such officers as of their owne heads execute lawes, not attending her ordinance; she would haue all things done according to nature

nature by measure, and therefore violence doth no way beset it. But what, shall vertue see the insolencie of vice and not be angry with it? shall the libertie thereof be so bridled as not to dare to bee mooued against the wicked? vertue desires no indecent libertie, it needes not turne it owne strength against it selfe, nor that the wickednesse of another should trouble it: a wise man must as well beare the vices of a wicked man without choler, as his prosperitie without enuie. Hee must endure the indiscretions of rash and inconsiderate men, with the selfe same patience that Physitians do the iniuries of mad men. There is no greater wisdom, nor more profitable in the world, than to endure the folly of another, for otherwise by not suffering it with patience, we make it our owne. That which hath heretofore bene spoken touching *Choler*, may likewise be spoken of these passions following, hatred, enuie, reuenge, which are made or formed *Cholers*.

Particular aduiseements and remedies against this euill are

*Lib. 3. cap. 31.*

## CHAP. XXVI.

### *Hatred.*

**H**atred is a strange passion, which strangely and without reason troubleth vs: and to say the truth, what is there in the world that tormenteth vs more? By this passion wee put our selues into the power of him that we hate, to afflict and vex vs; the sight of him mooueth our senses, the remembrance stirreth our spirits both waking and sleeping; yea we neuer present him to our memories but with dispiight and gnashing of teeth, which puts vs belides our selues, and teares our owne hearts; whereby we suffer in our selues, the punishment of that euill we wish vnto another. He which hateth is the patient, he that is hated, the agent: contrary to the sound of the words, the hater is in torment, the hated in ease. But what doe we hate? Men, or their matters and affaires? Doubtlesse wee hate nothing that wee should; for if there bee any thing to be hated in this world, it is hate it selfe; and such like passions, contrary to that which should command in vs.

Particular

Particular considerations and remedies against this euill,  
are *Lib. 3. cap. 32.*

## CHAP. XXVII.

*Enuie.*

**E**nuie is cousen-germaine to Hatred ; a miserable passion and outragious beast, which in torment excelleth hell it selfe. It is a delire of that good that another possesseth, which gnaweth our heart, and turneth the good of another man to our owne hurt. But how should it torment vs, since it is as well against that which is ill, as that which is good ? Whilest an enuious man looketh obliquely vpon the goods of another man, he loseth what is good in himselfe, or at least wise takes no delight in it.

Particular aduiselements and remedies against this euill, are  
*Lib. 3. cap. 33.*

## CHAP. XXVIII.

*Iealousie.*

1  
*What it is.*

**I**ealousie is a passion like almost both in nature and effect, vnto Enuie, but that it seemeth that Enuie considereth not what is good, but in as much as it is in the possession of another man, and that we desire it for our selues ; and Iealousie concerneth our owne proper good, whereof wee feare another doth partake.

2  
*The weaknesse thereof.*

Iealousie is a weake malady of the soule, absurd, vaine, terrible and tyrannicall, it insinuateth it selfe vnder the title of amity, but after it hath gotten possession, vpon the selfesame foundation of loue and good will, it buildeth an euermolting hate. Vertue, health, merit, reputation, are the incendiaries of this rage, or rather the fewell vnto this fury.

3  
*The venom thereof.*

It is likewise the Gaule that corrupteth all the Hony of our life : it is commonly mingled with the sweetest and pleasantest actions, which it maketh so sharpe and sower as nothing more : it changeth loue into hate, respect into disdain, assurance into diffidence : it ingendreth a pernicious curiosity and desire in a man to cleere himselfe of that euill, which being



ing past remedie, by too much stirring stinketh the more:  
For what doth he but publish, put out of all doubt, bring in-  
to the light, sound with a trumpet his owne shame and mise-  
ry, and the dishonour of his owne children?

Particular considerations and remedies against this euill,  
are *Lib. 3. cap. 35.*

CHAP. XXIX.

*Reuenge.*

**T**He desire of Reuenge is first a cowardly and effeminate  
passion, proceeding from a base, weak and abiect mind, *A cowardly*  
which experience telleth vs to be true: for we commonly see *passion.*  
the weakest mindes the most malicious and reuengefull, as  
women and children. The valiant and generous minde doth  
little feele this passion, but contemneth and disdaineth it, ei-  
ther because the iniury toucheth him not, or because he that  
offereth the iniurie is not worthy his reuenge, as not daining  
so farre to debase himselfe: *Indignus Caesaris ira. Unworthy the*  
*anger of Caesar.* The haile, thunder, and tempests, and those  
fearefull motions that are in the aire, doe neither trouble nor  
touch the superlor celestiall bodies, but only the weak and  
inferior: and euen so the indiscretions and childish brawles of  
fooles wound not great and high minds. All the great men of  
the world, *Alexander, Caesar, Epaminondas, Scipio,* haue beene  
so farre from reuenge, that quite contrary, they haue done  
good vnto their enemies.

Secondly, it is a boiling and biting passion, and like a  
worme it gnaweth the hearts of those that are infected with *Boiling.*  
it; it molestheth them by day, and by night keeps them a-  
waked.

It is likewise full of iniustice, for it tormenteth the inno-  
cent, and addeth affliction. It is to make the party offending, *3*  
to feele that euill and punishment, which the desire of re- *Unjust.*  
uenge giueth to a mans heart; and the party offended goes to  
lay on the burthen, as if he had not already hurt enough by  
the iniury receiued; in such sort, that many times and ordi-  
narily, whilest he tormenteth himselfe to seeke meanes of re-  
uenge, he that hath committed the offence laughs and makes  
himselfe

himselfe merry with it. But it is also farre more vniust in the meanes of the execution, which many times is wrought by treasons and villanous practises.

4  
Dangerum.

Lastly, the execution is not only painfull but dangerous too; for experience telleth vs, that he that seeks to be reuenged, doth not that which he would, and what his blow intendeth, but commonly that which he would not comes to passe, and thinking to put out the eye of his enemy, he putteth out both his owne. The feare of iustice tormenteth him, and the care to hide him those that loue him.

5  
To kill is not to  
reuenge.

Againe, to kill and to make an end of his enemy, is not reuenge, but meere cruelty, which proceedeth from cowardlinesse and feare. To be reuenged is to beat his enemy, to make him stoope; not to kill him: for by killing hee feesles not the power of his wrath, which is the end of reuenge. And this is the reason why a man cares not to be reuenged vpon a dogge or a beast, because he can no way taste or conceit his reuenge. In true reuenge there must be a kinde of pleasure and delight in the reuenger: and he vpon whom he is reuenged must feelee the weight of his displeasure, suffer paine, & repent him of the cause, which being kild he cannot doe: yea he is rather freed thereby from all miserie, and contrariwise he that is the reuenger endureth many times that torment & feare which he wished to his enemy. To kill then is a token of cowardlinesse and feare, lest his enemy feeling the force of his reuenge, should liue to requite him with the like; which though it make an end of the quarrell, yet it woundeth his reputation, it is a trick of precaution and not of courage, and is the way to proceed safely but not honorably. *Qui occidit longè, non vlciscitur, nec gloriam assequitur.* He that killeth a farre off, doth neither reuenge, nor obtaine renowne.

Particular aduiseiments and remedies against this euill, are

*Lsb. 3. cap. 34.*

## CHAP. XXX.

### *Cruelty.*

**C**Rueltie is a villanous and detestable vice, and against Nature, and therefore it is likewise called Inhumanitie.  
It

It proceedeth from weakenesse, *Omnis ex infirmitate feritas est.* All cruelty proceedeth of infirmity. And it is the daughter of cowardlinesse: for a valarous man doth alwayes exercise his strength against a resisting enemy, whom he hath no sooner at his mercy, but he is satisfied: *Romana virtus, parcere subiectis, debellare superbos.* The *Romane vertue* was to spare the humble, and subdue the proude. Forasmuch therefore as cowardly weaknesse can not be of this ranke, to the end it may yet get the name of valour, it makes blood and massacres the prooffe thereof. Murders in victories are commonly executed by common people, and the officers of the baggage. Tyrants are bloody, because they feare, not knowing how to secure themselves, but by rooting out those that may offend them; and therefore they exercise their cruelty against all, euen women too, because they feare all, *cuncta ferit, dum cuncta timet.* He strikes all, because he feares all. Cowardly dogges bite and teare with their teeth, within the house, the skinnes of those wild beasts, which in the open field they durst not looke vpon. What makes ciuill warres so cruell, but that tie where. with the common people are led and linked, who like dogs that are backt by their master backe one another? The Emperour *Mauritius* being tolde that one *Phocas* a souldier should kill him, enquired what he was, and of what nature and condition; and being tolde by his sonne in law *Philip* that he was a base coward: Why then, saith he, no maruell if he be a murderer and cruell. It proceedeth likewise from the inward malignity of the soule, which feedeth and delighteth it selfe with the hurt of another. Monsters, like *Caligula*.

## CHAP. XXXI

*Sadnesse, or Heauinesse of heart.*

I

*The description.*

**S**Adnesse is a languishing feeblenesse of the spirit, and a Skinde of discouragement ingendered by the opinion that we haue of the greatnesse of those evils that afflict vs. It is a dangerous enemy to our rest, which presently weakeneth and quelleth our soules, if we take not good heed, and taketh from vs the vse of reason and discoturse, and the means whereby to prouide for our affaires, and with time it rusteth and

H.

fenoweth

ſenoweth the ſoule, it corrupteth the whole man, brings his vertues aſleepe, euen then when he hath moſt need to keepe them awaked, to withſtand that euill which oppreſſeth them: but we muſt diſcouer the foulneſſe and follie, the pernicious effects, yea the iniuſtice that is in this cowardly, baſe, and feeble paſſion, to the end wee may learne with all our might to ſlie and auoide it, as moſt vnworthy the wiſeſt men, according to the doctrine of the Stoicks, which is not ſo eaſie to be done becauſe it excuſeth and couereth it ſelfe with many beautifull colours of nature; pietie, goodneſſe, yea the greateſt part of the world it drawes to honour and fauour it, making it an ornament to wiſedome, vertue, conſcience.

2  
Not naturall.  
Publike mournings.

First then it is ſo farre from being naturall (as it would make men beleue) that it is formall, and an enemy to nature, as may eaſily be proued. Touching ceremonious ſorrowes and publike mournings, ſo much affected and practiſed in former times, and likewise at this preſent (my meaning is not to touch the honeſtie and moderation of obſequies and funerals, nor that ſorrow that belongs to piety and religion) what greater impoſture or deceitfull couſenage can there be in any thing beſides? How many fained and artificiall counterfeit couſenages are there with no ſmall coſt and charges, both in thoſe whom it concerneth, the authors of the ſport, and thoſe whoſe offices they make uſe of in that buſineſſe? For to giue the better credit to their iugling tricks they hire people to lament, and to ſend vp their ſhreeking cries and lamentations, which all men know to bee fained and extorted for money, teares that are not ſhed but to bee ſcene, and ſo ſoone as they are out of ſight, are dried vp; where is it that nature hath taught vs this? Nay, what is there that nature doth more abhorre and condemne? It is a tyrannicall, falſe and vulgar opinion (the worſt, as hath been ſaid, almoſt of all the paſſions) that teacheth vs to weepe and lament in ſuch a caſe. And if a man cannot finde occaſion of teares & a heauy countenance in himſelfe, he muſt buy it at a deare price in another, in ſuch fort that to ſatiſfie this opinion, he muſt enter into a great charge whereof nature if we would credit it, would willingly diſcharge vs. Is not this willingly and publicly to betray reaſon, to enforce and to corrupt nature; to prostitute his  
owne

owne manhood, to mocke both the world and himselfe, to satisfie the vulgar sort, which produce nothing but error, and account of nothing that is not counterfeited and disguised? Neither are those more particular sorrowes naturall, as it seemes to many, for if they did proceed from nature, they shoude bee common to all men, and almost touch all men alike. Now wee see that the selfe same things that are causes of sorrow to some, giue occasion of ioy vnto others, that one Prouince, one person laugheth at that whereat another weepeth; that they that are conuersant with those that lament, exhort them to resolution, and to quit themselues of their teares. Yea the greatest part of those that thus torment themselues, when you haue talked with them, or that themselues haue had the leasure but to discoureypon their owne passions, they confesse that it is but a folly thus to afflict themselues, and praise those who in the like aduersities, haue made head against fortune, and with a manly and generous courage haue withstood their afflictions. And it is certaine that men do not accommodate their mourning to thier cause of sorrow, but the opinion of those with whom they liue. And if a man marke them well, he shall find that it is opinion, which the more to annoy vs presenteth the things vnto vs which torment vs either more than they should, or by anticipation, feare, and preuention of that which is to come, sooner than they should.

Particular.

But it is against nature, inasmuch as it polluteth and defaceth whatsoeuer nature hath made beautifull and amiable in vs, which is drowned by the force of this passion, as the beautie of a pearle is dissolued in vineger. We make our selues heerby spectacles of pity, we go with our heads hanging, our eies fastned on the earth, our mouthes tongueleise, our members immoouable, our eies serue for no other vse than to weepe, that you may say wee are nothing but sweating statues, turned (as the Poets faine) like *Niobe* into a stone by the power of this passion.

3 -  
Against nature.

Now it is not only contrary and an enemy vnto nature, but God himselfe: for what other thing is it, but a rash and outrageous complaint against the Lord and common law of the whole world, which hath made all things vnder the Moone changeable and corruptible? If we know this law, why do we

4  
Injust and  
impious.

torment our selues? If we know it not, whereof doe we complaine, but of our owne ignorance, in that we know not that which Nature hath written in all the corners and creatures of the world? We are heere not to giue a law, but to receiue it, and to follow that which we find established: for to torment our selues by contradicting it, doth but double our paine.

5  
*Permitious.*

Besides all this, it is pernicious and hurtfull vnto man, and by so much the more dangerous, because it killeth when we thinke it comforts, hurteth vnder the colour of doing good; vnder a false pretence of plucking the iron out of the wound, it driues it to the heart: and the blowes thereof are so much the more hardly auoided, and the enterprises broken, because it is a domesticall enemy brought vp with vs, which we haue engendred for our owne punishment.

6  
*Outwardly.*

Outwardly, by a deformed and new countenance wholly altered and counterfeited; it dishonoreth and defameth man. Doe but consider when it entrencheth into vs, it filleth vs with shame, in such sort, that wee dare not shew our selues in publike place, no not priuately to our dearest friends; and after we are once possessed of this passion, we doe nothing but seeke corners to hide our selues from the sight of men. What is this to say, but that it condemneth it selfe, and acknowledgeth how indecent it is? For it is for a woman that is taken in her wantonnesse to hide herselfe, and to feare to be known. Again, do but consider the vestments and habits of sorrow, how strange and effeminate they are; which sheweth, that it taketh away whatsoeuer is manly and generous in vs, and puts vpon vs the countenances and infirmities of women: and therefore the *Thracians* adorned those men that mourned, like women. And some say, that sorrow makes men eunuches. The first and more manly and generous lawes of the *Romans* forbad these effeminate lamentations, finding it an horrible thing, that men should so degenerate from their owne natures, and do things contrary to manhood; allowing only of those first teares which proceed from the first encounter of a fresh and new griefe, which may fall euen from the eyes of Philosophers themselves, who keepe with their humanitie their dignitie: and may fall from the eyes, vertue not falling from the heart.

Now

Now it doth not only alter the visage, change, and dishonestly disguise a man outwardly, but piercing euen to the marrow of the bone, *Tristitia exsiccat ossa, Heauinesse drieth the bones.* It weakeneth likewise the soule, troubleth the peace thereof, makes a man vnapt to good and honourable enterprises, taking away the taste, the desire, and the disposition to doe any thing that is profitable eithier to himselfe or to another, and not only to doe good but to receiue it: For euen those good fortunes that light vpon him displease him; every thing is tart vnto his soule, as victuals to a corrupted stomacke: and lastly, it maketh bitter our whole life, and poisoneth all our actions.

It is twofolde, great and extreame, or at least wise, though not great in it selfe, yet great when by reason of a sudden surprise, and furious v unexpected alarum it seifeth vpon the heart of a man, pierceth it thorow, depriueth him of motion and sense, like a stone, & not vnlike that miserable mother *Noebe*,

*Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa relinquit,  
Labitur, & longa vix tandem tempore satur.*

*She foun ded in our sight, fainted, and waxed pale,  
Fell downe, and long it was, ere she could tell hir tale.*

And therefore the Painter diuersly and by degrees presenting vnto vs the sorrow and miserable estate of the parents and friends of *Iphygenia* when she was sacrificed, when he came to her father, he painted him with his face couered, as confessing his art not sufficient to expresse in the visage a griefe of that degree. Yea, sometimes a sorrow may be such, that it killeth outright. The second degree is the indifferent sorrow, which though perhaps it may be greater than the former, yet in time it is lessened and eased, and is expressed by teares, sobs, sighs and lamentations: *Cura leues loquuntur, ingentes stupent. Light cares doe speake, great confound.*

Particular aduilement and remedies against this euill, are

*Lib. 3. cap. 29.*

### CHAP. XXXII.

*Compassion.*

**W**E sigh with those that are afflicted, and with a fellow-like feeling pitie their miseries, either because by a se-

eret consent we participate one the others euils, or because we feare that in our selues, which hath happened to others. But this is done two wayes, whereby there is likewise a twofolde compassion; the one good, when a man with a good will, not troubling or afflicting himselfe, not effeminating his owne nature, and without impeachment of equitie or honor, doth freely and effectually succour those that are afflicted. This is that vertue so much commended in religion, found in the holiest and wisest in the world: the other is a passion of a feeble minde, a sottish and feminine pitie, which proceedeth from a delicate tenderneisse, a troubled spirit, proper to women, infants, and to cruell and malicious mindes (which are consequently base and cowardly, as hath beene prooued in the Chapter of Crueltie) who pitie the punishments of offenders, which produceth vniust effects, not respecting the depth and merit of the cause, but the present fortune, state and condition.

Aduisements and remedies against this euill, you shall find  
*Lib. 3. cap. 30.*

### C H A P. XXXIII.

#### *Feare.*

**I** *The description.* **F**Eare is the apprehension of an euill to come, which holdeth vs in a continuall care, and runnes before those euils that fortune threatneth vs.

Wee speake not heere of that feare of God so much commended in Scripture, nor of that feare which proceedeth from loue, and is a sweet respect towards the thing beloued, commendable in subiects and all inferiours towards their superiours; but of that vitious feare that troubleth and afflicteth, which is the seed of sinne, the twinne of shame, both of one wombe, sprung from that close and cursed mariage of the spirit of man with a diabollicall perswasion. *Timeo, eò quòd nudus essem, & abscondi me. I feare, because I was naked, and therefore I hid my selfe.*

**2** *The malice and* It is a deceitfull and malicious passion, and hath no other power ouer vs, but to mocke and seduce vs: it serues it turne tyranny therof. with that which is to come, where though we seeme to foresee



see much, we see nothing at all; and in that doubtfull darke-  
 nesse it holdeth vs, as in a darke place, as the eues do by night,  
 to the end they may robbe a man and not be knowen, and  
 giue a great and sudden affright with a small number. And  
 therefore it tormenteth vs with masks and shewes of euils, as  
 men feare children with bug-beares; euils that haue nothing  
 but a simple appearance, and haue nought in themselves  
 whereby to hurt vs, yea, are not euils, but that wee thinke  
 them so. It is the only apprehension which we haue, which  
 makes that euill to vs which is not so, and draweth euill euen  
 from our owne good to afflict vs withall. How many do we  
 see euery day, that with feare to become miserable, become  
 that they feare, and turne their vaine feare into certaine mis-  
 eries? How many haue lost their friends, by distrusting their  
 friends; haue got diseases, by fearing them? One hath in  
 such sort conceiued an opinion that his wife hath plaid false  
 play with him, that for griefe he languisheth; another hath  
 in such sort apprehended such a conceit of pouertie, that he  
 falleth sicke: and to be briefe, some haue died for feare to die.  
 And euen so may a man say almost of whatsoeuer we feare:  
 for feare seemeth not to other end, than to make vs finde that  
 which we flie from. Doubtlesse, feare is of all other euils the  
 greatest and most tedious: for other euils are no longer euils  
 than they continue, and the paine endureth no longer than  
 the cause; but feare is of that which is, and that which is not,  
 and that perhaps which neuer shal be, yea sometimes of that  
 which can not possible be. Beholde then a passion truly ma-  
 licious and tyrannicall, which draweth from an imaginarie  
 euill true and bitter sorrowes, and is ouer greedie by thought  
 and opinion to ouer take, nay out-run them.

Feare doth not only fill vs with euils, and many times by  
 false appearances, but it likewise spoileth all the good that  
 we haue, and all the pleasure of our life, as an enemy to our  
 rest. A man can take no delight in the fruition of that good  
 which he feareth to lose; life it selfe can not be pleasant, if a  
 man feare to die. Nothing good (saith an ancient writer) can  
 bring pleasure with it, but that against the losse whereof a  
 man is alwayes prepared.

It is also a strange passion, indiscreet and inconsiderate, and

proceeds as often from the want of iudgement, as of heart. It ariseth from dangers, and many times casteth vs into dangers; for it ingendreth in vs such an inconsiderate desire to get out; for it astonisheth, troubleth, and hindereth vs from taking that order that is fit to get out. It bringeth a violent kinde of trouble, whereby the soule being affrighted, withdraweth it selfe into it selfe, and debateth with it selfe how to auoid that danger that is presented. Besides that great discouragement that it bringeth, it seizeth on vs with such an astonishment, that we lose our iudgement, & there is no longer reason or discourse in vs: it maketh vs to flie when no man pursueth, yea many times our owne friends and succours: *adeo paor etiam auxila formidat. Inſomuch that feare dreads his owne helpes.* Many haue run mad heerewith, yea the senses themſelues haue heerèby lost their vse: we haue our eyes open, and see not; one speaks to vs, and we hearken not vnto him; we would flie, and we can not go.

An indifferent feare puts wings to our heeles; a great naile fast our feet, and intangles them. Feare peruerteth and corrupteth the intire man, both the spirit, *Paor sapientiam omnem mihi ex animo expellat.* Feare deprieth my minde of all wisdom and vnderstanding. and the body, *Obſtupui ſeterumq; come, vox faucibus haſit.* I was astonished, my haire stood an end, and my tongue stucke to the rooſe of my month. Sometimes it makes vs desperate, and therefore resolute like that *Romane Legion* vnder the conduct of the Conſull *Sempronius* against *Hannibal*, *Andacem fecerat ipſe timor.* Feare made him bold. There are feares and affrightments without any apparent cause, and as it were by some celeſtiall impulſion, which they call Panique terrors, *Terrores de caelo, aſcendentibus hominibus pra timore, Terrors from heauen, men conſuming away with feare.* ſuch as once happened in the city of *Carthage*, and wherewith whole people and armies haue beene confounded.

Particular aduiſements and remedies againſt this cuill, are  
*Lib. 3. cap. 28.*

LUC. 21.

The

## The second Consideration of Man, by

*comparing him with all other creatures.*

## CHAP. XXXIIII.

**V**Ee haue considered man whollie and simply in himselfe: now let vs consider him by comparing him with other creatures, which is an excellent meanes to know him. This comparison hath a large extent and many parts that bring much knowledge of importance, and very profitable, if it be well done. But who shall doe it? Shall man? He is a party and to be suspected; and to say the truth, deales partially therein: which may easily be proued, because he keepes neither measure nor mediocrity. Sometimes he placeth himselfe farre aboue all, he tearmes himselfe a Master, and disdaineth the rest: diuides vnto them their morsels, distributeth such a portion of faculties and powers vnto them as shall seeme good vnto him. Sometimes as it were in despight, he debaseth himselfe beneath all; hee murmureth, complaineth, wrongeth Nature as a cruell step-mother, makes himselfe the outcast and most miserable of the world. Now both these extreames are equally against reason, verity, modesty. But how would you haue him to walke yprightly & euenly with all other creatures, when he doth it not with man his companion, nor with God himselfe, as shall be shewed? this comparison is also difficult to do; for how can a man know the inward and secret carriages of creatures, that which moueth within them? But yet let vs doe our endeavour to doe it without passion.

<sup>I</sup>  
A profitable &  
difficult compa-  
rison, wherein  
man is suspec-  
ted.

In the chap. of  
presumption.

2

First, the policy of the world is not so vnequall, so deformed and irregular, neither is there so great a disproportion between the parts thereof, but that they that are neere neighbours and touch one another haue a resemblance, some more some lesse. So is there a great vicinitie and kindred betwixt man and other creatures: they haue many things alike and common to each other, and they haue differences likewise, but not so farre distant and vnlike, but that they may hold together.

Ecclesiast.

together. Man is neither altogether above, nor beneath the rest : All that is vnder heaven, saith the Wisdome of God, runnes the same fortune.

3

Things common

Let vs first speake of those things that are common to all, and almost alike, which are to ingender, nourish, to do, moue, liue, die: *Idem interitus hominis & iumentorum, & aqua vtriusque conditio. As the death of men, so of beasts, and condition of them booth is alike.* And this is against those that finde them-

Ecclef. 4.

selues agriued, saying, that man is the most contemptible creature of Nature, abandoned, left naked vpon the naked earth, without conert, without armor, bound, swadled, without instruction of what is fit for him : whereas all other creatures are clothed and couered with shels, husks, haire, wooll, feathers, scales : armed with teeth, horns, tallants, both to assault and to defend : taught to swim, to runne, to flie, to sing, to seeke their releefe, and man knowes neither how to go, nor to speake, nor to eat, nor any thing but crie without an apprenticeship and much labour. All these complaints to him that

1 Nakednesse.  
cap. 5.

considereth the first composition and naturall condition, are vniust and false : our skinne is as sufficiently provided against the iniuries of times and seasons as theirs, witnesse many nations (as hath beene sayd) that neuer knew what garments meant : yea those parts that we thinke good we keepe vnco- uered, yea the most tender and sensible, as the face, the hands,

2 Swadling  
clothes.

the stomacke, and the delicatest damosels their breasts. Bands and swadling clothes are not necessarie, witnesse the *Lacedemonians*, and in these daies the *Switzers*, *Almaines*, which dwell in cold countries, the *Bisques* & vagabonds that are called *Egyptians*. Crying is likewise common vnto beasts:

3. Crying.

all creatures almost complain, and grone for a time after they come into the world. As for armour, we want not that which is naturall, and haue more motion of our members, vse their seruice more naturally and without instruction. If some

4. Armour.

beasts excell vs in this, wee in the same excell diuers others. The vse of eating is both in them and in vs naturall and without instruction. Who doubreth that an infant, being once able to feede himselfe, knowes how to seeke his sustenance? And the earth likewise bringeth forth and offereth enough vnto him for his necessity, without other culture or Art, wit-

nesse

nesse so many nations, which without labour, industrie and care liue plenteously. As for speech, a man may well say that if it be not naturall, it is not necessary: but it is common to man with other creatures, What else but speech is that faculty we see in them of complaining, reioicing, of calling others to their succour, of making loue? And as wee speake by gestures and motion of the eies, the head, the shoulders, the hands (wherein deafe men are very cunning) so beasts, as wee see in those which haue no voice, who neuerthelesse do interchange their mutuall offices; and as in some kinde of measure beasts vnderstand vs, so we them. They flatter vs, threaten vs, intreat vs and wee them, we speake to them, and they to vs, and if we perfectly vnderstand not one another, where is the fault? in vs or in them? That is to be determined. They may as well account vs beasts by that reason, as we them, yea they reproch vs for that we our selues vnderstand not one another. We vnderstand not the *Bisques*, the Britons, and they all vnderstand the one the other, not onely of the same, but which is more of a diuers kinde. By a certaine barking of the dog, the horse knoweth that he is in choler, and by another voice he knoweth he is not.

Again they haue their intelligence with vs. In the warres in the midst of the fight, Elephants, Dogs, Horses vnderstand with vs, they frame their motions according to the occasion, they pursue, they make their stand, they retire, nay they haue their pay, and diuide the booty with vs, as it hath been practised in the new conquests of the Indies. And these are those things that are common to all, and alike.

Let vs now come to those differences and aduantages that the one hath ouer the other. Man is singular and excellent in some things about other creatures, and in others, beasts haue the superiority, to the end that all things might thereby be knit and chained together in this generall policy of the world and nature. The certaine aduantages or excellencies of man, are those great faculties of the soule; the subtilitie, inuacitie, & sufficiency of the spirit to inuent, to iudge, to chuse, speech to demand and to offer and to succour, the hand to execute that the spirit hath inuented either of it selfe, or learned from another. The forme also of the body, the great diuersity

6. Speech.

7. Mutuall intelligence.

4  
Differences and aduantages.

Of man.

uerfity of the motion of the members, whereby his body doth him better ſeruiſe.

§  
Of Beasts *gent.*  
tail.

*Particular.*

1

2

3

The certaine aduantages that beaſts haue ouer men, and ſuch as are paſt all doubt, are either general or particular. The generall are health, and ſtrength of body farre more perfect, conſtant, & ſtrong in them, among whom there are no blind, deafe, lame, mute, diſeaſed, defectiue, and ill born, as amongſt men. The *Sereno* hurts them not, they are not ſubiect to rheumes from whence proceed almoſt all other diſeaſes; from which man though he couer his head with a hat and a houſe too, can hardly defend himſelfe. Moderation in diet and other actions, innocency, ſafety, peace and tranquillity of life, a plaine and intire liberty without ſhame, feare, or ceremony in things naturall and lawfull ( for it is onely man that hath cauſe to hide himſelfe in his actions, and whoſe faults and imperfections offend others ). Exemption from ſo many vi- ces and diſorders, ſuperſtition, ambition, avarice, enuie, yea mightie dreames trouble not them as they doe men, nor ſo many thoughts and fantaſies. The particular aduantages are the pure, high, healthfull, pleaſant habitation, and abode of birds in the aire. Their ſufficiencie in ſome arts, as the ſwal- low and other birds in building, the Spider in ſpinning and weauing, diuers beaſts in Phylicke, and the Nightingale in Muſicke. Maruellous effects and properties, not to be imi- rated, no not imagined, as the propertie of the fiſh *Remora* to ſtay the greateſt veſſels of the ſea, as we reade of the chiefe galley of *Marcus Antonius*, and the ſelfe ſame of *Caligula*; of the *Torpedo* or Crampe-fiſh, to benum and dead the mem- bers of another, though farre diſtant, and not touching him; of the Hedgehog, to foreſee the windes; of the Chameleon, to change his colours. Prognostications, as of birds in their paſſages from countrey to countrey, according to the diuer- ſitie of the ſeaſons; of all beaſts that are dammes, in knowing which of their young is the beſt; for ſome happe falling out of defending them from danger, or conueying them to their neſts, they alwayes begin with that they know and foreſee to be the beſt. In all theſe things man is farre their inferior, and in ſome of them he hath no ſkill at all. A man may adde vnto this, if hee will, the length of their liues, which in ſome beaſts

beasts doth seuen or eight times exceed the longest terme of the life of man.

Those aduantages that man pretendeth to haue aboue beasts, but are yet disputable, and perhaps as well in beasts as men, are many: First, the reasonable faculties, discourse, reasoning, discipline, iudgement, prudence. There are heere two things to be spoken, the one of the veritie of the thing it selfe. It is a great question, whether beasts be deprived of all these spirituall faculties. The opinion that they are not deprived, but haue them, is the more true and the more authentike. It is defended by many great Philosophers, especially by *Democritus*, *Anaxagoras*, the *Stoicks*, *Galen*, *Porphyrus*, *Plotarchus*, and maintained by this reason. The composition of the braine, which is that part which the soule makes vse of, and whereby it reasoneth, is all alike, as the same in beasts and men, confirmed by experience. Beasts from particulars conclude generals, by the light of one only man they know all men, they know how to ioyne, and diuide, and distinguish the good from the ill, for the safegard of their liues, libertie, and little ones. Yea, we reade and see, if we would but marke and consider it, many things done by beasts, that doe farre excell the sufficiencie, subtiltie, and all the wit and cunning of the common sort of men: some of those that are best woorth the noting, I will note vnto you. The Fox being to passe ouer a riuer that is frozen with ice, applieth his eare vnto the ice, to finde whether he can heare any noyse, and that the water doe runne vnder it, that thereby he may resolue either to goe forward, or to retire backe; of whom the *Thracians* haue learned the same cunning, being to passe their frozen riuers. A Dogge, to the end hee may know which way of three either his master or that beast he hunteth is gone, hauing assured himselfe by senting them, that he hath not passed by two of them, because he findes not the trace, without the setting of his nose to the ground or farther trauersing, he runneth mainly into the third. The Mule of the Philosopher *Thales* crossing a riuer with a sacke of salt on his backe, and being plunged into the deepe with his burthen, his salt dissolved in the water, and made his burthen the lighter; which the Mule (falling into the deepe by chance) hauing found,

being

6  
Disputable ad-  
uantages.  
1  
Reason.



being afterwards loaden with wool, vsed the same remedie, and sunke the more. *Plutarch* reporteth, that he saw a Dog in a ship casting stones into a pipe of oile, to make the oile to mount, that hee might the better come at it. As much is reported of the Crowes of *Barbarie*, who by that meanes raise the water when it is too low, that they may drinke. So likewise Elephants gather stones and sticks, and cast them into that ditch whereinto their companion is fallen, to helpe him to get out. The Oxen of the Kings gardens of *Suzer* being taught to go in a wheele a iust hundred turnes, to draw water to water the gardens, they would neuer exceed that iust number, and were neuer deceiued in their account. All these things, how can they be done, without discourse and reason, addition and diuision? To say they know not this, were to deny that we see they doe. What should we thinke of that dexterity that is in the Elephant in plucking those darts and iauelins foorth of his bodie with little or no paine at all? of the Dogge that *Plutarch* speaketh of, which in a publike play vpon a scaffold counterfeited death, drawing towards his end, trembling, afterwards growing stiffe, and suffering himselfe to be caried foorth, by little and little comming to himselfe, and lifting vp his head counterfeited a new resurrection? of so many apish imitations and strange tricks that the dogs of Players and Iuglers doe? of the policies and inuentions wherewith beasts defend themselves against the assaults we make vpon them? of the husbandrie and great prouidence of the Ant in laying abroad his graine to drie, lest it take moisture and so corrupt, in nipping the ends thereof that it grow not? of the policie of the Bee, where there is such diuersity of offices and charges so firmly established?

7  
*An opposition of  
 the naturall in-  
 stinct.*

To beat downe all this, some doe maliciously attribute these things to a naturall, seruile and forced inclination; as if beasts did performe their actions by a naturall necessity, like things inanimate, as the stone falleth downeward, the fire mounteth vpward. But besides that, that can not be, nor enter into our imagination; for there must be a numbring of the parts, comparison, discourse by addition and diuision, and consequents; they likewise know not what this naturall inclination and instinct is; they be words which they abuse to  
 small



small purpose, that they may not be deafe and mute altogether. Againé, this saying is retorted against them : for it is beyond all comparifon more noble, honourable, and reſembleth more the Diuinity to worke by nature than by art and apprenticeship ; to be led and directed by the hand of God, than by our owne ; regularly to act by a naturall and ineuitable condition, than regularly by a rash and caſuall liberty.

By this obiection of the naturall inſtinct, they would likewise deſtrive them of inſtruction and diſcipline both aſtiue and paſſiue, but experience giues them the lie ; for they doe both receiue it : witneſſe the Pie, the Parret, the Black-bird, the Dogge, the Horſe, as hath beene ſayd, and they giue it, witneſſe the Nightingale, and aboue all other the Elephant, which excelleth all other beaſts in docilitie, and all kinde of diſcipline and ſufficiency.

As for this facultie of the ſpirit whereof man doth ſo much glory, which is to ſpiritualize things corporall and aſent, robbing them of all accidents, to the end it might conceiue them after it owne maner, *nam intellectum eſt in intelligente ad modum intelligentis* ; For that which is underſtood, is in him that underſtandeth, after the maner of the underſtander, beaſts themſelues doe the like. The Horſe accuſtomed to the warres ſleeping in his ſtable, trembleth and groaneth as if he were in the middeſt of the fight ; conceiueſſe the ſound of the drumme, the trumpet, yea an army it ſelfe. The Hare in ſleepe panting, liſteth vp her ſeul, ſhaking her legs, conceiueſſe a ſpiritual Hare. Dogs that are kept for gard, in their ſleepe doe ſnar, and ſometimes barke outright, imagining a ſtranger to bee come. To conclude this firſt point, wee muſt confeſſe that beaſts doe reaſon, haue the uſe of diſcourſe and iudgement, but more weakly and imperfectly than man ; they are inferiour vnto men in this, not becauſe they haue no part therein at all ; they are inferiour vnto men, as amongſt men ſome are inferiour vnto others ; and euen ſo amongſt beaſts there is ſuch a difference : but yet there is a greater difference between men ; for (as ſhall be ſaid heereafter) there is a greater diſtance betweene a man and a man, than a man and a beaſt. But for all this we muſt not heereby inferre, a kinde of equality or parity betwixt a beaſt and a man (though as *Ariſtoſtle* ſayth, there are

are some men so weake and blockish, that they differ from a beast only in figure) and that the soule of a beast is immortall as that of a man, or the soule of a man mortall as that of a beast: for these are but malicious illations. For, besides that in this reasoning faculty, a man hath a very great aduantage above beasts, so hath the other faculties more high and wholly spirituall, whereby he is sayd to be like vnto God himselfe, and is capable of immortality, whercin beasts haue no part, and are signified by that vnderstanding, which is more than a simple discourse. *Nolite fieri sicut equus & mulus in quibus non est intellectus. Be not like horse and mule in whom there is no vnderstanding.*

9

The other point which we are to speake of in this matter is, that this preheminance and aduantage of vnderstanding, and other spirituall faculties that man pretenderth, is sold him at a deare rate, and brings with it more hurt than good: for it is the principall source of all those euils that oppresse him; of vices, passions, maladies, irresolution, trouble, despaire, which beasts want, by the want of this great aduantage: witnesse the Hogge of *Pyrrho*, which did eat his meat peaceably in the shippe in the midst of a great tempest, when all the men were almost dead for feare. It seemeth that these great parts of the soule haue beene denied vnto beasts, or at leastwise lessened, and giuen them more feeble, for their great good and quiet, and bestowed vpon man for his torment: for it is long of them that he toileth and trauelleth, tormenteth himselfe with what is past, and that which is to come; yea he imagineth, apprehendeth, and feareth those euils that are not, nor ever shall be. Beasts apprehend nothing that is ill vntill they feele it; and being escaped, they are presently in security and at peace. So that we see that man is most miserable euen in that wherein he thought himselfe most happy: whereby it seemeth that it had beene better for man, not to haue beene indued and adorned with all those beautifull and celestiallyl armes, since he turneth them against himselfe, euen to his owne destruction. And to say the truth, wee see those that are most stupid and feeble of spirit, liue at best content, and feele not their euill accidents in so high a degree, as those that are more spirituall.

Another

Another aduantage that man pretendeth aboue beasts is a signorie and power of commanding, which hee thinketh he hath ouer beasts: but besides, that it is an aduantage that men themselues haue and exercise the one ouer the other, this is not true. For where is this command of man, this obedience of the beasts? It is a monster that was neuer seen, yea men doe more feare beasts, than beasts them. It is true that man hath a great preheminence ouer beasts, *Vi praeis piscibus maris, uolatilibus caeli, bestiis terra.* That he might rule ouer the fish of the sea, the fowles of the aire, and the beasts of the earth. And this by reason of his beautifull and vpright forme, of his wisdom and the prerogative of his spirit: but not that hee should either command, or they obey.

10

3. Signorie and command.

Gen. 1.

There is likewise another aduantage, neere neighbour to this, pretended by man, which is a plaine libertie, reproching beasts with their seruitude, captiuitie, subiection: but this is to small purpose. There is farre greater reason why man should reproch man; witnesse those slaues, not only made by force, and such as descend from them, but also those that are voluntarie, who either sell for money their libertie or giue it, out of the lightnesse of their hearts, or for some commoditie, as the ancient sensors solde outright women to their mistresses, souldiers to their captaines. Now there is none of all this in beasts, they neuer serue one another, nor yeeld themselves to any seruitude either actiue or passiue, either to serue or to be serued, and are in euery thing more free than men. And as man goeth to the chase, taketh, killeth, eateth the beasts; so is he taken, killed, eaten by them in his turne, and more honourably too, by maine strength, not by wit and art, as man doth: and not only by them is he killed, but by his companion, by another man, a thing base and dishonorable. Beasts assemble not themselves in troops to go to kill, to destroy, to ransacke, to inthrall another troope of their kinde, as men do.

11

3. Libertie.

The fourth and greatest aduantage pretended by man; is in vertue, but of morall it is disputable (I meane morall materially by the outward action): for formallie the moralitie good or euill, vertue and vice, can not be in a beast. Kinde acknowledgement, officious amitie, fidelitie, magnanimitie, and many other vertues, which consist in society and conuersation,

12

4. Vertue.

uerſation, are more lively, more expreſſe and conſtant, than can be in the common ſort of people. *Hircanius* the dogge of *Lyſimachus* continued vpon the bed of his dead maſter, reſuſing all kinde of ſuſtenance, and afterwards caſt himſelfe into that fire wherein his maſter was burnt, and there died with him. The ſelfe ſame did another belonging to one *Pyrrhus*. That dogge of wife *Heſiodus* diſcouered the murder of his maſter. Another in like ſort in the preſence of King *Pyrrhus*, and his whole armie. Another which neuer ceaſed, as *Plutarch* affirmeth, going from citie to citie, vntill that ſacrilegious Robber of the Temple of *Athens* was apprehended and brought to iudgement. That hiſtorie is famous, of the Lion that was hoſt and nurſe to *Androdeus* the ſlaue and his Phyſitian, which would not touch him being caſt out vnto him: which *Appion* affirmeth to haue ſeen at *Rome*. An Elephant hauing in choler killed his gouernour, repenting himſelfe of it, reſuſed any longer to eat, drinke, or liue. Contrariwiſe, there is not a creature in the world, more vniuſt, vnthankfull, traiterous, perſidious, lying and deceitfull, than man. Again, ſo far as much as vertue conſiſteth in the moderation of our appetites, and the bridling of our pleaſures, beaſts are much more moderate therein than wee, and doe better containe themſelues within the limits of nature. For they are not only not touched with vnnaturall, ſuperfluous and artificiall paſſions and deſires, which are all vicious and infinite, as men who for the moſt part are plunged in them, but alſo in the naturall, as eating and drinking, the acquaintance betwixt the male and the female, they are far more moderate and ſtaied. But that we may ſee which is the more vertuous or vicious a man or a beaſt, and in good earneſt to ſhame a man more than a beaſt, let vs take the vertue moſt proper and agreeable vnto man, that is, as the word it ſelfe importeth, humanity: as the, moſt ſtrange and contrary vice is cruelty. Now heerein beaſts haue aduantage enough euen to make men bluſh for ſhame. They neuer aſſaile, and ſeldome offend thoſe of their kind *Maiores ſerpentum ferarumque concordia quam hominum*: Greater is the concord and agreement amongſt ſerpents and wild beaſts, then among men. They neuer fight but for great and iuſt cauſes, as the defence and preferuation of their liues, liberty, and their little

Humanity.  
Cruelty.

little ones: and that they doe with their naturall and open armes, by their only force and valour, and that one to one, as in single combates, and not in troupes, nor by designements. Their combates are short and soone ended, vntill one of them be either wounded or yeeldeth, and the combate ended, the quarrell, hatred, and choler is likewise at an end. But man hath no quarrell but against man, for not only light, vaine and friuolous causes, but many times vniust, with artificiall and traiterous armes, by deceits and wicked meanes, in troupe and assembly gathered by assignement; and lastly his warres are long and neuer ended but with death, and when he is able no longer to hurt, yet the hatred and choler endureth.

The conclusion of this comparison is, that vnruly and vainely doth man glorifie himselfe about beasts. For if man haue in him something more then they, as especially the viuacity of the spirit and vnderstanding, and those great faculties of the soule; so likewise in exchange is hee subiect to a thousand euils from which the beasts are freed, inconstancie, irresolution, superstition, a painefull care of things to come, ambition, auarice, enuie, curiosity, detraction, lying, and a world of disordered appetites, discontentments, emulations. This spirit wherewith man maketh himselfe so merry, brings him a thousand inconueniences, and then most, when it is most stirred and enforced. For it doth not only hurt the body, trouble, breake and weaken the bodily forces and functions, but also it hurts and hindereth it selfe. What casteth man into folly and madnesse, but the sharpenesse, agility, and proper force of the spirit? The most subtile follies and excellent lunacies proceede from the rarest and quickest agitations of the spirit, as from greatest amities spring greatest enmities and from soundest healths mortall maladies. Melancholicke men, saith *Plato*, as they are more capable of knowledge and wisedome, so likewise of folly. And hee that well marketh it, shall finde, that in those eleuations and fallies of a free soule, there is some mixture of folly; for to say the truth, these things are neere neighbours.

Touching a simple life and such as is according to nature, beasts do farre exceede men; they liue more freely, securely, moderately, contentedly. And that man is wise that considereth

12

*The conclusion  
of this second  
consideration.*

13

*An exhortation*

reth heereof, and benefiteh himselfe by making them an instruction vnto himselfe, which doing, he frameth himselfe to innocencie, simplicitie, libertie, and that naturall sweetnesse which shineth in beasts, and is wholly altered and corrupted in vs by our artificiall inuentions, and vnbridled licentiousnesse, abusing that wherein we say we excell them, which is the spirit and iudgement. And therefore God doth many times send vs to schoole, to birds, beasts themselues, to the kite, the grasshopper, the swallow, the turtle, the ant, the ox, the asse, and diuers others. Lastly, we must remember that there is a kind of commerce betwixt beasts & vs, a certaine relation & mutuall obligation, whereof there is no other reason, but that they belong to one & the same master, and are of the same family that we are. It is an vnworthy thing to tyrannise ouer them, we owe iustice vnto men, and pitie and gentleness to such other creatures as are capeable thereof.

### The third Consideration of Man,

*which is by his life.*

#### CHAP. XXXV.

*The estimation, breuity, description, of the life of man,  
and the parts thereof.*

*Of the estimation  
and worth  
of life.*

**I**T is a great and principall point of wisdom, truly to know how to esteeme of life, to holde and preserve it, to lose or to take it away, to keepe and direct it, as much as after such a manner as is fit; there is not perhaps any thing wherein a man faileth more, or is more hindred. The vulgar vnlearned for accounteth it a soueraigne good, and preferreth it aboue all things; yea he will not ticke to redeeme and prolong it by all the delayes that may be, vpon what conditions soeuer, thinking it can neuer be bought too deare: for it is all in all with him, his motte is *Vita nihil aurius. Nothing is dearer than life.* He esteemeth and loueth his life for the loue of it selfe: he liues not but to liue. It is no maruell if hee faile in all the rest, if he be wholly compounded of errours, since from his very entrance, and in this fundamentall point hee mistakes himself so grossly. It may be likewise with some lesse esteemed, and

and more basely accounted of than it should, either by reason of some insufficiency in iudgement, or a proud misknowledge thereof: for falling into the hands of those that are good and wise, it may be a profitable instrument both to themselves and others. And I can not be of their opinion (as it is simply taken) that say it is best of all, not to bee at all; and that the best is the shortest life: *optimum non nasci aut quam citissime aboleri. The best thing is not to be borne, or presently to die.* And it is neither well nor wisely sayd, What hurt or what matter had it beene if I had neuer beene? A man may answer him with the like question: Where had that good beene which is come, and being not come, had it not beene euill not to haue beene? It is a kinde of euill that wanteth good, whatsoeuer it be, yea though not necessary. These extremities are too extreme and vitious, though not equally: but that seemes true that a wise man spake, That is such a good as a man would not take, if he knew well what it were before he tooke: *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus. No man would accept of life if he knew what it were.* It is well that men are within before they see the entrance, and that they are carried hwdwinckt into it. Now when they are within, some doe so cocker and flatter themselves therein, that vpon what condition soeuer they will not go forth againe; others do nothing but murmur and vex themselves: but the wiser sort seeing it to be a market that is made without themselves (for a man neither liues nor dies when and how he will) and that though the way be rough and hard, yet neuerthelesse it is not alwaies so, without wining, or struiuing and troubling any thing, they accommodate themselves vnto it as they may, and so passe their life in quietnesse, making of necessitie a vertue; which is a token of wisdom and industrie: and so doing, they liue as long as they should, and not like fooles, as long as they can. For there is a time to liue, and a time to die: and a good death is farre better than an ill life. A wise man liues no longer, than that his life may be woorth more than his death: for the longest life is not alwaies the better.

See heereof lib.  
2. ca. 11.

All men doe much complaine of the breuity of the life of man; not only the simple vulgar sort, who wish it would neuer haue end, but also (which is more strange) the greatest

<sup>2</sup>  
Of the length &  
breuity of life.



and wisest make it the principall ground of their complaints. To say the truth, the greatest part thereof being diuerted and otherwise employed, there remaines little or nothing for it selfe : for the time of our infancy, olde age, sleepe, maladies of minde and bodie, and many other times, both vnprofitable and vnfit for any good, being taken away, that which remaineth is little or nothing at all. Neuerthelcise, without op-  
 posing the contrarie opinion to them that holde a short life to be a great good and gift of Nature, their complaint seemeth to haue little equitie and reason, and rather to proceed from malice. For to what end serueth a long life ? Simplicie to liue, to breathe, to eat, to drinke, to see this world : for all this what needs so long time ? We haue scene, knowen, tasted all in a short space ; and knowing it, to desire so long a time to practise it, and still to reiterate the same thing, to what end is it ? Who will not be satisfied, nay wearied, to doe alwaies one and the same thing ? If it be not tedious and irkesome, at the least it is superfluous : it is a turning wheele where the same things come and goe : it is alwaies to begin where we end, and to respinne the same webbe. But perhaps they will say they desire a long life to learne and to profit the more, and to proceed to a greater perfection of knowledge and vertue. Alas good soules that wee are, what should wee know, or who should teach vs ? We employ but badly that little which is giuen vs, not only in vanities and those things that yeeld vs no profit, but in malice and sinne ; and then we crie out and complaine, that we haue not enough giuen vnto vs. And to say the truth, to what end serues so great store of knowledge and experience, since in the end wee must leaue it and dislodge it ; and hauing dislodged it altogether, forget and lose it all, or know it better and otherwise ? But you will say, that there are beasts that do triple and quadruple the life of man. To omit those fables that are tolde heereof ; Be it so : but yet there are a number that liue not a quarter of that time that man doth, and few neither, that liue out their time. By what right or reason, or priuiledge, can man challenge a longer life than other creatures ? Is it because he doth better employ it in matters more high and more worthy life ? By this reason he should liue lesse time than all other creatures ; for  
 there



there is none comparable to man in the ill emploiment of his life, in wickednesse, ingratitude, intemperance, and all manner of disorder and immodestly in maners, as hath been shewed before in the comparison of man with beasts : so that as I asked euen now, to what end a long life serued ; now I aske, what euils there would be in the world, if the life of man were long ? What would he not enterprise, since the shortnesse of life, which cuts off his way, and (as they say) interrupts his cast, and the vncerteinty thereof, which takes away all heart and courage, can not stay him, liuing as if he should liue euer ? On the one side he feareth, perceiuing himselfe to be mortall, but notwithstanding that, hee can not bridle himselfe from not coueting, hoping, enterprising, as if he were immortall.

*Tanquam semper victuri vinitis, nunquam vobis fragilitas vestra* Seneca.

*succurrit : omnia tanquam mortales timetis, tanquam immortales concupiscitis.* Ye liue as though yee were alwaies to liue, your frailty neuer comes into your minde, ye feare all things as mortall, but ye desire all things as immortall. And to say the trueth, what need hath

Nature of all these great and goodly enterprises and employments, whereby man challengeth a longer life than other creatures ? Man therefore hath no subiect whereof to complaine, but to be angrie with himselfe. We haue life enough, but we are not good husbands, we manage it not well ; life is not short, but we make it so ; we are not in want, but prodigall ; *non inopes vita, sed prodigi* : we lose it, we dissipate it, we vilifie it, as if it were nought worth, as if we had more than enough : we all fall into one of these three faults, either we employ it ill, or about nothing, or in vaine. *Magna vita pars elabatur male* Seneca.

*agentibus, maxima nihil agentibus, tota aliud agentibus.* A great

part of life is lost, to those that doe ill, a greater to those that doe no- cap. 6.

thing, and all to those that doe that they should not doe. One man studieth not to liue, but rather busieth himselfe in any other thing ; he shall neuer know how to doe a thing well by acquitting himselfe of labour, but by care and attention. Others reserue their liues vntill they can liue no longer, then take comfort in life when there is nothing left but the lees and dregs thereof. Oh what folly, what miserie is this ! Yea there are some that haue sooner ended than begunne to liue, and life is past before they thought of it. *Quidam vivere incipiunt, cum*

*desinendum; quidam ante desierunt, quam inciperent. Inter cetera mala, hoc quoque habet stultitia, semper incipit viuere. Some beginne to liue, when they should die, some ended, before they beginne, amongst other enils, folly hath this, that it alwaies beginsse to liue.*

3  
*A description of a perpetuall illue of errors, a web of vnhappie aduentures, the life of man,* Our present life is but the entrance and end of a Tragedie, a pursuit of diuers miseries inchained together on all sides; there is nothing but euill that it distilleth, that it prepareth; one euill driues forward another euill, as one waue another; torment is euer present, and the shadow of what is good deceiuerth vs; blindnesse and want of sense possesseth the beginning of our life, the middle is euer in paine and trauell, the end in sorrow; and beginning, middle, and end in error.

4  
The life of man hath many discommodities and miseries common, ordinary and perpetuall; it hath likewise some particular and distinct, according to the diuersity of the parts, ages and seasons; infancy, youth, virilitie, olde age; euerie one hath their proper and particular discommodities.

5  
*A comparison betwixt youth and olde age.* The greatest part of the world speake more honorable & fauorably of old age, as the more wise, ripe, moderat, accustoming and shaming youth of a vitious, foolish, licentious, but very vniustly: for in truth the infirmities and vices of old age are more in number, more great and troublesome than those of youth, it fills the minde more with wrinckles, than the visage; and there is not a soule growing olde, growes not sower and rotten. With the body the spirit is vsed, and the worse for the vse; and at the last returns to infancy againe, *Bis pueri senes. Olde men twice children.* Old age is a necessary and puissant malady, which loadeth vs insensibly with many imperfections. It were absurd to tearme wisdom a difficultie of humours, an anxiety and distaste of things present, an impotencie to doe as in former times: Wisdom is too noble to be serued with such officers. To wax olde is not to wax wise, nor to take away vices; but to change them into worse. Olde age condemneth pleasure, but it is because it can not taste or relish it aright, like *Esops* dogge, it saith it will none of it, but it is because it can not ioy in it: for olde age leaueth not pleasure properly, but pleasure disdaineth olde age; for it is

is alwaies wanton and sporting: and it is no reason that impotencie should corrupt iudgement, which should in youth know vice in pleasure, and in olde age pleasure in vice. The vices of youth are temeritie, indiscreet forwardnesse, and vnbridled libertie and ouer greedie desire of pleasure, which are naturall things proceeding from the heat of the blood and naturall vigour, and therefore the more excusable, but the vices of olde age are farre otherwise. The lighter are a vaine and fraile proteruitie, an enuious pratling, insociable homours, superstition, care to get riches, euen then when the vse of them is lost, a sottish auarice, and feare of death, which proceedeth properly, not from the want of spirit and courage, as they say, but because olde men are long acquainted and as it were cockered in this world, whereby their affections are knit vnto it, which is not in yoong men: but besides these they are enuious, froward, vniust: but that which is most sottish and ridiculous in them, is that they would not only be reuerenced but feared, and therefore they put vpon them an austere looke and disdainfull, thinking thereby to extort feare and obedience: but they are therein much deceiued, for this stately and furious gesture is receiued of youth with mockerie and laughter, being practised only to blinde their eyes, and of purpose to hide and disguise the truth of things. There are in olde age so many faults on the one side, and so many impotencies on the other, and therefore so fit for contempt, that the best way to compasse their desires is loue and affection: for command and feare are no longer fit armes for them. It ill befits them to make themselves to bee feared: and though they could doe it, yet loue and honour is a fairer purchase.

The

# The fourth consideration of Man, morall

by his *maners, humours, conditions,*  
very lively and notable.

## THE PREFACE.

**A**Ll the descriptions the wise, and such as haue taken  
greatest paines in the studie of humane knowledge,  
haue giuen vnto man, seene all to note in man foure  
things, *Vanitie, Weaknesse, Inconstancie, Miserie*; calling him  
the spoile of times, the play-game of Fortune, the image of  
inconstancie, the example and spectacle of infirmitie, the  
ballance of enuie and miserie, a dreame, a fantasie, ashes, a  
vapour, a morning dew, a flower that presently fadeth and  
withereth, a winde, grasse, a bladder or bubble, a shadow,  
leaves of trees caried with the winde, vncleane seed in his be-  
ginning, a sponge of ordures, a sacke of miseries in his middle  
age, a stench and meat for wormes in his end; and to con-  
clude, the most miserable and wretched thing in the world.  
*Job*, one of the most sufficient in this matter, as well in the pra-  
ctise and contemplation thereof, hath well and at large descri-  
bed him, and after him, *Salomon*, in their bookes. To be short,  
*Plinie* seemeth very properly to haue desciphered him, in  
calling him the most miserable, and yet the most arrogant  
creature of the world, *Solum ut certum sit nihil esse certi, nec*  
*miserius quicquam homine aut superbius.* That it is only certaine,  
that there is nothing certaine, neither any thing more proud, and  
miserable then man. By the first word (miserable) he com-  
prehendeth all those former descriptions, and as much as all  
the rest haue said; but by the other (the most proud) hee  
toucheth another chiefe point very important: and hee seem-  
eth in these two words to haue vttered whatsoever can be said.  
These are those two things that seeme to hurt and hinder one  
the other, Miserie and Pride, Vanitie and Presumption. See  
then how strange and monstrous a patch-coat man is.

Forasmuch as man is composed of two diuers parts, the  
soule and the body, it is a matter of difficulty well to describe  
him entire in his perfection and declining state. Some refer  
vnto

vnto the body whatsoeuer ill can be spoken of man; they make him an excellent creature, and in regard of his spirit extoll him about all other creatures: but on the other side, whatsoeuer is ill, either in man, or in the whole world, is forged and proceedeth from this spirit of man, and in it there is farre more vanity, inconstancy, misery, presumption, than in the body, wherein there is little matter of reproch in respect of the spirit, and therefore *Democritus* calleth it a world of hidden miseries, and *Plutarch* prooueth it in a booke written of that subiect. Now let vs consider man more according to the life, than heeretofore we haue done, and pinch him where it itcheth not, referring all to these five points, *vanitie, weakness, inconstancy, misery, and presumption*, which are his more naturall and vniuersall qualities, but the two latter touch him more neerely. Again there are some things common to many of these five, which a man knowes not to which to attribute it, and especially imbecillity and miserie.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

1. *Vantie.*

**V**anity is the most essentiall and proper quality of humane nature. There is nothing so much in man, be it malice, infelicity, inconstancy, irresolution (and of all these there is alwaies abundance) as base feebleness, sottishness and ridiculous vanity. And therefore *Democritus* met better with it, with a kinde of disdaine of humane condition, mocking and laughing at it, than *Heracitus* that wept and tormented himselfe, whereby he gaue some testimony, that he made some account thereof; and *Diogenes* who scorned it, than *Timon* that hater and flier of the company of men. *Pindarus* hath expressed it more to the life than any other, by the two vaineest things in the world, calling it the dreame of a shadow, *vanitas vanitatum et omnia vanitas.*

This is that, that hath wrought in the wisest so great a contempt of man, that hearing of some great designment and honourable enterprize, and iudging it such, were wont neuertheless to say that the world was not worthy a mans labour and paines, (so answered *Statilius* to *Brutus*, talking with him about

bout the conspiracie against *(Cesar)* and that a wise man should doe nothing but for himselfe, for it is not reason that wise men, and wisdom should put themselves in danger for fooles.

2  
*Thoughts.*

This vanitie is shewed and exprest many waies, and after a diuers maner, first in our thoughts and priuate imaginations, which are many times more then vaine, friuolous, and ridiculous, wherein neuerthelesse we spend much time, and yet perceiue it not. Wee enter into them, we dwell in them, and we come forth againe insensibly, which is a double vanitie, and a great forgetfulnesse of our selues. One walking in a hall considereth how he may frame his paces after a certaine fashion vpon the boords of the floure: another discourseth in his minde, with much time, and great attention, how he should carry himselfe if hee were a king, a Pope, or some other thing that he is assured can neuer come to passe; and so hee feedeth himselfe with winde, yea lesse thap winde, that, that neither is, nor euer shall be. Another dreameth how he shall compose his body, his countenances, his gestures, his speech after an affected fashion, and pleaseth himselfe therein, as with a thing that wonderfully becomes him, and that every man should take delight in. But what a vanity and fortish weakenesse in our desires is this, that brings forth beliefs and hopes farre more vaine? And all this falleth out not onely when we haue nothing to doe, when we are swallowed vp with idlenesse, but many times in the midst of our most necessarie affaires: so naturall and powerfull is vanity, that it robbeth and plucketh out of our hand, the truth, soliditie, and substance of things, and fills vs with winde, yea with nothing.

3  
*Care for time to come.*

Another more fortish vanitie is a troublesome care of what shall heere fall out when we are dead. We extend our desires and affections beyond our selues, and our being; we would provide that some thing should bee done vnto vs, when wee know not what is done vnto vs; we desire to be praised after our death, what greater vanitie? It is not ambition, as it seemeth & a man may thinke it, for that is the desire of a sensible and perceptible honor: if this praise of our selues when we are gone, might any waie profit either our children, our parents,  
or

or our friends that suruiue vs, it were well, there were some benefit, though not to our selues; but to desire that as a good, which shall no way touch vs, nor benefit others, is a mere vanitie, like that of those who feare their wiues will marrie after their departure: and therefore they desire them with great passion to continue vnmarried, and binde them by their willes so to doe, leauing vnto them a great part of their goods vpon that condition. This is vanitie and many times iniustice. It was contrariwise a commendable thing in those great men in times past which dying exhorted their wiues to marry speedily for the better increase of the Commonwealt. Others ordeine, that for the loue of them and for their sakes a friend keepe such and such a thing, or that he do this or that vnto their dead bodies which rather sheweth their vanity, than doth any good to soule or body,

See heere another vanity, we liue not but by relation vnto another; we take not so much care what we are in our selues in effect and truth, as what we are in the publike knowledge of men; in such sort, that we do many times deceiue and deprive ourselues of our owne goods and commodities, and torment ourselues, to frame our outward appearances to the common opinion. This is true, not onely in outward things and such as belong to the bodie, and the expense and charge of our meanes, but also in the goods of the spirit, which seeme vnto vs to be without fruit, if others enioy them not, and they be not produced to the view and approbation of strangers.

Our vanity is not only in our simple thoughts, desires, and discourses, but it likewise troubleth, shaketh and tormenteth both soule and bodie. Many times men trouble and torment themselves more for light occasions and matters of no moment, than for the greatest and most important affaires that are. Our soule is many times troubled with small fantasies, dreames, shadowes, fooleries, without bodie, without subject; it is intangled and molested with choler, hatred, sorrow, ioy, building castles in *Spain*. The remembrance of a farewell of some particular grace or action afflicteth vs more than a whole discourse of a matter of greater importance. The sound of names and certaine words pronounced with a pitifull

3  
*Agitations of the spirit.*

pitifull voice, yea with sighs and exclamations pierceth euen to the quicke, as Oratours and Players, and others that sell winde and smoake, doe well know and practise. And this winde catcheth and carrieth away many times men that are most constant and setled, if they stand not vpon their gard: so puissant is vanitie ouer men. And not only light and little things doe shake and trouble vs, but also lies and impostures, euen those we know to be such (a strange thing) in such sort; that we take pleasure to deceiue our selues in good earnest, to feed our fantasies with tales, with nothing (*ad fallendum nosmetipos ingeniosissimi sumus*): Wee are wise to deceiue our selues; witnesse they that weepe and afflict themselves hearing a relation, or seeing a Tragedie, which they know to be an inuention made for delight, euen of those things that neuer were. I could tell you of one that was so besotted, that he died for one whom he knew to be foule, olde, deformed, not because he loued her, but because she was well painted, and plastered or coloured with other impostures, though hee alwayes knew them to be such.

6  
Visitations and  
offices of cour-  
tesies.

Let vs come from the particular vanitie of euery particular man in his common life, to see how much this vanitie is tied to the nature of man; not onely as a priuate and personall vice. What vanitie and losse of time is there in those visitations, salutations, congies and mutuall entertainments, those offices of courtelie, orations, ceremonies, offers, praises, promises! How many hyperbolicall speeches, hypocrisies and impostures are there in the sight and knowledge of all, both of those that giue them, that receiue them, that heare of them! insonmuch that it seemeth to be a match and market made together, to mocke, lie, and deceiue one another. And that which is woorth all the rest, he that knowes that a man doth impudently lie vnto him, must yet giue him thanks; and he that knowes that when he lies he is not beleeued, sets a bolde face vpon the matter, attending and obseruing one the other, who shall first begin or end; when they could both be content they were both asunder. What inconueniences doth man endure? He faineth, counterfeiteth, disguiseth himselfe; he endureth heat, colde, troubleth his rest, afflicteth his life for those courtly vanities, and leaueth his weightie affaires for



for the winde. We are vaine at the charge of our owne ease, yea of our health and of our life. The accidents and the lighter things trample vnder foot the substance, and the winde carrieth the bodie, so much is man a slave to vanitie: and he that will do otherwise shall be held for a foole and a man that vnderstands not the world. It is dexteritie well to play this Comedie, and folly not to be vaine. Being entred into speech and familiar discourse, how many vaine and vnprofitable, false, fabulous tales are there (not to say wicked and pernicious, which are not of this count) how many vaunts and vaine boastings! Man desireth and delighteth to speake of himselfe and that which is his, and if he thinke he haue either done or said, or possesse any thing that is worthy estimation, he is not at ease vntill he hath vttered it, and made it knowne to others: when a commoditie first commeth he entred into an account thereof, he valueth it, he raiseth the price, nay he will not seeme to attend his commoditie, though he seeke it with industrie; and then to heare what the speech of the people is abroad, he thrusts himselfe into companie, and it tickleth him at the heart to heare his happie successe spoken of, and that men esteeme of him the more, and of what hee esteemes.

But better to make knowne what credit and command this vanitie hath ouer the nature of man, let vs call to minde that the greatest alterations of the world, the most generall and fearefull agitations of States and Empires, armies, battels, murders, haue risen from light, ridiculous and vaine causes: witnesse the warres of *Troy* and *Greece*, of *Sylla* and *Marinus*, *Cesar* and *Pompey*, *Augustus* and *Antonie*. The Poets signify as much, when they set all *Greece* and *Asia* on fire for an apple. The first occasions and motiues arise of nothing, afterwards they grow and increase: a testimony of the vanitie and follie of man. Many times the accident doth more than the principall, the lesser circumstances touch more to the quicker than the greatest, nay the causes and subiects themselves. The robe of *Cesar* troubled *Rome* more than his death did, or those 22 stabs with a poignard that were giuen him.

Lastly, the crowne and perfection of the vanitie of man is shewed in that which he most affecteth and seeks after; he pleaseth

7

Publike and  
vniuersall agi-  
tations.

8

Felicity and  
contentment.

pleaseth himselfe and placeth his whole felicity in those vaine and friuolous goods, without which hee may well and commodiously liue, and takes not that care that he should for the true and essentiall : his chance is winde, his whole good nothing but opinion and dreames, wherein he is matchlesse. God hath all good things in essence, all euill in vnderstanding ; man quite contrarie possesseth his good things by fancie, his euill in essence. Beasts content not, nor feed themselves with opinions and fantasies, but with that which is present, palpable and in verity. Vanitie hath beene giuen vnto man as his proper part or condition ; he runnes, he stirs, he hunts vp and downe, hee catcheth a shadow, he adoreth the winde, he flies, he dies, and a mote at the last is the hire of his daies worke. *Vanitati creatura subiecta est etiam molens, vniuersa vanitas omnis homo viuens. Every creature is subiect to vanitie, even against his will, and all men living are but vanity.*

## CHAP. XXXVII.

## Debility or Infirmitie.

**B**Eholde heere the second head of this Consideration and humane knowledge : for how should vanitie be other than fraile and feeble ? This weaknesse is confessed, and proued by all that account many things easie to be vnderstood of all, but is not taken to be such in those things it should, as in such wherein a man seemeth to be most strong, and least weak ; in desiring, possessing, and vsing those things that he hath and holdeth, and in euery good and euill ; and to be short, in such wherein he glorieth most, wherein he thinketh to excell others ; and to be some thing. These are the true testimonies of his weakenesse : but we shall see this better apart.

**F**irst, touching desire, a man can not settle his contentment in any thing, no not his owne desire and imagination. It is not in our power to chuse that we should : and whatsoeuer we haue desired or obtained, it satisfies vs not : but we goe bleating after things vnknown and to come, because things present content vs not, and we more esteeme of things absent. If one should put a man to his owne choise, make him his owne caruer, it is not in his power so to chuse, as that he re-  
pent

2  
In desiring and  
chusing.

pent not his choise; or which he will not adde vnto, or take from, or alter someway or other; for he desires that which he knowes not how to expresse: and at the last nothing can content him, but he is angrie and falleth out with himselfe.

The weaknesse of man doth more appeare, and is greater in the possession and vse of things, and that diuers wayes: first, in that he can not make vse of any thing in it owne purity and simple nature; but he must disguise, alter and corrupt them before he can accommodate them to his vse: the elements, mettrals, and all things els in their owne nature are not fit for vse. Good things, delights and pleasures can not be enjoyed without some mixture of euill and discomfort: *Medo de fonte leporum surgit amari aliquid, quod in ipsis floribus angat. Euen from amidst the fountaines of delights doe arise alwaies some biternes, which euen in the height of pleasure doe annoie.* The highest pleasure that is hath a sigh and a complaint to accompanie it; and being come to perfection is but debility, a deiection of the minde, languishment. An extreame and full contentment hath more moderate feueritic than wanton delight: *Ipsa felicitas, se nisi temperat, premis: Felicity it selfe, vnlesse it temper it selfe, vexeth:* And therefore it was well said of him, That God selles vnto vs whatsoeuer good thing he sends vs: that is to say, That he giueth nothing vnto vs purely good, but that we buy it at the scales with an addition of some euill to make vp weight. So likewise, sorrow is neuer pure without the alliance of some pleasure: *Labor voluptasq; dissimillima natura, societate quadam naturali inter se sunt iuncta; est quadam fere voluptas. Labour and pleasure though in nature most vnlike, yet by a certaine naturall societie they are linked together, so that euen to weepe is a certaine delight.* So all things in this world are mingled and compounded with their contraries: those motions and wrinkles in the visage that serue to laugh, serue to weepe, as Painters teach vs: and wee see that the extremitie of laughter is mingled with teares. There is no good thing in vs that hath not some vitious tincture with it, *Omnes infustia nostra sunt tanquam pannus menstruata, All our righteousnesses is as a mensstruous cloath;* as anon shalbe shewed in his due place; nor no euill without some good: *nullum sine auctoramento malum est. There is no sinne without punishment.* Mi-

serie it selfe alwayes serues to some end : for there is no euill without good, no good in man without euill : all is mingled, and there is nothing pure in our hands. Secondly, whatsoever happeneth vnto vs, we take and enioy with an ill hand; our taste is vnresolved and vncertaine, it knowes not how to hold and possesse any thing after a good maner : and from thence sprang that vndetermined question of the soueraigne good. The better things many times in our hands, by our infirmities, vice, insufficiencie, are made woorse, are corrupted, become nothing, are vnprofitable vnto vs, yea sometimes hurtfull and contrary.

4  
In good and  
euill.

But humane imbecillity is more richly displaied in good and euill, in vertue and vice : hence it is, that man can not be, when it seemes good vnto himselfe, either wholly good or wholly wicked, but he hath his weakenesse, his impotencies in them both. Touching vertue, three points are to be considered : the first is, That it is not in the power of man to doe all good, to put in practise all vertues ; in somuch that many vertues are incompatible, and can not be together, at least in one and the same subiect, as filiall or maidenly continencie and viduall, which are wholly different ; the married and vnmarried state ; the two second of widowhood and marriage, being more painfull and busie, and hauing more difficultie and vertue than the two first of virginity and the vnmarried estate, which haue more purity, grace and ease : *Virgo salicior, vidua laboriosior, in illa gratia, in ista virtus coronatur : The virginie is the happier, the widow the more painfull, in the former grace, in the latter vertue is crowned.* That constancie which is in pouerty, want, aduersitie, and that which is in abundance and prosperity : patience in beggerie and liberality. And this is more true in vices, which are opposit one against the other.

Terrell.

5

The second point is, That many times a man can not performe that which belongs to one vertue, without the scandall and offence either of another vertue, or of it selfe ; in somuch that they hinder one the other : whereby it comes to passe that a man can not satisfie the one but at the charge of the other ; which wee must not attribute vnto vertue, or thinke that the vertues be soe and contrarie one another, for they agree.

gree well enough, but vnto the weakenesse of our humane condition, all the sufficiencie and industrie thereof being so short and so feeble, that it can not finde any certaine, vniuersall and constant rule, whereby to make an honest man: and such order can not betaken, but that the meanes to doe well doe many times hinder one the other. Let vs take for example, Charitie and Iustice: if I encounter my father or my friend in the warres, on the enemies part, in iustice I ought to kill him, but in charitie I should spare and saue him. If a man be wounded to the death and past all remedie, and that there remaineth nothing but a grieuous languishment, it were a deed of charitie to make an end of him, as he did that killed *Saul* at his earnest intreatie; but this charitie is punished by iustice, as he was by *Dauid*, and that iustly, *Dauid* being the minister of publike iustice, not priuate charity: yea, to be found neere vnto a man in such a case, in a suspicious place, and where there is doubt of the murderer, although hee be there to performe some office of humanitie, is very dangerous; and the best thing that can happen vnto him, is to be called into question, and put to answer to that accident whereof he is innocent. So that we see that iustice doth not only offend charitie, but it hampereth and hindereth it selfe: and therefore it was very well sayd and truly, *Summum ius, summainiuria. Extremè right, extreme wrong.*

The third point and the most notable is, that a man is constrained many times to vse badde meanes for the better auoidance of some great euill, or the execution of what is good, in such sort that he must sometimes approoue as lawfull, not onely those things that are not good, but that are starke naught; as if to be good, it were necessarie to be somewhat wicked. And this is seene in euery thing, in *Policie, iustice, Veritie, Religion.*

In *Policy*, how many euils are there permitted and publickly acted, not only by conniueance or permission, but also by the approbation of the lawes themselves? as shall heereafter be said in his due place; *ex senatusconsultis & plebescitis scelera exercentur. Crimes are committed by the decrees of the Senate, and approbations of the people.* To disburthen a State or Common-weale either of too great a number of people, or of such

6

7

*Policy.*

as are inflamed with a desire of warres, which the state, like a body repleat with bad or abundant humours, cannot beare, it is the maner to send them elsewhere, and to ease themselves at the charge or disease of another. As the *French, Lombards, Gothes, Vandales, Tartarians, Turky* haue beene accustomed to doe. To auoid a ciuill war, it is the maner to entertaine a strange war. To instruct others in the vertue of Temperance *Lycergus* caused the *Iloes* their seruants to be made drunke, that by the vgly deformity of their superfluous inundation, others might grow into a horror and detestation of that sinne. The *Romanes* to prepare their people to valour, and a contempt of the dangers of death, ordeined of purpose those furious spectacles of the fencers, which at the first they ordained for offenders, afterwards for slaues or seruants, but innocents, and lastly for freemen that gaue themselves therunto. Brothell houses in great Cities, *vsuries, dinorces*, vnder the law of *Moyse*, and in diuers other nations, and religions, haue beene permitted for the better auoiding of greater mischieses, *ad durticem cordis eorum. For the hardnesse of mens hearts.*

8

Iustice.

In Iustice, which cannot subliste, cannot be executed, without the mixture of some wrong, not onely Iustice commutatie, for that is not strange: it is after a sort necessarie, and men could not liue and traffique together, without mutuall dammage, without offence, and the lawes allow of the losse which is vnder the moiety of the iust price. But also Iustice distributive, as it selfe confesseth: *Summum ius, summa iniuria: & omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod contra singulos, utilitate publica rependitur. Extreame right is extreame wronge, and all great examples haue some iniustice, which for the common good is practised against all.* *Plato* alloweth, and it is not against the law, by deceits and false hopes of fauour and pardon, to draw the offender to confesse his fault. This is by iniustice, deceit and impudencie to doe iustice. And what should we say of the inuention of tortures, which is rather a prooffe of patience, than verity? For both hee that can suffer them, and cannot, will conceale the truth. For why should griefe cause a man rather to speake that which is, than that which is not? If a man thinke that an innocent is patient enough to endure torments, why should not he that is guilty, being

Of tortures.

being a meanes to saue his life ? *Ille tormenta gubernat dolor, moderatur natura, cuiusque tam animi, tam corporis regit questor, flectit libido, corrumpit spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot verum angustijs nil veritati loci relinquatur.* Griefe governeth those tormentes, nature doth moderate, the sercher both of the body and mind doth rule, lust boweth, hope corrupteth, feare weakeneth, so that in so many extremities, there is no place for truth. In defence heereof it is said, that tortures doe astonish and quell the guiltie, and extort from him a truth ; and contrariwise strengthen the innocent : but we doe so often see the contrary, that this may bee doubted ; and to say the truth, it is a poore meanes full of vncertainie, full of doubt. What will not a man say, what will he not doe, to auoid such torment ? *et enim innocentes mentiri cogit dolor, For griefe inforceth innocents to lie,* in such sort that it falleth out that the iudge which giueth the torture, to the end an innocent should not die, causeth him to die an innocent and tortured too. A thousand and a thousand haue falsly accused their owne heads, either to shorten their tormentes or their liues. But in the foot of this account is it not a great iniustice and crueltie to torment and to racke a man in pieces for that offence which is yet doubted of? To the end they may not kill a man without iust cause, they doe worse than kill him if he be innocent and beare the punishment, what amends is made him for his vniust torture? He shall be quit, a goodly recompence, and much reason he hath to thank you. But it is the lesse euill that the weakenesse of man could inuent.

If man bee weake in vertue, much more is hee in veritie, whether it be eternall and diuine, or temporall and humane. *Faintnes* That astonisheth him with the lightning, and beats him down with the thunder thereof, as the bright beames of the sunne, the weake eie of the owle : if he presume to behold it, being oppressed, he presently fainteth, *qui scrutator est maiestatis, opprimitur à gloria: The curious searcher of Gods maiestie, shall be oppressed by his glory :* in such sort that to giue himselfe some breath, some taste, he must disguise, temper, and couer it with some shadow or other. This, that is, humane veritie, offendeth and woundeth him, and he that speaks it, is many times holden for an enemy, *Veritas odium parit. Truth breedeth hatred.* It is a strangething, man desireth naturally to know the



truth, and to attaine thereunto he remooueth all lets whatsoever, and yet he cannot attaine it : if it be present, he can not apprehend it ; if he apprehend it, he is offended with it. The fault is not in the truth, for that is alwayes amiable, beautiful, worthy the knowledge ; but it is humane imbecillity that can not endure the splendor thereof. Man is strong enough to desire, but too weake to receiue and holde what he desireth. The two principall means which he vseth to attaine to the knowledge of truth, are Reason and Experience. Now both of them are so feeble and vncertaine (though Experience the more weake) that nothing certaine can be drawn from them. Reason hath so many formes, is so pliable, so wauering, as hath beene said, and Experience much more, the occurrents are alwayes vnlike; there is nothing so vniuersall in Nature as diuersitie, nothing so rare and difficult, and almost impossible as the likenesse and similitude of things : and if a man can not note this dissimilitude, it is ignorance and weaknesse ; I mean this perfect, pure, and entire similitude and dissimilitude : for to say the trueth, they are both whole and entire, there is no one thing that is wholly like or dislike to another. This is an ingenious and maruellous mixture of Nature.

Cap. 14

10

Religion.

But after all this, what doth better discouer this humane imbecillitie than Religion ? yea the very intention thereof is to make man feeble his owne euill, his infirmitie, his nothing, and to make him to receiue from God his good, his strength, his all things. First it preacheth it vnto him, it beats it into our memory, it reprocheth man, calling him dust, ashes, earth, flesh, blood, grasse. Afterwards it insinuateth it into him, and makes him feeble it after an excellent and goodly fashion, bringing in God himselfe, humbled, weakened, debased for the loue of him, speaking, promising, swearing, chiding, threatning ; and to be brieft, conuersing and working with man after a base, feeble humane maner, like a father that counterfeits his speech, and playes the childe with his children. The weakenesse of man being such, so great, so inuincible, that to giue it some accessse and commerce with the Diuinitie, and to vnite it vnto God, it was necessaric that God should debase himselfe to the basest : *Deum quia in altitudine sua a nobis paruulis apprehendi non poterat, ideo se strauit hominibus.*



nibus. God because in his height he could not be apprehended by vns-  
 little ones, did humble himselfe to men. Again, it makes him  
 see his owne weaknesse by ordinarie effects; for all the prin-  
 cipall and holiest exercises, the most solemne actions of reli-  
 gion, are they not the true symptomes and arguments of hu-  
 mane imbecillity and sickenesse? Those sacrifices that in for-<sup>Sacrifices.</sup>  
 mer times haue bene vsed thorowout the world, and yet in  
 some countries continue, not only of beasts but also of liuing  
 men, yea of innocents, were they not shamefull marks of hu-  
 mane infirmity and miserie? First, because they were signes  
 and symboles of his condemnation & malediction) for they  
 were as publike protestations, that he had deserued death,  
 and to be sacrificed as those beasts were) without which there  
 had neuer bene any bloody offerings or propitiatory and ex-  
 piatorie sacrifices. Secondly, because of the basenesse of the  
 purpose and intent, which was to thinke to appease, flatter  
 and gratifie God by the massacre and blood of beasts and of  
 men: *Sanguine non colendus Deus, que enim extrucidatione im-  
 merentium voluptas est?* God is not worshiped with blood, for what  
 can there be in shedding innocent blood? It is true, that God in  
 those first ages, yet the feeble infancie of the world and na-  
 ture remaining simple, did well accept of them at the hands  
 of religious men, euen for their deuotion, or rather Christ  
 his sake: *Respexit Dominus ad Abel, & ad munera eius*, God had  
 respect to Abell, and to his gifts, taking in good part that which  
 was done with an intent to honour and serue him; and also  
 afterwards, the world being as yet in it apprentilhip, *sub peda-  
 gogo*, was wholly seasoned in this opinion so vniuersall, that it  
 was almost thought naturall. I touch not heere that particu-  
 lar mysterie of the religion of the Iewes, who vsed them for fi-  
 gure (that is a point that belongs to religion) and with whom  
 it was common to conuert that which was humane or natu-  
 rall and corporall to a holy and sacred vse, and to gather  
 from thence a spirituall fruit. But this was not because God  
 tooke pleasure in them, nor because it was by any reason in it  
 selfe good: witnesse the Prophets, and the cleere sighted  
 amongst them, who haue alwayes freely said, *Si voluisses sa-  
 crificium dedissem, utiq; holocaustis non delectaberis, sacrificium  
 & oblationem noluisti, holocaustum pro peccato non postulasti, non*

*accipiam de domo tua vitulos &c.* If thou wouldest haue sacrifice, I had giuen it thee, but thou delightest not in burnt offerings, neither wilt thou haue any sacrifice or oblation, nor requirest any burnt offering for sinne, I will not receive the calves from thy house &c. And haue called backe and inuited the world to another sacrifice more high, spirituall and worthy the Diuinitie, *Sacrificium Deo spiritus: aures autem perforasti mihi, ut facerem voluntatem tuam, & legem tuam in medio cordis mei: Immola Deo sacrificium laudis: misericordiam volo, non sacrificium.* The spirit is a sacrifice to God, thou hast boared mine eares, to the end I might doe thy will, and keepe thy lawe in the middelt of my heart, offer vnto God the sacrifice of praise and thanks giuing: I will haue mercy, and not sacrifice. At the last, the sonne of God, the Doctor of Truth, being come to secure and free-dentze the world, did abolish them wholly: which he had not done, if it had beene a thing in it selfe and essentially good, and that it had pleased his father: for contrarily, *Pater non tales querit, sed tales qui adorent in spiritu & veritate.* My Father doth not seeke such, but those that worship him in spirit and Truth. And to say the truth, it is one of the goodliest effects & fruits of Chriitianity after the abolition of Idoles. And therefore *Julian* the Emperour, his capitall enemy, as in despight of him, offered more sacrifices than euer any other did in the world, attempting to set them vp againe with idolatrie. Wherefore let vs heere leaue them, and let vs see those other principall parts of religion.

*Sacraments.*

*Repentance.*

*An oath.*

The Sacraments in a matter base and common, bread and wine, and an outward action as base, are they not testimonies of our pouertie and basenesse? Repentance, the vniuersall remedie of our maladies, is a thing in it selfe shamefull, feeble, yea euill: for to repent, to be sorry, to afflict the spirit, is euill, though by consequent it be good. An oath, what is it, but a symptome and shamefull marke of distrust, infidelitie, ignorance, humane infirmitie, both in him that requires it, that giues it, that ordaines, it? *Quod amplius est à malo est.* That which is more is from the deuill. Seethen how religion healeth our euils by meanes not only small and feeble, our weakenes so requiring, *Stulta & infirma mundi elegit Deus*; God hath chosen the foolish and simple of the world, but such as by no meanes

are

are of any value, nor are good in themselves, but good in that they serue and are employed against euill, as medicines are: they sprang from an ill cause, yet they driue away ill: they are good, as gibbets and wheelles are in a Commonwealth, as vomits and other discharges proceeding from ill causes are to the bodie: to be briefe, they are such good things, as that it had beene farre better we had neuer had them; and neuer had we had them, if man had beene wise, and preserved himselfe in that estate wherein God had placed him; neither shall he haue them any more, so soone as he is deliuered from this captiuitie, and arriued to his perfection.

All this sheweth how great this humane weaknesse is to a ny thing that is good, in Policie, Iustice, Verity, Religion to-  
wards God, but that which is more strange is, that this weaknesse is as great in what is euill: for man though hee be willing to be wicked, yet hee can not be wholly such, but when he hath done his worst there will be more to doe. There is alwaies some remorse and fearefull consideration, that mollifieth the will and maketh it relent, and still reserueth something to be done; which hath beene the cause of the ruine of many, although perhaps they made it a proiect for their safetie. This is imbecillity and sottishnesse, and from hence did arise that Prouerbe at their cost, That a man must not play the foole by halves. A speech vttered with iudgement, but that may haue both a good and ill sense. To say that a man, when hee is once in, must still proceed to worse and worse, without any reseruatiō or respect, it is a very pernicious doctrine, and the Prouerbe saith well against it: The shorter follies are the better. But yet in some certaine cases the middle way is very dangerous, as when a man hath a strong enemy by the throat, like one that holdeth a wolfe by the eares, he must either win him altogether by courtesie or vtterly vndoe him and extinguish him; which was alwaies the practise of the *Romans*, and that very wisely: among others, concerning the *Latines* or *Italians*, at the exhortation of *Camillus*, *Pacem in perpetuum parere vel seruando vel ignoscendo*. To get perpetuall peace either seruing, or in pardoning. For in such a case to doe things by halves, is to lose all, as the *Samitians* did, who for want of putting in practise that counsell  
giuen

giuen them by an olde weather-beaten souldier, concerning the *Romans*, whom they had then enclosed and shut vp, payd dearly for it; *Aut conciliandus aut tollendus hostis. An enemy is either to be reconciled, or made out of the way.* The former course of courtesie is the more noble, honourable, and rather to be chosen; and wee ought not come to the second but in extremities, and then when the enemy is not capable of the first. By this that hath beene said, is shewed the extreame imbecillitie of man in good and euill, and that good or euill which he either doth or flieth, is not purely and entirely good or euill: so that it is not in his power to be wholly deprived of all good, nor altogether wicked.

12  
*Reprehensions  
and repulses.*

Let vs likewise note many other effects and testimonies of humane weaknesse. It is imbecillitie and pusillanimitie not to dare or not to be able to reprehend another, or to be reprehended: hee that is feeble or courageous in the one, is so in the other. Now it is a strange kind of delicatenesse, to deprive either himselfe or another of so great a fruit, for so light and verball a wound, that doth onely touch and pierce the care. Neere neighbour vnto this it is, not to be able to giue a deniall with reason, nor to receiue and suffer a repulse with patience.

13  
*False suspicions  
& accusations.*

In false accusations and wicked suspicions, which are done in place of iustice and iudgement, there is double imbecillitie; the one in those that are accused and suspected, and that is in iustifying and excusing themselves too carelessly, and as it were ambitiously. *Mendax infamia terret quem nisi mendacem? Whom doth an infamous lie feare but a liar?* This is to betray their owne innocencie, to put their conscience and their right to compramise and arbitrement; for by such plea *perspicuitas argumentatione elenatur. Perspicuitie, by argument is made more apparent.* *Socrates* in iudgment it self would not do it, neither by himselfe nor by another, refusing to vse the learned plea of great *Lysias*, and chose rather to die. The other is in a contrary case, that is, when the accused is so courageous that he takes no care to excuse or iustifie himselfe, because he scorneth the accusation and accuser, as vnwoorthy his answer and iustification; and he will not doe himselfe that wrong to enter the lists. This course hath been practised by generous men,  
by

by *Scipio* above all others, many times out of the marvellous constancy of his minde. Now others are offended heerewith, thinking it too great a confidence and pride, and it stingeth them, that he hath too sensible a feeling of his innocency, and will not yeeld himselfe; or imputing this silence and contempt to the want of heart, distrust of the law, and inability to iustifie himselfe. O feeble humanitie! the accused or suspected, whether he defend or defend not himselfe, it is imbecillity and cowardnesse. We wish a man courage to defend himselfe, and when he hath done it, we shew our owne weakenesse by being offended with it.

Another argument of imbecillitie is, when a man shall subiect and addict himselfe to a certaine particular forme of life; 14  
this is a base kinde of tendernesse, and effeminate delicacie, *Tendernesse* ☉  
*delicacy.*  
vnworthy an honest man, and makes vvnprofitable, different in conuersation, and may be hurtfull too in a case where change of maners and carriage is necessarie. It is likewise a shame, either not to dare or not to be able to doe that which hee seeth every man to doe besides himselfe. It were fittest that such people should liue and hide themselves in the chimney corner in their priuate houses. The fairest forme of liuing is to be pliable to all, euen to excelsse it selfe, if need be; to be able, to dare, to know how to doe all things, and yet to doe nothing but what is good. It is good to know all, not to vse all.

It is likewise imbecillity, and a great & vulgar sottishnes, to run after strange and scholasticall examples, after allegations, neuer to settle an opinion without testimonies in print, nor to beleue men but such as are in bookes, nor trueth it selfe but such as is ancient. By this reason fooleries and toyes if they once passe the Presse, they haue credit and dignity enough. Now there are euery day many things done before our eyes, which if we had but the spirit and sufficiently well to collect, to search with dexterity, to iudge of, and to apply to their times, we should frame and finde myracles and marvellous examples, which yeeld not in any thing to those of times past, which we so much admire, and therefore we admire because they are ancient and in print. 15  
*Search of books.*

Againe another testimony of weaknesse is, that man is not capable

capable but of indifferent things, and cannot endure extremities; for if they be small and in outward shew base, he contemneth and disdaineth them as vnworthie, and it is offensive vnto him to consider of them: if they be very great and ouersplendent, he feares them, he admires them, and is offended with them. The first doth principally concerne great and high minds: the second as common with those that are weake.

17  
Sudden occur-  
rences.

This weakenesse doth likewise appeare in our hearing, sight, and in the sudden stroke of a new v unexpected occurrence, which surpriseth and seafeth vpon vs vnawares. For they doe in such sort astonish us, that they take from vs both our sense and speech,

*Dirigit visu in medio, calor ossa reliquit,  
Labitur & longo vix tandem tempore fasor,  
Stiffe in our sights he grew, heate left his bones,  
He fal's, and scarce at length breath's out these mones.*

yea, sometimes life it selfe: whether they bee good, witnesse that Romane dame, who died for ioy seeing hir sonne, returnesafe from the warres; *Sophocles* and *Dionysius* the tyrant: or whether they be euill, witnesse *Diodorus*, who died in the field for shame, because he was not able to resolute a doubt, nor answer an argument.

18  
Traueris and  
submissiue.

Yet there is another imbecillity, and it is twofold, and after two contrary maners. Some yeeld and are overcome by the teares & humble supplications of another, and their courage and gallantry is wounded with their words: others quite contrary are not moued by all the submissions and complaints that may bee, but are rather more obdurate and confirmed in their constancy and resolution. There is no doubt but the former proceeds of weaknesse, and it is commonly found in effeminate and vulgar mindes; but the second is not without difficultie, and is found in all sorts of people. It should seeme that to yeeld vnto vertue, and to manly & generous strength and vigour, is the part of a valorous and generous minde. It is true if it be done in a reuerent esteeme of vertue, as *Scanderbeg* did receiuing into grace a souldiour whom hee had feene to carrie himselfe valorously in fight euen against himselfe; or as *Pompey* did, pardoning the citie of the *Mammertines*,

times, for the vertue of *Zenon* a citizen thereof, or as the Emperour *Conradus* did, forgiuing the Duke of *Bauiers*, and others besieged with him, for the magnanimie of their women, who priuily conuaid them away, and tooke the danger vpon their owne heads. But if it be done with a kinde of astonishment and affright of the power of vertue, as the people of *Thebes*, who lost their hearts hearing *Epaminondas* then accused, recount vnto them his honourable acts, and scuerely reproaching them with their ingratitude, it is debility and cowardize. The fact of *Alexander* containing the brauer resolution of *Betis* taken with the citie of *Gaza* where he commanded, was neither weaknes nor courage, but choler, which in him had neither bridle, nor moderation.

## CHAP. XXXVIII.

## 3. Inconstancy.

**M**AN is a subiect wonderfully diuers, and wauering, vpon whom it is very difficult to settle an assured iudgement, I say a iudgement vniuersall and entire; by reason of the great contrarietie and disagreement of the parts of our life. The greatest part of our actions, are nothing else but eruptions and impulsions enforced by occasions, and that haue reference to others. Irresolution on the one part and afterwards inconstancy and instability, are the most common and apparent vices in the nature of man. Doubtlesse our actions doe many times so contradict one the other in so strange a manner, that it seemes impossible they should all come forth of one and the same shop; we alter and we feele it not, we escape as it were, from our selues, and we rob our selues, *ipsinobis facto subducimur*. We goe after the inclinations of our appetite, and as the wind of occasions carrieth vs, not according to reason; *At nil potest esse equabile, quod non a certaratione profisciscatur*. Nothing can be iust which proceedeth not from reason. Our spirits also and our humours are changed with the change of time. Life is an vnequall motion, irregular, of many fashions. In the end wee stirre and trouble our selues by the instability of our behauiour. *Nemo non quotidie consilium mutat & votum: modo uxorem vult, modo amicam; modo regnare vult, modo non est eo officiosior seruus; nunc pecuniam spargit,*

*spargit, nunc rapit; modo frugi videtur & grauis, modo prodigius & vanus; mutamus subinde personam.* No man there is who daily changeth not his minde, purpose and desires, sometimes he will haue his wife, sometimes a concubine, sometimes he will dominere, againe no seruant more humble, and officious then he; Now hee prodigally spends his owne, at another time he violently raketh after other mens goods; sometime he would seeme graue and thrifty, another time a spendthrift and vaine; so euery moment are we changed.

*Quod petijt, spernit, repetit quod nuper omisit,*

*Estuat, & vita disconnenit ordine toto.*

He scornes that he desired, and seeketh that he lost,

He swels, and from all course of reason alters most.

Man is a creature of all others the most hard to be founded and knowen, for he is the most double and artificiall couert and counterfeite, and there are in him so many cabinets and blind corners, from whence he comes forth sometimes a man, sometimes a satyre; so many breathing holes, from whence hee breathes sometimes heat, sometimes colde, and from whence comes soorth so much smoake: all his carriage and motion is a perpetuall race of errorrs; in the morning to be borne, in the euening to die; sometimes in the racke, sometimes at libertie; sometimes a god, sometimes a flie; hee laughs and weeps for one and the samething, he is content and discontent; hee will, and hee will not, and in the end he knowes not what he will: now he is filled with ioy and gladnesse, that he can not stay within his owne skinne, and presently he fallcth out with himselfe, nay dares not trust himselfe, *Modo amore nostri, modo tadiso laboramus.* Sometimes we loue, sometimes we loath our selues.

## CHAP. XXXIX.

### 4. Miseric.

I  
Misery proper  
vnto man,

**B**Ehold heere the maine and principall line and liniament of the picture of man, he is (as hath beene said) vaine, feeble, fraile, inconstant in good, in felicitie, in pleasure, but strong, constant and hardned in miserie: he is misery it selfe quicke and incarnate; and this is in a word to expresse humanity, for in man is all miserie, and without him there is  
not



not any in the world. It is the property of man to be miserable, only man and all man is alwaies miserable, *Homoniatus de muliere, breui uiuent tempore repletur multis miserijs.* Man borne of a woman hath but a short time to liue, and is full of miseries. He that will take vpon him to represent vnto vs all the parts of humane miserie, had need to discouer his whole life, his substance, his entrance, his continuance, his end. I do not therefore vndertake this businellse, it were a worke without end; and besides, it is a common subiect handled by all: but I will here only quote certaine points which are not common nor taken for miseries, either because they are not felt, or sufficiently considered of, although they be such as presse man most, if he knew how to iudge of them.

The first point and prooue of the miserie of man is his birth; his entrance into the world is shamefull, vile, base, contemptible; his departure, his death, ruine, glorious and honorable: whereby it seemeth that he is a monster and against nature, since there is shame in making him, honor in destroying him. *Nostri nosmet penitet & pudet.* We are ashamed and repent our selues of our selues. Heerof a word or two. The action of planting and making man is shamefull, and all the parts thereof, the congregients, the preparations, the instruments, and whatsoeuer serues thereunto is called and accounted shamefull, and there is nothing more vnclane in the whole nature of man. The action of destroying and killing him honorable, and that which serues thereunto glorious: wee glid it, we enrich it, we adorne our selues with it; wee carrie it by our sides, in our hands, vpon our shoulders. Wee disdain to go to the birth of man: every man runnes to see him die, whether it be in his bed, or in some publike place, or in the field. When we goe about to make a man, wee hide our selues, we put out the candle, we doe it by stealth. It is a glorie and a pompe to vnmake a man, to kill him; wee light the candles to see him die, wee execute him at high noone, wee sound a trumpet, we enter the combat, and we slaughter him when the sunne is at highest. There is but one way to beget, to make a man; a thousand and a thousand meanes; inventions, arts to destroy him. There is no reward, honour or recompence assigned to those that know how to increase; to preserve

2

In his beginning  
and his end.

1

2

3

4

5

Seneea.  
Tertull. de  
Spectae.

preferue humane nature, all honour, greatnesse, riches, dignities, empires, triumphs, trophes are appointed for those that know how to afflict, trouble, destroy it. The two principall men of the world, *Alexander* and *Cesar*, haue vnmade, haue slaine, ech of them (as *Plinie* reporteth) more than a million of men, but they made none, lest none behinde them. And in aſcient times, for pleasure onely and pastime, to delight the eyes of the people, there were publike slaughters and massacres of men made. *Homosacra res per iocum & ludum occiditur: satis spectaculi in homine mors est: innocentes in ludum veniunt, ut publice voluptatis hostia fiant.* Man though a sacred thing is slaine euen for sport and delight, death in man is spectacle enough, Innocents come to the game that they may be made the sacrifices of the publike pleasure. There are some nations that curse their birth, blesse their death. How monstrous a creature is this, that is made a horror vnto himselfe! None of all this is in any other creature, no not in the whole world besides.

3

The second point and testimonie of the misery of man is the diminishing of his pleasures, euen those small and slight ones that appertaine vnto him, (for of such as are great and sound he is not capable, as hath beene shewed in his weaknesse) and the impairing of the number and sweetnesse of them. If it be so, that he doe it not for Gods cause, what a monster is this? that is an enemy vnto himselfe, robbes, and betrayes himselfe, to whom his pleasures are a burthen and a croſſe! There be some that flie from health, ioy, comfort, as from an euill thing.

*O miseri quorum gaudia crimen habent!*

*O miserably set, whose ioyes with faults are met.*

We are not ingenious but to our owne hurt, it is the true diet of the force of the spirit.

4

Forging of euils.

But there is yet that which is worse, the spirit of man is not only a diminisher of his ioy, a trouble-feast, an enemy to his small, naturall and iust pleasures, as I meane to proue, but also a forger of those that are euill; it faineth, feareth, flieth, abhorreth as great mischiefs, things that are not any way euill in themselves, and in trueth, which beaſte themselves feare not, but that by his owne proper discourse and imagination they

they are fained to be such, as not to be aduanced in honour, greatnes, riches, as cuckoldship, sterilitie, death: for to say the truth, there is nothing but griefe it selfe that is euill and which is felt. And though some wise men seem to feare these things, yet it is not for their owne sakes, but because of that griefe which sometimes doth accompany them afterwards: for many times it is a fore runner of death, and sometimes followeth the losse of goods, of credit, of honour. But take from these things griefe, the rest is nothing but fantasie, which hath no other lodging but in the head of man, which quits it selfe of other businesse to be miserable; and imagineth within it owne bounds, false euils besides the true, employing and extending his miserie in stead of lessening and contracting it. Beasts feelee not these euils; but are exempted from them, because nature iudgeth them not to be such.

As for sorrow, which is the only true euill, man is wholly borne thereunto, and it is his naturall propertie. The *Mexi-* <sup>He is borne</sup> *canes* thus salute their infants comming forth of the wombe of <sup>to sorrow.</sup> their mother: *Infant thou art come into the world to suffer: endure, suffer, and hold thy peace.* That sorrow is naturall vnto man, and contrariwise, pleasure but a stranger, it appeareth by these three reasons. All the parts of man are capable of sorrow; very few of delight. The parts capable of pleasure cannot receiue more than one or two sorts, but all can receiue the greatest number of griefes all different, heat, cold, pricking, rubbing, trampling, fleaing, beating, boiling, languishing, extension, oppression, relaxation, and infinite others, which haue no proper name, (to omit those of the soule) in such sort, that man is better able to suffer them, than to expresse them. Man hath no long continuance in pleasure: for that of the bodie is like a fire of straw: and if it should continue, it would bring with it much enuie and displeasure: but sorrowes are more permanent, and haue not their certaine seasons as pleasures haue. Againe, the empire and command of sorrow is farre more great, more vniuersall, more powerfull, more durable, and (in a word) more naturall, than that of pleasure.

To these three a man may adde other three: Sorrow and griefe is more frequent, and fallies out often; Pleasure is rare.

L

Euill

2 Euill comes easily of it selfe, without seeking; Pleasure neuer  
 3 comes willingly, it must be sought after, and many times we  
 pay more for it than it is worth. Pleasure is neuer pure, but  
 alwaies distempered, and mingled with some bitterneesse,  
 and there is alwaies something wanting; but sorrow and  
 griefe is many times entire and pure. After all this, the worst  
 of our market, and that which doth euidently shew the miserie  
 of our condition, is, that the greatest pleasures touch vs  
 not so neere, as the lightest griefes. *Segnius homines bona, quam  
 mala sentiunt: Men more slowly feele that which is good, than that  
 which is euill.* Wee feele not so much our soundest health, as  
 the least maladie that is: *Pungit in cute vix summa violatum  
 plagula corpus, quando valere, nil quinquam mouet.*

6  
 By memorie and  
 anticipation.  
 It is not enough that man be indeed and by nature miserable,  
 and besides true and substantiall euils he faine and forge  
 false and fantasticall, as hath beene said; but hee must like-  
 wise extend and lengthen them, and caute both the true and  
 false to endure and to liue longer than they can, so amorous is  
 he of miserie; which he doth diuers waies. First by the re-  
 membrance of what is past, and the anticipation of what is to  
 come, so that we cannot faile to be miserable, since that those  
 things which are principally good in vs, and whereof wee  
 glorie most, are instruments of miserie. *Futuro torquemur &  
 praterito, multa bona nostra nobis nocent, timoris tormentum me-  
 moria reducit, prouidentia anticipat, nemo presentibus tantum  
 miser est: Wee are tormented with that which is past, and with  
 that which is to come, euen our owne goods doe harme vs, memorie  
 reduceth the torment of feare, prouidence anticipateth, no man is  
 miserable only by things present.* It is not enough to be misera-  
 ble, but wee must increase it by a continuall expectation be-  
 fore it come, nay seeke it, and prouoke it to come, like those  
 that kill themselves with the feare of death, that is to say, ei-  
 ther by curiositie or imbecillitie, and vaine apprehension, to  
 preoccupare euils and inconueniences, and to attend them  
 with so much paine and adoe, euen those which peraduenture  
 will neuer come neere vs. These kinde of people will be  
 miserable before their time, and double miserable, both by  
 a reall sense or feeling of their miserie, and by a long preme-  
 ditation thereof, which many times is a hundred times worse  
 than

than the euils themselves. *Minus afficit sensum fatigatio, quam cogitatio*: The conceits of affliction doth hurt more than affliction it selfe. The essence or being of miserie endureth not long, but the minde of man must lengthen and extend it, and entertaine it before hand. *Plus dolet quam necesse est, qui ante dolet quam necesse est. Quadam magis, quadam antequam debeant, quadam cum omnino non debeant, nos torquent. Aut augemus dolorem, aut fugimus, aut precipimus.* He sorroweth more than he needs, that lamenteth before he hath need, some things afflict vs more than they should, some before they should, some when they should not at all; either wee increase our griefe, or wee feele it, or wee command it. Beasts doe well defend themselves from this follie and miserie, and are much bound to thanke nature that they want that spirit, that memorie, that providence that man hath. *Cesar* said well, that the best death was that which was least premeditated. And to say the truth, the preparation before death hath beene to many a greater torment, than the execution it selfe. My meaning is not heere to speake of that vertuous and philosophicall premeditation, which is that temper, whereby the soule is made inuincible, and is fortified to the prooofe against all assaults and accidents, whereof wee shall Lib. 2. ca. 7. speake heereafter: but of that fearefull and sometimes false and vaine apprehension of euils that may come, which afflicteth and darkeneth, as it were with smoke, all the beautie and serenitie of the soule, troubleth all the rest and ioy thereof, insomuch that it were better to suffer it selfe to be wholly surpris'd. It is more easie and more naturall not to thinke thereof at all. But let vs leaue this anticipation of euill, for simply euery care and painfull thought bleating after things to come by hope, desire, feare, is a very great miserie. For besides that wee haue not any power ouer that which is to come, much lesse ouer what is past; (and so it is vanitie, as it hath beene said) there doth still remaine vnto vs that euill and dammage, *Calamitosum est animus, futuri anxius*, That minde is in a lamentable case, which is troubled for future things: which robbeth our vnderstanding, and taketh from vs the peaceable comfort of our present good, and will not suffer vs to settle and content our selues therein.

But this is not yet enough. For to the end man may nee-

By *requiesit*  
*search.*

uer want matter of miserie, yea that hee may alwaies haue his full, he neuer ceaseth searching and seeking with great studie, the causes and aliments of miserie. He thrusteth himselfe into businellse euen with ioy of heart, euen such as when they are offered vnto him, hee should turne his backe towards them; and either out of a miserable disquiet of minde, or to the end hee may shew himselfe to be industrious, a man of employment and vnderstanding, that is a foole and miserable too, he enterpriseth, mooueth, and remooueth new businellse, or else he putteth himselfe into that of other mens. To be short, he is so strongly and vncessantly molested with care, and thoughts not only vnprofitable and superfluous, but painfull and hurtfull, tormented with what is present, annoied with what is past, vexed with that which is to come, that hee seemeth to feare nothing more, than that he shall not be sufficiently miserable. So that a man may iustly crie out, O poore and wretched creatures that you are, how many euils doe you willingly endure, helides those necessarie euils that nature hath bestowed vpon you? But what? Man contenteth himselfe in miserie, he is obstinate to ruminare & continually to recall to minde his passed euils. Complaints are common with him, and his owne euils and sorrowes seeme many times deare vnto him, yea it is a happie thing for small and light occasions to be termed the most miserable of all others: *Est quaedam dolendi voluptas: There is a certaine delight in grieffe.* Now this is a farre greater miserie to be ambitiously miserable, than not to know it, not to feele it at all. *Homo animal querulum, cupide suis incumbens miserijs: Man is a complaining creature, willingly yeelding to his owne miseries.*

8  
By *incompt-*  
*abilitate.*

We will not account it a humane miserie, since it is an euill common to all men, and not to beaſts, that men cannot accommodate themſelues, and make profit of one another, without the loſſe and hurt, the ſickneſſe, follie, ſinne, death of one another. We hinder, wound, oppreſſe one the other in ſuch maner, that the better ſort euen without thought or will thereunto, out of an inſenſible deſire and innocently thirſt after the death, the euill, the paine and puniſhment of another.

So that we ſee man miſerable both naturally and voluntarily,

rily, in truth and by imagination, by obligation and willingness of heart. He is too miserable, and yet he feares he is not miserable enough, and laboureth to make himselfe more miserable. Let vs now see how. When he feeles any euill, and is annoied with some certaine miserie (for hee is neuer without many miseries that he feeles not) he endeouoreth to quit himselfe thereof; but what are his remedies? Truly such as importune him more than the euill it selfe which hee would cure; in such sort, that being willing to get forth of one miserie, he doth but change it into another, and perhaps into a worse. But what of that? the change it selfe perhaps delighteth him, or at least yeelds him some solace: hee thinketh to heale one euill with another euill, which proceedeth from an opinion which the bewitched and miserable world holdeth; that is, That there is nothing profitable, if it be not painfull. That is worth nought that costs nothing, yea ease it selfe is much suspected. This doth likewise proceed from an higher cause. It is a strange thing, but true, and which conuicteth man to be miserable, That no euill can be taken away, but by another euill, whether it be in bodie or in soule. Spirituall maladies and corporall are not cured and chased away, but by torment, sorrow, paine. The spirituall by repentance, watchings, fastings, imprisonments, which are truly afflictions, and such as gaule vs too, notwithstanding the resolution and deuotion willingly to endure them: for if wee vse them either for pleasure or profit, they can worke no effect, but are rather exercises of pleasure, of couetousnesse, of household gouernment, than of repentance and contrition of heart. The corporall in like sort be medicines, incisions, cauteries, diets, as they well feele that are bound to medicinall rules, who are troubled on the one side with the disease that afflicts them, on the other with that rule, the thought whereof continually annoies them. So likewise other euils, as ignorance is cured by great, long and painfull studie: *Qui addit scientiam, addit & laborem*: He that increaseth knowledge, increaseth labour. want and pouertie, by great care, watchings, trauell, sweatings: *In sudore vultus tui*, In the sweat of thy browes: So that both for the soule and for the bodie, labour and trauell is as proper vnto man, as it is for a bird to flie.

*In the remedies of miserie*

*It was erroneous, but corrected.*



All these miseries aboue mentioned are corporall, or common both to the spirit and to the body, and mount little higher than the imagination and fantasie. Let vs consider of the more subtile and spirituall, which are rather to be called miseries, as being erroneous and malignant, more actiue and more our owne, but lesse felt and confessed, which makes a man more, yea doubly miserable, because hee onely feeleth those euils, that are indifferent, and not the greater; yea a man dares not touch them, or speake of them, so much is hee confirmed, and so desperate in his miseries. Wee must therefore by the way as it were, and gently say something, at least with the finger point a farre off, to giue him occasion to consider and thinke thereof, since of himselfe hee hides it not. First, in regard of the vnderstanding, is it not a strange and a lamentable misery of humane nature, that it should wholly bee composed of errour and blindnesse? The greater part of common and vulgar opinions, yea the more plausible, and such as are receiued with reuerence, are false and erroneous; and which is worse, the greater part vnprofitable for humane societie. And although some of the wisest, which are but few in number, vnderstand better than the common sort, and iudge of these opinions as they should, neuertheless sometimes they suffer themselues to be caried, if not in all and alwayes, yet in some and sometimes. A man had need be firme and constant that he suffer not himselfe to be carried with the streame, yea sound and prepared to keepe himselfe cleere from so vniuersall a contagion. The generall opinions receiued with the applause of all, and without contradiction, are as a swift river which carrieth all with it: *Proh supers quantum mortalia pectora ceca nollis habent! O miseras hominum mentes & pectora ceca, qualibus in tenebris vita, quantisque periculis degitur hoc cui quodcumque est! O God, how much sottish blindnesse rests in the breasts of men? O the senselesse and miserable blindnesse of mens minds, in what darknesse is our life, and how many dangers doth this age whatsoeuer it is, passe through.* Now it were too long and too tedious a thing to run ouer all those foolish opinions by name, wherewith the whole world is made drunken: yet let vs take a view of some few of them, which in  
their



their due place shall be handled more at large.

1 To iudge of aduice and counsell by the euents, which are no way in our owne hands, and which depend vpon the heavens. *See lib. 3 cap. 1.*

2 To condemne and reiect all things, maners, opinions, lawes, customes, obseruations as barbarous and euill, not knowing what they are, or seeing any inconuenience in them, but onely because they are vnusuall, and different from such as are ordinary and common. *Lib. 2. cap. 8.*

3 To esteeme and commend things, because of their noueltie, or raritie, or strangenesse, or difficultie, foure messengers which haue great credit vulgar spirits: and many times such things are vaine, and not to be esteemed, if they bring not with them goodnesse and commoditie. And therefore that Prince did iustly contemne him that glorified himselfe because he could from far cast a graine of millet thorow the eye of a needle. *Lib. 2. cap. 3.*

4 Generally all those superstitious opinions wherewith children, women, and weake mindes are infected.

5 To esteeme of men for their riches, dignities, honors, and to contemne those that want them, as if a man should iudge of a horse by his saddle and bridle.

6 To account of things not according to their true, naturall and essentiall worth, which is many times inward and hidden, but according to the outward shew or common report.

7 To thinke to be reuenged of an enemy by killing him: for that is to put him in safety, and to quit him from all ill, and to bring a vengeance vpon himselfe: it is to take from his enemy all sense of reuenge, which is the principall effect thereof. This doth likewise belong vnto weaknesse.

8 To account it a great iniurie, or to thinke a man miserable because he is a cuckold: for what greater folly in iudgement can there be, than to esteeme of a man the lesse for the vice of another, which hee neuer allowed? As much may be sayd of a bastard.

9 To account lesse of things present, and that are our owne, and which wee peaceably enioy; and to esteeme of them most, when a man hath them not, or because they are

another mans, as if the presence and possession of them did lessen their worth, and the want of them increase it,

*Virtutem in vuluam, odimus,*

*Sublatam ex oculis querimus inuidi.*

*When safe among vertue is, we sue it:*

*When tis fled from vs, we seeke and ennie it.*

And this is the cause why a Prophet is not esteemed in his owne country. So likewise, mastery and authoritie ingendreth contempt of those that are subiect to that authoritie: husbands haue a carelesse respect of their wiues, and many fathers of their children. Wilt thou (saith the good fellow) loue her no more? then marrie her. Wee esteeme more the horse, the house, the seruant of another, because he is another and not ours. It is a thing very strange to account more of things in imagination, than in substance, as a man doth all things absent and that are not his, whether it be before hee haue them, or after he hath had them. The cause hereof in both cases may be, because before a man possesse them, hee esteemeth not according to that they are worth, but according to that which he imagineth them to be, or they haue by another bene reported to bee; and possessing them, hee esteemes them according to that good and benefit he getteth by them; and after they are taken from him, he considereth and desireth them wholly in their perfection and declination, whereas before he enioyed them and vsed them, but by peccemeale successiuelly: for a man thinketh he shall alwaies haue time enough to enioy them, and by that meanes they are gone before he was aware that he had them. And this is the reason why the griefe is greater in hauing them not, than the pleasure in possessing them. But heerein there is as much imbecillitie as miserie. We haue not the sufficiency to enioy, but only to desire. There is another vice cleane contrary to this, and that is, when a man setteth himselfe in himselfe, and in such sort conceits himselfe and whatsoeuer he hath, that he preferres it before all, and thanks nothing comparable to his owne. Though these kinde of people be no wiser than the other, yet they are at least more happie.

10 To be ouer-zealous in euery question that is proposed, to bite all, to take to the heart, and to shew himselfe importunate

portunate and opinatiue in euery thing, so he haue some faire pretext of iustice, religion the weale-publike, the loue of the people.

11 To play the mourner, the afflicted person, to weepe *See cap. 17.* for the death, or vnhappie accident of another, to thinke that not to be moued at all, or very little, is for want of loue and affection. There is also vanity in this.

12 To esteeme to make account of actions that are done *Lib. 2. ca. 10.* with rumour, clatter, and clamor, and to contemne those that are done otherwise, and to thinke that they that proceed after so sweet and caline a maner, do nothing, are as in a dreame without action; and to be briefe, to esteeme Art more than Nature. That which is puffed vp, swollen and cleuated by studie, fame, report, and striketh the sense (that is to say, artificiall) is more regarded and esteemed, than that which is sweet, simple, plaine, ordinary, that is to say, Naturall: that awaketh, this brings vs asleepe.

13 To giue an ill and wrong interpretation of the honorable actions of another man. and to attribute them to base and vaine, or vicious causes or occasions; as they that attributed the death of yoong *Cato* to the feare he had of *Cesar*, wherewith *Plutarch* seemes to be offended, and others more foolishly, to ambition. This is a great maladie of the iudgement, which proceedeth either from malice, and corruption of the will and maners, or enuie against those that are more woorthy than themselves, or from that vice of bringing their owne credit to their owne doore, and measuring another by their owne foot; or rather than all this, from imbecillitie and weaknesse, as not hauing their sight so strong and so certaine to conceiue the brightnesse of vertue in it owne natiue purity. There are some that thinke they shew great wit and subtiltie in deprauing and obscuring the glory of beautifull and honorable actions, wherein they shew much more malice than sufficiency. It is a thing ealie enough to doe, but base and villanous.

14 To defame and to chastise ouer-rigorously, and shamefully, certaine vices as crimes in the highest degree villanous and contagious, which are neuertheless but indifferent, and haue their roote and excuse in nature: and not so much to detest,

telt, and to chastise with so greedy adoo those vices that are truly great, and against nature, as pretended and plotted murders, treasons, and treachery, cruelty, and so forth.

15 Behold also after all this a true testimonie of spirituall miserie, but which is wily & subtile, and that is, that the spirit of man in it best temper, and peaceable, settled, and soundest estate, is not capable but of common, ordinary, naturall, and indifferent things. To be capable of diuine and supernaturall, as of diuination, prophesie, reuelation, inuention, and as a man may say, to enter into the cabinet of the gods, he must be sicke, displaced from his naturall seate, and as it were corrupted, *corruptus*, either by extrauagancy, extasie, inspiration, or by dreaming; insomuch that the two naturall wayes to attaine thereunto are either fury, or dead sleepe. So that the spirit is neuer so wise, as when it is a foole, nor more awaked, than when it sleepeth: it neuer meeteth better, than when it goes on one side, or crosseth the way; it neuer mounts or flies so high, as when it is most dejected. So that it must needs be miserable, because to be happy, it must be, as it were lost, and without it selfe. This toucheth not in any sort the diuine disposition, for God can to whom, and when it pleaseth him, reueale himselfe, man in the meane time continuing settled in his sense and vnderstanding, as the scripture makes mention of *Moses* and diuers others.

16 To conclude, can there be a greater fault in iudgement, than not to esteeme of iudgement, not to exercise it, and to preferre the memory, and imagination, or fantasie before it? We see those great, goodly and learned orations, discourses, lectures, sermons, bookes, which are so much esteemed and admired, written by men of greatest learning in this age (I except some few) what are they all, but a heape and collection of allegations, and the labours of other men (a worke of memory and reading, and a thing very easie, being all culled and disposed to their hands, and heereof are so many bookes composed) with some few poynts handled, with a good instruction or two (a worke of imagination) and heere is all. This is many times a vanity, and there appeareth not in it any sparke of iudgement, or excellent vertue: so likewise the authours themselves are many times weake and common

common in iudgement, and in will corrupted : how much better is it, to heare a countrey swaine, or a merchant talking in his counting-house, discourfing of many goodly propolitions and verities, plainely and truely without arte or forme and giuing good and wholesome counsell, out of a sound, strong, and folide iudgement?

In the will there are as many, or rather more miseries, and more miserable, they are without number, among which *Of ibi u. a.* these following are some few of them.

1 To be willing rather to seeme an honest man. than to be, and rather to be such to another, than to himselfe.

2 To be farre more ready and willing to reuenge an offence, than to acknowledge a good turne, in such sort, that it is a corfiue to his heart to acknowledge, pleasure and gaine to reuenge, a prooffe of a malignant nature, *traiā oners est, ultio in quāstā habetur.*

3 To be more apt to hate, than to loue, to slaunder, than to commend; to feede more willingly and with greater pleasure vpon the euill, than the good of another, to enlarge it more, to display it more in his discourse, and the exercise of his stile, witnesse Lawycrs, Oratours, and Poets, who in reciting the good of any man, are idle, eloquent in euill. The words, inuentions, figures, to speake ill, to scoffe, are farre otherwise, more rich, more emphaticall and significant, than to praise, or speake well.

4 To flye from euill, to doe what is good, not properly for the good effect by naturall reason, and for the loue of vertue, but for some other strange consideration, sometimes base and idle, of gaine and profit, vaine-glory, hope, feare, of custome, company; and to be brieft, not simply for himselfe and his duty, but for some other outward occasion, and circumstance: all are honest men by occasion and accident. And this is the reason why they are such vnequally, diuersly, not perpetually, constantly, vniformely.

5 To loue him the lesse whom we haue offended, and that because wee haue offended him, a strange thing, and which proceedeth not alwayes from feare that hee will take occasion to bee reuenged, for it may be hee wisheth vs neuer the worse; but it is because his presence doth accuse vs, and brings

brings to memory our fault and indiscretion. And if the offendour loue not the offended the worse, it is because the offence he committed was against his will, for commonly he that hath a will to offend, loues him the lesse whom he hath offended, *Chi offende, mai non perdona*, He that offends, neuer forgiues.

6 As much may be said of him to whom we are much bound for courtesies receiued, his presence is a burthen vnto vs, he putteth vs in minde of our band and duty, he reprocheth vnto vs our ingratitude and inabilities, and we wish he were not, so we were discharged of that duty. Villaines by nature, *Quidam quo plus debent; magis oderunt: leue as alienum debiorem facit, graue inimicum*. Some the more they ought to loue, the more they hate, a little debt alienateth a little, a great maketh him an enemy.

7 To take pleasure in the euill, hurt, and danger of another, to greeue and repine at his good, aduancement, prosperitie (I meane when it is without cause of hatred, or priuate quarrell, for it is another thing when it proceedeth from the ill desert of a man) I speake heere of that common and naturall condition, whereby without any particular malice, men of indifferent honestie, take pleasure to see others aduventure their fortunes at sea, and are vexed to see them thriue better than themselves, or that fortune should smile more vpon others than them, and make themselves merry with the sorrow, of another: this is a token of a malicious seed in vs.

12  
The comen  
of these spiri  
all miseries.

To conclude, that I may yet shew you how great our misery is, let mee tell you that the world is replenished with three sorts of people, who take vp much roome therein, and carry a great sway both in number and reputation: the superstitious, formalists, *Pedantes*, who notwithstanding they are in diuers subiects, iurisdiccions, and theaters (the three principall, religion, life or conuersation, and doctrine) yet they are all of one itamp, weake spirits, ill borne, or very ill instructed a very dangerous kind of people in iudgement, and touched with a disease incurable. It is lost labour to speake to these kind of people, or to perswade them to change their minds, for they account themselves the best and wisest in the world, opinatiue obstinacie is there in his proper seate; he that is

once

once stricken and touched to the quicke with any of these euils, there is little hope of his recovery : Who is there more fortish, and withall more braine-sicke and heady than these kind of people ? Two things there are that doe much hinder them (as hath beene spoken) naturall imbecillity, and incapacitie, and afterwards an anticipated opinion to do as well and better than others I do heere but name them, and point them with the finger, for afterwards in their places heere quoted their faults shall be shewed more at large.

The *Superstitious*, iniurious to God, and enemies to true religion, couer themselves with the cloke of pietie, zeale and loue towards God, euen to the punishing and tormenting of themselves more than is needfull, thinking thereby to merit much, and that God is not only pleased therewith, but indebted vnto them for the rest. What would you doe to these kind of people? If you tell them that they do more than they need, and that they receiue things with the left hand, in not vnderstanding them aright, they will not beleeeue you, but tell you, that their intent is good (whereby they thinke to saue themselves) and that they do it for deuotion. Howsoeuer, they will not quit themselves of their gaine, nor the satisfaction which they receiue, which is to bind God vnto them.

1  
*Superstitious.*  
*See lib. 2. c. 9.*

The *Formalists* doe wholly tie themselves to an outward forme and fashion of life, thinking to be quit of blame in the pursuite of their passions and desires, so they doe nothing against the tenour of the lawes, and omit none of their formalities. See heere a miserable churle which hath ouerthrowne and brought to a desperate state many poore families; but this hath fallen out by demaunding that which he thought to be his owne, and that by way of iustice. Who then can asseme that he hath done ill? O how many good works haue beene omitted, how many euils committed, vnder this cloake of fornes, which a man sees not! And therefore it is very truly sayd, That the extremity of law is the extremitie of wrong: and as well sayd, God shield vs from *Formalists*.

2  
*Formalists.*

The *Pedantie* or housholde schoole-master hauing with great study and paines filched from other mens writings their learning, they set it out to the view and to sale, and with a questuous and mercenary ostentation they disgorge it, and

3  
*Pedantes. Lib.*  
*3. cap. 13.*

let

let it flie with the winde. Are there any people in the world so sottish in their affaire, more vnapt to euery thing, and yet more presumptuous and obstinate? in euery tongue and nation, *Pedante, Clerke, Master*, are words of reproch. To doe any thing sottishly, is to doe it like a *Clerke*. These are a kinde of people that haue their memories stuffed with the wisdome of other men, and haue none of their owne: their iudgements, willes, consciences are neuer the better, they are vnapt, simple, vnwise, in such sort, that it seemes that learning serues them for no other vse than to make them more fooles, yea more arrogant pratlers: they diminish or rather swallow vp their owne spirits, and bastardize their vnderstanding, but pusse vp their memorie. Heere is that miserie feared which wee now come to speake of, and is the last of those of the vnderstanding.

## CHAP. XL.

5. *Presumption.*

**B**Eholde heere the last and leawdest line or liniament of this picture, it is the other part of that description giuen by *Plinie*; the plague of man, and the nurse of false and erroneous opinions, both publike and particular: and yet a vice both naturall and originall in man. Now this presumption must be considered diuersly, and in all senses, high, low, collaterall, inward and outward, in respect of God, things high and celestiall; in regard of things base, as of beasts, man his companion, of himselfe, and all may be reduced to these two, To esteeme too much of himselfe, and not to esteeme sufficiently of another: *Qui in se confidebant, & aspernabantur alios.* *Trusted in themselves and despised others.* A word or two of either.

Luc. 18.

**I** First in respect of God (and it is a horrible thing) all superstition and want in religion, or false seruice of God, proceedeth from this, That we esteeme not enough of God, we vnderstand him not; and our opinions, conceits and beliefs of the Diuinitie are not high and pure enough. I meane not by this enough, proportion answerable to the greatnesse of God, which

*Presumption in  
regard of God.*



which being infinite receiuerh not any proportion; for it is impossible in this respect to conceit or beleue enough: but I meane enough in respect of what we can and ought to doe. We soare not high enough, we doe not cleuate and sharpen sufficiently the point of our spirit, when we enter into an imagination of the Diuinity: we ouer-basely conceit him, our seruices are vnworthy his maiestie: we deale with him after a baser maner than with other creatures: we speake not only of his works, but of his maiestie; will, iudgements, with more confidence and boldnesse than we dare to doe of an earthly Prince or man of honour. Many men there are that would scorn such kind of seruice and acknowledgement, and would holde themselves to be abused, and their honours in some sort violated, if a man should speake of them, or abuse their names in so base and abiect a maner. We enterprise to leade God, to flatter him, to bend him, to compound or condition with him; that I may not say, to braue, threaten, despight, murmur against him. *Cesar* willed his Pilot not to feare to hoise vp sailes, and commit himselfe to the furie of the seas even against destinie and the will of the heauen, with this onely confidence, That it was *Cesar* whom he carried. *Augustus* having bene beaten with a tempest at sea, desired god *Nep- tunc*, and in the chiefeest pompe of the *Curcean* sports caused his image to be taken downe, from where it was placed amongst the rest of the gods, to be reuenged of him. The *Thracians* when it thundereth and lighteneth, shoot against heauen, to bring God himselfe into order. *Xerxes* scourged the sea, and writ a bill of defiance against the hill *Arbos*. And one telleth of a Christian King a neere neighbour of ours, who hauing receiued a blow from God, swore he would be reuenged: and gaue commandement, that for ten yeeres no man should pray vnto him, or speake of him.

See lib. 1. c. 10.

See lib. 2. c. 18.

See lib. 3. c. 1.

*Audax Iapeti genus.*

*Nil mortalibus arduum.*

*Calum ipsum petimus stultitia, neque*

*Per nostrum patimur scelus*

*Iracunda Iouem ponere fulmina.*

*Prometheus, and all Iapets stock's too bold.*

*We mortall men nought, difficult doe hold.*

We

*We by our fondnesse hea'ue it self assay,  
Nor by our sinnes suffer we God to lay  
From him his angry thunderbolts away.*

But to leaue these strange extravagancies, all the common sort of people do they not plainly verifie that saying of *Pliny*, That there is nothing more miserable, and therewithall more glorious than man? For on the one side he faineth loftie and rich opinions of the loue, care and affection of God towards him, as his minion and only beloued, and in the meane time he returneth him no duty or seruice worthe so great and louing a God. How can a life so miserable, and a seruice so negligent on the one side, agree with an opinion and belief so glorious and so haughtie on the other? This is at one and the same time, to be an angell and a swine: and this is that where-with a great Philosopher reproched the Christians, that there were no people more fierce & glorious in their speech, and in effect more dissolute, effeminate and villanous: It was an enemy that spake it perhaps to wrong and abuse vs, but yet he spake but that which doth iustly touch all hypocrites.

2  
*In respect of  
Nature.*

It likewise seemeth vnto vs, that wee burthen and importune God, the world, and nature, that they labour and traueill in our affaires, they watch not but for vs, and therefore we wonder and are astonished with those accidents that happen vnto vs, and especially at our deaths. Few there are that resolve and beleue, that it is their last houre, and almost all do euen then suffer themselves to be mocked with vaine hopes. This proceedeth from presumption, we make too much of ourselves, and we think that the whole world hath great interest in our death, that things faile vs according to that measure that we faile them, or that they faile themselves, according to that measure that they faile vs; that they goe the selfe-same daunce with vs, not vnlike those that rowe vpon the water, think the heauens, the earth, yea citties themselves to mooue, when they mooue; we thinke to draw all with vs, and there is no man amongst vs that sufficiently thinkes he is but one.

3  
*Of Heauen,*

Besides all this; man beleueth that the heauen, the starres, all this great celestiaall motion of the world, is only made for him,

him. *Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes Deos: And that all the Gods are in contention for him alone.* And the poore miserable wretch is in the meane time ridiculous: hee is heere beneath lodged in the last and worst stage of the world, most distant from the celestially vault, in the sincke of the world, amongst the filth and lees thereof, with creatures of baser condition, made to receiue al these excrements and ordures, which raine downe and fall from aboue vpon his head; nay hee liues not but by them, and to endure all those accidents that on al sides happen vnto him; and yet he makes himselfe beleue that he is the master and commander of all, that all creatures, yea those great luminous incorruptible bodies, wherof he knowes not the least vertue, and which hee is constrained with astonishment to admire, moue not but for him, and to doe him seruice. And because he beggeth (wretch that he is) his liuing, his maintenance, his commodities, from the beames, light and heat of the Sunne, from the raine and other distillations of heauen, and the aire; he stickes not to say, that he enioieth the heauens and the elements, as if all had beene made, and still mooue only for him. In this sense a gosling may say as much, and perhaps more iustly and peremptorily. For man who many times receiue many discommodities from aboue, and of all that he receiue hath nothing in his owne power or vnderstanding, nor can diuine of them, is in continuall doubt and feare, lest those superiour bodies should not mooue aright, and to that end and purpose which hee hath proposed, and that they procure vnto him sterilitie, sickness, and whatsoeuer is contrary to his designement, and so hee trembleth vnder his burden; whereas beasts receiue whatsoeuer commeth from aboue, without stirre or apprehension of what shall happen vnto them; and without complaint of that which is hapned, which man cannot doe. *Non nos causa mundi. Scæc.*  
*do sumus byemem æstatemq; referendi: suæ ista leges habent; quibus diuina exercentur: minus nos suspicimus si digni nobis videamur, propter quos tanta sponte dantur: non tam a cunctis nobiscum sociari vult, ut nostro fato sit ille quoque siderum fulgor. Wee are not the cause why the world hath course, and a course of winter and summer, these things haue their rules and lawes, by which the will of God is executed: we honour our selues the lesse, if wee thinke our selues worthy,*

that for our sakes so many things should be moued. We haue not that societie with the heauens, that the starres should only shine for vs.

4  
of Creatures.

In respect of things base and earthly, that is to say, all other creatures, he disdaineth and contemnerth them, as if they did not appertaine to the same master-workeman, and came not of the same mother, did not belong to the same familie with him, as if they did not any way concerne him, or had any part or relation vnto him. And from hence proceedeth that common abuse and crueltie that is practised against them, a thing that reboundeth against that common and vniuersall master which hath made them, which hath care of them, and hath ordained lawes for their good and preservation, hath giuen them preheminance in certaine things, and sent man vnto them as to a schoole. But this belongs to the subiect of the chapter following.

5

Now this derogateth not any thing at all from that common doctrine, that the world is made for man, and man for God : for besides the instruction that man draweth in generall from euery high and low thing, whereby to know God, himselfe, his dutie, he also draweth in particular from euery thing either profit, pleasure, or seruice. That which is aboue him, which he hath least in vnderstanding, and nothing at all in his power, the azured heauen so richly decked and counterpointed with starres, and rowling torches neuer ceasing ouer our heads, he only enioieth by contemplation, he moun- teth and is caried with admiration, feare, reuerence of the author and soveraigne Lord of all : and therefore in this sense it was truly said by *Anaxagoras*, that man was created to contemplate the heauen and the sunne, and as truly by other Philosophers was he called *ignoramus*, from base and inferiour things, he draweth helpe, seruice, commoditie ; but for a man to perswade himselfe that in the framing of all these things no other thing was thought vpon but man, and that he is the only end and Butte of all these luminous and incorruptible bodies, it is a great follie and an ouer-bold presumption.

6  
of man him-  
selfe.

Finally, but especially, this presumption is to be considered in man himselfe, that is to say, in regard of himselfe, and of man his companion, both within, in the progresse of his iudgment and opinions ; and without in his communication and

conuer-

conuersation with another. Concerning which, wee are to consider three things, as three heads which follow one the other, where humanitie bewraith in a sottish imbecillitie the foolish presumption thereof. The first in beleeuing or misbeleeuing (heere is no question of religion, nor of faith and beleefe Theologicall, and therfore we must still call to mind the aduertisement giuen in the Preface) where we are to note two contrary vices, which are common in humane condition; the one and the other more ordinary, is a kinde of lightheffe, *qui citò credit, leuis est corde; he that lightly beleueneth, is light in heart*: and too great a facilitie to belecue and to entertaine whatsoeuer is proposed, with any kinde of appearance of truth or authoritie. This belongeth to the folly, simplicitie, tendernesse and imbecillitie of the weaker sort of people, of spirits effeminate, sicke, superstitious, astonished, indiscreetly zealous, who likewax doe easily receiue all impressions, suffer themselves to betaken and lead by the eares. And this is rather an error and weaknesse, than malice, and doth willingly lodge in mindes gentle and debonaire. *Credulus error est magis quam culpa, & quidem in optimi cuiusq; mentem facile irripit: Credulitie is rather an error than a fault, which easily creepeth into the best mans heart.* Wee see almost the whole world led and caried with opinions and beleefes, not out of choice and iudgement, yea many times before they haue either yeeres or discretion to iudge, but out of the custome of the countrey, or instruction in youth receiued, or by some sudden encounter as with a tempest, whereby they are in such sort fastned, subiected and enthralled, that it is a matter of great difficultie euer to vnlearne them againe. *Veluti tempestate delati ad quamcunq; disciplinam tanquam ad saxum adhaerescunt: They cleaue to any discipline as to a stone, being carried thither as with a tempest.* Thus is the world lead, wee trust our selues too much, and then perswade others to beleue vs. *Vnusquisque magis credere quam iudicare; versat nos & precipitat traditus per manus error, ipsa consuetudo assentiendi periculosa & lubrica.* Every one had rather beleue than iudge; error comming by tradition, doth precipitate andASSE vs, the very custome of assenting is dangerous and slipperie. Now this popular facilitie, though it bee in truth weakenesse and imbecillitie, yet

Three degrees of  
humane pre-  
sumption.

1. To beleue,  
misbeleue.

it is not without presumption. For so lightly to beleue and hold for truth and certaintie that which we know not, or to enquire of the causes, reasons, consequents, and not of the truth it selfe, is to enterprise to presume too much. For from what other cause proceeds this? If you shall answer, from a supposition that it is true; why this is nothing: a man handleth and stirreth the foundations and effects of a thousand things which neuer were, whereby both *pro* and *contra* are false. How many fables, false and supposed miracles, visions, reuelations, are there receiued in the world that neuer were? And why should a man beleue a miracle, a thing neither humane nor naturall, when hee is able by naturall and humane meanes to confute, and confound the truth thereof? Truth and lying haue like visages, like cariage, relish, garte, and wee behold them with one and the same eye. *Ita sunt finissima falsa veris, ut in precipitem locum non debeat se sapiens committere*: Falshood is so neere vnto truth, that a wise man ought not to suffer himselfe to be vnadvisedly carried away. A man ought not to beleue that of a man which is not humane, except he be warranted by supernatural and superhumane approbation, which is only God, who is only to be beleued in that he saith, only because he saith it.

7

The other contrary vice is an audacious temeritie to condemn and reiect as false all things that are not easily vnderstood, and that please not the palat. It is the propertie of those that haue a good opinion of themselves, which play the parts of men of dexteritie and vnderstanding, especially Heretikes, *Sophists*, *Pedanticies*: for they finding in themselves some speciall point of the spirit, and that they see a little more cleerely than the common sort, they assume vnto themselves law and authoritie to decide and determine all things. This vice is farre greater and more base than the former: for it is an enraged follie to thinke to know as much as possibly is to be known, the iurisdiction and limits of nature, the capacitie of the power and will of God, to frame vnto himselfe and his sufficiency the truth and falshood of things, which must needs be in so certaine and assured resolution and definition of them: for see their ordinarie language, that is false, impossible, absurd: and how many things are there which at one time

time we haue reiecte with laughter as impossible, which wee haue been constrained afterwards to confesse and approoue, yea and others too, more strange than they? And on the other side, how many things haue wee receiued as articles of our faith, that haue afterwards prooued vanities and lies?

The second degree of presumption, which followeth and commonly proceedeth from the former, is certainly and obstinately to affirme or disprooue that which hee hath lightly beleueed or misbeleueed. So that it addeth vnto the first obstinacie in opinion, and so the presumption increaseth. This facilitie to beleue with time is confirmed, and degenerateth into an obstinacie inuincible and vncapable of amendment, yea a man proceeds so farre in this obstinacie, that he defends those things that he knowes and vnderstands least. *Maiorem fidem homines adhibent ijs qua non intelligunt: cupiditate humani ingenij lubentius obscura creduntur: Men easily beleue those things they vnderstand not; by a naturall desire of humane wit obscure things are easily beleueed.* He speaks of all things with resolution. Now affirmation and opinatiue obstinacie are signes of negligence and ignorance accompanied with follie and arrogancie.

The third degree, which followeth these two, and which is the height of presumption, is to perswade others to receiue as canonicall whatsoeuer hee beleueeth, yea imperiously to impose a beleefe as it were by obligation, and inhibition to doubt. What tyrannie is this? Whosoever beleueeth a thing, thinkes it a worke of charitie to perswade another to beleue the same; and that he may the better doe it, he feareth not to adde of his owne inuention so much as he seeth necessary for his purpose to supplie that want, and vnwillingneisse which he thinkes to be in the conceit of another of that herels. There is nothing vnto which men are commonly more prone, than to giue way to their owne opinions. *Nemo sibi tantum errat, sed alijs erroris causa & author est: No man erres only to himselfe, but is the author and cause of error to others.* Where the ordinarie meane wanteth, there a man addeth commandement, force, fire, sword. This vice is proper vnto dogmatists, and such as will gouerne, and giue lawes vnto the world. Now to attaine to the end heereof, and to captiuate the beleefes of men vnto themselves,



Copernicus.  
Paracelsus.

themselves they vse two meanes: First they bring in certaine generall and fundamentall propositions, which they call principles and presuppositions, whereof they say we must neither doubt nor dispute; vpon which they afterwards build whatsoever they please; and leade the world at their pleasure: which is a mockerie whereby the world is replenished with errorrs and lies. And to say the truth, if a man should examine these principles, he should finde as great or greater vntueths and weakneses in them, than in all that which they would haue to depend vpon them, and as great an appearance of truth in propositions quite contrarie. There haue beene some in our time that haue changed and quite altered the principles and rules of our Ancients and best Professors in *Astronomie*, *Physicke*, *Geometrie*, in nature, and the motion of the windes. Every humane proposition hath as much authoritie as another, if reason make not the difference. Truth dependeth not vpon the authority and testimony of man: there are no principles in man if Diuinitie haue not revealed them; all the rest is but a dreame and smoake. Now these great masters will, that whatsoever they say should be beleeued and receiued, and that every man should trust them, without iudging or examining what they teach: which is a tyrannicall iustice. God onely (as hath beene sayd) is to be beleeued in all that hee saith, because he saith it: *Qui a se-metipso loquitur mendax est. Hee that speaketh of himselfe is a liar.*

The other meane is by supposition of some miraculous thing done, new and celestiall reuelation and apparition, which hath beene cunningly practised by Law-makers, Generals in the field, or priuate Captaines. The perswasion taken from the subiect it selfe possesseth the simpler sort, but at the first it is so tender and fraile, that the least offence, mistaking or impudencie that shall happen, vndoeth all: for it is a great maruell how from so vaine beginnings and friuolous causes there should arise the most famous impressions. Now this first impression being once gotten, doth woonderfully grow and increase, in such sort that it fasteneth euen vpon the most expert and skilfull, by reason of the multitude of beleeuers, witnesses, yceres, wherewith a man suffereth himselfe

to



to be carried, if he see not well into it, and be not well prepared against it: for then it is to small purpose to spurne against it, or to enquire farther into it, but simply to beleue it. The greatest and most powerfull meane to perswade, and the best touch-stone of trueth, is multitude of yeeres and beleeuers: now fooles doe win the game, *sanctis patrociniū est insanientium turba.* The madde multitude is a patronage for sobriety. It is a very difficult thing for a man to resolue and settle his iudgement against the common opinion. All this may easily appeare by those many impostures and fooleries which wee haue seene to goe for miracles, and rauish the whole world with admiration, but instantly extinguished by some accident, or by the exact inquirie of such as are quicke sighted, who haue cleered and discovered the coufenge, which if they had but time to ripen, and to haue fortified in nature, they had continued for euer, beene generally receiued and adored. And euen such are diuers others, which by the fauour of Fortune haue passed for currant, and gained publike beliefe, wherunto men afterwards accommodate themselves, without any farther desire to know the thing in it first forme and originall, *nusquam ad liquidum fama perducitur. Report is neuer brought to full triall.* Ond this is the reason why there are so many kinds of religion in the world, so many superstitious customes of the Pagans, which are yet remainig euen in Christendome, and concerning which we can not wholly assure the people. By this whole discourse we see what wee are, and to what wee tend, since we are lead by such guides.

The fift and last Consideration of Man, by  
those varieties and great differences that are  
in him, and their comparisous.

CHAP. XLI

Of the difference and inequality of men  
in generall.

**T**Here is nothing in this lower world wherein there is found so great difference as amongst men, and where the differences are so distant and diuers in one and the same

same subiect and kinde. If a man should belecue *Plinie*, *Herodotus*, *Plutarch*, there are shapes of men in some countries that haue very little resemblance with ours, and some that are of a mixt and doubtfull kind betwixt men and beasts. There are some countreys where men are without heads, carrying their eyes and mouthes in their breasts; where they are *Her-maphrodites*, where they goe with foure feet, where they haue one eye in the forehead, and a head liker to a dogs head than a mans, where they are as fish from the nauell downwards, and liue in the water; where their women beare children at fise yeeres of age, and liue but eight; where they haue their head and forehead so hard that iron can not pierce them; where they doe naturally change into wolues and other beasts, and afterwards into men againe; where they are without a mouth, nourishing themselves with the smell of certaine odours; where they yeeld a seed that is blacke; where they are very little and dwarfs; where they are very great and giants; where they goe alwayes naked; where they are all hairie; where they speake not, but liue in woods like beasts, hidden in caues and hollow trees. And in our times we haue discovered, seene with the eye, and touched with our fingers, where the men are without beards, without vse of fire, come, wine; where that is held to be the greatest beautie, which we account the greatest deformitie, as hath beene sayd before. Touching the diuersity of maners we shall speake elsewhere. And to omit many of these strangewonderments, we know that as touching the visage, it is impossible to find two in all things alike; it may fall out that we may mistake, and take the one for the other, because of the great resemblance that may bee betweene two; but this must be in the absence of the one, for in the presence of them both it is easie to note a difference, though a man know not how to expresse it. In the soules of men there is a farre greater difference, for it is not only greater without comparifon betwixt a man and a man, than betwixt a beast and a beast: but there is greater difference betwixt a man and a man, than a man and a beast; for an excellent beast comes neerer to a man of the basest sort and degree, than that man to another great and excellent personage. This great difference of men proceedeth from the

the inward qualities, and from the spirit, where there are so many parts, so many iurisdctions, so many degrees beyond number, that it is an infinit thing to consider. We must now at the last learne to know man by those distinctions and differences that are in him, which are diuers, according to the many parts in man, many reasons, and meanes to compare and consider of him. We will heere set downe five principall, vnto which all the rest may be referred, and generally all that is in man, *Spirit, bodie naturall*, acquired, publike, priuate, apparent, secret : and so this fift and last consideration of man shall haue five parts, which are five great and capitall distinctions of men, that is to say :

The first naturall, essentiall, and vniuersall of all men, soule and body.

The second naturall and essentiall principally, and in some sort acquired, of the force and sufficiencie of the spirit.

The third accidentall of the estate, condition and dutie of man, drawen from superiority and inferiority.

The fourth accidentall of the condition and profession of life.

The fift and last of the fauours and disfauours of Nature and of Fortune.

CHAP. XLII.

*The first distinction and difference of men naturall and essentiall, drawen from the diuers situation of the world.*

THE first most notable and vniuersall distinction of men, which concerneth the soule and body, and whole essence of man, is taken and drawne from the diuers site of the world, according to which the aspect and influence of heauen, and the sunne, the aire, the climate, the countrie, are diuers. So likewise not only the colour, the feature, the complexion, the countenance, the manners, are diuers, but also the faculties of the soule, *plaga cæli non solum ad robur corporum, sed & animarum facit. Atheniæ tenues cælum, ex quo etiam acutiores Attici; crassum Thebis, ideo pingues Thebani & valentes.* The temperature of the celestiall Climat is of great operation, both for the strength of the bodie, and the vigour of the minde, the *Athenian* aire

*The diuersity of men proceedeth from the diuers situation of the world.*

aire is delicate, and therefore they of a more sharpe and ready wit ; The Theban grosse, and they fat & strong. And therefore *Plato* thanked God that he was an *Athenian*, and not a *Theban*. As fruites and beasts are diuers, according to the diuers countries wherein they are : so men are borne more and lesse warlike, iust, temperate, docible, religious, chaste, ingenious, good, obedient, beautifull, sound, strong. And this is the reason why *Cyrus* would not agree to the *Perlians* to abandon their sharp and hillie countrie, to goe to another more plaine and pleasant, saying, that fat countries and delicate, made men soft and effeminate, and fertile grounds barren and infertile spirits.

2  
The diuision of  
the world into  
three parts.

Following this foundation, we may in grosse diuide the world into three parts, and all men into three kinds of nature: we will make three generall situations of the world, which are, the two extremities South, and Noth, and the middle betwixt them both ; euery part and situation shall haue sixtie degrees. The Southerne part which is vnder the *Aequator*, hath thirtie degrees on this side the line, thirtie on that, that is to say, all that part which is betwixt the two *Tropicks* or somewhat more, where are the hot and Southerne countries, *Africke* and *Aethiophe*, in the middle betwixt the East and the West ; *Arabia*, *Calicut*, the *Molukes*, *Ianes*, *Taprobana* towards the Orient ; *Peru* and the great Seas towards the Occident. The other middle part hath thirtie degrees beyond the *Tropicks* both on this side the line and on that, towards the Poles, where are the middle and temperate regions, all *Europe* with the *Mediterrane* Sea in the middle betwixt the east and West ; all *Asia* both the lesse and the greater which is towards the East, with *China*, *Iapan*, and *America*, towards the West. The third which is the thirtie degrees which are next to the two Poles on both sides, which are the cold and Icie countries the *Septentrional* people, *Tartary*, *Muscovy*, *Estrotian*, *Mage-lan*, which is not yet thoroughly discovered.

3  
Their natures.

Following this generall partition of the world, the natures of men are likewise different in euery thing, body, soule, religion, maners, as wee may see in this little Table : For the

*Northerne*

Northerne people are

Midale are

Southerne are

{ High and great, pleg-  
maticke, sanguine, white,  
and yellow, sociable, the  
voice strong, the skin soft  
and hairie, great eaters  
and drinkers, puissant.

{ Heanie, obtuse, stupid,  
sottish, facill, light, in-  
constant.

{ Little religious and de-  
vout.

{ Warriors, valiant, pain-  
full, chaste, free from ieal-  
ousie, cruell and inhu-  
mane.

{ Indifferent  
and tempe-  
rate in all  
those things,  
as neuters,  
or parta-  
kers a little  
of those two  
extremities,  
and partici-  
pating most  
of that regi-  
on to which  
they are nee-  
rest neigh-  
bours.

{ Little, melancholicke,  
cold, and drie, blacke,  
Solitarie, the voice  
shrill, the skinne hard,  
with little haire, and  
curled, abstinent, fee-  
ble.

{ Ingenious, wise, sub-  
tile, opinatine.

{ Superstitious, contem-  
plative.

{ No warriors, idle,  
unchaste, iealous,  
cruell, and inhu-  
mane.

1 In their Bodies.

2 Spirit.

3 Religion.

4 Manners.

All these differences are easily prooued. As for those of the bodie, they are known by the eye, and if there be any exceptions, they are rare, and proceed from the mixture of the people, or from the windes, the waters, and particular situation of the place, whereby a mountaine is a notable difference in the selfe-same degree, yea the selfe-same countrie and citie. They of the higher part of the citie of Athens, were of a quite contrary humor, as Plutarke affirmeth, to those that dwell about the gate of Pyrcus: and they that dwell on the North side of a mountaine differ as much from those that dwell on the South side, as they do both differ from those in the valley.

As for the differences of the spirit, we know that mechan-  
call and manuell artes belong to the North, where men are  
made for labour; Speculative sciences came from the South.  
Cesar and other ancients of those times called the Egyptians  
ingenious, and subtile: Moses is said to be instructed in their  
wisdom: and Philosophie came from thence into Greece.  
Greatnesse began rather with them, because of their spirit  
and subtiltie. The guards of Princes (yea in the Southerne  
parts) are Northerne men, as having more strength, and lesse  
subtiltie

4  
The proofes of  
these differences  
of the body.

2  
The Spirit.

subtiltie and malice. So likewise the Southerne people are indued with great vertues, and subiect to great vices, as it is said of *Hannibal*: The Northerne haue goodnes and simplicitie. The lesser and middle sciences, as policies, lawes, and eloquence, are in the middle nations, wherein the greatest Empires and policies haue flourished.

3  
Religion.

As touching the third point, religions haue come from the South, Egypt, *Arabia*, *Chaldea*; more superstition in *Africke* than the whole world besides, witnesse their vowes so frequent, their temples so magnificent. The Northerne people, saith *Cesar*, haue little care of religion, being wholly giuen to the warres and to hunting.

4  
Manners.

As for maners; and first touching warres, it is certaine that the greatest armies, artes, military instruments and inuentions haue come from the North. The *Scythians*, *Gothes*, *Vandals*, *Huns*, *Tartarians*, *Turks*, *Germanes*, haue beaten and conquered all other nations, and ransacked the whole world; and therefore it is a common saying, that all euill comes from the North. Single combats came from them. The Northern people adore a sword fastned in the earth, saith *Solinus*. To other nations they are inuincible, yea to the *Romans*, who hauing conquered the rest of the world, were vtterly destroyed by them. They grow weake and languish with the Southerne winds, and going towards the South; as the Southerne men comming into the North redouble their forces. By reason of their warlike fiercenes, they will not endure to be commanded by authority, they loue their libertie, at leastwise electiue commanders. Touching chastitie and iealousie in the North, saith *Tacitus*, one woman to one man; yea one woman sufficeth many men, saith *Cesar*. There is no iealousie, saith *Munster*, where men and women bathe themselves together with strangers. In the South *Polygamie* is altogether receiued. All *Africke* adoreth *Venus*, saith *Solinus*. The Southerners die with iealousie, and therefore they keepe Eunuches as gardians to their wiues, which their great Lords haue in great number, as they haue stables of horses. Touching crueltie, the two extreames are alike cruell, but the causes are diuers, as we shall see anon, when we come to speake of the causes. Those tortures of the wheele, and staking of men aliue, came from the North:

North: The inhumanities of the *Moscouites* and *Tatars*, are too well known. The *Almans*, saith *Tacitus*, punish not their offenders by lawe, but cruelly murder them as enemies. The Southrens flea their offenders aliue, and their desire of reuenge is so great, that they become furious if they be not glutted therewith. In the middle regions they are mercifull and humane: The *Romans* punished their greatest offenders with banishment. The *Greeks* vsed to put their offenders to death with a sweet drugg made of a kinde of Hemlocke which they gaue them to drinke: And *Cicero* saith, that humanitie and courtesie were the conditions of *Asia minor*, and from thence deriued to the rest of the world.

The cause of all these corporall and spirituall differences, is the inequalitye and difference of the inward naturall heate, which is in those countries and peoples, that is to say, strong and vehement in the Northerns, by reason of the great outward cold which incloseth and driueth the heate into the inward parts, as caues and deepe places are hot in winter, so mens stomachs, *Ventre hyeme calidiores. Our stomachs are hot in winter.* Weake and feeble is the Southern, the inward heate being disperfed and drawne into the outward partes, by the vehemencie of the outward heate, as in Sommer vaults and places vnder the earth are cold. Meane and temperate in the middle regions. From this diuersitie, I say, and inequalitye of naturall heat, proceed these differences not only corporall, which are easie to note, but also spirituall; for the Southern by reason of their cold temperature, are melancholike, and therefore staid, constant, contemplatiue, ingenious, religious, wise; for wisdom is in cold creatures, as Elephants, who as they are of all other beasts the most melancholike, so are they more wise, docile, religious, by reason of their cold blood. From this melancholie temperature it likewise cometh, that the Southern are vnchaste, by reason of that frothie, freating, tickling melancholie, as we commonly see in Hares; and cruell, because this freating sharp melancholie doth violently preſse the passions and reuenge. The Northerns are of a phlegmaticke and sanguine temperature, quite contrarie to the Southerne, and therefore haue contrarie qualities, saue that they agree in this one, that they are likewise

<sup>5</sup>  
The cause of  
the aforesaid  
differences.

likewise cruell and inhumane, but by an other reason, that is, for want of iudgement, whereby like beasts, they know not how to conteine and gouerne themselue. They of the middle regions are sanguin and cholericke, tempered with a sweete, pleasant, kindly disposed humor; they are actiue. Wee could likewise more exquisitely represent the diuers natures of these three sorts of people, by the application and comparison of all things, as you may see in this little Table, where it appeareth that there doth properly belong, and may be referred to the

	Northerne,	Midlere,	Southerne.
Qualities of the soule.	The common sense.	Discourse & reasoning.	Vnderstanding
	Force as of Beares and other beasts.	Reason and iustice of men.	Subtily of foxes, & religion of diuines.
Planets,	Mars } warre The moon } hūing	Mercurie } semperours, Iupiter } or-tours.	Saturn } cōtemplati- Venus } loue. (on.
Actions and parts of the common weale.	Arte and handi-crafts.	Prudence, knowledge of good and euill.	Knowledge of truth and falshood.
	Labourers, artificers, souldiers, to execute & obey.	Magistrates, prouident, to iudge, command.	Prelates, Philosophers, to contem-plate.
	Young men vnapt.	Perfekt men, managers of affaires.	Grane old men, wise, pensiue.

The other distinction more particular may be referred to this generall of North, and South: for wee may referre to the conditions of the Northerne those of the West, and that liue in mountaines, warriours, fierce people, desirous of libertie, by reason of the colde which is in mountaines. So likewise, they that are farre distant from the sea are more simple and innocent. And contrarily to the conditions of the Southernes, we may referre the Easterlings, such as liue in valleys, effeminate and delicate persons, by reason of the fertilitie of the place, which naturally yeeldeth pleasure. So likewise they that liue vpon the sea coasts are subtil, deceiuers by reason of their commerce and traffike with diuers sorts of people and nations. By all this discourse we may see that



that generally those of the North doe excell in bodie; haue strength for their part; and they of the South in spirit, and haue for their part subtiltie; they of the middle Regions partake of both, and are temperate in all. Sulikewise we may see that their maners, to say the truth, are neither vices nor vertues, but works of nature, which to amend or renounce altogether is more than difficult; but to sweeten, temper and reduce the extremitie to a mediocritie, is a worke of vertue.

CHAP. XLIII.

*The second distinction, and more subtile difference of the spirits and sufficiencies of men.*

**T**His second distinction which respecteth the spirit and sufficiencie, is not so plaine, and perceptible as the other, and come as well from nature as atchieuement; according vnto which there are three sorts of people in the world, as three conditions and degrees of spirits. In the one and the lowest are the weake and plaine spirits, of base and slender capacitie, borne to obey, serue, and to be led, who in effect are simply men. In the second and middle stage are they that are of an indifferent iudgement, make profession of sufficiencie, knowledge, dexteritie; but do not sufficiently vnderstand and iudge themselves, resting themselves vpon that which is commonly held, and giuen them. at the first hand, without further enquire of the truth and souce of things, yea with a perswasion that it is not lawfull; and neuer looking farther than where they be, but thinking that it is euery where so, or ought to be so, and that if it be otherwise, they are deceiued, yea, they are barbarous. They subiect themselves to opinions, and the municipall lawes of the place where they liue, even from the time they were first hatched, not only by obseruance and custome, which all ought to do, but even from the very heart and soule, with a perswasion that that which is beleueed in their village is the true touchstone of truth (heere is nothing spoken of diuine reuealed truth, or religion) the only, or at least the best rule to liue well. These sorts of people are of the schoole and iurisdiction of *Aristotle*, affirmers, positive men, dogmatists, who respect more vtilitie than veritie, according to the vse and custome of the world, than that which

1  
Three sorts and  
degrees of p. o. is  
in the world.

1

2

which is good and true in it selfe. Of this condition there are a very great number and diuers degrees, the principall and most active amongst them gouerne the world, and haue the command in their hand. In the third and highest stage are men indued with a quicke and cleare spirit, a strong, firme, and solid iudgement, who are not content with a bare affirmation, nor settle themselves in common receiued opinions, nor suffer themselves to be wonne & preoccupied by a publike and common beleefe, whereof they wonder not at all, knowing that there are many couenages, deceits & impostures receiued in the world with approbation and applause, yea publick adoration and reuerence: but they examine all things that are proposed, sound maturely, and seek without passion the causes, motives, and iurisdictions euen to the roote, louing better to doubt, and to hold in suspence their beleefe, than by a loose and idle facility or lightnesse, or precipitation of iudgement to feede themselves with lies, and affirme or secure themselves of that thing whereof they can haue no certaine reason. These are but few in number, of the Schoole of *Socrates* and *Plato*, modest, sober, staied, considering more the verity and reality of things than the vtilitie; who if they be well borne, hauing with that aboue mentioned prohibie and gouernment in manners, they are truly wise, and such as heere we seeke after. But because they agree not with the common sort, as touching opinions, see more clearly, pierce more deeply, are not so facile and easily drawne to beleefe, they are suspected and little esteemed of others, who are farre more in number, and held for fantasticks and philosophers; a word which they vse in a wrong sense, to wrong others. In the first of these three degrees or orders there is a farre greater number than in the second, and in the second, than in the third. They of the first and last, the lowest and highest trouble not the world, make no stirre, the one for insufficiencie and weakenes, the other by reason of too great sufficiencie, stability, and wisdom. They of the middle make all the stirre, the disputations that are in the world, a presumptuous kinde of people, alwayes stirred, and alwaies stirring. They of the lower range, as the bottome, the lees, the sinke, resemble the earth, which doth nothing but receiue and suffer that which comes from aboue.

They

They of the middle resemble the region of the aire, wherein are formed all the meteors, thunderings, and alterations are made, which afterwards fall vpon the earth. They of the higher stage resemble the firmament it selfe, or at least the highest region next vnto heauen, pure, cleare, neate, and peaccable. This difference of men proceedeth partly from the nature of the first composition and temperature of the braine, which is different, moist, hot, drie, and that in many degrees, whereby the spirits and iudgements are either very solid, courageous, or feeble, fearefull, plaine: and partly from instruction and discipline; as also from the experience and practise of the world, which serueth to put off simplicitie, and to become more aduised. Lastly, all these three sorts of people are found vnder euery robe, forme and condition both of good and euill men, but diuersly.

There is another distinction of spirits and sufficiencies, for some there are that make way themselves, and are their owne guides and gouernours. These are happie, of the higher sort, and very rare; others haue neede of help, and these are of two sorts. For some neede only a little light, it is enough if they haue a guide and a torch to goe before them, they will willingly and easily follow. Others there are that must bee drawn, they neede a spurre, and must be led by the hand. I speake not of those that either by reason of their great weakness cannot, as they of the lower range, or the malignitie of their nature will not, as they of the middle, who are neither good to follow, nor will suffer themselves to be drawn and directed, for these are a people past all hope.

2  
Another distinction.

### CHAP. XLIIII.

*The third distinction and difference of men accidentall, of their degrees, estates and charges.*

**T**HIS accidentall distinction, which respecteth the estates and charges, is grounded vpon two principles and foundations of humane societie, which are, to command and obey, power and subiection, superioritie and inferioritie. *Imperio & obsequio omnia constant: All things doe consist of command and subiection.* This distinction wee shall better see, first in grosse in this Table.

N

All

The first general division.

All power and subjection is either

Private, which is either in

Publike, which is either

Families and household governments, and it is fourfold:

Marriage, of the husband and the wife. This is the source of humane society.

Paternal of parents over their children. This is truly natural.

Herile, which is twofold, of Lords, over their slaves. Masters, over their servants.

Patronall, of patrons over their pupils: the use whereof is lesse frequent.

Corporations and Colledges, Civill communities over the particular members of that community.

Souereign, which is threefold, and they are three sorts of estates, cunctas nationes & vrbes, populus aut primores, aut singuli regunt, i.

Monarchie, of one.

Aristocratie, of a few.

Democritie, of all.

Subaltern, which is in those who are superiors and inferiors, for diuers reasons, places, persons, as

Particular lords in many degrees. Officers of the soveraignty, whereof there are diuers sorts.

The subdiuision of the souereigne power.

This publike power, whether it bee soueraigne, or subalterne, hath other subdiuisions necessarie to be knownen. The soueraigne, which, as hath been said, is threefold in regard of the maner of gouernment is likewise threefold; that is to say, every one of these three is gouerned after a threefold maner, and is therefore called Royall, or Signorall, or Tyrannicall. Royall, wherein the soueraigne (be it one, or many, or all) obeying the lawes of nature, preserueth the naturall libertie and proprietie of the goods of his subiects. *Ad reges potestas omnis pertinet, ad singulos proprietat: omnia Rex imperio possidet, singuli*

*singuli dominio.* All power belongeth to Kings, so every particular man the proprietie, the King possesseth all by command, private men by possession. Signorall or lordly, where the soueraigne is lord both of men and goods, by the right of armes, governing his subiects as slaues. Tyrannicall where the soueraigne contemning all lawes of Nature, doth abuse both the persons and goods of his subiects, differing from a Lord, as a theefe from an enemy in warre. Of the three souereigne states, the *Monarchie*, and of the three governments, the Lordly, are the more ancient, great, durable and maiestticall, as in former times *Assyria*, *Persia*, *Egypt*, and now *Ethiopia* the most ancient that is, *Moscovie*, *Tartarie*, *Turkie*, *Peru*. But the better and more naturall state and government is the *Monarchie Royall*. The most famous *Aristocracies* hath sometimes beene that of the *Lacedemonians*, and now the *Venetians*. The *Democracies*, *Rome*, *Athens*, *Carthage*, Royall in their government.

The publike subaltern power, which is in particular Lords, is of many kindes and degrees, principally five, that is to say, *Lords Tributaries*, who pay only tribute. 3  
Of particular  
Lords.

*Fuedetaries*, simple *Vassals*, who owe faith and homage for the tenure of their land. These three may be souereignes.

*Vassals* bound to do seruice, who besides faith and homage owe likewise personall seruice, whereby they cannot truly be souereignes.

Naturall subiects, whether they be *Vassals* or *Censors*, or otherwise, who owe subiection and obedience, and cannot be exempted from the power of their souereigne: and these are Lords.

The publike subalterne power which is in the officers of the souereigntie, is of diuers kindes, and both in regard of the honour and the power may be reduced to five degrees. 4  
offices.

The first and basest are those ignominious persons, which should remaine without the citie, the last executioners of iustice. 1

The second, they that haue neither honour nor infamie, Sergeants, Trumpeters. 2

The third, such as haue honour without knowledge and power, Notaries, Receiuers, Secretaries. 3

4 The fourth, they that haue with honour, power and knowledge, but without iurisdiction, the Kings seruants.

5 The fifth, they that haue with the rest iurisdiction ; and these are properly called Magistrates : of whom there are many distinctions, and especially these five, which are all double:

1. { Maiors, Senators. } 2. { Politiques.  
       { Minors, Iudges. }       { Militaries.

3. { Ciuill. } 4. { Titularies in offices of form, who haue  
       { Criminall. }       { Commissaries. (it by inheritance,

5. { Perpetuall, as the lesser both in number and otherwise  
       { should be.  
       { Temporall and moouable, as the greater should be.

OF THE ESTATES AND DEGREES OF MEN  
 in particular following this precedent Table.

*An Aduertisement.*

HEere wee are to speake in particular of the parts of this Table, and the distinctions of powers and subiections, (beginning with the priuate and domesticall) that is to say, of euery estate and profession of men, to the end wee may know them ; and therefore this may be called The Booke of the knowledge of man : for the duties of euery one shall bee set downe in the Third Booke, in the vertue of iustice ; where in like maner and order, all these estates and chapters shall be resumed and examined. Now before wee beginne, it shall be necessarie summarily to speake of commanding and obeying, two foundations and principall causes of these diuersities of estates and charges.

CHAP. XLV.

*Of commanding and obeying.*

THEse, as hath beene said, are the two foundations of all humane societie, and the diuersitie of estates and professions. They are Relatiues, they doe mutually respect, ingender

der and conserue one the other, and are alike required in all assemblies and communities; but are yet subiect to a naturall kind of enuie, and an euerlasting contestation, complaint and obtrication. The popular estate make the Soueraigne of worse condition than a Carter. The Monarchie placeth him about God himselfe. In commanding is the honour, the difficultie (these two commonly goe together) the goodnesse, the sufficiencie, all qualities of greatnesse. Command, that is to say, sufficiencie, courage, authoritie, is from heauen and of God. *Imperium non nisi diuino fato datur: omnis potestas à Deqesi: Empire and dominion is not giuen but by diuine destinie, all power is from God above.* And therefore Plato was wont to say, That God did not appoint and establish men, that is to say, men of a common sort and sufficiencie, and purely humane, to rule others, but such as by some diuine touch, singular vertue, and gift of heauen, doe excell others: and therefore they are called *Heroes*. In obeying is vilitie, procliuitie, necessitie, in such sort, that for the preservation of the weale publike it is more necessariethan well to command; and the deniall of obedience, or not to obey as men should, is farre more dangerous than for a Prince not to command as he should. Euen as in marriage, though the husband and the wife be equally obliged to loialtie and fidelitie, and haue both bound themselves by promise in the same words, the same ceremonies and solemnities, yet notwithstanding the inconueniences are incomparably farre greater, in the fact of adulterie, to the wife than the husband: euen so, though command and obedience are equally required in every state and company, yet the inconueniences of disobedience in subiects are farre more dangerous than of ill government in a Commander. Many States haue a long time continued and prospered too vnder the command of wicked Princes and Magistrates, the Subiects obeying and accommodating themselves to their gouernment: and therefore a wise man being once asked why the Common-wealth of *Sparta* was so flourishing, and whether it were because their Kings commanded well? Nay rather, saith he, because the Citizens obéy well. For if the subiects once refused to obey, and shake off their yoke, the state must necessarily fall to the ground.

1 **N**otwithstanding the state of marriage be the first, more ancient and most important, and as it were the foundation and fountaine of humane societie, whence arise families, and from them common-weales, *Prima societas in coniugio est, quod principium urbis, seminarium Reipublice*; The first society is in wedlocke, which was the beginning of cities, and the seminarie of the common-wealth. yet it hath beene contemned and defamed by many great personages, who haue iudged it unworthy men of heart and spirit, and haue framed many objections against it.

2 **F**irst they account the band and obligation thereof vnjust, a hard and overstraight captiuitie, insomuch, that by marriage a man is bound and enthralled to the cares and humours of another. And if it fall out, that hee haue mistaken in his choice, and haue met with a hard bargaine, more bone than flesh, his life is euer afterwards most miserable: What iniquitie and iniustice can there be greater than for one houres follie, a fault committed without malice, and by meere oversight, yea the many times to obey the aduice of another, a man should be bound to an euermore torment? It were better for him to put the halter about his necke, and to cast himselfe into the sea, his head downward, to end his miserable life, than to liue alwayes in the paines of hell, and to suffer without intermission on his side, the tempest of ialousie, of malice, of rage, of madnesse, of brutish obstinacie, and other miserable conditions: and therefore one sticks not to say, That he that inuented this knot and tie of mariage, had found a goodly and beautifull meanes to be reuenged of man, a trap or gin to intangle beasts, and afterwards to make them languish at a little fire. Another saith, That to marry a wife man to a foole or a foole to a wife man, is to binde the liuing to the dead, which was the cruelliest death inuented by Tyrants, to make the liuing to languish and die by the companie of the dead. Secondly, they say that mariage is a corruption and adulterating of good and rare spirits, insomuch that the flatteries and smooth speeches of the partie beloued, the affection towards



wards children, the care of household affaires, and aduancement of their families, do lessen, dissolue, and mollifie the vigour and strength of the most liuely and generous spirit that is, witnesse *Samson*, *Salomon*, *Marc. Antony*. And therefore howsoeuer the matter goe, we had not neede to marry. But those that haue more flesh than spirit, strong in bodie, and weake in minde, tie them to the flesh, and giue them the charge of small and base matters, such as they are capable of. But such as are weake of body, haue their spirits great, strong, and puissant, is it not then a pitie to binde them to the flesh, and to marriage, as men doe beasts in a stable? We see that beasts the more noble they are, the stronger and fitter for seruice, as horses and dogs, the more are they kept asunder from the companie and acquaintance of the other sex, and it is the maner to put beasts of least esteeme at random together. So likewise such men and women as are ordeined to the most venerable and holiest vocation, and which ought to be as the creame and marrow of Christianitie, Church-men and religious, are (though not by any warrant from the word of God) excluded from marriage. And the reason is, because marriage hindreth and auerteth those beautifull and great eleuations of the soule, the contemplation of things, high, celestiall and diuine, which is incompatible with the troubles and molestations of domesticall affaires; for which cause the Apostle preferreth the solitarie continent life before marriage. Vtility may well hold with marriage, but honestie is on the other side.

Againe, it troubleth beautiful and holy enterprises: as *Saint Austin* reporteth, that hauing determined with some other his friends, among whom there were some married, to retire themselves from the citie, and the company of men, the better to attend to the studie of wisdom and vertue, their purpose was quickly broken and altered by the wiues of those that were married. And another wise man did not doubt to say, that if men could liue without women, they should be visited and accompanied by Angels. Moreouer, marriage is a hindrance to such as delight in trauell and to see strange countries, whether to learne to make themselves wife, or to teach others to be wife, and to publish that to others which they

know. To conclude, marriage doth not only corrupt and deiect good and great spirits, but it robberth the weale-publicke of many beautifull and great things, which cannot manifest themselues remaining in the bosome and lap of a woman, or being spent about young children. But is it not a goodly sight, naya great losse, that he that is able for his wisdom and policie to gouerne the whole world, should spend his time in the gouernment of a woman and a few children? And therefore it was well answered by a great personage being sollicitated to marry, That he was borne to command men, not a woman, to counsell Kings and Princes, not little children.

<sup>3</sup>  
The answer to  
the foresaid ob-  
jections, Cap. 4.

To all this a man may answer, that the nature of man is not capable of perfection, or of any thing against which nothing may be objected, as hath elsewhere beene spoken. The best and most expedient remedies that it hath, are in some degree or other but sickly, mingled with discommodities: They are all but necessarie euils. And this is the best that man could deuise for his preservation and multiplication. Some (as *Plato*, and others) would more subtiltie haue inuented meanes to haue auoided these thorny inconueniences; but besides that they built castels in the aire, that could not long continue in vse, their inuentions likewise if they could haue beene put in practise, would not haue been without many discommodities and difficulties. Man hath beene the cause of them, and hath himselfe brought them forth by his vice, intemperancy, and contrarie passion; and we are not to accuse the state, nor any other but man, who knowes not well how to vse any thing. Moreouer a man may say, that by reason of these thornes and difficulties, it is a schoole of vertue, an apprent ship, and a familiar and domesticall exercise: and *Socrates* a doctor of wisdom did once say to such as hit him in the teeth with his wiues pettish frowardnes, That he did thereby learne euen within his owne dores, to be constant and patient euery where else, and to thinke the crosses of fortune to be sweet and pleasant vnto him. It is not to be denied but that he that can liue vnmarried, doth best: but yet for the honour of marriage, a man may say, that it was first instituted by God himselfe in Paradise before any other thing, and that in the state of innocencie and perfection. See heere foure commendations of  
marriage,

mariage, but the fourth passeth all the rest, and is without reple. Afterwards the Sonne of God approoved it, and honoured it with his presence at the first miracle that hee wrought, and that miracle done in the fauour of that state of mariage and married men; yea he hath honored it with this priuiledge, that it serueth for a figure of that great vnion of his with the Church, and for that cause it is called a mystery and great.

Without all doubt, mariage is not a thing indifferent: It is either wholly a great good, or a great euill, a great content, or <sup>4</sup> *Wholly good or wholly ill.* a great trouble, a paradise or a hell: It is either a sweet and pleasant way, if the choice be good, or a rough and dangerous march, and a gauling burthen some tye, if it be ill: It is a bargain where truly that is verified which is said, *Homo homini deus, aut lupus. Man is to man either a god or a wolfe.*

Mariage is a worke that consisteth of many parts; there must bee a meeting of many qualities, many considerations besides the parties married. For whatsoeuer a man say, he marieth not onely for himselfe; his posteritie, familie, alliance, and other meanes, are of great importance, and a greuous burthen. See heere the cause why so few good are found; and because there are so few good found, it is a token of the price and value thereof: it is the condition of all great charges: Royaltie is full of difficultie, and few there are that exercise it well and happily. And whereas we see many times that it falleth not out so luckely, the reason thereof is the licentious liberty, and vnbridled desire of the persons themselves, and not in the state and institution of mariage: and therefore it is commonly more commodious, and better fitted in good, simple, and vulgar spirits, where delicacy, curiosity, and idleness are lesse troublesome: vnbridled humours and turbulent wauering minds are not fit for this state or degree.

Mariage is a step to wisdom, a holie and inuolable band, an honourable match. If the choyce be good and well ordered there is nothing in the world more beautifull: It is a sweet societie of life, full of constancy, trust, and an infinite number of profitable offices and mutuall obligations: It is a fellowship not of loue, but amity. For loue and amity are as different, as the burning sicke heat of a feuer, from the haru-  
rall heate of a sound bodie. Mariage hath in it selfe amitie,  
vtilitie,

<sup>5</sup> *A good marriage, is a good*

<sup>6</sup> *A simple description and summary of marriage.*

vilitie, iustice, honor, constancy, a plaine pleasure, but sound firme, and more vniuersall. Loue is groundd vpon pleasure only, and it is more quicke, piercing, ardent. Few mariages succede well that haue their beginnings and progresse from beautie and amorous desires. Mariage hath neede of foundations more solid and constant; and we must walke more warily; this boyling affection is woorth nothing, yea mariage hath a better conduct by a third hand.

7  
A description  
more exact.

This much is said summarily and simplie; but more exactly to describe it, we know that in Mariage there are two things essentiall vnto it, and seeme contraries, though indeed they be not; that is to say, an equalitie sociable, and such as is betweene Peeres: and an inequality, that is to say superiority and inferiority. The equality consisteth in an entire and perfect communication and communitie of all things, soules, wills, bodies, goods, the fundamentall law of Mariage, which in some places is extended euen to life and death, in such sort, that the husband being dead, the wife must incontinently follow. This is practised in some places by the publicke lawes of the countries, and many times with so ardent affection, that many wiues belonging to one husband, they contend, and publicly pleade for the honour to goe first to sleepe with their spouse (that is their word) alleaging for themselves the better to obtaine their suite, and preferment heerin, their good seruice, that they were best beloved, had the last kisse of their deceased husband, and haue had children by him.

*Et certamen habent lethi, quæ vina sequatur*

*Coniugium; pudor est non licuisse mori.*

*Ardent uultrices, & flamme pectora prebent,*

*Imponuntq; suis ora perusta uiris.*

*They strine to die, alius who may be famed*

*To follow him, if die they may not, ashamed,*

*She burnes that winn's, and yeeld's to th' flame hir brest*

*And hir burnt face doth on hir husband rest.*

In other places it was obserued, not by publicke lawes, but priuate compacts and agreements of mariage, as betwixt Marc, Antony, and Cleopatra. This equalitie doth likewise consist in that power which they haue in commune ouer their family, whereby the wife is called the companion of  
her

her husband, the mistress of the house and family, as the husband the master and lord : and their ioint authoritie ouer their family is compared to an *Aristocracie*.

The distinction of superioritie and inferioritie consisteth in this, that the husband hath power ouer the wife, and the wife is subiect to the husband. This agreeth with all lawes and policies ; but yet more or lesse according to the diuersity of them. In all things the wife, though she be far more noble, and more rich, yet is subiect to the husband. This superioritie and inferioritie is naturall, founded vpon the strength and sufficiencie of the one, the weaknes and insufficiencie of the other. The Diuines ground it vpon other reasons drawn from the Bible : Man was first made by God alone and immediately, expressly for God his head, and according to his image, and perfect, for nature doth alwaies begin with things perfect. The woman was made in the second place, after man, of the substance of man, by occasion and for another thing, *mulier est vir occasionatus*, to serue as an aide and as a second to man, who is her head, and therefore imperfect. And this is the difference by order of generation. That of corruption and sinne proueth the same, for the woman was the first in preuarication, and by hir owne weaknes and will did sinne, man the second, and by occasion of the woman ; the woman then the last in good and in generation, and by occasion, the first in euill and the occasion thereof, is iustly subiect vnto man, the first in good, and last in euill.

This superioritie and power of the husband hath beene in some places such as that of the father, ouer life and death, as with the *Romans* by the law of *Romulus*: and the husband had power to kill his wife in foure cases, *Adulterie*, *Suborning of children*, *counterfeiting of false keyes*, and *drinking of wine*. So likewise with the *Greekes*, as *Polybius*, and the ancient *French*, as *Cesar* affirmeth, the power of the husband was ouer the life and death of his wife. Elsewhere, and there too, afterwards this power was moderated ; but almost in all places the power of the husband and the subiection of the wife doth inferre thus much, That the husband is master of the actions and vows of his wife, and may with words correct her and hold her to the stocks (as for blowes, they are vnworthy a woman

8

*Inequalitie.*

9

*The power of the husband.*  
Dion. Halicarn. l. 2.  
Lib. 2.  
Lib. 6. bel. Gal.

of

of honour or honestie, faith the Law) and the wife is bound to hold the condition, follow the qualitie, countrey, familie, habitation and rancke of her husband, she must accompanie and follow him in all things, in his iourneys if need be, his banishment, his imprisonment, yea a wandring person, a vagabond a fugitiue. The example. heereof are many and excellent, of *Sulpia*, who followed her husband *Lentulus* being banished into *Cicilie*; *Erethrea* her husband *Phalaris*; *Ipsicrates* the wife of King *Mubridate* vanquished by *Pompey*, who wandred thorow the world. Some adde vnto this, That wiues are to follow their husbands euen in the warres, and into those prouinces whither the husband is sent with publike charge. Neither can the wife bring any thing into question of law, whether she be plaintiffe or defendant, without the authority of her husband, or of the Iudge, if he refuse; neither can she call her husband into iudgement, without the permission of the Magistrate.

Corn. Tacit.

IO  
The diuers rules  
of marriage.

Marriage is not carried after one and the same fashon, neither hath it in euery place the same lawes and rules, but according to the diuersitie of religions and countreys, it hath rules either more easie or more streight: according to the rules of Christianity of all other the straightest, marriage is more subiect, and held more short. There is nothing but the entrance left free, the continuance is by constraint, depending of some thing els than our owne willes. Other nations and religions, to make marriage more easie, free, and fertile, haue receiued and practised *Polygamie* and repudiation, libertie to take and leaue wiues: they accuse Christianitie for taking away these two, by which meanes amity and multiplication, the principall ends of marriage, are much preiudiced, inasmuch as amity is an enemy to all constraint, and they doe better maintaine themselves in an honest libertie; and multiplication is made by the woman, as Nature doth richly make knowne vnto vs in wolues, of whom the race, is so fertile in the production of their yoong, euen to the number of twelue or thirteene, that they farre excell all other profitable creatures: of these there are great numbers killed euery day, by which meanes there are but few, and they though of all others the most fertile, yet by accident the most barren: the  
reason

reason is because of so great a number as they bring, there is one only female, which for the most part beareth not by reason of the multitude of males that concur in the generation, of which the greatest part die without fruit, by the want of females. So likewise we may see how much *Polygamy* helpeth to multiplication in those nations that receiue it, Iewes, Turks and other barbarians, who are able to raise forces of three or foure thousand fighting men fit for warres. Contrariwise, in Christendome there are many linked together in matrimony, the one, of which, if not both, are barren, which being placed with others, both the one and the other may happily leaue great posteritie behinde them. But to speake more truly, all his fertilitie consisteth in the fertilitie of one only woman. Finally, they obiect, That this Christianlike restraint is the cause of many lasciuious pranks and adulteries. To all which we may answer, That Christianitie considereth not of marriage by reasons purely humane, naturall, temporall; but it beholds it with another visage, and weigheth it with reasons more high and noble, as hath beene said. Adde vnto this, That experience sheweth in the greatest part of marriages, that constraint increaseth amitie, especially in simple and debonaire mindes, who doe easily accommodate themselves where they find themselves in such sort linked. And as for lasciuious and wicked persons, it is the immodestie of their maners that makes them such, which no libertie can amend. And to say the truth, Adulteries are as common where Polygamie and repudiation are in force; witnesse the Iewes and *Dauid*, who for all the wiues that hee had could not defend himselfe from it: and contrariwise, they haue beene a long time vnknown in policies well gouerned, where there was neither Polygamie nor repudiation; witnesse *Sparta* and *Rome* a long time after the foundation. And therefore it is absurd to attribute it vnto religion, which teacheth nothing but puritie and continencie.

The libertie of Polygamie which seemeth in some sort naturall, is carried diuersly according to the diuersity of nations and policies. In some, all the wiues that belong to one husband liue in common, and are equall in degree; and so are their children. In others, there is one who is the principall and

II

Polygamie di.  
111.



and as the mistrie, whose children inherit the goods, honours, and titles of the husband: the rest of the wiuers are kept apart, and carrie in some places the titles of lawfull wiuers, in others of concubines, and their children are onely pensioners.

12  
Repudiation  
dissers.

The vse of repudiation in like sort is different: for with some, as the *Hebrewes*, *Greeks*, *Armenians*, the cause of the separation is not expresse, and it is not permitted to retake the wife once repudiated, but yet lawfull to marry another. But by the law of *Mahomet*, the separation is made by the Iudge, with knowledge taken of the cause (except it be by mutuall consent) which must be adulterie, sterilitie, incompatibilitie of humours, an enterprize on his, or hir part against the life of each other, things directly and especially contrarie to the state and institution of mariage: and it is lawfull to retake one another as often as they shall thinke good. The former seemeth to be the better, because it bridleth proud women, and ouer-sharpe and bitter husbands: The second, which is to expresse the cause, dishonoureth the parties, & discouereth many things which should be hid. And if it fall out that the cause be not sufficientlie verified, and that they must continue together, poysonings and murthers doe commonly ensue; many times vnknowne vnto men: as it was discouered at *Rome* before the vse of repudiation, where a woman being apprehended for poysoning of her husband, accused others and they others too, to the number of threescore and ten, which were all executed for the same offence. But the worst law of all others hath beene, that the adulterer escapeth almost euery where without punishment of death, and all that is laid vpō him is diuorce & separation of companie, brought in by *Iustinian*, a man whollie possessed by his wife, who caused whatsoeuer lawes to passe that might make for the advantage of women. From hence doth arise a danger of perpetuall adulterie, desire of the death of the one partie, the offender is not punished, the innocent injured remaineth without amends.

The dutie of married folke, See *Lib. 3. Cap. 12.*

CHAP.



## CHAP. XLVII

## Of Parents and Children.

There are many sorts and degrees of authoritie and humane power, Publike and Priuate; but there is none more naturall, nor greater, than that of the father ouer his children, (I say father, because the mother who is subiect vnto hir husband, cannot properly haue hir children in hir power and subiection) but it hath not bene alwayes, and in all places alike. In former times almost euery where it was absolute and vniuersall ouer the life and death, the libertie, the goods, the honor, the actions and cariages of their children, as to plead, to marie, to get goods: as namely with the Romans by the expresse law of *Romulus*, *Parentum in liberos omne ius esto, relegandi, vendendi, occidendi*; *Let the parents haue full libertie to dispose of their children, yea of banishing, selling, or killing them*; Except only children vnder the age of three yeares, who as yet could not offend either in word or deede; which law was afterwards renewed by the law of the twelve tables, by which the father was allowed to sell his children to the third time: with the *Persians* according to *Aristotle*; the ancient *French* as *Cassar* and *Prosper* affirme; with the *Masconites* and *Tartars*, who might sell their children to the fourth time. And it should seeme by that fact of *Abraham* going about to kill his sonne, that this power was likewise vnder the law of nature: for if it had bene against his dutie, and without the power of the father, hee had neuer consented thereunto, neither had hee euer thought that it was God that commanded him to doe it, if it had bene against nature. And therefore we see that *Isaac* made no resistance, nor alledged his innocencie, knowing that it was in the power of his father: which derogateth not in any sort from the greatnesse of the faith of *Abraham*, because hee would not sacrifice his sonne by vertue of his right or power, nor for any demerit of *Isaac*, but only to obey the commandement of God. So likewise it was in force by the law of *Moyse*, though somewhat moderated. So that we see what this power hath bene in ancient times in the greatest part of the world, and which endured vnto the time of the *Romane Emperours*. With the

Fatherly power.

Dion. Halic.

lib. 2. antiq.

Rom. 1. in suis

ff. de lib. &amp;

post. Aul.

Gell lib. 20.

Lib. 2. Edh.

cap. 20.

Lib. 6. Bel.

Gal.

Prosper.

Aquitain. in

Epist. Segism.

Deut. 21.

the Greeks it was not so great and absolute, nor with the Egyptians: neuerthelesse, if it fell out, that the father had killed his sonnes wrongfully and without cause, he had no other punishment, but to be shut vp three daies together with the dead bodie.

<sup>2</sup>  
*The reasons and fruits thereof.* Now the reasons and fruits of so great and absolute a power of fathers ouer their children, necessarie for the culture of good maners, the chasing away of vice, and the publike good, were first to holde the children in awe and dutie: and secondly, because there are many great faults in children, that would escape vnpunished, to the great preiudice of the weale publike, if the knowledge and punishment of them were but in the hand of publike authoritie, whether it be because they are domesticall and secret, or because there is no man that wil prosecute against them: for the parents who know them and are interested in them will not discredit them; besides that, there are many vices and insolencies that are neuer punished by iustice. Adde heereunto, that there are many things to be tried, and many differences betwixt parents and children, brothers and sisters, touching their goods or other matters, which are not fit to be published, which are extinct and buried by this fatherly authoritie. And the law did alwayes suppose, that the father would neuer abuse this authoritie, because of that great loue which he naturally carrieth to his children, incompatible with crueltie: which is the cause that in stead of punishing them with rigour, they rather become intercessours for them, when they are in danger of the law: and there can be no greater torment to them, than to see their children in paine. And it falleth out very seldome or neuer, that this power is put in practise without very great occasion; so that it was rather a scarcrow to children and very profitable, than a rigour in good earnest.

<sup>3</sup>  
*The declination.* Now this fatherly power (as ouer-sharpe and dangerous) is almost of it selfe lost and abolished (for it hath rather happened by a kinde of discontinuance than any expresse law) and it beganne to decline at the comming of the Romane Emperours: for from the time of *Augustus*, or shortly after, it was no more in force, whereby children became so desperate and insolent against their parents, that *Seneca*, speaking to *Nero*, said,

said, That hee had seene more parricides punished in five  
 yeeres past, than had beene in seven hundred yeeres before;  
 that is to say, since the foundation of *Rome*. In former times,  
 if it fell out that the father killed his children, he was not pu-  
 nished, as we may see by the example of *Fulvius* the Senatour,  
 who killed his sonne because hee was a partner in the conspi-  
 racie of *Cariline*: and of diuers other Senatours, who haue  
 made criminall proceesse against their children in their owne  
 houses, and haue condemned them to Jeath, as *Cassius Tra-*  
*tianus*; or to perpetuall exile, as *Manlius Torquatus* his sonne  
*Sillanus*. There were afterwards lawes ordained, that inioi-  
 ned the father to present vnto the Iudge his children offend-  
 ing, that they might be punished, and that the Iudge should  
 pronounce such a sentence as the father thought fit; which is  
 still a kinde of footstep of antiquitie: and going about to take  
 away the power of the father, they durst not doe it but by  
 halves, and not all together and openly. These latter lawes  
 come somewhat neere the law of *Moyse*, which would, That  
 at the only complaint of the father made before the Iudge,  
 without any other knowledge taken of the cause, the rebelli-  
 ous and contumacious childe should be stoned to death; re-  
 quiring the presence of the Iudge, to the end the punishment  
 should not be done in secret or in choler, but exemplarily.  
 So that according to *Moyse*, this fatherly power was more  
 free and greater, than it hath beene after the time of the Em-  
 perours; but afterwards vnder *Constantine* the Great, and  
*Theodosius*, and finally vnder *Iustinian*, it was almost altoge-  
 ther extinct. From whence it is, that children haue learned  
 to denie their obedience to their parents, their goods, their  
 aide, yea to wage law against them; a shamefull thing to see  
 our Courts full of these cases. Yea, they haue beene dispen-  
 sed heerewith vnder pretext of deuotion and offerings, as  
 with the Iewes before Christ, wherewith he reprocheth them: *Matt. 23.*  
 and afterwards in Christianitie, according to the opinion of  
 some: yea, it hath beene lawfull to kill them either in their  
 owne defence, or if they were enemies to the Common-weale:  
 although, to say the truth, there should neuer be cause iust e-  
 nough for a sonne to kill his father. *Nullum tantum scelus ad-*  
*mitti potest à patre, quod sit parricidio vindicandum, & nullum sce-*

*lustrationem habet. A father cannot commit such a crime, as may be revenged with parricide, and no wickednesse hath any reason.*

Now we feele not what mischief and prejudice hath hapned to the world, by the abolishing and distinction of this fatherly power. The Common-weales wherein it hath beene in force haue alwaies flourished. If there were any danger or euill in it, it might in some sort be ruled and moderated; but vitterly to abolish it, as now it is, is neither honest nor expedient, but hurtfull and inconuenient, as hath beene said.

Of the reciprocall duty of parents and children, See *Lib. 3. Cap. 14.*

### CHAP. XLVIII.

*Lords and slaues, Masters and seruants.*

1  
*The vse of  
slaues vniuer-  
sal and of a nst  
nature.*

THE vse of slaues, and the full and absolute power of Lords and Masters ouer them, although it be a thing common thorowout the world and and at all times (except within these foure hundred yeeres, in which time it hath somewhat decayed, though of late it reuiue againe) yet it is a thing both monstrous and ignominious in the nature of man, and such as is not found in beafts themselves, who consent not to the captiuitie of their like neither actiuelly nor passiuelly. The law of *Moyse* hath permitted this as other things, *ad duritiam cordis eorum, for their hardnesse of heart*, but not such as hath beene elsewhere: for it was neither so great, nor so absolute, nor perpetuall, but moderated within the compasse of seuen yeeres at the most. Christianitie hath left it, finding it vniuersall in all places, as likewise to obey idolatrous Princes and Masters, and such like matters as could not at the first attempt and altogether be extinguished, they haue abolished.

2  
*Distinction.*

There are foure sorts, Naturall, that is, slaues borne; Enforced, and made by right of warre; Iult, termed slaues by punishment by reason of some offense, or debt, whereby they are slaues to their Creditors, at the most for seuen yeeres, according to the law of the Iewes, but alwaies vntill payment and restitution be made, in other places; Voluntaries, whereof there are many sorts, as they that cast the dice for it, or sell their libertie for money, as long sithence it was the custome

*Tacit. de  
morr. Ger-  
men.*

in

in *Almaigne*, and now likewise in some parts of Christendom, where they doe giue and vow themselves to another for euer, as the Iewes werewont to practise, who at the gate bored a hole in their eare, in token of perpetuall seruitude. And this kinde of voluntarie captiuitie is the strangest of all the rest, and almost against nature.

It is couetousnesse that is the cause of slaues enforced; and leauidnesse the cause of voluntaries. They that are Lords and Matters haue hoped for more gaine and profit by keeping, than by killing them: and indeed the fairest possessions and the richest commodities, were in former times slaues. By this meanes *Crassus* became the richest among the *Romanes*, who had besides those that serued him five hundred slaues, who every day brought gaine and commoditie by their gainfull Arts and mysteries, and afterwards when he had made what profit by them he could, he got much by the sale of them.

It is a strange thing to reade of those cruelties practised by Lords vpon their slaues, euen by the approbation and permission of the lawes themselves: They haue made them to till the earth being chained together, as the manner is in *Barbarie* at this day; they lodge them in holes and ditches; and being old, or impotent, and so vnprofitable, they sell them, or drowne them, and cast them into lakes to feed their fish withall: They kill them not only for the least fault that is, as the breaking of a glasse, but for the least suspicion, yea, for their owne pleasure and pastime, as *Flaminius* did, one of the honestest men of his time. And to giue delight vnto the people, they were constrained in their publike Theaters to kill one another. If a Master hapned to bee killed in his house by whomsoever, the innocent slaues were all put to death, inso-much that *Pedonius* the *Romane* being slaine, although the murderer were known, yet by the order of the Senate, foure hundred of his slaues were put to death.

On the other side, it is a thing as strange, to heare of the rebellions, insurrections, and cruelties of slaues against their Lords, when they haue beene able to worke their reuenge, not only in particular by surprise & treason, as it fell out one night in the Citie of *Tyre*, but in set battell both by sea and land; from whence the prouerb is, so many slaues, so many enemies.

6

*Diminution  
of Slaues.*

Now as Christian religion, and afterwards *Mahometisme* did increase, the number of slaues did decrease, and seruitude did cease, insomuch that the Christians, and afterwards the Turkes, like apes imitating them, gaue freedome and libertie to all those that were of their religion; in such sort, that about the twelue hundred yeere, there were almost no slaues in the world, but where these two religions had no authoritie.

7

*The increase of  
poore people  
and vagabonds.*

But as the number of slaues diminished, the number of beggers and vagabonds increased: for so many slaues being set at libertie, come from the houses and subiection of their Lords, not hauing wherewithall to liue, and perhaps hauing children too, filled the world with poore people.

8

*Returne to  
seruitude.*

This pouertie made them returne to seruitude, and to become voluntarie slaues, paying, changing, selling their libertie, to the end they might haue their maintenance and life assured, and be quit of the burthen of their children. Besides this cause and this voluntarie seruitude, the world is returned to the vse of slaues, because the Christians and Turks alwaies maintaining warres one against the other, as likewise against the Gentiles both orientall and occidentall, although by the example of the Iewes they haue no slaues of their owne nation, yet they haue of others, whom, though they turne to their religion, they hold slaues by force.

9

The power and authoritie of masters ouer their seruants, is not very great, nor imperious, and in no sort can be preiudiciall to the libertie of seruants; onely they may chastise and correct them with discretion and moderation. This power is much lesse ouer those that are mercenarie, ouer whom they haue neither power nor correction.

The dutie of Masters and Seruants,

*See lib. 3. cap. 15.*

## CHAP. XLIX.

*Of the State, Soueraigntie, Soueraignes.*

1

*The description  
and necessitie of  
the state.*

**H**Auing spoken of priuate power, wee come to the publicke, that of the state. The state, that is to say, Rule, dominion, or a certaine order in commanding and obeying, is the

the prop, the cement, and the soule of humane things: It is the bond of societie, which cannot otherwise subliste; It is the vitall spirit, whereby so many millions of men doe breath, and the whole nature of things.

Now notwithstanding it be the pillar and prop of all, yet it is a thing not so sure, very difficult, subiect to changes, *ar-* <sup>3</sup>  
*dum & subiectum fortuna cuncta regendi onus*: The burden of go- *The nature of*  
*uernment is a hard matter, and subiect to fortune*: which decli- *the State.*  
*Tacit.*  
neth and sometimes falleth by hidden and vnknown causes, and that altogether at an instant, from the highest step to the lowest, and not by degrees, as it vseth to bee long a rising. It is likewise exposed to the hatred both of great and small, whereby it is gauled, subiect to ambushments, vnderminings, and dangers, which hapneth likewise many times by the corrupt and wicked manners of the soueraignes, and the nature of the soueraigntie, which wee are about to describe.

Soueraigntie is a perpetuall and absolute power, without <sup>3</sup>  
constraint either of time or condition. It consisteth in a pow- *The description*  
*of Soueraigntie.*  
er to giue lawes to all in generall, and to every one in particular, without the consent of any other, or the gift of any person. And as another saith (to derogate from the common law) Soueraigntie is so called, and absolute, because it is not subiect to any humane lawes, no not his owne. For it is against nature to giue lawes vnto all, and to command himselfe in a thing that dependeth vpon his will. *Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quæ à voluntate promittentis statum capit*; No obligation can stand good, which hath his strength from the will of the promiser. nor of another, whether liuing, or of his predecessors, or the countrie. Soueraigne power is compared to fire, to the sea, to a wilde beast; it is a hard matter to tame it, to handle it, it will not be crost, nor offended, but being is very dangerous. *Potestas res est quam moueri, docerique non vult, & castigatiomæ græ ferat*: Power is a thing which will neither bee admonished nor taught, and with great difficultie suffereth any correction.

The marks and properties thereof, are, to iudge the last ap- <sup>4</sup>  
peales, to ordaine lawes in time of peace and warre, to create *The properties,*  
and appoint magistrates and officers, to giue graces and dis-  
O 3                      pensations



penſations againſt the law, to impoſe tributes, to appoint money, to receiue homages, ambaffages, oathes. But all this is comprehended vnder the abſolute power to giue and make lawes according to their pleaſure. Other markes there are of leſſe weight, as the law of the ſea and ſhipwracke, conſiſcation for treaſon, power to change the tongue, title of Maieſtie.

Greatnes and Soueraigntie iſo much deſired of all, becauſe all the good that is in it appeareth outwardly, and all the ill is altogether inward : As alſo becauſe to command others, is a thing as beautifull and diuine, as great and difficult ; and for this cauſe they are eſteemed and reuerenced for more than men Which beleefe in the people, and credit of theirs is very neceſſarie and commodious to extort from the people due reſpect and obedience, the nurce of peace and quietnes. But in the end they prooue to be men caſt in the ſame mould that other men are, and many times worſe borne, and worſe qualified in nature than many of the common ſort of people. It ſeemeth that their actions becauſe they are weightie and important, doe proceed from weightie and important cauſes : but they are nothing, and of the ſame condition that other mens are. The ſame occaſion that breeds a brawle betwixt vs and our neighbour, is ground enough of a warre betwixt Princes : and that offence for which a Lackey deſerues a whipping, lighting vpon a King, is the ruine of a whole prouince. They will as lightly as we, and we as they, but they can do more than we : the ſelfe ſame appetites moue a ſlie and an elephant. Finally, beſides theſe paſſions, defects, and naturall conditions which they haue common with the meanest of thoſe that doe adore them, they haue likewiſe vices and diſcommodities which their greatnes and ſoueraigntie beares them out in, peculiar vnto themſelues.

6  
The manner of  
Soueraigntie.

The ordinarie maners of great perſonages are, vntamed pride, *Durus eſt veri inſolens, ad recta ſeclis regius non vult timor* ; He that is inſolent is vncapable of the truth, kingly pride will not yeeld to thoſe things that are true. violence too licentious, *Id eſſe regni maximum pugnis putant, ſi quicquid alijs non licet, ſolis licet : quod non poteſt, vult poſſe, qui nimium poteſt* : They thinke it the greateſt teſtimonie of their roialty, that that which is not per-

ted



red others, is only lawfull for them; he that hath power to doe much, will have power to doe that he cannot: Their motto that best pleaseth them is, *Quod libet, licet*: What they list is lawfull: Suspicion, ieaousie, *Suapte natura*, potentie anxy, They are naturally careful of their power, yea euen of their owne infants, *Suspectus semper, inuisusq;* dominantibus quisquis proximus destituitur, adeo ut displiceant etiam ciuilia filiorum ingenia: The next whoe neuer destinated to succeed them, is alwayes mistrusted and enuied, inasmuch that the ciuill demeanor of their owne children doth also displease them. whereby it falleth out that they are many times in alarum and feare, *Ingenia regum prona ad formidinem*. Kings are naturally apt to feare.

The aduantages of Kings and soueraigne Princes aboue their people, which seeme so great and glittering, are indeed but light, and almost imaginarie; but they are repayed with great, true, and solid disaduantages and inconueniences. The name and title of a soueraigne, the shew and outside is beautiful, pleasant, and ambitious; but the burthen and the inside is hard, difficult, and yrksome. There is honor enough, but little rest and ioy, or rather none at all: It is a publicke and honorable seruitude, a noble miserie, a rich captiuitie, *Aurea & fulgida compedes, clara miseria*; witnesse that which *Augustus, Marcus Aurelius, Pertinax, Diocletian*, haue said and done, and the end that almost all the first twelue *Cæsars* made, and many others after them. But because few there are that beleeue this, but suffer themselues to be deceiued by the beautiful shew, I will more particularly quote the inconueniences and miseries that accompanie great Princes.

First, the great difficultie to play their part, and to quit themselues of their charge: for can it be but a great burthen to gouerne so many people, since in the ruling of himselfe there are so many difficulties? It is an easier matter and more pleasant to follow, than to guide; to trauiell in a way that is already traced, than to finde the way; to obey, than to command; to answere for himselfe only, than for others too; *As sitis multo iam se parere quietum, quam regere imperio res velle*. It is far better to procure peace & quiet, then to gouerne a kingdom. Adde heerevnto that it is required that he that commandeth must be a better man, than he that is commanded: so said Cy-

7  
The miseries,  
and discom-  
forts,

8  
1. to their  
labors,

was a great Commander. How difficult a thing this is, we may see by the paucitie of those that are such as they ought to bee. *Vespasian*, saith *Tacitus*, was the only Prince that in goodnes excelled his predecessors: and another sticks not to say, that all the good Princes may be grauen in a ring.

9  
2 In the pleasures and actions of their life.

Secondly, in their delights and pleasures, wherein it is thought they haue a greater part than other men. But they are doubtlesse of a worse condition than the pleasures of priuate men: for besides that the lustre of their greatnes makes them vnfit to take ioy in their pleasures, by reason that they are too cleare and apparent, and made as a butt and subiect to censure, they are likewise crost and peered into euen to their very thoughts, which men take vpon them to diuine and iudge of. Againe, the great ease and facilitie that they haue to doe what pleaseth them, because all men applie themselues vnto them, takes away the taste, and sowreth that sweet which should be in their pleasures; which delight no man but those that taste them, with some scarcitie and difficultie. Hee that giues no time to be thirly, knowes not what a pleasure it is to haue drinke: Satiety is noysome, and goes against the stomacke.

*Pinguis amor nimiumq; potens in adia nobis  
Vertitur: & stomacho dulcis ut esca nocet.*

*Fat loue too powerfull waxeth tedious to vs,  
And as sweet meat the stomacke, doth vnder vs.*

There is nothing more tedious and loathsome than aburdance, yea they are deprived of all true and liuely action, which can not be without some difficultie and resistance. It is not going, liuing, acting in them, but sleeping and an insensible sliding away.

10  
3 In their marriages.

The third inconuenience that followeth Princes, is in their marriages. The marriages of the vulgar sort are more free and voluntarie, made with more affection, libertie and contentment. One reason hereof may bee, that the common sort of men finde more of their degree to chuse, whereas Kings and Princes, who are not of the rout, as we know, haue no plentiful choice. But the other reason is better, which is, that the common sort in their marriages looke but into their owne affaires, and how they may accommodate it best vnto themselues;

themselves ; but the marriages of Princes are many times inforced for publike necessity : they are great parts of the State, and instruments seruing for the generall good and quiet of the world. Great personages and Souereignes marrie not for themselves, but for the good of the State, whercof they must be more amorous and iealous, than of their wiues and children : for which cause they many times hearken vnto marriages where there is neither loue nor delight ; and matches are made betweene persons, who neither know nor haue seene one another, much lesse affect : yea, such a great man takes such a great ladie, whom if heewere not so great, hee would not take : but this is to serue the weale publike, to assure the States, and to settle peace amongst their people.

The fourth is, That they haue no true part in the attempts that men make one against the other in emulation of honour and valour, in the exercises of the minde and of the bodie, which is one of the most delightfull things in the commerce and conuersation of men. The reason heereof is, because all the world giues place vnto them, all men spare them, and loue rather to hide their owne valour, to betray their owne glorie, than to hurt or hinder that of their Soueraigne, especially where they know he affects the victorie. This, to say the trueth, is by force of respect to handle men disdainfully and iniuriously, and therefore one sayd, that the children of Princes learned nothing by order and rule, but to manage a horse, because in all other exercises euery one bowes vnto them, and giues them the prise : but the horse who is neither flatterer nor Courtier, casts as well the Prince to the ground as the Esquire. Many great personages haue refused the praises and approbations offered them, saying, I would accept and esteeme of them, and reioice in them, if they came from freemen, that durst say the contrarie, and tax mee if there were cause.

The fifth is, that they are deprived of the libertie to trauell in the world, being as it were emprisoned within their owne countries, yea within their owne palaces, being alwaies enclosed with people, suters, gazers, and lookers on, and that wheresoeuer they be, and in all actions whatsoeuer, prying euen through the holes of their chaire : whereupon *Alphonus* the

11

4 Attempts of honour.

12

5 Libertie of trauell.

the

the King said, that in this respect the estate of an alse was better than the condition of a King.

12  
6 Mutuall and  
harty amitie.

The sixth miserie, that they are deprived of all amitie and mutuall societie, which is the sweetest and perfectest fruit of humane life, and cannot be but betwixt equals or those betwixt whom the difference is but small. This great disparitie puts them without the commerce and society of men; all humble seruices, and base offices, are done vnto them by those that cannot refuse them, and proceed not from loue, but from subiection, or to increase their owne greatnes, or of custome and countenance; which is plaine, because wicked Kings are as well serued and reuerenced as the good; they that are hated, as they that are beloued, there is no difference, the selfe-same apparell, the selfe-same ceremonie: Whereupon *Julian* the Emperour answered his Courtiers, that commended him for his iustice, Perhaps I should be proud of these praises, if they were spoken by such as durst to accuse me, and to dispraise my actions when they shall deserue it.

14  
7 Ignorance of  
things.

The seventh misery, worse perhaps than all the rest, and more dangerous to the weale-publicke, is, that they are not free in the choice of men, nor in the true knowledge of things. They are not suffered truly to know the state of their affaires, and consequently not to call and employ such as they would, and as were most fit and necessary. They are shut vp, and beset with a certaine kind of people, that are either of their owne blood, or by the greatnes of their houses and offices, or by prescription, are so farre in authority, power, and managing of affaires before others, that it is not lawfull, without putting all to hazard, to discontent, or in any sort to suspect them. Now these kinde of people that couer, and hold as it were hidden the Prince, do provide that all the truth of things shall not appeare vnto him, and that better men, and more profitable to the state come not neere him, lest they bee known what they are. It is a pitifull thing not to see but by the eyes, not to vnderstand, but by the eares of another, as Princes doe. And that which perfecteth in all points this miserie, is, that commonly, and as it were by destinie, Princes and great personages are possessed by three sorts of people, the plagues of humane kinde, Flatterers, Inuenters of imposts

posts or tributes, Informers, who vnder a faire and false pretext of zeale and amitie towards the Prince, as the two first, or of loyaltie and reformation as the latter, spoile and ruinate both Prince and State.

The eight miserie is, that they are lesse free, and masters of their owne wills than all other, for they are enforced in their proceedings by a thousand considerations and respects, whereby many times they must captiuat their designments, desires, and wills; *in maxima fortuna, minima licentia. In the greatest honour the least libertie.* And in the meane time in stead of being plaintiffes, they are more rudely handled and iudged than any other: For men will not stick to diuine of their designs, penetrate into their hearts and inuentions, which they cannot doe, *Abditos principis sensus, & quid oculis parat exquirere; illicitum anceps nec ideo assequere: To prie into the hidden secrets of the Prince, and to search if they can finde any thing more secret; neither will they heerein forbeare although they know it unfitting:* and looking into things with another visage, where they vnderstand not sufficiently the affaires of the state, they require of their Princes what they thinke should bee done, blameth their actions, & refusing to submit themselues to what is necessarie, they commonly proceed in their businesse rudely enough.

Finally, it falleth out many times, that they make a miserable end, not only tyrants and vsurpers, for it belongs to them, but such as haue a true title to their Crowne; witnes so many Romane Emperours after Pompey the Great, and Caesar, and in our time Mary Queene of Scotland, who lost her life by the hand of an executioner, and Henry the third, wilfullie murdered in the middle of fortie thousand armed men, by a little Monke, and a thousand the like examples. It seemeth that as lightning and tempests oppose themselues against the pride and height of our buildings, so there are likewise spirits that enuie and emulate greatnes below vpon earth.

*Vsq; adeo res humanas vis abdit a quadam.  
Obterit & pulchros fasces, scuasq; securas  
Proculcare, ac ludibrio sibi habere videtur.  
So farre a hidden kinde of power beats downe  
Humane affaires, and seemes to trample downe  
And scorne the fiercest mace, or fairest crowne,*

To

15

Not masters  
of their wills.

16

A miserable  
end.

17 *The conclusion of their miseries* To conclude, the condition of Soueraignes is hard and dangerous: Their life if it be innocent, is infinitely painefull; if it be wicked, it is subiect to the hate and slander of the world, and in both cases exposed to a thousand dangers: for the greater a Prince is, the lesse may he trust others, and the more must he trust himselfe. So that we see, that it is a thing as it were annexed to soueraigntie, to be betrayed.

Of their duty, See the third booke, Cap. 16.

## CHAP. L.

### Magistrates.

1 *The distinction.* **T**HERE are diuers degrees of Magistrates as well in honor as power, which are the two things to be considered in the distinction of them, and which haue nothing common the one with the other: and many times they that are more honorable haue lesse power, as Counsellors of the priuie Counsell, the Secretarie of the state. Some haue but one of the two, others haue both, and that of diuers degrees, but they are properly called Magistrates that haue both.

2 The Magistrates that are in the middle betwixt the Soueraigne & the particulars, in the presence of their Soueraignes haue no power to command. As riuers lose both their name and power at the mouth or entrance into the sea, and the starres their light in the presence of the sunne; so all power of Magistrates is but vpon sufferance in the presence of their Soueraigne: as also the power of inferiours and subalternate Magistrates in the presence of their superiours. Amongst equals there is neither power nor superioritie, but the one may hinder the other by opposition and preuention.

3 All Magistrates iudge, condemne and command either according to the law; and then their sentence is but the execution of the law; or according to equity, and such iudgement is called the office or dutie of the Magistrate.

4 Magistrates can not change nor correct their iudgements, except the Soueraigne permit it, vnder paine of iniustice: they may reuoke their commands or make stay of them, but  
not

not that which they haue iudged and pronounced with knowledge of the cause.

Of the dutie of Magistrates, See lib. 3.

# CHAP. LI.

Lawyers, Doctors, Teachers.

**I**T is one of the vanities & follies of man, to prescribe lawes and rules that exceed the vse and capacitie of men, as some Philosophers and Doctors haue done. They propose strange and eleuated formes or images of life, or at leastwise so difficult and austere, that the practise of them is impossible at least for a long time, yea the attempt is dangerous to manie. These are castles in the aire, as the common-wealth of *Plato*; and *More*, the Oratour of *Cicero*, the Poet of *Horace*, beautifull and excellent imaginations; but he was yet neuer found that put them in vse. The soueraigne and perfect Lawgiuer and Doctor tooke heed of this, who both in himselfe, his life and his doctrine, hath not sought these extrauagancies and formes diuided from the common capacitie of men; and therefore he calleth his yoke easie, and his burthen light, *Inguum meum suauis, & onus meum leue. My yoke sweete and my burden light.* And they that haue instituted and ordered their companie vnder his name, haue very wisely considered of the matter, that though they make speciall profession of vertue, deuotion, and to serue the weale publike aboue all others, neuertheless they differ very little from the common and ciuill life. Wherein there is first great iustice: for there must alwaies be kept a proportion betwixt the commandement and the obediencie, the dutie and the power, the rule and the workmaster: and these bind themselues and others to be necessarily in want, cutting out more worke than they know how to finish: and many times these goodly Law-makers, are the first Law-breakers: for they doe nothing, and many times do quite contrarie to that they enioyne others, like the Pharises, *Imponunt onera grauia, & nolunt ea digito mouere. They impose great burdens, but will not themselues touch them with a finger.* So doe some Phisitions and Diuines: so liues the world, rules



rules and precepts are enioyned, and men not only by an irregularitie of life and manners, but also by contrarie opinion and iudgement follow others.

There is likewise another faultfull of iniustice, they are farre more scrupulous, exact, and rigorous in things free and accidentall than in necessarie and substantiall, in politieue and humane, than in naturall and diuine, like them that are content to lend, but not to pay their debts: and all like the Pharises, as the great and heavenly Doctour telleth them to their reproch. All this is but hypocritie and deccit.

## CHAP. LII.

## People or vulgar sort.

- 1 **T**He people (we vnderstand heere the vulgar sort, the popular rout, a kind of people vnder what covert soeuer, of base, seruile, and mechanicall condition) are a strange beaſt with many heads, and which in few words can not be described, inconstant and variable, without stay, like the waues of the sea; they are mooued and appeased, they allow and disallow one and the same thing at one and the same instant: there is nothing more easie than to driue them into what passion he will; they loue not warres for the true end thereof, nor peace for rest and quietnesse, but for varieties sake, and the change that ther is from the one to the other: confusion makes them desire order, and when they haue it, they like it not: they run alwaies one contrarie to another, and there is no time pleaseth but what is to come. *Hi vulgares, adesse presentia, ventura cupere, praterita celebrare.* It is the custome of the vulgar sort, to dispise the present, desire the future, praise and extoll that which is past.

- 2 They are light to beleue, to gather together newes, especially such as are most hurtfull; holding all reports for assured truths. With a whistle, or some sonnet of newes, a man may assemble them together like bees at the sound of a bason.

- 3 Without iudgement, reason, discretion. Their iudgement and wisdom is but by chance, like a cast at dice, vnadvised and headlong of all things, and alwaies ruled by opinion or custome, or the greater number, going all in a line, like sheepe that



that run after those that goe before them, and not by reason and truth: *Plebi non iudicium, non veritas; ex opinione multa, ex veritate pauca indicat.* The common people haue no iudgement, Tacit. no verity; deeme many things by opinion, few by the truth it selfe. Cic.

Enuious and malicious, enemies to good men, contemners of vertue, beholding the good hap of another with an ill eye, fauouring the more weake and the more wicked, and withholding all ill they can to men of honor they know not wherefore, except it be because they are honourable and well spoken of by others.

Treachorous and vntrue, amplifying reports, smothering of truths, and alwaies making things greater than they are, without faith, without holde. The faith or promise of a people, and the thought of a childe, are of like durance, which change not onely as occasions change, but according to the difference of those reports that every houre of the day may bring forth.

Mutinuous, desiring nothing but nouelties and changes, seditionous, enemies to peace and quietnesse: *Ingenio mobili, sedisiosum, discordiosum, cupidum rerum nouarum, quieti & orio aduersum.* Of a mutable disposition, seditionous, a breeder of discord, desirous of nouelties, enemies to peace and quietnes. Especially when they meet with a leader: for then euen as the calme sea, of nature tumbleth, and foameth, and rageth, being stirred with the fure of the windes; so doe the people swell, and grow proud, wilde, and outragious: but take from them their leader, they become deieft, grow wilde, are confounded with astonishment, *Sine rectore praecepta, pauidus, socors, nil ausus a plebs principibus amotis.* Headlong without a gouerner, fearefull, careless; daring nothing in absence of their princes. Salut.

Procurers and fauours of broiles and alterations in householde affaires, they account modestie simplicitie, wisdom rusticitie: and contrariwise, they giue to fierie and heady violence the name of valour and fortitude. They prefer those that haue hot heads and actiue hands, before those that haue a settled and temperate iudgement, and vpon whom the weight of the affaires must lie; boasters and pratlers before those that are simple and stayed.

They care neither for the publike good nor common honestie,

nestie, but their private good only ; and they refuse no base offices for their gaine and commodity. *Prinata cuius, stimulator, vile decus publicum. Every hath his private spur, concerning the publicke honor.*

Alwaies muttering and murmuring against the State, alwayes belching out slanders and insolent speeches against those that gouerne and command. The meaner and poorer sort haue no better pastime, than to speake ill of the great and rich, not vpon cause and reason, but of enuie, being neuer content with their gouernours, nor the present State.

They haue nothing but a mouth, they haue tongues that cease not, spirits that bowge not : they are a monster whose parts are all tongues, they speake all things, but know nothing ; they looke vpon all, but see nothing ; they laugh at all, and weepe at all, fit to mutine and rebell, not to fight. Their propertie is rather to assay to shake off their yoke, than to defend their libertie : *Procacia plebis ingenia, impigra lingua, ignaui animi. The wittes of the vulgar sort are seamlessse, talkatiue, base minded.*

They neuer know how to holde a measure, nor to keepe an honest mediocritie. Either like slaues they serue ouerbashely, or like lords they are beyond all measure insolent and tyrannicall. They cannot endure a soft and temperate bit, nor are pleased with a lawfull libertie ; they run alwaies to extremities, either out of hope too much trusting, or too much distrustling out of feare. They will make you afeard, if you feare not them : when they are frightened, you chocke them vnder the chin, and you leape with both feet vpon their bellies. They are audacious and proud, if a man shew not the cudgell ; and therefore the prouerbe is, Tickle them, and they will prickethee ; prickethem, and they will tickle thee. *Nil in vulgo modicum terrere ni pauant ; ubi perimuerint impune contemni : audacia turbidum nisi ubi metuas aut seruas humiliter, aut superbe dominatur : libertatem, qua media, nec spernere nec habere.*

Very vnthankfull towards their benefactors. The recompense of all those that haue deserued well of the Commonwealth, haue alwayes beene banishment, reproch, conspiracie, death. Histories are famous, of *Moses* and all the Prophets,

Tacitus.  
Salust.

phets, *Socrates, Aristides, Phocion, Lycurgus, Demosthenes, Themistocles*. And the Truth it selfe hath said, That he being one that procured the good and health of the people, escaped not : and contrariwise, they that oppresse them, are dearest vnto them. They feare all, they admire all.

To conclude, the people are a sauage beast, all that they thinke, is vanitie ; all they say, is false and erroneous ; that they reprocue, is good ; that they approoue, is naught ; that which they praise is infamous ; that which they doe and vnder-13take, is follie. *Nontam bene cum rebus humanis geritur ut Seneca. meliora pluribus placeant : argumentum pessimi turba est.* It goes not so well in humane affaires, as that the best things doe please the most : multitude is an argument of the worst. The vulgar multitude is the mother of ignorance, iniustice, inconstancie, idolatry, vanitie, which neuer yet could be pleased : their mot is, *Vox populi, vox Dei* ; The voice of the people is the voice of God : but we may say, *Vox populi, vox stultorum* : The voice of the people is the voice of fooles. Now the beginning of wisdom, is for a man to keepe himselfe cleere and free, and not to suffer himselfe to be caried with popular opinions. This belongs to the Lib. 2. ca. 1. second booke, which is now nere at hand.

*The fourth distinction and difference of men, drawn from their diuers professions and conditions of life.*

#### THE PREFACE.

**B**Ehold heere another difference of men, drawn from the diuersitie of their professions, conditions and kindes of life. Some follow the ciuill and sociable life, others flie it, thinking to saue themselves in the solitarie wildernesse ; some loue armies, others hate them ; some liue in common, others in priuate ; it pleaseth some best to haue charge, and to leade a publike life, others to hide and keepe themselves priuate ; some are Courtiers, attending wholly vpon others, others court none but themselves ; some delight to liue in the citie, others in the fields, affecting a countrey life, whose choice is the better, and which life is to bee preferred, it is a difficult thing simply to determine, and it may be impertinent. They

P

haue

haue all their aduantages and disaduantages, their good and their ill. That which is most to be looked into and considered heerein, as shall be sayd, is, That euery man know how to chuse that which best befits his owne nature, that he might liue the more easily and the more happily. But yet a word or two of them all, by comparing them together: but this shall be after we haue spoken of that life which is common to all, which hath three degrees.

## CHAP. LIII.

*The distinction and comparison of the three sorts of degrees of life.*

**T**Here are three sorts of life, and as it were three degrees, one priuate of euery particular man within himselfe, and in the closet of his owne heart, where all is hid, all is lawfull: the second, in his house and family, in his priuate and ordinarie actions, where there is neither studie nor arte, and whereof he is not bound to giue any reason: the third is publike in the eyes of the world. Now, to keepe order and rule in this first low and obscure stage, it is very difficult, and more rare than in the other two; and in the second, than in the third, the reason is, because where there is neither Iudge nor Controller, nor Regarder, and where we haue no imagination either of punishment or recompense, we carrie our selues more loosely and carelesly, as in priuate liues, where conscience and reason only is our guide, than in publike, where we are still in checke and as a marke to the eyes and iudgement of all, where glory, feare of reproch, base reputation, or some other passion doth leade vs (for passion commands with greater power than reason) whereby we keepe our selues readie, standing vpon our guard: for which cause it falleth out, that many are counted holy, great, and admirable in publike, who in their owne priuate haue nothing commendable. That which is done in publike is but a fable, a fiction, the truth is secret and in priuate; and he that will well iudge of a man, must conuerse euery day with him, and pry into his ordinary and naturall carriage; the rest is all counterfet; *Vniuersus mundus exercet histrioniam*: *The whole world playes the comedian*: and therefore sayd a wise man, That he is an excellent

lent man, who is such within and in himselfe which he is outwardly, for feare of the lawes and speech of the world. Publike actions thunder in the cares of men, to which a man is attentive when he doth them, as exploits in warre, sound judgement in counsell, to rule a people, to performe an Ambassage. Priuate and domesticall actions are quicke and sure, to chide, to laugh, to sell, to pay, to conuerse with his owne, a man considers not of them, he doth them, not thinking of them: secret and inward actions much more, to loue, to hate, to desire.

Again, there is heere another consideration, and that is, that that is done by the naturall hypocrisie of men, which we make most account of, and a man is more scrupulous in outward actions, that are in shew, but yet are free, of small importance, and almost all in countenances and ceremonies, and therefore are of little cost, and as little effect, than in inward and secret actions that make no shew, but are yet requisite and necessarie, and therefore they are the more difficult. Of those depend the reformation of the soule, the moderation of the passions, the rule of the life; yea, by the attainment of these outward, a man becomes careless of the inward.

Now of these three liues, inward, domesticall, publicke, he that is to leade but one of them, as Hermites, doth guide and order his life at a better rate, than he that hath two, and he that hath but two, his condition is more easie, than he that hath all three.

#### CHAP. LIIII.

*A comparison of the ciuill and sociable life with the solitary.*

They that esteeme and commend so much the solitarie and retired life, as a great stay and sure retraite from the molestations and troubles of the world, and a fit meanes to preserue and maintaine themselves pure and free from many vices, in as much as the worse part is the greater, of a thousand there is not one good, the number of fooles is infinite, contagion in a prease is dangerous, they seeme to haue reason on their side: for the companie of the wicked is a dangerous

thing, and therefore they that aduenture themselves vpon the sea, are to take heed that no blasphemers, or dissolute and wicked person enter their ship; one only *Jonas* with whom God was angrie, had almost lost all; *Bias* to those that were in the ship with him crying out in a great danger for helpe vnto their gods, pleasantly sayd, Hold you your peace, for the gods perceiue not that you are heere with mee. *Albuquerque* the Vice-roy of the *Indies* for *Emanuel* king of *Portingall*, in a great danger at sea, tooke vpon his shoulders a little child, to the end that his innocencie might serue as a suretie to God for his sinnes. But to thinke that a solitarie life is better, more excellent and perfect, more fit for the exercise of vertue, more difficult, sharp, laborious and painfull, as some would make vs beleeeue, they grossely deceiue themselves: for contrarily it is a great discharge and ease of life, and it is but an indifferent profession, yea a simple apprenticeship and disposition to vertue. This is not to enter into busines, troubles, and difficulties, but it is to flie them, and to hide themselves from them, to practise the counsell of the Epicures (*Hide thy selfe*) it is to runne to death, to flie a good life. It is cut of all doubt, that a King, a Prelat, a Pastor is a farre more noble calling, more perfect, more difficult, than that of a Monke, or a Hermit. And to say the truth, in times past the companies of Monks were but seminaries and apprenticeships, from whence they drew those that were fit for Ecclesiasticall charge, and their preparatiues to a greater perfection. And he that liues ciuilly hauing a wife, children, seruants, neighbours, friends, goods, busines, and so many diuers parts which he must satisfie, and truly and loyally answer for, hath without comparison farre more businesse, than he that hath none of all these, hath to doe with none but himselfe: Multitude and abundance is farre more troublesome, than solitariness and want. In abstinencie there is but one thing, in the conduct and vse of many, diuers things, there are many considerations, diuers duties. It is an easier thing to part from goods, honours, dignities, charges, than to gouerne them well, and well to discharge them. It is easier for a man to liue altogether without a wife, than in all points duly to liue, and to maintaine himselfe with his wife, children, and all the rest that depend

depend vpon him : so is the single life more easie than the married state.

So likewise to thinke that solitarinesse is a sanctuarie and an assured haven against all vices, temptations, and impediments, is to deceiue themselves ; for it is not true in euery respect. Against the vices of the world, the stirre of the people, the occasions that proceed from without, it is good ; but solitarinesse hath it inward and spirituall affaires and difficulties : *Itit in desertum ut tentaretur a diabolo. He went into the desert to be tempted of the deuill.* To imprudent and vnadvised young men, solitarinesse is a dangerous staffe, and it is to be feared, that whilest he walkes alone, he entertaines worse companie than himselfe, as *Crates* said to a young man who walked all alone farre from companie. It is there where fooles contriue their wicked designements, beginne their owne ouerthrowes, sharpen their passions and wicked desires. Many times to auoid the gulfes of *Charybdis*, they fall into *Scylla* ; to flie is not to escape, it is many times to increase the danger, and to lose himselfe, *Non vitas, sed fugit : magis autem periculus patemur auersi.* He doth not eschew it, but sueth it : we lie more open to dangers being auerted from them. A man had neede be wise and strong, and well assured of himselfe when he fallies into his owne hands, for it falls out many times that there are none more dangerous than his owne, *Guarda me, dios de mi, God keep me from my selfe*, saith the Spanishe proverb very excellently ; *Nemo est ex imprudentibus qui sibi relinqui debeat, solitudo omnia mala persuadet.* No vnwise man should be left alone to himselfe ; solitarinesse persuadeth all euill. But for some priuate and particular consideration, though good in it selfe (for many times it is for idlenesse, weakenesse of spirit, hatred, or some other passion) to flie and to hide himselfe, hauing meanes to profit another, or to do good to the weale-publicke, is to be a fugitive, to bury his talent, to hide his light, a fault subiect to the rigour of iudgement.

## CHAP. LV.

*A comparison betwixt the life lead in common,  
and in privat.*

SOME haue thought that the life lead in common, wherein nothing is proper to any man, whereby he may say, this is mine, or that is thine, but where all things are common, tendeth most to perfection, and hath most charity and concord. This may take place in the companie of a certaine number of people, lead and directed by some certaine rule, but not in a state and common-weale; and therefore *Plato* hauing once allowed it, thinking thereby to take away all auarice and dissension, did quickly alter his opinion, and was otherwise aduised: for as the practise sheweth, there is not only not any hartie affection towards that that is common to all, and as the prouerbe is, *The common asse is alwaies ill saddled*: but also the communitie draweth vnto it selfe contentions, murmurings, hatreds, as it is alwaies seene, yea euen in the primitive Church: *rescente numero discipulorum, factum est murmur Græcorum aduersus Hebræos. The number of the disciples increasing, there grew a murmuring of the Grecians against the Hebrewes.* The nature of loue is such, as that of great riuers, which being over-charged with abundance of waters, being diuided, are quit of that charge; so loue being diuided to all men, and all things, loseth it force and vigor. But there are degrees of communitie; to liue, that is to say, to eate and drinke together is very good, as the maner was in the better and most ancient common-weales, of *Lacedæmon* and *Crete*; besides that modestie and discipline is better retained amongst them, there is also a very profitable communication; but to thinke to haue all things common, as *Plato* for a while would, though he were afterwards otherwise aduised, is to peruert all.

Luc.  
Acts 6.



## CHAP. LVI.

The comparison of the country-life with  
the Citizens.

**T**HIS comparison to him that loueth wisdom is not hard to make, for almost all the commodities and aduantages are on one side, both spirituall and corporall, libertie, wisdom, innocencie, health, pleasure. In the fields the spirit is more free and to it selfe: in Cities, the persons, the affaires, both their owne and other mens, the contentions, visitations, discourses, entertainements, how much time doe they steale from vs? *Amici fures temporis. Friends steale away time.* How many troubles bring they with them, auocations, allurements to wickednesses? Cities are prisons to the spirits of men, no otherwise than cages to birds and beasts. This celestiall fire that is in vs, will not be shup vp, it loueth the aire, the fields; and therefore *Columella* saith, that the countrey life is the counsell of wisdom, *consanguinea*, which can not be without beautiful and free thoughts and meditations; which are hardly had and nourished among the troubles and molestations of the citie. Againe, the countrey life is more neat, innocent & simple; In cities vices are hid in the rout, and are not perceiued, they passe and insinuate themselues pell-mell, the vse, the aspect, the encounter so frequent and contagious, is the cause. As for pleasure and health, the whole heauens lie open to the view, the sun, the aire, the waters, and all the elements are free, exposed and open in all parts, alwayes sustaining vs, the earth discovereth it selfe, the fruits thereof are before our eyes; and none of all this is in cities in the throng of houses: so that to liue in cities is to be banished in the world and shut from the world. Againe, the countrey life is wholly in exercise, in action, which sharpeneth the appetite, mainteineth health, hardeneth and fortifieth the bodie. That which is to be commended in cities, is commoditie either priuate, as of merchants and artificers, or publike, to the managing whereof few are called, and in ancient times heeretofore they were chosen from the countrey life, who returned hauing performed their charge.

## CHAP. LVII.

## Of the militarie profession.

1  
The praise  
thereof.

**T**He militarie profession is noble in the cause thereof, for there is no commoditie more iust, nor more vniuersall than the protection of the peace and greatnesse of his country; noble in the execution, for valour is the greatest, the most generous and heroicall vertue of all others; honorable, for all humane actions, the greatest and most glorious is the warriers, and by which all other honours are iudged and discerned; pleasant, the company of so many noble men, yong, active, the ordinary view of so many accidents and spectacles, libertie and conuersation without arte, a manly fashion of life without ceremonie, the variety of diuers actions, a courageous harmonie of warlike musike, which entertaines vs and stirres our blood, our eares, our soule; those warlike commotions which rauish vs with their horror and feare, that confused tempest of sounds and cries, that fearefull ordering of so many thousands of men, with so much fury, ardour and courage.

2  
The dispraise.

But on the other side, a man may say, that the arte and experience of vndoing one another, of killing, ruinating, destroying our owne proper kinde, seemes to be vnnaturall and to proceed from an alienation of our sense and vnderstanding; it is a great testimonie of our weaknesse and imperfection, and it is not found in beasts themselves, in whom the image of nature continueth farre more entire. What follie, what rage is it, to make such commotions, to torment so many people, to runne thorow so many dangers and hazards both by sea and land, for a thing so vncertaine and doubtfull as the issue of warre, to runne with such greedinesse and fiercenesse after death, which is easily found euery where, and without hope of sepulture, to kill those he hates not, nor euer saw? But whence proceedeth this great furie and ardor, for it is not for any offence committed? What frensie and madnesse is this for a man to abandon his owne bodie, his time, his rest, his life, his libertie, and to leaue it to the mercy of another? to expose himselfe to the losse of his owne members,

bers, and to that which is a thousand times worse than death, fire and sword, to be troden, to be pinched with hot iron, to be cut, to be torne in pieces, broken, and put to the gallies for euer? And all this, to serue the passion of another, for a cause which a man knowes not to be iust, and which is commonly vniust: for warres are commonly vniust, and for him whom a man knowes not, who takes so little care for him that fights for him, that he will bee content to mount vpon his dead bodie to helpe his owne stature, that he may see the farther. I speake not heere of the duty of subiects towards their Prince and countrey, but of voluntaries and mercenarie souldiers.

*The first and last distinction and difference of men, drawn from the fauours and disfauours of Nature and Fortune.*

### THE PREFACE.

**T**HIS last distinction and difference is apparent enough and sufficiently knowen, and hath many members and considerations, but may all be reduced to two heads, which a man may call with the vulgar sort, Felicity or good fortune, and Infelicity or ill fortune, Greatnesse or littlenesse. To Felicity and greatnesse belong health, beautie, and the other goods of the body, liberty, nobility, honor, dignity, science, riches, credit, friends. To Infelicity or littlenesse belong all the contraries, which are priuations of the other good things. From these things doth arise a very great difference, because a man is happy in one of these, or in two, or in three, and not in the rest, and that more or lesse by infinite degrees: few or none at all are happie or vnhappie in them all. He that hath the greatest part of these goods, and especially three, Nobilitie, Dignitie, or Authoritie and riches, is accounted great; he that hath not any of these three, little. But many haue but one or two, and are accounted midlings betwixt the great and the little. We must speake a little of them all.

Of Health, beautie, and other naturall goods of the body *Chap. 11.*  
hath been spoken before; as likewise of their contraries, *Chap. 6.*  
Sicknesse, Griefe.

## CHAP. LVIII.

## Of Libertie and Seruitude.

**L**iberty is accounted by some a souereigne good, and Seruitude, an extreame euill, insomuch that many haue chosen rather to die a cruell death, than to be made slaue, or to see either the publicke good or their owne priuate indangered. But of this there may be too much, and of these too many, as of all other things. There is a twofolde libertie: the true, which is of the minde or spirit, and is in the power of euery one, and can not be taken away, nor indamaged by another, nor by Fortune it selfe: contrariwise, the seruitude of the spirit is the most miserable of all others, to serue our owne affections, to suffer our selues to be deuoured by our owne passions, to be led by opinions. ô pitifull captiuitie! The corporall libertie is a good greatly to be esteemed, but subiect to Fortune: and it is neither iust nor reasonable (if it be not by reason of some other circumstance) that it should bee preferred before life it selfe, as some of the ancients haue done, who haue rather made choice of death, than to lose it, and it was accounted a great vertue in them: so great an euill was seruitude thought to be: *Seruius obediencia est fracti animi & abiecti, arbitrio carentis suo.* Seruitude is the obedience of a base and abiect minde, which wanteth his due iudgement. Many great and wise men haue serued, *Regulus, Valerianus, Plato, Diogenes*, euen those that were wicked, and yet dishonoured not their owne condition, but continued in effect and truth more free than their masters.

## CHAP. LIX.

## Nobilitie.

<sup>I</sup>  
The description  
of nobility.

**N**obilitie is a qualitie euery where not common, but honourable, brought in and established with great reason and for publike vtilitie.

It is diuers, diuersly taken and vnderstood, and according to diuers nations and iudgements, it hath diuers kindes. According to the generall and common opinion and custome it

It is a qualitie of a race or stocke. *Aristotle* saith, that it is the antiquitie of a race and of riches. *Plutarch* calleth it the vertue of a race, *εὐγενείας*, meaning thereby a certaine habit and qualitie continued in the linage. What this qualitie or vertue is, all are not wholly of one accord, sauing in this, that it is profitable to the weale-publike. For, to some and the greater part this qualitie is military, to other it is politike, literarie of those that are wise, palatine of the officers of the Prince. But the militarie hath the aduantage aboue the rest: for besides the seruice which it yeeldeth to the weale-publike as the rest doe, it is painfull, laborious, dangerous; whereby it is accounted more worthy and commendable. So hath it carried with vs by excellencie the honourable title of Valour. There must then according to this opinion be two things in true and perfect nobilitie, profession of thir vertue, and qualitie profitable to the common-weale, which is as the forme; and the race as the subiect and matter, that is to say, a long continuance of this qualitie by many degrees and races, and time out of minde, whereby they are called in our language Gentlemen, that is to say, of a race, house, family, carying of long time the same name, and the same profession. For he is truly and entirely noble, who maketh a singular profession of publick vertue, seruing his Prince and Countrie, and being descended of parents and ancestors that haue done the same.

There are some that separate these two, and thinke that one of them sufficeth to true nobilitie, that is, either only vertue and qualitie, without any consideration of race or ancestors. This is a personall and acquired nobility, and considered with rigour it is rude, that one come from the house of a Butcher or Vintner should be held for noble, whatsoeuer seruice hee hath done for the Common-weale. Neuerthelesse, this opinion hath place in many nations, namely with the *Turkes*, contempters of ancient nobilitie, and esteeming of no other but personall, and actuall militarie valour; or only antiquity of race without profession of the quality; this is in the blood and purely naturall.

If a man should compare these two simple and imperfect nobilities together, that which is purely naturall (to iudge at right) it is the lesse, though many, out of their vanitie haue thought

3  
The distinction.

4  
Naturall nobi-  
ty.

though otherwise. The naturall is another mans qualitie, and not his owne, *Genus & prouos & que non facimus ipsi, vix ea nostra puto: nemo vixit in gloriam nostram; nec quod ante nos fuit, nostrum est.* I scarce account those things ours, which descend from our linage or ancestors, or any thing which we our selues haue not done; no man hath liued for our glory and renomme; Neither are we to account that ours which hath bene before vs. And what greater follie can there be, than to glory in that which is not his owne? This honor may light vpon a vitious man, a knaue, and one in himselfe a true villaine. It is also vnprofitable to another, for it communicareth not with any man, neither is any man bettered by it, as science, iustice, goodnesse, beautie, riches, doe. They that haue nothing else commendable in them but this nobility of flesh and blood, inake much of it, they haue it alwaies in their mouthes, it makes their cheekes swell and their heart too (they will be sure to manage that little good that they haue) it is the marke by which it is knowne, and a token that they haue nothing else in them, because they rest themselves wholly vpon that. But this is vanitie, for all their glorie springeth from fraile instruments, *Ab vtero, conceptu, partu, From the wombe, the conception, the birth,* and is buried vnder the toombe of their ancestors. As offenders being pursued haue recourse to altars and these pulchers of the dead, and in former times to the statutes of Emperours; so these men being destitute of all merit and subject of true honor, haue recourse to the memorie and armories of their ancestors. What good is it to a blind man, that his parents haue bene well sighted, or to him that stammereth, that his Grandfather was eloquent? and yet these kind of people are commonly glorious, high minded, contemners of others; *Contemptor animus & superbia commune nobilitatis malum. A contemptible & proud mind are common vices accompanying nobility.*

Salut.

5  
Acquired and  
per; onall honor.

The personall and acquired honor hath conditions altogether contrary and very good. It is proper to the possessor thereof, it is alwaies a worthy subiect, and profitable to others. Againe a man may say that it is more ancient and more rare, than the naturall, for by it the naturall began; and in a word, that is true honor which consisteth in good and profitable effects, not in dreames and imagination, vaine and vnprofitable,

profitable, and proceedeth from the spirit, not the blood, which is the same in noble men that is in others. *Quis generosus? ad virtutem à natura bene compositus animus facit nobilem, cui ex quacunque conditione supra fortunam licet surgere. Who is a gentleman? a mind well disposed to vertue maketh noble, who, upon what accident or condition former is able to raise it selfe above fortune.* Seneca.

But they are both oftentimes, and verie willingly together, and so they make a perfect honor: The naturall is a way and occasion to the personall; for things do easily returne to their first nature and beginning. As the naturall hath taken his beginning and essence from the personall, so it leadeth and conducteth his to it, *Fortes creantur fortibus: hoc vnum in nobilitate bonum, ut nobilibus imposita necessitudo videatur, ne à maiorum virtute degenerent; The valiant beget those that are valiant: this is the only good of nobilitie, that necessitie seemeth to be imposed on those that are noble, not to degenerate from the vertue of their ancestors.* To know that a man is sprung from honorable ancestors, and such as haue deserued well of the Common-weale, is a strong obligation and spurre to the honorable exploits of vertue. It is a foule thing to degenerate, and to belie a mans owne race. The nobilitie that is given by the bountie and letters patent of the Prince, if it haue no other reason, it is shamefull, and rather dishonorable than honorable. It is a nobilitie in parchment, bought with siluer or fauor, and not by blood as it ought, If it be given for merit, and notable seruices, it is personall and acquired as hath beene said. 6  
Naturall and acquired.

## CHAP. LX.

## Of Honor.

SOME say (but not so well) that honor is the prize and recompence of vertue, or not so ill, an acknowledgement of vertue, or a prerogative of a good opinion, and afterwards of an outward dutie towards vertue; It is a priuiledge that draweth his principall essence from vertue. Others haue called it the shadow of vertue, which sometimes followeth, sometimes goeth before it, as the shadow the bodie. But to speake truly, it is the rumor of a beautifull and vertuous action, which reboundeth 1  
The description of honor.

reboundeth from our soules to the view of the world, and by reflexion into our selues, bringing vnto vs a testimonie of that which others beleue of vs, which turneth to a great contentment of mind.

- 2 Honor is so much esteemed and sought for by all, that to attaine therunto a man enterpriseth, endureth, contemneth whatsoeuer besides, yea life it selfe; neuerthelesse, it is a matter of small and slender moment, vncertaine, a stranger, and as it were separated in the aire, from him that is honored; for it doth not only not enter into him, nor is inward and essentiall vnto him, but it doth not so much as touch him (being for the most part either dead or absent, and who feeleth nothing) but setleth it selfe and stayeth without at the gate, sticks in the name, which receiueth and carrieth all the honors and dishonors, praises and dispraises, wherby a man is said to haue either a good name or a bad. All the good or euil that a man can say of *Cesar* is caried by his name. Now the name is nothing of the nature and substance of the thing, it is only the image which presenteth it, the marke which distinguisheth it from others, a summarie which containeth it in a small volume, mounteth it, and carieth it whole and entire, the meane to enioy it and to vse it (for without the names there would bee nothing but confusion, the vse of things would be lost, the world would decay, as the historie of the tower of *Babel* doth richly teach vs) to be breefe, the stickler and middle of the essence of the thing, and the honor or dishonor thereof, for it is that that toucheth the thing it selfe, and receiueth all the good or ill that is spoken. Now honor before it ariue to the name of the thing, it goes a course almost circular, like the Sunne, performed and perfected in three principall sites or places, the action or worke, the heart, the tongue: for it begins and is conceived, as in the matrix and roote, in that beautie, goodnes, profit of the thing honored which comes to light and is produced, this is (as hath bene said) the rumor of a beautifull or honorable action. *Celi enarrant gloriam dei: pleni sunt celi & terra gloriatus. The heauens declare the glorie of God, the heauens and the earth are full of thy glorie* (for whatsoeuer valour worth and perfection the thing haue in it selfe and inwardly, if it produce nothing that



that is excellent, it is altogether vncapable of honor, and is as if it were not at all ) from thence it entreth into the spirit and vnderstanding, where it takes life, and is formed into a good, haucie, and great opinion : finally fallying foorth from thence, and being caried by the word verball or written, it returns by reflexion, and as it were, dissolueth and endeth in the name of the authour of this beautifull worke, where it had the beginning, as the Sunne in the place from whence it departed, and then it beares the name of honor, praise, glory, and renowme.

But the question is, what those actions are to which honor is due. Some thinke that it is generally due to those that performe their duty in that which belongs to their profession, although it be neither famous nor profitable, as he that vpon a Stage playes the part of a seruant, well, is no lesse commended than he that presenterh the person of a King, and he that cannot worke in statues of gold, cannot want those of leather or earth wherein he may as well shew the perfection of his arte. All cannot employ themselves, neither are they called to the managing of great affaires, but the commendation is to do that well, that he hath to doe. This is too much to lessen and vilifie honor, which is not a common and ordinarie ghest for all persons, and all iust and lawfull actions. Euery chalt woman, euery honest man is not honorable. The wisest men require also thereunto, two or three things, the one is difficultie, labor or danger, the other is publicke vtility, and this is the reason why it is properly due to those that administer, and well acquit themselves of great charges, that be the actions as priuatly and generally good and profitable as they will, they shall haue approbation and sufficient renowme with those that know them, and the safetie and protection of the lawes; but not honour, which is publicke, and hath more dignitie, fame, and splendor. Some adde vnto these a third, and that is, that it be not an action of obligation, but of supererogation.

The desire of honour and glorie, and the approbation of another, is a vitious, violent, powerfull passion, whereof we haue spoken in the passion of ambition, but very profitable

4

Desires of honor, chap. 20.

to

*Lib. 3. In the  
virtue of Tem-  
perancie.*

to the weale-publike, to containe men in their dotie, to awa-  
ken and inflame them to honourable actions, a testimonie of  
weaknesse and humane insufficiencie, which for want of good  
money vseth light and false coine. Now in what, and how  
far-foorth it is excusable, and when not commendable, and  
that honour is not the recompence of vertue, shall bee said  
heereafter.

*5  
Markes of honor.*

The markes of honour are very diuers, but the better and  
more beautifull are they that are without profit and gaine,  
and are such as a man may not straine, and applie to the viti-  
ous, and such as by some base office haue serued the weale-  
publike. These are the better and more esteemed: they are  
in themselves more vaine, that haue nothing of worth in  
them, but the simple marke of men of honour and vertue, as  
almost in all policies, crownes, lawrell garlands, oake, a cer-  
taine forme of accoutrements, the prerogative of some sur-  
name, precedence in assemblies, orders of Knighthood. And  
it falleth out sometimes, that it is a greater honor not to haue  
the marks of honour, hauing deserued them, than to make  
them. It is more honourable vnto me, sayd *Cato*, that every  
man should aske mee, why I haue not a statue erected in the  
Market-place, than they should aske why I haue it.

## CHAP. LXI.

### *Science.*

*See lib. 3.  
cap. 14.*

**S**cience, to say the trueth, is a beautifull ornament, a very  
profitable instrument to him that knowes well how to vse  
it; but in what ranke to place it, or how to prize it, all are not  
of one opinion: and therein they commit two contrary faults,  
some by esteeming it too much, some too little. Some make  
that account of it, that they preferre it before all other things,  
and think that it is a soueraigne good, some kinde and ray of  
Diuinitie, seeking it with greedinesse, charge and great la-  
bour; others contemne it, and despise those that professe it:  
the mediocritie betwixt both is the more iust and most alfu-  
red. For my part, I place it farre beneath honestie, sanctity,  
wisdom, vertue, yea beneath dexterity in affaires: and yet  
I dare

I dare to range it with dignity, naturall nobilitie, militarie valour, and I thinke they may very well dispute of the precedencie: and if I were called to speake my opinion, I should make it to march either side by side with them, or incontinently after. As sciences are different in their subiects and matters, in the apprenticeship and acquisition, so are they in their vtilitie, honestie, necessitie, as also in their gaine and glorie: some are Theoricks and in speculation only, others are practike and in action: againe, some are Reals, occupied in the knowledge of things that are without vs, whether they be naturall or supernaturall; other are particular, which teach the tongues to speake, and to reason. Now without all doubt, those sciences that haue most honestie, vtilitie, necessity, and least glory, vanitie, mercenarie gaine, are farre to be preferred before others. And therefore the practike are absolutely the better, which respect the good of man, teaching him to liue well, to die well, to command well, to obey well, and therefore they are diligently to be studied by him that endeuoureth to be wise: whereof this worke is a briebe and summarie, that is to say, Morall Science, Oeconomicall, Politicall. After these is Naturall, which serueth to the knowledge of whatsoeuer is in the world fit for our vse, as likewise to admire the greatnesse, goodnesse, wisdom, power of the chiefe workmatter. All other knowledges are vaine, and are to be studied curiosly, as appendents vnto these, because they are no wayes beneficiall to the life of man, and helpe not to make vs honest men. And therefore it is a losse and a follie to employ therein so much time, so much cost, so much labour as we doe. It is true that they serue to heape vp crownes, and to win reputation with the people, but it is in pollicies that are not wholly sound goods,

## CHAP. LXII.

*Of riches and povertie.*

These are the two sources and elements of all discords, troubles, and commotions that are in the world: for the excellie riches of some do stirre them vp to pride, to delicacies, pleasures, disdain of the poore; to enterprise and attempts.

Q

tempt:

tempt: the extreame poverty of others, prouokes them to enuie, extreame ieaousie, furie despaire, and to attempt for-  
times. *Plato* calleth them the plagues of a Common-wealth.  
But which of the two is the more dangerous, is not thorowly  
resolved amongst all. According to *Aristotle* it is abundance,  
for a State needs not doubt of those that desire but to liue, but  
of such as are ambitious and rich. According to *Plato* it is po-  
uertie, for desperate poore men are terrible and furious crea-  
tures; for wanting either bread or worke to exercise their arts  
and occupations, or too excessiue charged with imposts,  
they learne that of the mistresse of the schoole Necessitie,  
which of themselves they neuer durst to haue learned, and  
they dare, because their number is great. But yet there is a  
better remedie for them than for the rich, and it is an easie  
matter to hinder this euill; for so long as they haue bread and  
employment to exercise their mysteries, and liue, they will  
neuer stir. And therefore, the rich are to be feared for their  
ownefakes, their vice and condition: the poore, by reason of  
the imprudencie of gouernours.

2  
Against the  
quality & in-  
equality of  
riches.

Now, many Law-makers and great States-men haue gone  
about to take away these two extremities, and this great in-  
equality of goods and fortunes, and to bring in a mediocritie  
and equalitie, which they called the nourishing-mother of  
peace and amitie; and others likewise haue attempted to  
make all things common, which could neuer be but by ima-  
gination. But besides that, it is impossible to establish an e-  
qualitie, by reason of the number of children which increase  
in one familie, and not in another, and that it can hardly be  
put in practise, although a man be enforced, and it cost much  
to attaine thereunto. it were also inexpedient, and to small  
purpose, and by another way to fall into the same mischief: for  
there is no hatred more capitall than betwixt equals; the  
enuie and ieaousie of equals is the seminarie of troubles, se-  
ditions, and cruell warres. Inequality is good, so it be mode-  
rate. Harmonie consisteth not of like sounds, but different  
and well according.

*Nihil est aequalitate inequalius.*

*Nothing more unequal than equalitie.*

This great and deformed inequality of goods proceedeth  
from

from many causes, especially two: the one is from vniust  
 lones, as vsuries and interests, whereby the one eat the other,  
 and grow fat with the substance of another: *Qui deuorant ple-  
 bem sicut escam panis. Who deuoure the people as a morsell of bread.*  
 The other from dispositions, whether amongst the liuing, as  
 alienations, donations, endowments in mariages; or testa-  
 mentaries by reason of death. By both which meanes some  
 doe excessiue increase aboue others, who continue poore.  
 The heires of rich men marrie with those that are rich, where-  
 by some houses are dismembred and brought to nothing; &  
 others made rich and exalted. All which inconueniences  
 must be ruled and moderated by auoiding excessiue ex-  
 tremities, and in some sort approaching to some  
 mediocritie and reasonable equality: for to  
 haue either entire, is neither possible,  
 nor good nor expedient, as hath  
 bene said. And this shall  
 be handled in the ver-  
 tue of Iustice.

FINIS.

Q :





OF  
WISDOME,  
THE

SECOND BOOKE,

*Conteining the generall instructions and  
rules of Wisdome.*

THE PREFACE.

*Wherein is contained a generall portrait of Wisdome,  
and the summe of this Booke.*



Having in the First Booke layd open vnto man many and diuers meanes to know himselfe and our humane condition, which is the first part, and a great introduction to Wisdome, we are now to enter into the doctrine, and to vnderstand in this Second Booke the general rules and opinions thereof, reseruing the more particular to the Third and last Booke. It is worthiest consideration, and as a Preamble to the rest, to call man vnto himselfe, to taste, sound, studie himselfe, to the end he may know and vnderstand his defects and miserable condition, and so make himselfe capable of holtsome and necessarie remedies, which are the aduiselements and instructions of wisdome.

But it is a strange thing, that the world should take so little care of it owne good and amendment. What wit is it for a man to be vtterly carelesse that his businesse be well done?

Q 3

Man

Man would only liue, but he cares not to know how to liue well. That which a man should especially, and only know, is that which he knowes least, and cares least to know.

Our inclinations, delignments, studies, are (as we see) from our youth diuers, according to the diuersity of natures, companies, instructions, occasions, but there is not any that casteth his eyes to the other side, that indueth to make himselfe wise, not any that ruminateth hereupon, or that doth so much as thinke thereon. And if perhaps sometimes he do, it is but by chance, and as it were passing by, and he attendeth it, as newes that is told, which concerneth him not at all. The word pleaseth some well, but that is all, the thing it selfe is neither accounted of, nor sought for in this world of so vniuersall corruption and contagion. To vnderstand the merit and worth of wisdom, some kinde of aire or tincture of nature is necessarie, for men are willing to vse studie and induor, rather for those things that haue their effects and fruits glorious, outward, and sensible, such as ambition, auarice, passion haue, than for wisdom whose effects are sweet, darke, inward, and lesse visible.

O how much doth the world erre in this account, it loueth better the wind with noise, than the bodie it selfe, the essence without it, opinion and reputation, than verity! Man (as hath beene said in the first booke) is nothing but vanitie and miserie, vncapable of wisdom. Every man hath a taste of that aire which he breatheth, and where he liueth, followeth the traine and custome of liuing followed by all, how then should he aduise himselfe of any other? We follow the steps of another, yea we presse and inflame one another, we inuest our vices and passions one into another; no man stayes vs, or cries *hola* vnto it, so much do we faile and mistake our selues. We haue neede of some speciall fauour from heauen, and withall a great and generous force and constancy of nature to note that common error which no man findeth, in aduising and consulting of that which no man considereth, and resoluing our selues quite contrarie to the course of other men.

3

There are some though rare, I see them, I vnderstand them, I smell them with pleasure and admiration; but what, they are all *Democrites* or *Heracles*; the one sort do nothing but mock



mock and gibe, thinking they shew truth & wisdom enough in laughing at error and follie. They laugh at the world, for it is ridiculous, they are pleasant, but not good and charitable. The other are weake and poore, they speake with a low voice, their mouths halfe open, they disguise their language, they mingle and stuffe their propositions, to make them passe more currantlie, with so many other things, and with such arte, that they are hardly discerned. They speake not distinctly, clearly, assuredly, but doubtfully like oracles. I come after them and vnder them, but I speake in good sooth that which I thinke and beleene clearly and perspicuously.

I giue heere a picture, with certaine lessons of wisdom, which perhaps may seeme to some new and strange, and such as no man in former time hath giuen in such a fashion; and I doubt not but malicious people, who haue neither patience, nor power to iudge truly and wisely of things, maliciously condemne whatsoeuer agrees not with their palat, and with that which they haue already received. But that is all one, for who is he that can assure himselfe of the good opinion of all? But my hope is that the simple and debonaire, the Ætherian and sublime spirits will iudge indifferentlie. These are the two extremities and stages of peace and serenitie; In the middle are the troubles, tempests, and meteors, as hath bene said. Lib. 1.

To the end wee may haue some rude and generall knowledge of that which is handled in this booke, and the whole doctrine of wisdom, we may diuide this matter into foure points or considerations. The first are preparatiues to wisdom, which are two, the one an exemption and freedome from all that may hinder the attainment thereof, which are either the externall errorrs and vices of the world, or inward, as passions: the other is a plaine, entire, and vniuersall liberty of the mind. These two first, and the more difficult make a man capable and apt for wisdom, because they empty and cleanse the place, to the end it may be more ample & capable to receiue a thing of so great importance as wisdom is, *magna & spatiosa res est sapientia, vacuo illi loco opus est, superuacua ex animo tollenda sunt.* Great and spacious is wisdom, and had neede of large room: the minde must be freed from things superfluous.

The diuision of  
this B. 1. into  
4 parts.

1  
Preparations.

And this is the first. Afterwards they make him open, free, and alwaies ready to receiue it. This is the second.

2  
Foundations.

The second are foundations of wisdom, which are likewise two, true and essentiall probitie, and to haue a certaine end and course of life. These two respect nature, they rule and accomodate vs thereunto, the first to the vniuersall nature, which is reason; for probitie or honestie, as shall be said, is no other thing: the second to the particular of euery one of vs; for it is the choice of the kinde of life proper and fit for the nature of euery one.

3  
Offices.

The third belongs to the raising of this building, that is to say, offices and functions of wisdom, which are six, whereof the three first are principally for euery one in himselfe, which are pietie, inward gouernment of our desires and thoughts, and a sweet cariage in all accidents of prosperitie and adueritie: the other three respect another, which are such an obseruation as is necessarie of lawes, customes, and ceremonies, a sweet conuersation with another, and prudence in all affaires. These six do correspond and comprehend the foure morall vertues, the first, fourth, and fift do properly appertaine to Iustice, and to that which we owe to God and our neighbour; the second and third to *Fortitude* and *Temperance*, the sixt to *Prudence*. And therefore these six, are the matter and subiect of the third booke, which handleth at large the foure morall vertues, and in particular the offices & duties of a wise man, but in this booke they are handled in generall.

4  
Fruits.

The fourth, are the effects and fruits of wisdom, which are two, to be alwaies readie for death, and to maintaine a mans selfe in true tranquillity of spirit, the crowne of wisdom, and the soueraigne good.

These are in all twelve rules and lessons of wisdom, diuided into so many Chapters, which are the proper and peculiar foot-steps and offices of a wise man, which are not found elswhere. I meane in that sense wherein we take them, and now describe them: For although some of them, as honestly, the obseruation of the lawes, seeme to be found in others of the common and prophane sort, yet not such as wee heere require and decipher them to be. He then is wise, who mainteining

ning himfelfe truly free and noble, is directed in all things according to nature, accommodating his owne proper and particular to the vniuerfall, which is God, living and carying himfelfe before God, with all, and in all affaires, ypright, conftant, cheerefull, content, and affured, attending with one and the fame foote, all things that may happen, and laftly, death it felfe.

## C H A P. I.

*Exemption and freedome from errors and the vices  
of the world, and from paffions. The firft  
difpofition to Wifdome.*

**I**T is heere neceffarie for the firft leffon and inftitution vnto wifdome; to put the knowledge of our felues and our humane condition, for the firft in every thing, is well to know the fubieft, wherewith a man hath to do, and which he handleth and manageth to bring to perfection. But we hold that to be alreadie done, for it is the fubieft of our firft booke. We can only fay heere, as a fummary repetition of all that hath beene fpoken; that a man aspiring vnto wifdome, fhould about all things, and before all other workes, fufficiently know himfelfe, and all men befides. This is the true fciencie of man, very profitable, a matter of great ftudy, fruit, and efficacie, for man is all in all: It is proper to a wife man; for, only he that is wife knowes himfelfe, and hee that knowes himfelfe well is wife. It is very difficult, for a man is extreamly counterfeited and difguifed, not only man with man, but euery man with himfelfe. Euery one takes a delight to deceiue himfelfe, to hide, to rob, to betray himfelfe, *Ipsinobis furto subducimur*, flattering and tiding himfelfe to make himfelfe laugh, extenuating his defects, fetting a high price of whatfoeuer is good in himfelfe, winking of purpofe left hee fhould too clearely fee himfelfe: It is very rare and fought for by a few, and therefore no maruell if wifdome be fo rare, for they are very few that doe well know this firft leffon, or that do ftudie it; there is not a man that is mafter to himfelfe, much leffe to another. In things not neceffarie and ftrange, there are many mafters, many difciples. In this point, we are neuer with, nor within our felues, we alwaies mufe of outward things, and man bet-

ter

ter knoweth all things than himselfe. O miserie, O madnesse! To be wise in this point, it is necessarie that we know all sorts of men, of all aires, climats, natures, ages, estates, professions, (to this end serues the trauelier and the historie) their motions, inclinations, actions, not only publicke, (they are least to be regarded, being all fained and artificiall) but priuate, and especially the more simple and peculiar, such as arise from their proper and naturall iurisdiction; as likewise all those that concerne them particularly, for in these two their nature is discovered: afterwards that we conferre them all together to make an entire body and vniuersall iudgement; but especially that we enter into ourselues, taste and attentiuely sound our selues, examine euery thought, word, action. Doubtlesse we shall in the end learne, that man is in truth on the one side a poore, weake, pittfull, and miserable thing, and we cannot but pitie him; and on the other, we shall find him swollen and puffed vp with wind, presumption, pride, desires, and we cannot but disdain and detest him. Now he hath bene sufficiently deciphered and presented vnto vs euen to the life, in the first booke, by diuers meanes, in all senses, and according to all his visages: and this is the reason why we speake no more of this knowledge of man; and of our selues in this place; but we set downe heere for the first rule of wisdom the fruit of this knowledge, to the end, that the end and fruit of the first booke might be the beginning and entrance of the second. This fruit is to defend and preserue men from the contagion of the world and of themselves, these are the two euils and formall hindrances of wisdom, the one outward, as popular opinions & vices, the generall corruption of the world; the other inward, that is, our passions. Now we are to see how difficult this is, and how a man may defend himselfe against thesetwo. Wisdom is difficult and rare, and the greatest, yea almost the only endeouour that we haue to attaine vnto it, is to set at libertie, & to free our selues from that miserable double captiuitie, publick and domesticall, of another and of our selues: this being attained, the rest will be ealie. Let vs speake of these two euils distinctly and apart.

2

*Exemption of  
vulgar errors.*

As concerning the outward, we haue before sufficiently displayed the vulgar nature, the strange humors of the world,  
and

and the common sort of people, whereby it is easie enough to know what can proceed from them ; for since they are worshippers of vanitie, enuious, malicious, vniust, without iudgement, discretion, mediocritie, what can they deliberat, thinke, iudge, resolue, speake, doe well and iustlie ? We haue likewise as it were by example reported and quoted (in presenting the miserie of mankind) many great faults, which the world doth generally commit in iudgement and will, whereby it is easie to know, that it is wholly composed of error and vice, wherevnto all the sayings of the wisest in the world do accord, affirming, that the worse part is the greater : of a thousand there is not one good ; the number of fooles are infinit, and contagion is most dangerous in a prease.

And therefore they counsell vs not only to preferue our selues neare and cleare from popular opinions, designments, and affections, as being all base, feeble, indigested, impertinent, and very often false, at the least imperfect : but also to stea aboute all things the multitude, the companie and conversation of the vulgar sort, because a man cannot approach neere vnto it without some losse and empeachment. The frequentation of the people is contagious and very dangerous euen to the wisest and best settled men that are : for who is able to withstand the force and charge of vices comming with so great a troope ? One example of couetousnesse or incontinency doth much harme. The company of one delicate effeminate person, doth soften and make nice by little and little those that liue with him. One rich neighbour giues light and life to our couetousnesse. One dissolute person worketh (if I may so say) and applieth his vice, like rust into the neatest and purest mindes. What then can we looke for from such maners, after which the world runneth, as it were with a loose bridle ?

But what ? it is very rare and difficult so to doe. It is a plausible thing, and that hath great appearance of goodnes and iustice, to follow the way approued by all ; the great beaten way doth easily deceiue, *lata est via ad mortem, & multi per eam; mundus in maligno posuit: Broad is the way to death, & many walk therein; The world is giuen to wickednes* : we go one after another like beasts for cōpany; we neuer diue into the reason, the merit, the

the equitie of the cause; we follow examples and customes, and as it were of enuie and emulation, we stumble, and fall one vpon another; we throng one another, and draw every one to a head-long downe-fall. We borrow our owne ouerthrow, and perish vpon credit, *Alienis perimus exemplis. We perish by other mens example.* Now he that would be wise, must alwaies suspect whatsoeuer pleaseth, and is approved by the people, by the greater number, and must looke into that that is true and good in it selfe, and not into that which seemeth to them, and that is most vsed and frequented, and not suffer himselfe to be cunny-catcht and carried by the multitude, which should not be accounted but for one, *Vnus mihi pro populo, & populus pro vno.* One is to mee for the people, and the people for one. And when to stop his mouth, and to beate him downe at a blow it shall be said, that the whole world saith it, beleeueth it, doth it; he must say in his heart, it is so much the worse, it is but a simple and a wicked caution; I esteeme it the lesse, because the world esteemes it so much; like wife *Phocion*, who seeing the people highly to applaud something which he had spoken, turned to his friends that stood by him, and said vnto them, Hath any follie vnwitting to my selfe escaped my mouth, or any loose or wicked word; that all this people doe so approue me? *Quis placere potest populo, cui placet virtus? malis artibus queritur popularis fauor.* Who is he to whom vertue is pleasing, that can please the people? The fauour of the people is attained by ill meanes. We must then as much as is possible flie the haunt and companie of the sottish, illiterate, ill-composed people; but aboue all preserve our selues from their iudgements, opinions, vitious behauiour; and without any stirre keepe alwayes our owne thoughts apart by themselues: *Quod scio non probat populus. quod probat populus agnosco: Sapient non respicit quod homines indicent; non it quâ populus, sed ut sile, et mundi contrarium iter intendant; ita hac aduersus opiniones omnium vadit: What I know the people allowe not: what the people allow, I know not: A wise man respecteth not what men iudge of him; He goes not the same way with the people; but at the farres runne a contrarie course to the world, so he to the opinions of all men.* Remaining in the world, without being of the world, like the kidneis couered with fat, but haue none them-  
selues

selues: *Non estis de mundo, ideo odit vos mundus: odi prophannum vulgus & arceus.* You are not of the world the world: therefore hateth you. The profane multitude I both hate and abandon. This is that solitarinesse so much commended by the wise, which is to disburthen the soule of all vices and popular opinions, and to free it from this confusion and captiuitie, to draw it to it selfe, and to set it at libertie.

The other euill and hinderance to wisdom, which a man must carefullie auoid, and which is inward, and therefore the more dangerous, is the confusion and captiuitie of his passions, and turbulent affections, whereof he must disfurnish and free himselfe, to the end he may be emptie and neate, like a white paper, and be made a subiect more fit to receiue the tincture and impressions of wisdom, against which the passions do formallie oppose themselves: and therefore the wisest were wont to say, that it was impossible euen for *Iupiter* himselfe to loue, to be in choler, to be touched with any passion, and to be wise at one time. Wisdom is a regular managing of our soule with measure and proportion: It is an equabilitie, and sweet harmonie of our iudgements, wills, manners, a constant health of our minde; whereas the passions are contrariwise but the furious reboundings, accessions and recessions of follie, violent and rash sallies and motions.

<sup>5</sup>  
The second part  
exemption of  
passions.

We haue sufficiently deciphered the passions in the first booke; and sayd enough to bring vs into horror and detestation of them: the generall meanes and remedies to overcome them (for the particular in every one are in the third booke, in the vertue of fortitude and temperancie) are many and different; good and euill. And not to speake of that goodnelle and felicitie of nature, so well tempered and seasoned, that it maketh vs calme and cleare, exempt and quit from strong passions and violent motions, and keepeth vs in good case, equall, vnited, firme, and as strong as Steele against the assault of our passions, a thing very rare; for this is not a remedie against this euill, but an exemption of euill, and health it selfe: but of the remedies against them we may note foure.

<sup>6</sup>  
Generall remedies  
against the  
passions.

The first, improper and by no meanes commendable, is a kind of stupiditie and insensiblenes in not perceiuing and apprehending of things, a brutish pampering foode of base mindes,

<sup>7</sup>  
Stupiditie.



minds, or such as haue their apprehension wholly dulled, a spiritual leprosie, which seemeth to haue some shew of health, but it hath not; for it is not possible there should be wisdom and constancie, where there is not knowledge and vnderstanding, and emploiment in affaires: so that it is only a complexion, and not a vertue. This is not to feele the disease, and therefore not to cure it: neuerthelesse this estate is nothing so bad, as to know, and feele, and vnderstand, and yet to suffer himselfe to be gulled and ouercome:

— *Præterea delirus inersq̃, videri,  
Dum mea delectent mala me, vel denique fallant,  
Quam sapere & ringi. —*  
*I better like, a dull foole you conceiue me,  
So as my follies please me, you deccine me,  
Than to be wise, and wrong'd (if you belceue me.*

8

Counterpassion.

The second remedie is little better than the euill it selfe, but yet more in vse, that is, when a man conquereth and extinguisheth one passion by a stronger than it: for passions are neuer of equall force, but there is alwayes one or other (as in the humors of the bodie) which is the predominant, which ruleth and deuoureth the rest; and we attribute many times very vntuly that vnto vertue and wisdom which ariseth from passion: but yet it is enough in these men, when those passions that beare sway in them, are not of the worst.

9

Precaution.

The third remedie and good (though it be not the best) is wise and artificiall, whereby a man auoideth, flieth, and hideth himselfe from all such accidents whatsoever, as may stirre, awaken, or kinde his passions. This is a kind of studie and Art, whereby a man prepareth himselfe before the occasions, in diuerting of euils, and prouiding that he feele them not; like that King who brake a beautifull and rich cup that one gaue him, to take away in a good houre all matter of brawle and anger that might happen about it. The praier of these kinde of people is, *No nos induas in tentationem: Leade vs not into temptationem.* By this remedie, hee that sets himselfe forward to the sport, sports not himselfe; men of honour, prompt and cholericke, shie contentions, altercations, and stay themselves at the first onset and occasion of passion. For when a man is once entred, it is no easie matter to carrie him-  
(selfe



selfe wisely and discretely: We guide our affaires in the beginning, and hold them at our mercie, but after they are once a-foot and thorowly heated, they guide and carrie vs. Passions are farre more easily auoided than moderated, *exiunduntur animo facilius quam temperantur*, because all things are in their first birth feeble and tender. In their weaknesse wee discover not the danger, and in their full growth and strength wee know not how to withstand them; as we may see in diuers, who easily and lightly enter into quarrels, and law, and contentions, but are afterwards enforced to get out as they can, with shame enough, and to come to any agreement, be it neuer so base and dishonorable, yea, to seeke false interpretations, to belie themselves, to betray their owne hearts, to plaster and couer the fact, which are all remedies a hundred times worse than the euill they goe about to heale; *melius non incipient, quam desinunt*: They shall not beginne better, than they end: from the want of wisdom they fall into want of heart: This is contrary to that saying of Bias, Enterprise coldly, pursue ardently. It is like foolery, who out of a vitious shame are easily perswaded to agree to whatsoeuer a man demands, and as easily flie from their words, and reuoke that they haue spoken. We must therefore in all our affaires and commerce with men, from the beginning be prudent and aduised.

The fourth and best remedie of all, is a liuely vertue, resolution, and constancie of the mind, whereby a man seeth and confronteth all accidents without trouble, he wrestleth and entreth into combat with them. It is a valiant, noble, and glorious impassibilitie, quite contrary to the first which we haue spoken of, base stupiditie. Now, to forme it, and to attaine vnto it, there is nothing more necessarie than a precedent discourse. Discourse is the master of our passions, premeditation is that which giueth the temper to the soule, and makes it hard and steellie and impenetrable against whatsoeuer would wound, or hurt it. The proper meanes to appease and sweeten these passions, is, to know them well, to examine, to iudge what power they haue ouer vs, and we ouer them. But aboue all, the soueraigne remedie is to belecue, and not to suffer himselfe to be carried with opinion, which is that which cherisheth and kindleth our passions, and is (as hath bin said) false, foolish,

10  
Vertus.

foolish, inconstant, and vncertaine, the guide of fooles and the vulgar sort; but to suffer himselfe to be sweetly led by reason and nature, which is the guide of the wiser sort, ripe, solid, and settled. But heereof, heereafter more at large.

13  
Presumption.

But aboute all other passions, it is necessary that we do carefully gard and defend our selues from that selfeloue presumption, and foolish dotage of our selues, the plague of mankind the capitall enemye of wisdom, the true gangrene and corruption of the soule, whereby wee adore our selues, and rest contented with our selues, we harken to none other, and beleue none other but our selues. Now we should know that we are not in greater danger in the hands of any, than of our selues. It is an excellent motto originally come from the Spanish tongue, *O God keepe my selfe, from my selfe*. This presumption and foolish loue of our selues, proceedes from the ignorance wee haue of our selues, of our weaknesse; and that little that is in vs, not only in generall of the infirmities and misery of mankind; but also of our own proper and personall imperfections: but whosoever he be that hath the least graine or touch of this follie, shall neuer attaine vnto wisdom. Faith, modestie, a hartie and serious acknowledgement of that little that we haue, is a great testimonie of a good and sound iudgement, of a right will, and is an excellent disposition vnto wisdom.

## CHAP. II.

*A vniuersall and plaine libertie of spirit both in iudgement and will, the second disposition to Wisdom.*

**T**He other disposition vnto Wisdom, which followeth the first (which doth quit vs from this outward and inward captiuitie and confusion, popular and passionate) is a plaine, entire, generous, and lord-like liberty of the minde, which is two-fold, that is to say, of iudgement, and will.

1 The first  
part, liberty of  
iudgement.

The first, of iudgement, consisteth in the consideration, iudgement, examination of all things, and in not tying himselfe to any one, but remaining free in himselfe, vniuersall, ready, and open for all. And this is the highest point, the proper

per law and true priuiledge of a wife and actiue man. But few they are that will vnderstand it, and acknowledge it, fewer that practise it as they should : and this is the reason why wee must heere establish it, against such as are incapable of wisdom. And first, to auoid all miscountings, wee explaine the words, & giue the sense. There are heere three things which maintaine, cause, and conserue one the other, that is, to iudge of all things, not to bee married or bound to any, to continue open and readie for all. When I say to iudge, my meaning is not to resolve, affirme, determine : this were contrarie to the second, which is, not to bind our selues to any thing; but it is to examine, and weigh the reasons and counter-reasons on all parts, the weight and merit of them, and thereby worke out the truth. So likewise not to bind our selues to any thing, is not to settle our selues, and to remaine short of that we should, bleating in the aire, and to cease our indeuors, and to proceed in our necessary actions and deliberations : For I will that in all outward and common actions of our life, and in whatsoeuer is ordinarily vsed, a man should agree and accomodate himselfe to the common sort ; for our rule extendeth not it selfe to that which is outward, and to the action, but to that which is within, the thought, and secret, and inward iudgement : yea and therein likewise I consent, that a man settle and applie himselfe to that which seemeth most agreeable to the truth, most honest and profitable ; but yet that it bee without determination, resolution, affirmation, or condemnation of contrary or diuers iudgements, old, or new, but alwaies to hold himselfe readie to entertaine better if it appeare, yea not to be offended, if another shall contest with him against that which he thinketh better, but rather desire to heare what may be said ; for this is the meane, to exercise the first, which is to iudge, and alwaies to enter into the search of the truth. These three I say, doe maintaine and conserue one the other, for he that iudgeth well, and without passion of all things, findeth in euery thing appearances of reason, which hinder his resolution, whereby hee feareth to settle his iudgement, and so remaineth vndetermined, indifferent, and vniuersall : whereas contrariwise, he that resolueth, iudgeth no more, but setteth and resteth himselfe vpon that which he holdeth, and so

R

makes

*In the name of god among the holies & righteous  
of the Church of Christ in the country of  
Glasgow in being of the second body*

makes himsele a partaker and a particular. To the former fooles, simple and weake people are contrarie: to the second, obstinate opinatiue affirmers: to the third, both of them, which are particulars: but all three are practised by the wise, modest, discret, and temperate searcher of the truth and true Philosophie. It remaineth for the explication of this our proposition, that I let you know, that by all things, and some thing (for it is sayd, to iudge of all things, not to be assured of any) we vnderstand not those diuine verities which haue bin reuealed vnto vs, which we are to receiue simplie with all humilitie and submission, and without all controuersie and discussion, subnit our selues, and captiuate our minds therunto, *captiuantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei*, Submitting our vnderstanding to the obedience of faith: but wee vnderstand heereby all other things without exception. This simple explication would be sufficient perhaps to perswade an indifferent spirit to receiue this rule of wisdom; but I see and perceiue a sort of people, glorious, affirmatiue, which would rule the world, and command it as it were with a rod and as others in former times haue sworne to certaine principles, and married themselves to certaine opinions, so they would that all others should do the like, whereby they oppose themselves to this noble liberty of the spirit. It shall be necesserie therefore to establish it more ample, and by order to confirme and handle these three points and members thereof.

2  
The first is  
to iudge of all.

The first is to iudge of all. It is the property of a wise and spirituall man; faith one of the first and wisest of the world, *Spiritualis omnia diiudicat, & à nemine iudicatur*: The spirituall man iudgeth all, and is iudged of none. The true office of man, his most proper and naturall exercise, his worthiest profession is to iudge. Why is he a man discoursing, reasoning, vnderstanding? Why hath he a spirit, to build (as they say) castles in the aire, and to feede himsele with fooleries and vanities, as the greatest part of the world doth? *Quis unquam oculos tenebrarum causâ habuit?* Who euer had eyes, not to see in darkness? No doubtlesse, but to vnderstand, to iudge of all things, and therefore hee is called the gouernour, the superintendent, the keeper of nature, of the world, of the works of God. To goe about to depriue him of this right, is to make him no  
more

more a man, but a beast; to doe it singularly, excellently, is the part of a wise man; if not to iudge, hurts the simple and proper nature of man, what shall it doe in a wise man, who is as farre about the common sort of men, as a common man is about beasts? It is then strange that so many men (I speake not of idiots, & the weaker sort, who haue not the facultie and meane to exercise it) who either are, or make shew of vnderstanding and sufficiencie, deprive themselues willingly of this right and authority so naturall, so iust, and excellent, who without the examining or iudging of any thing, receiue and approue whatsoever is presented, either because it hath a faire semblance & appearance, or because it is in authority, credit, and practise; yea, they thinke that it is not lawfull to examin or doubt of any thing, in such sort doe they debase & degrade themselues: they are forward and glorious in other things, but in this, they are fearefull and submitte, though it do iustly appertaine vnto them, and with so much reason. Since there are a thousand lies for one truth, a thousand opinions of one and the same thing, and but one that is true, why should not I examin with the instrument of reason, which is the better, the truer, the more reasonable, honest, and profitable? Is it possible that amongst so many laws, customes, opinions, different maners, and contrary to ours, as there are in the world, there are none good but ours? Hath all the world besides bene mistaken? Who dares to say so, and who doubteth but others say as much of ours, and that he that thus condemneth others, if he had been there borne and brought vp, would thinke them better, and prefer them before those he now accounteth the only good, and all because he hath been accustomed vnto them? To conclude, to him that shall be so foole hardy to say it, I doe answer, that this rule shall at the least be good for all others, to the end that they iudging and examining all, may finde ours to be the better. Go to then, the wise man shall iudge of all, nothing shall escape him which he bringeth not to the barre, and to the ballance. It is to play the part of prophane men and beasts, to suffer themselues to be lead like oxen. I will that men liue, & speake, and do, as others, and the common sort doe; but not that they iudge like the common sort, but iudge them. What can a wise

man, or a holie man haue about a prophane, if he must haue his spirit, his mind, his principall and heroicall parte a slave to the vulgar sort? The publicke and common should content it selfe, if a man conforme himselfe thereunto in all apparent things; what hath it to do with our inside, our thoughts, and iudgements? They shall gouerne as long as they will my hand, my tongue, but not my spirit, for that, by their leaue, hath another master. It is a hard thing to bridle the libertie of the spirit, and if a man would do it, it is the greatest tyrannie that may be: a wise man will take heed thereof actively and passively, will maintaine himselfe in his liberty, and not trouble that of other men.

3  
The effect of  
this first treatise.  
A wise man one  
within, another  
without.

Now a wise man enioying this his right to iudge and examine all things, it many times comes to passe, that the iudgement and the hand, the minde and the body, contradict one another, and that he will carie himselfe outwardly after one maner, and iudge inwardly after another, will play one part before the world, and another in his mind, which he must do to preferue equitie and iustice in all. That generall saying, *vniversus mundus exerceat histrioniam*, All the world caries two faces in one head, should properly and truly be vnderstood of a wise man, who is another man within, than he outwardly shewes. If he were without such as he is within, he should not be accounted of, but in all things offend the world: If he were within such as without, he should be no more a wise man, hee should iudge amisse, be corrupted in his mind. He must doe, and carie himselfe outwardly, for publicke reuerence, and so as he offend no man, according to the law, custome, and ceremonie of the countrey, and inwardly iudge of the truth as it is, according to the vniuersall reason, whereby it many times comes to passe that he condemneth that which outwardly he doth. *Sapiens faciet quæ non probabit, ut ad maiora transitum inuenias, nec relinquet bonos mores, sed semper aptabit omnia quæ imperiti faciunt, et luxuriosi, faciet, sed non eodem modo nec eodem proposito, multa sapientes faciunt quæ homines sunt, non quæ sapientes.* A wise man will doe that which himselfe will not allow, to make way unto greater matters thereby: neither will he forsake good maners, but accommodate all things to the time; what unskillfull and dissolute persons doe, that will he doe, but not in the same manner

maner, or to the same purpose. Many things wise men doe as they are men, but not as wise men. He will carie himselfe in things and actions, as Cicero in words, who said, I leaue the vse or custome of speech to the people, and obserue the true science and knowledge of words, *Loquendum & extra viuendum ut multi, sapiendum ut pauci.* We must speake and carie our selues outwardly as the greater number, and be wise with the smaller. Some few examples heereof, and first of things of lesse moment. In all humilitie I take off my hat, and keepe my head vncouered before my superior, for so doth the custome of my cuntry require; but yet I will not leaue to iudge, that the custome of the East is farre better, to salute and do reuerence, by laying the hand vpon the brest, without vncouering the head, to the preiudice of our health, and other inconueniences. Contrariwise, if I were in the East, I would take my repast, sitting vpon the earth, or leaning on the elbow, or halfe lying looking vpon the table side-ways as they doe there, and as our Sauour with his Apostles did vse to doe, *recumbentibus, discumbentibus*: and yet I would not cease to iudge, that the maner of sitting upright at table, our faces towards it, as the custome is heere, is more honest, more fit, and commodious. These examples are of small weight, and there are a thousand the like: let vs take another of better importance. I will and I yeeld my consent that the dead bee interred and left to the mercie of the worme, of rottenesse and stench, because it is now the common custome almost euery-where; but yet I will not cease to iudge, that the ancient manner of burning them, and gathering their ashes together, is more noble and more neate, to commit and commend them to the fire, the excellentest element, enemie to putrefaction and stench, neighbour to heauen it selfe, a signe of immortalitie, a shadow of the diuinity, and whereof the vse is proper and peculiar vnto man, rather than to the earth, which is the ordure, lees, dregs of the elements, the sinke of the world, the mother of corruption, and to the wormes which is the extreamest ignominie and horror, and so to couple and handle alike a man and a beast. Religion it selfe teacheth and commandeth to dispose after this maner of all things, as of the Paschall lamb which might not be eaten, and (where popery beareth sway)



the consecrated host, and diuers the like, why then should not the like respect be had of our bodies? What can a man doe that is more dishonorable to the bodie, than to cast it into the earth there to corrupt? It seemeth to me to be the vttermoſt punishment that can be inflicted vpon infamous persons and hainous offenders, and that the carcases of honest and honorable men should be handled with better respect. Doubtlesse of all the maners in disposing of dead bodies, which may bee reduced to fīue, that is, to commit them to the foure elements, and the bowels of wilde beasts, the vilest, and basest, and most shamefull is to interre them, the most noble and honorable to burn them. Againe, I will and consent, that this my Wife man in things naturall be modest, that hee hide and couer those parts and actions that are called shamefull, dishonorable; and he that should doe otherwise, I would detest, and thinke hardly of him, because it is almost the custome of the whole world; but yet I will neuertheless that hee iudge that simply in themselves, and according to nature, they are no more shamefull than the nose or the mouth, to drinke and to eat: Nature, that is, God, hauing made nothing shamefull, but it is for another cause, not from nature, that is to say, from the enemy of nature, which is sinne. Diuinitie also more chaste than Philosophie telleth vs, that in entire nature, not yet altered by the sinne of man, these parts and actions were not shamefull, for then shame was not, it is the enemy of nature, the fruit of sinne. I consent to apparell my selfe like those of my cōuntry and profession, and if I had bene borne in those countries where they go naked, I would haue gone so too: but yet I cease not to iudge, that neither of the two fashions is very good; and if I were to chuse, and ordaine, I would chuse a fashion indifferent betwixt both, out of those countries where they couer themselves with one onely and simple couering. light and easie enough, without fashion, or cost; for our maner of attiring is not good, yea worse than to goe naked, to be so fast wrapped and bound, with such a multitude and varietie of couerings of diuers stufes, euen to the number of foure, fīue, six, one vpon another, and whereof some are double, that they hold vs prest and packt vp with so many ties, binding, butnings (not to speake of that dissolute and  
abominable



abominable excesse condemned by all good lawes) that wee can hardly stirre our selues in them. I will content my selfe with these examples. The selfesame a man may say of all lawes, customes, maners, and of that which is *de facto*, and much more of opinions, and that which is *de iure*.

If any man shall say that I haue iudged amisse in these examples, and that generally, if libertie be giuen to iudge of all things, the spirit will wander and lose it selfe, filling and furnishing it selfe with follies and false opinions; I answer to the first, which toucheth me in particular, that it is very easie to erre in finding the truth in all these instances, and yet it is overboldnesse to accuse any man; for it is as much as if hee should say, that a man knowes where and what the truth is in things, which who can perfectly know or iudge of? Now not to finde the truth, is not to iudge amisse; to iudge amisse, is to weigh, and ballance, and compare amisse, that is to say, not to examine the reasons, and to ponder them according to the first and vniuersall nature, (both which though a man doe, yet it followeth not that he must needs finde out the truth.) Now I beleue nothing that is but simply affirmed, if it be not likewise proued; but if any man by contrary reasons more strong and forcible shall make good what he saith, of all others hee is the welcomest man vnto me, and the man I looke for; for oppositions and contradictions well vrged, and with reason, are the true meanes to exercise this iudging office. I had neuer set downe these opinions, but that I looked that some one or other should abrogate them, and helpe me to better, and to answer more effectually, and to that generall obiection of the danger that there is in this libertie, besides that which hath been spoken, and shall more expressly bee said in the third lesson of Wisdome and Chapter following, that the rule which we ought to hold in iudging, and in all things is nature, naturall and vniuersall reason, following which a man can neuer erre. See heere the other member of this iudicious libertie which we are about to handle, which will furnish vs with a remedie against this pretended danger.

The other point of this lord-like libertie of spirit, is an indifferencie of taste, and a deferring of a settled resolution, whereby a wise man considering coldly and without passion

4  
An obiection.

5  
2 Not to bind  
our selves to any  
thing.

all things, as is said, is not obstinate, doth not sweare, tye, bind himselfe to any opinion, keeping himselfe alwaies readie to receiue the truth, or that which seemes to him to haue best semblance of truth; and saying in his inward and secret iudgement, that which our ancients were wont to say in their outward and publicke, *Ita videatur*, it seemeth so, there is great appearence of truth on this side; and if any man do contradict and oppose himselfe, with patience he is ready to vnderstand the contrarie reasons and to receiue them finding them more strong & better; and when he hath heard what he can heare, he still thinketh that either there is, or may be better, though as yet it appeareth not. This dilation and putting off of a mans iudgement is founded first vpon those propolitions so much celebrated among the wise, That there is nothing certaine, that we know nothing, that there is nothing in nature but doubt, nothing certaine but incertainty, *Solum certum, nihil esse certi, hoc unum scio, quod nihil scio*; The only thing certaine, is, that nothing is certaine, this one thing know I, that I know nothing; That of all things a man may dispute alike, that we do nothing but search, enquire, and grope after appearances, *Scimus nihil, opinamur versimilia*; We know nothing, and imagine likelihoods; That verity is not a thing of our owne inuention & purchase, and when it yeelds it selfe into our hands, we haue nothing in our selues whereby we may challenge it, possesse it, or assure our selues of it; That truth and falshood enter into vs by one and the same gate, and there hold the same place and credit, and maintaine themselves by the same meanes; That there is no opinion held by all, or currant in all places, none that is not debated and disputed, that hath not another held and maintained quite contrarie vnto it; That all things haue two handles and two visages, and there is reason for all, and there is not any that hath not his contrarie, it is of lead, it turneth and accommodateth it selfe to whatsoever a man will haue it: To be short, it is the doctrine and practise of all the wisest, greatest, and most noble Philosophers, who haue made profession of ignorance, doubting, enquiring, searching. Others notwithstanding they haue beene dogmatists, and affirmers, yet it hath beene of gestures and words only, and that to shew how far they could wade in the purchase and search

of

of the truth, *Quam docti fingunt magis quam norunt*, Which the learned doe rather faigne, then follow, giuing vnto all things no other nor stronger title, than probabilie and true likelihood, and handling them diuersly, sometimes with one visage and in one sense, sometimes in another, by problematicall questions, rather enquiring than instructing, and many times shewing that they speake not in earnest, but in sport and for exercise, *Non tam id sensisse quod dicerent, quam exercere ingenia materie difficultate voluisse videntur*. They will seeme not so much to thinke what they say, as to exercise their wittes with the difficultie of the matter. And who will belecue that it was the purpose of *Plato* to tie men to his Common-wealth and his Ideas, of *Pythagoras* to his numbers, of *Epicurus* to his Atomes, or to giue them for currant coine? They tooke pleasure to solace their spirits with pleasant and subtile inuentions, *Que ex ingenio finguntur, non ex scientia vi*. Which they rather faigne wittely, than know skilfully. Sometimes likewise they haue studied after difficulty, to couer the vanity of their subiect, and to employ the curiositie of their spirits, And *Aristotle* the most resolute of all the rest, the prince of dogmatists, and peremptorie affirmers, the god of pedanties, how often hath he been crost in his opinions, not knowing what to resolute in that point of the soule, wherein he is almost alwaies vnlike to himselfe, and in many other things more base, which he knew not how to finde or vnderstand, ingeniously confessing sometimes the great weakenes of man in finding and knowing the truth.

They that haue come after, of a pedanticall and presumptuous spirit, who make *Aristotle* and others say what they please, and are more obstinate in their opinions than euer they were, disauowing those for disciples that faint in their opinions, hate & arrogantly condemne this rule of wisdom, this modestie, and academicall stayednes, glorying in their obstinate opinions, whether they be right or wrong, louing better a heady froward affirmer against their owne opinions, and against whom they may exercise their wit and skill, than a modest peaceable man, who doubteth and maketh stay of his iudgement, against whom their wits are dulled, that is to say, a foole than a wise man; like to women, who loue better to be contradicted, euen with iniurie, than that a man either  
out

out of the coldnes of his nature, or contempt should say nothing to them, whereby they imagine they are either scorned or condemned, wherein they shew their iniquity. For why should it not be as lawfull to doubt, and consider of things as doubtfull, not determining of any thing, as it is to them to affirm? Why should it not be lawfull ingenuously to confesse that which a man knoweth not, since in verity he knoweth it not, and to hold in suspence that which hee is not assured of, and against which there are many reasons and oppositions? It is certaine according to the opinion of the wisest, that we are ignorant of much more than we know, that all our knowledge is the lesser part, and almost nothing, in regard of that wee know not: the causes of our ignorances are infinit, and both in respect of the things themselues either too farre from vs, or too neere, too great, or too little, too durable, or not durable enough, perpetually changing, and in respect of our selues, and the maner of knowing them, which as yet is not sufficiently learned. And that which we thinke we know, we know not, neither can we hold it well, for with violence it is got from vs, and if it may not be gotten because our obstinacie in opinion is strong, yet we are contended with, and much troubled. Now how should we be capable to know more or lesse, if we grow resolute in our opinions, settle and repose our selues in certaine things, and in such maner, that we seeke no farther, nor examine any more that which we thinke to hold? They thinke this suspension a shame and a weaknes, because they know not what it is, and they perceiue not that the greatest men that are haue made profession thereof; they blush, and haue not the heart freely to say, I know not, so much are they possessed with the opinion and presumption of science; and they know not that there is a kind of ignorance & doubt, more learned, and more certaine, more noble and generous, than all their science and certaintie. This is that that hath made *Socrates* so renoumed and held for the wisest man: It is the science of sciences, and the fruit of all our studies: It is a modest, mild, innocent, and hartie acknowledgement of the mysticall height of truth, and of the pouertie of our humane condition full of darknes, weaknes, vncertainty, *cogitationes mortalium timide, incerta adinuationes nostra: Deus nouis cogitationes*

*gitationes hominum quoniam vane sunt.* Mans thoughts are fearefull, and our inventions vncertaine : God knowes the thought of man how vaine it is. Heere I would tell you, that I caused to be grauen ouer the gate of my little house which I built at Condom in the yeare 1600. this word, *I know not.*

But they will needs that we submit our selues in all dutie to certaine principles, which is an vniust tyrannie. I yeeld my consent, that a man employ them in all iudgement, and make vse of them, but yet not so as that a man may not spurne against them, for against that opinion I oppose my selfe. Who is he in the whole world, that hath right to command, and giue lawes to the world, to subiect the spirits of men, and to giue principles which may be no more examined, that a man may no more denie or doubt of, but God himselfe the soueraigne spirit, and true principle of the world, who is only to be beleeued because he saith it ? All other things are subiect to triall and opposition, and it is weaknes to subiect our selues vnto it. If they will that I submit my selfe to principles, I will say to them as the Curat said to his parishoners, in a matter of time, and as a Prince of ours to the Secretaries of this age in a point of religion, Do you first agree to these principles, and then I will submit my selfe vnto them. Now there is as great doubt and dispute in the principles, as in the conclusions, in the *Theses*, as in the *Hypotheses*, whereby there are so many sects among them, that if I yeeld my selfe to the one, I offend all the rest. They say likewise, that it is a great affliction not to be resolu'd, to remaine alwaies in doubt, yea, that it is a matter of difficultie for a man to continue long in that state. They haue reason to say it, for they finde it so in themselves, being the propertie of fooles, and weake minds, of presumptuous fooles, passionate and obstinate in certaine opinions, who condemne all others, and although they be overcome, neuer yeeld themselves, vexing and putting themselves into choler, neuer acknowledging any reason. If they be constrained to change their opinions, being altered, they are as resolute and obstinate in their new, as they were before in their first opinion, not knowing how to hold any thing without passion, and neuer disputing to learne and finde the truth, but to maintaine that which they haue sworne and bound themselves

selues

Ioh. 9.

2. Cor. 8.

selues vnto. These kinde of people know nothing, neither know they what it is to know, because they thinke to know and to hold the truth in their sleeue : Because thou thinkest thou seest, thou seest nothing, saith the Doctor of truth to the glorious and presumptuous man ; *Si quis existimes se scire aliquid, nondum cognouit quemadmodum oporteat eum scire : If any man thinke he knowes something, he knowes not that which he ought to know.* It is fit that weake men that haue not strength to keepe themselves vpright vpon their feet, bee kept vp with props, they cannot liue but in bonds, nor maintaine themselves free, a people borne to seruitude, they feare Bug-bearers, or that the Wolfe will eat them if they be alone. But in wise, modest, and staied men it is quite contrary, the surest stay and most happy estate of the spirit, which by this meanes keepeth it selfe firme, vpright, constant, inflexible, alwaies free and to it selfe : *hoc liberiore & solutiore sumus, quia integra nobis iudicandi potestas manet : Heerein we are free, because in our selues wee haue full power to iudge.* It is a very sweet, peaceable, and pleasant sort of life, where a man feareth not to faile or miscount himselfe, where a man is in the calme, vnder couert, and out of danger of participating so many errors produced by the fantasie of man, and whereof the world is full of entangling himselfe in complaints, diuisions, disputes, of offending diuers parts, of belying and gainsaying his owne beleefe, of changing, repenting, and readuising himselfe. For how often hath time made vs see that wee haue beene deceiued in our thoughts, and hath enforced vs to change our opinions ? To be brieue, it is to keepe the minde in peace and tranquillitie, farre from agitations and vices, which proceed from that opinion of science which we thinke to haue in things ; for from thence does spring pride, ambition, immoderate desires, obstinacie in opinion, presumption, lone of nouelties, rebellion, disobedience : from whence come troubles, sects, heresies, seditions, but from men fierce, obstinate, & resolute in opinion ? not from Academiques, neuters, modest, indifferent, staied, that is to say, wise men. Moreouer let me tell them, that it is a thing that doth more seruice to pietie, religion, and diuine operation, than any thing whatsoeuer. I say seruice as well in the generation and propagation, as the conseruation thereof.

Diuinitie,

Diuinity, yea the mysticall part thereof, teacheth vs, that well to prepare our soules for God and the receiuing of his holy spirit, we must emptie, cleanse, purifie them, and leaue them naked of all opinion, beleefe, affection; make them like a white paper, dead to it selfe and to the world, that God might liue and worke in it, drive away the old master, to establish the new, *Expurgato vetus fermentum, exuite veterem hominem. Purge the old leuen, and put off the old man.* So that it seemeth, that to plant and establish Christianity among infidels, or mis-beleeuing people, as in these daies in *China*, it were a very excellent method to begin with these propositions and perswasions: That all the wisdom of the world is but vanity and leasing, That the world is wholly composed, torne, and vilefied with the forged phantasticall opinions of euery priuate mans braine: That God hath created man to know the truth, but that he cannot know it of himselfe, nor by any humane means: And That it is necessarie that God himselfe, in whose bosome it resideth, and who hath wrought a desire thereof in man, should reueale it as he doth. But, That the better to prepare himselfe for this reuelation, man must first renounce and chase away all opinions and beleefs, wherewith the spirit is already anticipated and befotted, and present himselfe white, naked, and ready to receiue it. Having well beaten and gained this point, and made men as it were Academics and Pyrronians, it is necessary that we propose the principles of Christianity as sent from heauen, brought by the Embassadour and perfect messenger of the diuinity, authorised and confirmed in his time by so many marvellous proofes and authentickall testimonies. So that we see that this innocent and modest delay from resolution, is a great means to true piety, not only to receiue it, as hath bene said, but to preterue it, for with it there neuer are heresies, and selected particular extrauagant opinions. An *Academicke* or *Pyrrhonian* was neuer hereticke, they are things opposite. It may be some man will say that he will neuer be either good Christian or Catholike, because he will as well be a neuter & irresolute in the one, as the other. This is to vnderstand amisse that which hath bene spoken, because there is no delay to be made, nor place to iudge, nor liberty in that which concerneth God,



God, but we must suffer him to put and engraue that which pleaseth him, and none other. I haue made heere a digression for the honour of this our rule against such as contradict it. Let vs now returne to the matter.

7  
The third  
art, vniuersal-  
lity of spirit.

After these two, to iudge of all, to be slow in determining, there cometh in the third place, the vniuersality of spirit, whereby a wise man taketh a view and entreth into consideration of the whole Vniuerse, hee is a citizen of the world like *Socrates*, hee containeth in his affection all humane kinde, he walketh through all, as if they were neere vnto him, hee seeth like the sunne, with an equall, settled, and indifferent regard, as from a high watch-tower all the changes and interchangeable courses of things, not changing himselfe, but alwaies continuing one and the same, which is a liuery of the diuinity, and a high priuiledge of a wise man, who is the image of God vpon earth. *Magna & generosa est animus humanus, nullos sibi ponit nisi communes & cum Deo terminos patitur. Non idem sapientem qui ceteros terminos includit, omnia illi secula ut Deo seruiunt. Nullum seculum magnis ingenijs clausum, nullum non cogitationi peruenit tempus. Quam naturale in immensum mentem suam extendere, in hoc a natura formatus homo ut paria dys velit, ac se in spatium suum extendat. Great and generous is the minde of man; it endureth no bounds, but such as belong to God himselfe. The same holdeth not a wise man, which includeth all other things. All times obey him as God himselfe. No times are hidde from great wittes, nor any not subiect to their thoughts. It is naturall for mans mind to reach beyond the moone; wherein nature hath framed in man a desire to be equall to the Gods, and to extend himselfe to his greatnes. The most beautifull and greatest spirits are the more vniuersall, as the more base and blunt are the more particular. It is a sottish weakenesse to thinke that a man must beleue, doe, liue in all respects as at home in his owne village and country, or that the accidents that fall out heere, concerne and are common with the rest of the world. A foole, if a man tell him that there are diuers maners, customes, lawes, opinions, contrary to those which he seeth in vse, either he will not beleue them, and saith they are fables, or he presently refuseth and condemneth them as barbarous, so partiall is he, and so much enthralled with those his municipall maners,*

which



which he accounteth the onely true, naturall, vniuersall. E-  
uery man calleth that barbarous that agreeth not with his  
palat and custome, and it seemeth that we haue no other  
touch of truth and reason, than the example and the *Idea* of  
the opinions & customes of that country where we liue. These  
kind of people iudge of nothing, neither can they, they are  
slaves to that they hold, a strong preuention and anticipation  
of opinions doth whollie possesse them, they are so besotted,  
that they can neither say, nor do otherwise. Now partiality is  
an enemy to liberty, and ouerruleth the mind already tainted  
and preoccupied with a particular custome, that it cannot  
iudge aright of others; an indifferent man iudgeth all things.  
He that is fastned to one place, is banished and depriued from  
all others. The paper that is blurred with another colour, is no  
more capable of any other, whereas the white is fit to receiue  
any. A iudge that heares a cause with a preiudicate opinion, &  
inclineth to one part more than to another, cannot be a iust,  
vpriight, and true iudge. Now a wise man must free himselfe  
from this brutish blockishnes, and present vnto himselfe as in  
a table this great image of our mother nature in her entire  
maiestie, marke & consider hir in a Realme, an Empire, yea in  
this whole visible world, as in the figure of a small point, and  
there read that generall and constant varietie in all things, so  
many humours, iudgement, beleeves, customes, lawes, so many  
alterations of states, charges of fortune, so many victories &  
conquests buried & forgotten, so many pomps and greatnes-  
ses vanished, as if they had neuer beene. Heereby a man may  
learne to know himselfe, to admire nothing, to thinke no-  
thing new, or strang, to settle & resolute himselfe in all things.  
For the better attaining of this vniuersall spirit, this generall  
indifferencie, we are to consider these foure or five points.

The great inequality and difference of men in their nature,  
forme, composition, whereof we haue spoken.

The great diuersity of lawes, customes, maners, religions,  
opinions, whereof we will speake heereafter.

The diuers opinions, reasons, sayings of Philosophers tou-  
ching vnity and pluralitie, the eternitie and temporalitie,  
the beginning and end, the durance and continuance, the a-  
ges, estates, changes, and interchangeable causes of the world  
and

and the parts thereof, The Egyptian priests told *Herodotus* that since their first King (which was aboue eleven thousand yeares before, the picture and statue of whom, and of all that succeeded him, they shewed him drawne to the life) the Sun had changed his course four times. The *Chaldeans* in the time of *Diodorus* (as he saith) & *Cicero*, had a register of seven hundred thousand yeares. *Plato* saith, they of the citie of *Sais* had memorials in writing of eight thousand yeares, and that the citie of *Athens* was built a thousand yeares before the said citie of *Sais*. *Zoroaster*, *Plinie*, and others haue affirmed, that *Socrates* liued six thousand yeares before the time of *Plato*. Some haue said, that the world hath beene from all eternitie, mortall, and growing and being againe by interchangeable courses. Others and the more noble Philosophers, haue held the world for a god, made by another god greater than it, or as *Plato* auerreth, and others argue from the motions thereof, that it is a creature composed of a bodie and of a soule, which soule lodging in the centre thereof, disperseth and spreadeth it selfe by mulicall numbers into the circumference, and parts thereof, the heauen, the starres, composed of bodies and of a soule, mortall by reason of their composition, immortall by the decree and determination of the Creator. *Plato* saith, that the world changeth countenance in all respects: that the heauen, the starres, the Sunne change and quite alter by turnes their motion, in such sort, that that which was first is last, the East is made the West; and according to the ancient and most authentickall opinion, and of the more famous spirits, worthy the greatnes of God, and founded vpon reason, there are many worlds, in so much that there is nothing one and only in this world, all kinds are multiplied in number, whereby it seemeth not to haue semblance of truth, that God hath made this only worke, without companion, and that all is concluded in this one *indivisum*; at the least diuinitie saith that God could make many, and infinite worlds, for if he could make no more but this one visible, his power should be finite, because the world is such.

By that which we haue learned of the discoverie of the new world, the East and West Indies, we see first that all our ancient writers haue beene deceiued, thinking to haue found the

the measure of the habitable earth, and to haue comprehended the whole *Cosmographie*, except some scattered Ilands, doubting of the *Antipodes*: for now behold another world, almost such as ours is, and that all vpon firme land inhabited, peopled, politiquely gouerned, distinguished by realmes, and Empires, beautified with cities, that excell in beautie, greatness, opulencie, all those *Asia*, *Africa*, *Europe*, many thousand yeeres agoe: And who doubteth but that in time heereafter there will bee discovered diuers others? If *Ptolemy* and other our ancient Writers haue beene heeretofore deceived, why should not he be likewise deceived that affirmeth, that all is readie found and discovered? Say it he that will, I will beleue him as I list.

Secondly, we see that the Zones which were thought inhabitable by reason of their excessiue heate and cold, are habitable.

Thirdly, that in these new countries, almost all things which we so much esteeme of heere, and hold that they were first reuealed and sent from heauen, were commonly beleueed and obserued (from whence they came, I will not say, who dares determine it?) Yea many of them were in vse a thousand yeeres before we heard any tidings of them, both in the matter of religion, as the beleefe of one only man the father of vs all, of the vniuersall deluge, of one God, who sometimes liued in the forme of a man vndeiled and holy, of the day of iudgement, the resurrection of the dead, circumcision like to that of the Iewes, and *Mahomet*: And in the matter of policie, as that the elder sonne should succeed in the inheritance, that hee that is exalted to a dignitie, loseth his owne name & takes a new, tyrannicall subsidies, armories, tumblers, muscical instruments, all sorts of sports, Artillery, Printing. From all these discourses wee may easily draw these conclusions: That this great bodie which wee call the world, is not that which wee thinke and iudge it to bee; That neither in the whole, nor parts thereof, it is alwaies the same, but in perpetuall flux and reflux; That there is nothing said, held, beleueed at one time and in one place, which is not likewise sayd, held, beleueed in another, yea and contradicted, reprobued, condemned elsewhere, the spirit of man being capable of all

things, the world alwaies tumbling, sometime the same, sometimes diuers; That all things are setled and comprehended in this course and revolution of nature, subiect to increase, changing, ending, to the mutation of times, places, climates, heauens, aires, countries. And from these conclusions we learne, to marie our selues, to sweare to nothing, to admire, to trouble our selues at nothing; but whatsoeuer shall happen, whatsoeuer men talke of and trouble themselves about, to resolute vpon this point, that it is the course of the world, that it is nature that worketh these things; but yet wisely to provide that nothing hurt vs by our own weaknes and defection of minde. Enough is said of this perfect libertie of iudgement, established by these three parts, to iudge of all, to iudge nothing, to bee vniuersall, wherein I haue the rather insisted, because I know that it pleaseth not the palat of the world, it is an enemy to pedanterie as well as wisdom, but yet it is a faire floure or ornament of wisdom, which preferueth vs from two contrarie rockes, whereon the vulgar sort doe commonly lose themselves, that is to say, from being headie, opinative, shamefull gaisaiers, repenters, mutable; and a man maintaineth himselfe in a sweet, peaceable, and assured modestie and great libertie of spirit, noble and magnificall vniuersalitie. This is that great qualitie and sufficiencie of *Socrates*, the *Coryphaeus* of the wise, by the confession of all, of whom it is said as *Plutarch* discourseth, That he neuer brought forth, but seruing as a Midwife, hee made others to bring forth. This is very neere and in some sense the disorder of the *Pyrrhonians*, the neutralitie and indifferencie of the *Academicks*, from whence proceedeth, not to be astonished at any thing, not to admire any thing, the soueraigne good of *Pythagoras*, the magnanimitie of *Aristotle*.

*Nil admirari, prope res est una Numici  
Solus, qua possit facere, & seruare beatum.  
One thing, as nothing wonder vp to take,  
Is it, that may you happie keepe and make.*

It is a strange thing that man will not so much as taste it, yea is offended to heare speech thereof, loueth better to continue a shawe to runne from one part to another, than to be to himselfe, to liue of his owne, to be about all, and to passe equally thorow

thorowall. 5. Hath he not reason to crie with *Tiberius*, and farre more iustly, *O homines ad seruitutem nati ! O men borne to seruitude*. What monlter is this, to desire to haue all things free, his bodie, his members, his goods, and not his spirit, which neuerthelesse is only borne vnto libertie ? A man will willingly make benefit of whatsoever is in the world, that comes from the East or the West, for the good and seruice of his bodie, nourishment, health, ornament, and accomodate it all vnto his vse, but not for the culture of his spirit, benefit and enriching, giuing his bodie the libertie of the fields, and holding his spirit in close prison.

The other libertie which is of the will, must likewise be in high esteeme with a wise man. Wee speake not heere of the free will of man, according to the maner of Diuines : wee say, that a wise man to maintaine himselfe in rest and libertie, must manage his will and his affections, in giuing himselfe and affecting but few things, and those iust (for the iust are but few in number if a man iudge well) and that without violence and asperitie. There enter heere into combat (or to speake more mildly, there are to be explicated and vnderstood) two popular and plausible opinions in the world, the one teacheth to be readie and willing in the seruice of another, to forget our selues for our neighbour, and principally for the weale publicke, in respect whereof the particular is not to be respected : the other to carie our selues couragiously with actiuitie, zeale, affection. He that doth not the first, is accused not to haue any charitie ; Hee that doth not the second, suspected to be cold, not to be a friend ; and not to haue that zeale or sufficiencie that hee ought. Some would haue these two opinions to preuaile beyond reason and measure, and there is not any thing which hath not beene spoken heereof : for the heads or cheefestaynes many times preach things according to that vse for which they serue, not according as they are : And many times the truest opinions are not the more profitable. And afterwards seeing we hold our selues too much to our selues, and with a tie too naturall, they would distract vs and draw vs along, as they that goe about to streighten a crooked staffe, bend it as much more the contrary way.

But these opinions ill vnderstood and ill taken, as they are

by diuers, bring with them iniustice, trouble, paine, and much euill, as a man may see in those who backbite and detract from all, giuing themselves to hire, and the seruice of another: They doe not only suffer themselves to be caried, and seased vpon, but they likewise thrust themselves into all matters, as well into those that concerne them not, as those that doe, as well into small as great, and many times for no other cause, but to employ and bulie themselves, *In negotijs sunt negotij causa; In busines is the cause of busines*; And because they cannot hold and stay themselves, as if they had nothing to doe, with and within themselves, and that for want of inward, essentiall, proper and domesticall affaires, they seeke & vndergoe those that are strange vnto them. They are good husbands and frugall enough of their purse, but prodigall of their soules, their liues, their time, affection, and willes. the good husbandrie whereof is only profitable and commendable. And if they giue themselves to any thing, it is with such passion and violence, that they are no more their owne men, so whollie doe they engage and inlinate themselves thereinto. Great men seeke after such people, that will grow into passion and kill themselves for them, and they allure them with faire promises and much Arte, to win them vnto them; and they alwaies find fooles enow that belecue them, but they that are wise will take heed of them.

9

This is first vniust, it wholly troubleth the state, driues away the rest, and libertie of the spirit. It is, not to know that which euery one ought to know, and by how many offices euery man is obliged vnto himselfe; whilest they seeke to be officious and seruiceable to another, they are vniust to themselves. Wee haue all businesse enough with and within our selues, and neede not seeke meanes to lose our selues without, and to giue our selues vnto others: euery man must hold him to himselfe. He that knowes not how to liue honestly, healthfully, and merrily, is ill aduised, and takes an ill and vnnatural course, if he thinke to doe it by seruing another. He must affect and tie himselfe but to a few things and those iust.

10

Secondly, this sharpe intention and passionate affection, troubleth all, and hindereth the conduct of those affaires to which he so much giueth himselfe; as in a precipitate pace

too

too much haste makes a man stumble and enterseare, and so staies him whether he will or no: *Ipsa se velocitas implicat, unde festinatio tarda est. Qui nimium properat serius absoluit.* Haste makes waite, and binders it selfe: He that maketh too much speed dispatcheth too late. So likewise a man being drunken with this violent intention, he entangleth and fettereth himselfe, commits many indiscretions and wrongs, growes into hard conceits and suspicions of others, becomes impatient in crosse or slow occurrents that fall not out according to his owne desire: *male cuncta ministrat impetus. violence doth nothing well.* This is seene not only in serious affaires, but also vaine and friuolous, as in play, where hee that is carried with an ardent thirst of gaining, troubleth himselfe, and the more he troubleth himselfe, the more he loseth. Hee that walkes moderately, is alwaies with himselfe, directeth his businesse with better aduantage, and more surely and cheerfully: he dissembleth, applieth, deferreth all to his owne leasure, and as his occasions shall fall out: if hee chance to be conuicted in a matter, it is without torment and affliction, being alwaies readie for a new change: hee alwaies marcheth with the bridle in his hand, *festinat lentè.*

Thirdly, this violent affection infecteth and corrupteth even the iudgement it selfe: for following one part and desiring the aduantage thereof, they wax mad if they bee contradicted, attributing to their partie false praises and conditions, and to the contrary false accusation; interpreting all prognostications and occurrents at their owne pleasure, and making them serue their owne designments. All that are of the contrary part, must needs bewicked and of contrarie conditions, yea and they that speake any good, or descric any good thing in them, are likewise suspected to be of their part. Can it not possibly be that a man honest in all things else, or at least in something, may follow a wicked person, maintaine a wicked cause? It is enough that passion enforce the will, but that it cary likewise the iudgement, and make that a foole, this is too much. It is the soueraigne & last part that should alwaies maintaine it owne authority; and we must ingenuously, and in good sooth acknowledge the good that is in our aduersaries, and the euill that is in those whom wee follow. The



ground and foundation of the controuerſie being laid aſide; wee muſt keepe moderation and indifferencie, and out of the buſineſſe it ſelfe baniſh all choller, all diſcontent. And thus wee ſee the euils that this ouergreat affection to any thing whatſoeuer bringeth with it; of all, yea of goodneſſe and wiſdome it ſelfe a man may haue too much.

12

*An aduſement.*

But for a rule heerein, wee muſt remember, that the principle and moſt lawfull charge that we haue, is in euery man the conduction and guide of himſelfe. The reaſon why we are heere, is, that we ſhould maintaine our ſelues in tranquillitie and libertie. And to doe this, the beſt remedie is, to lend our ſelues to others, and to giue our ſelues to none but to our ſelues, to take our affaires into our hands, not to place them in our hearts, to take buſineſſe vpon vs, but not incorporate them into vs, to be diligent, not paſſionate, not to tie our ſelues but to a few, but rather alwaies to reſerue our ſelues vnto our ſelues. This counſell condemneth not thoſe offices due to the weale-publike, to our friends, our neighbour, yea it is ſo farre from it, that a wiſe man muſt be officious and charitable, applye vnto himſelfe the cuſtomes of other men and the world, and the rather to doe it, he muſt contribute to publike ſocietie thoſe offices and duties which concerne him. *Qui ſibi amicum eſt, hunc omnibus ſcio eſſe amicum.* He that is a friend to himſelfe, is a friend to all. But I require a double moderation and diſcretion heerein; the one, that a man applye not himſelfe to all that is preſented vnto him, but to that which is iuſt and neceſſarie; and that is not hard to be done: the other, that it be without violence and trouble. He muſt deſire little, and that little moderately; buſie himſelfe little, and that peaceably: and in thoſe charges that he vndertaketh, employ his paſſe, his ſpeech, his attentions, his ſweatings, his meanes, and if need be, his blood, his life; but yet without vexation and paſſion, keeping himſelfe alwaies to himſelfe in health and tranquillitie. A man may performe his durie ſufficiently without this ardencie, and this ſo great contention of will. And they deceiue themſelves very much, that thinke that a buſineſſe is not well done, and there is no maner of affection, if it be not done with tempeſt, clamour and clatter: for contrariwiſe, it is that that hindreth and troubleth the good guide and conduction thereof,



thereof, as hath beene said. O how many men hazard their liues every day in those warres which no way concerne them, and thrust themselves into the danger of that bartell, the losse whereof doth no way trouble their sleepe : and all to the end they may not faile in their dutie ! whilest there is another in his owne house, that dares not enter the danger, or looke the enemy in the face, is more affected with the issue of that warre, and hath his minde more troubled than the souldier that adventureth his blood and life in the field.

Finally, wee must know how to distinguish and separate our selues from our publike charges : euery one of vs plaiceth two parts, two persons ; the one strange and apparent, the other proper and essentiall : we must discerne the skinned from the shirt. An active man will performe his charge, and yet withall not leaue to iudge of the follie, vice, deceit that is therein : he will conforme himselfe to euery thing, because the custome of his countrey requireth it, it is profitable to the weale-publike : the world liues so, and therefore it must be done. A man must serue and make vse of the world such as he findeth it ; in the meane time, he must likewise consider it as a thing estranged from it selfe, know how to keepe and carrie himselfe apart, and to communicate himselfe to his owne trustie good, howsoeuer things fall out with himselfe.

### CHAP. III.

*True and essentiall honestie, the first and fundamentall part of wisdom.*

**H**Auing prepared and disposed our scholar to wisdom by these precedent aduiselements, that is to say, hauing purified and freed him from all euils, and placed him in a good estate, of a full and vniuersall libertie, to the end he may haue a perfect view, knowledge and power ouer all things (which is the priuiledge of a wise and spirituall man : *Spiritualis omnia iudicat : The spirituall man iudgeth all things.*) it is now time to giue him instructions and generall rules of wisdom. The two first shall be as preambles and foundations, whereof the first and principall is honestie or probitie.

1

It will not be, perhaps, any matter of difficultie, to make good this propolition, That honestie is the first principall and fundamentall part of wisdom: for all (whether in truth and good earnest, or in outward shew, for shame or feare to say the contrarie) doe applaud it; they alwayes honour in it the first place, confessing themselves seruitors and affectionate followers thereof: but it will cost me some labour to shew and perswade, which is that true and essentiall probitie we heere require. For that which is in authoritie and credit, wherewith the whole world contenteth it selfe, that which is only knowne, sought for, and possessed (I alwaies except some few of the wiser) is bastardy, artificiall, false, and counterfeite.

2

*Masques of  
honestie.*

First we know that many times we are lead & pricked forward to vertue and honourable actions, by wicked and condemned meane, by default & naturall impotencie, by passion, and vice it selfe; chastitie, sobrietie, temperancie may be in vs by reason of our corporall imbecillitie; the contempt of the world, patience in aduersitie, constancie in danger, proceede many times from want of apprehension and iudgement: valor, liberalitie, iustice it selfe, from ambition: discretion, prudence, from feare, from auarice. And how many beautifull actions hath presumption and temeritie brought forth? So that the actions of vertue are many times no other but masques, they carry the outward countenance, but they haue not the essence; they may very well be termed vertuous in consideration of another, and of the visage they carry outwardly and in publike, but in truth and with the actor himselfe they are nothing so; for it will appeare at the last, that profit, glorie, custome, and other the like, strange causes haue induced him to doe them.

Sometimes they arise from stupiditie and brutish sottishnes, and therefore it is sayd, that wisdom and sottish simplicitie doe meete in one and the same point, touching the bearing and suffering of humane actions. It is then very dangerous to iudge of the probitie or improbitie of a man by his actions: wee must sound him within, from what foundation these motions doe arise: wicked men performe many times many good and excellent actions, and both good and euill preferue themselves alike from doing euill, *Oderunt peccare boni*

*boni & mali. Both good and euill feare to offend.* To discover therefore and to know which is the true Honestie, we must not stay in the outward action, that is but the signe, the simplest token, and many times a cloke and maske to couer villanie: we must penetrate into the inward part, and know the moriue which causeth the strings to play, which is the soule and the life that giueth motion to all. It is that whereby we must iudge, it is that wherein euery man should prouide to be good and entire, and that which we seeke.

That honestie which is commonly accounted true, and so much preached and commended of the world, whereof they make expresse profession, who haue the title and publike reputation to be men of honestie and settled constancie, is scholasticall, and pedanticall, seruant to the lawes, enforced by hope, and feare, acquired, learned and practised out of a submission too, & a consideration of the religion, lawes, customes, commaunds of superiors, other mens examples, subiect to prescript formes, effeminate, fearefull, and troubled with scruples and doubts; *Sunt quibus innocentia nisi metu non placet: Innocency without feare like not some*; which is no only in respect of the world diuers and variable, according to the diuersitie of religions, lawes, examples, formes, (for the iurisdctions changing, the motions must likewise alter) but also in it selfe vnequall, wauering, deambulatorie, according to the accesse, recesse, successe of the affaires, the occasions which are presented, the persons with whom a man hath to doe, as a ship driuen with the winds and the oares, is carried away with an vnequall tottering pafe, with many blowes, blasts, and bilowes. To be breefe, these are honest men by accident and occasion, by outward and strange euents, and not in veritie and essence: they vnderstand it not, and therefore it is easie to discover them, and to conuince them, by shaking of a little their bridle, and sounding them somewhat nearer, but aboue all, by that inequality and diuersity which is found in them: for in one and the same action they will giue diuers iudgements, and cary themselues altogether after a diuers fashion, going sometimes a slow pafe, sometimes running a maine gallop. This vnequall diuersity proceedeth from this, that the outward occasions which moue and stirre them, doe either

3  
Vulgar honestie, and according to the stile of the world.

either puffe them vp, multiplie and increase them, or make them luke-warme and deiect them, more or lesse like accidents, *Quæ recipiunt magis & minus.*

4  
The description  
of true honesty.

Now that true honestie, which I require in him that will be wise, is free, manly, and generous, pleasant, and cheerefull, equall, vniforme, and constant, which marcheth with a stayed pace, stately and hawtie, going alwaies his owneway, neither looking on this side, or behind him, without staying or altering his pace, or gate for the wind, the times, the occasions, which are changed, but that is not, I meane in iudgement and will, that is in the soule, where honestie resideth and hath it seat. For outward actions, especially the publike haue another iurisdiction, as shall be said in his place: This honestie I will describe in this place, giuing you first to vnderstand, that following the designment of this booke declared in the Preface, I speake of humane honestie and wisdom, as it is humane, whereby a man is called an honest man and a wise, and not of Christian, though in the end I may chaunce to speake a word or two thereof.

5  
Nature enioyneth  
honestie.

The iurisdiction of this honestie is Nature, which bindeth every man to be, and to make himselfe such as he ought, that is to say, to conforme and rule himselfe according vnto it. Nature is together both a mistris which enioyneth and commaundeth honestie, and a law and instruction which teacheth it vnto vs. As touching the first, there is a naturall obligation inward and vniuersall in every man to be honest, iust, vp-right, following the intention of his author and maker. A man ought not to attend or seeke any other cause, obligation, instinct, or motiue of this honestie; and he can neuer know how to haue a more iust and lawfull, more powerfull, more ancient, it is altogether as soone as himselfe, borne with himselfe. Every man should be, or should desire to be an honest man, because he is a man, and he that takes no care to be such, is a monster, renounceth himselfe, beliethe, destroyeth himselfe, by right he is no more a man, and in effect should desist to be a man. It is necessarie that honestie grow in him by himselfe, that is to say, by that inward instinct which God hath put in him, and not from any other outward and strange cause, any occasion, or induction. A man will not, out of a iust  
and

and regular will, any thing that is depraved, or corrupt, or other than it owne nature requireth, it implieth a contradiction to desire or accept a thing, and nothing to care whether it be worth the caring for; a man would haue all his parts good and sound, his bodie, his head, his eies, his iudgement, his memorie, yea his nose and thooes; and why will he not likewise, haue his will, and his conscience good, that is to say, be whollie good and sound? I will therefore that he be good, and haue his will firme and resolu'd to equity and honesty for the loue of himselfe, and because he is a man, knowing that he can be no other, without the renouncing and destruction of himselfe, and so his honestie shall be proper, inward, essentiall, even as his owne essence is vnto him, and he vnto himselfe. It must not then be for any outward consideration, and proceeding from without, whatsoever it bee, for such a cause being accidentall and outward, may happen to faile, grow weake, and alter, and consequently all that honestie that is grounded thereupon, must doe the like. If he be an honest man, for honour, or reputation, or other recompence, being in a solitarie place, where he hath no hope to be knownen, hee either ceaseth to be honest, or putteth it in practise very coldly and negligently. If for feare of the lawes, magistrates, punishments, if he can deceiue the lawes, circumuent the iudges, auoide or disproue the proofes, and hide himselfe from the knowledge of another, there is an end of his honestie. And this honestie is but fraile, occasioned, accidentall and miserable; and yet it is that which is in authority and vse, no man knowes of any other, there is not an honest man, but such as is enforced or inuited by some cause, or occasion, *nemo gratis bonus est. No man is freely good.* Now I would haue in this my wise man an essentiall and inuincible honestie, which dependeth of it selfe, and ariseth from it owne root, and may as hardly be separated, and rooted out as humanity from a man. I will that he neuer consent vnto euill, & though his honestie be not made knownen to any, yet if he know himselfe, what needs any more? If all the world besides should know it, it is not so much, *quid tibi prodest non habere conscium, habens conscientiam?* What is it to thee that hast a conscience, not to haue a witness of thy conscience? And what though he receiue no great recompence for

for it? For what may it be that concerneth him so neere, as his owne proper essence? This were not to care how bad the horse is, so the saddle be faire. I will then that these things be inseparable, to be, and to consent to liue a man, to be, and to be willing to be an honest man. This first hath bene sufficiently pressed. Let vs come to the second.

6

Nature teacheth  
all honestie.

Now the paterne and rule to be honest, is this nature it selfe, which absolutely requireth that we be such, it is, I say, this equity and vniuersall reason which shineth in euery one of vs. Hee which worketh according to it, worketh truly according to God, for it is God, or at least, his first fundamentall and vniuersall law, which hath brought it into the world, and which came first from God, for God and nature are in the world, as in a state, the king, the author and founder, and the fundamentall law which he hath made for the preservation and gouernment of the said estate. This is a lightning and ray of the diuinity, a streame and dependance of the eternall law, which is God himselfe and his will: *Quid naturam nisi Deus, & diuinaratio totimundo, & partibus eius inserta? What is nature but god, and diuine reason inserted to the whole world, and all the parts thereof.* He worketh also according to himselfe, for he worketh according to the sterne, and animated instinct, which he hath within himselfe moouing and stirring him: and so he is an honest man essentially, and not by accident and occasion; for this law and light is essentiall and naturall in vs, and therefore it is called Nature, and the law of nature. He is also by consequent an honest man, alwaies and perpetually, vniiformly and equally at all times and in all places: for this law of equity, and naturall reason is perpetuall in vs, *Edictum perpetuum, A perpetuall edict*, inuio-  
lable, which can neuer be extinct nor defaced, *Quam nec ipsa delet iniquitas; vermis eorum non morietur, Which neuer iniquity it selfe may deface; their worme shall neuer die.* vniuersall and constant in all things, and alwaies the same, equall vniiforme, which neither time nor place can alter nor disguise, receiue-  
neither neither accesse nor recesse, more nor lesse, *Substantia non recipit magis & minus.* what seekest thou elsewhere, either law or rule in the world? What may a man say or alledge which thou hast not about thee and within, if thou wilt but feele & harken

to

to thy selfe? A man may say to thee, as to a bad debtor, who asked for what the debt is, and will see the bill which he hath about him, *Quod petis intus habes*; What thou demandest is within thy selfe; Thou demandest that which thou hast in thy owne boosome. *Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui. Gentes naturaliter quae legis sunt faciunt: ostendunt opus legis scriptum in cordibus suis; lex scripta in cordibus nostris.* The light of thy countenance is sealed in vs. People naturally obserue the law: they shew the worke of the law written in their hearts: the law is written in our hearts. The law of Moses in his decalogue, is an outward and publike copie, the law of the twelue tables, and the Romane law, the morall instructions of diuines and Philosophers, the aduiselements and counsels of Lawyers, the edicts and ordinances of Princes are no other but piety and particular pourtraies thereof: so that if there be any law, that stayeth the least that may be from this first and originall mistris, it is a monster, falsehood, and error. To be brieft, all the lawes of the world, are no other but copies and abstracts brought forth into iudgement, against thee that holdest hidden the originall, and makest as if thou knewest it not, extinguishing as much as in thee lieth, this light, which enlightheth thee within, *Qui veritatem deid tinent in misistia*, Who detaine the truth of God in unrighteous, for these lawes had neuer beene published abroad, but because that law which was inward, whollie celestially and diuine, hath been too much contemned and forgotten. These are all riuers, but such as neither haue so much water, nor so pure as the source and inuible fountaine, which is within thee, if thou suffer it not to perishe, and to be lost: I say not so much water, *Quam multa pietas, humanitas, liberalitas, fides exigunt, quae extra tabulas sunt.* Piety, humanity, liberality and faith require many things, that are not in the tables. O the miserable honestie of formalists, who hold themselues to the words of the law, and so thinke themselues discharged! How many duties are there required besides? *Quam angusta innocentia ad legem bonum esse: latius officiorum patet quam iuris regula.* What a strickt innocency is required, according to the law; the rule of duty extendeth it selfe farther, then the rule of the law. The rule of ourdutie is farre larger than that of the law, which is neither so strong, nor so liuely, witnes this one thing, that well to vnderstand.

Psal. 4.  
Rom. 1.  
August.



stand and know their intention to quit our selues of ambiguitie, difficultie, contrarietie, we must bring them to the source, and reentring into the inward part, put them to the touch and rule of nature, *Anima legis ratio. Reason is the life of the law.* Behold then an essentiall, radicall, and fundamentall honestie, sprung in vs from it owne proper rootes by the seed of that vniuersall reason which is in the soule, as the spring and ballance in a clock, as the naturall heart in the body, maintaining it selfe of it selfe strong and inuincible, whereby a man worketh according to God, according to himselfe, nature, the vniuersall order and policie of the world, quietly, sweetly, and as silently without noise, as a ship that is not driuen but by the naturall and ordinary course of the water: All other is ingrafted by arte and accidentall discipline, as the heate and cold of feuers, acquired and conducted by strange occasions and considerations, working with clamor and clatter ambitiously.

7

We must follow  
nature

This is the reason why the doctrine of all the Sages doth teach, that to liue well, is to liue according to nature, that the chiefest good in this world is to consent to nature, that in following nature as our guide and mistris, we can neuer erre, *Naturam si sequaris ducem nusquam aberrabis: bonum est quod secundum naturam, omnia vitia contra naturam sunt: Idem beatè viuere & secundum naturam:* If thou follow nature as thy guide, thou shalt not erre: All goodnes is naturall; vices vnnaturall: it is one and the same thing to liue blessedly, and according to nature: vnderstanding by nature that equity and vniuersall reason which shineth in vs, which containeth and hatcheth in it the seeds of all vertues, probitie, iustice, and is the matrix from whence all good and excellent lawes doe spring and arise, yea those true and iust iudgements that are sometimes pronounced by the mouth of an idiot. Nature hath disposed all things in the best state that they could be, and hath given them the first motion to good, and the end which they should seek, in such sort, that he that will follow hir, need not obtaine and possesse his owne good and his owne end, *Sapientia est in naturam conuersa, & eò restitui vnde publicus error expulerit; Ab illa non deerrare, ad illius legem exemplumq; formari sapientia est. It is wisdom to be conformable to nature, and to yeeld vnto it, whereby*



he may expell all publicke and grosse error; From which not to wander, but to fashion and applie himselfe thereto is wisdom. Men are naturally good, and follow not euill, but for profit or pleasure, & therefore lawmakers to induce them to follow their natural and good inclination, and not to enforce their wils, haue proposed two contrarie things, punishment and reward.

Doublelesse, Nature in euery one of vs is sufficient, and a sweet mistris and rule to all things, if we will hearken vnto hir, employ and awaken hir; and wee need not seeke elsewhere, nor begge of Arte and the Sciences, the meanes, the remedies, and the rules which we haue need of: Euery one of vs if he will, may liue at his pleasure of his owne. To liue content and happie, a man need not be wise, a courtier, nor so actiue; all this sufficiencie that is beyond the common and naturall is vaine and superfluous, yea it bringeth more euill with it then good. We see ignorant people, idiots, and simple men, leade their liues more sweetly and cheerefully, resist the assaults of death, of want, of sorrow, more constantly and contentedly, than the wisest men and most actiue. And if a man marke it well, he shall finde among pesants and other poore people examples of patience, constancie, equanimitie, more pure than all those that are taught in Schooles; they follow simplie the reason and conduct of nature, they trauell quietly and contentedly in their affaires, not enflaming or eleuating themselves, and consequently more soundly: Others mount themselves vpon their great horses, play the light horsemen, bandie themselves one against the other, keepe their braines alwaies in worke and agitation. A great master and admirable doctor in nature was *Socrates*, as *Aristotle* in arte and science. *Socrates* by simple and naturall discourses, by vulgar similitudes and inductions, speaking like a country swaine, did furnish vs with precepts and rules of good life, and remedies against all euils, so substantiall and strong, that all the arte and science of the world could not deuise better or the like.

But we doe not only not hearken vnto it, beleeue and follow it according to the counsell of the wise, but also (not to speake of those monsters who by the violence of their vices, inordinate and peruerse delights and pleasures suffocate and extinguish, as much as in them lieth, the light, mortifie the seed

8

As a good and  
sufficient mi-  
stris.

By arte.

seed thereof) we endeavour to auoid it, we suffer it to sleepe and to cease, louing better to begge elsewhere our first rudiments, to runne to studie any arte, than to content our selues with that which is bred within vs. We haue a busie troublesome spirit, which offereth it selfe to rule and gouerne in all things, and which carrieth it selfe after our owne willes, disguiseth, changeth, and troubleth all, will adde, inuent, alter, and can not stay it selfe in home-borne simplicitie, it thinketh nothing good wherein there is not craft and subtiltie. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in. obscuram & solertem scienciam versa est.* That simple and open vertue is euer turned into obscure and craftie cunning. And it is a vice common amongst vs, not to account of any thing that is in vs, we esteeme only of that which is bought, which is costly, and is brought from farre: we prefer arte before nature, we shut the windowes at high noone, and light candles. This fault and follie proceedeth from another, that is, that we esteeme not of things according to their true & essentiall value, but according to the shew and report. How many are there more scrupulous and exact in those things that belong to the positieue and municipall law, than the naturall? Truly almost all, yea euen in the ceremoniall, & law of ciuilitie, which we haue framed to our selues, in respect whereof we disdain and are ashamed of nature. We speake little, we make a faire shew, and carefully keepe a *decorum* or decencie, and make no difficultie to goe directly against nature, dutie, conscience. So that the shadow, is more vnto vs than the bodie, the roote, the countenance more than the substance and sound veritie. That we may not offend a ceremonie, we couer and hide things naturall; we dare not name, and we blush at the sound of things, which we doe in no sort feare to doe, both lawfull and vnlawfull. We dare not speake that which is permitted to doe, we dare not directly to name our owne proper members, and yet we feare not to employ them in all maner of wickednesse: we pronounce, speake, and do, without feare and without shame, wicked things, and such as are against nature and reason, forswear, betray, asfaile, kill, deceiue; and we blush to speake of things good, naturall, necessarie, iust and lawfull. There is not a husband, which is not more ashamed to embrace his wife in the open

view

view of the world, than to kill, lie, atsaile; nor a woman that will not rather vtter any wickednesse in the world, than name that wherein she taketh most delight, and may lawfully doe. Euen to treasons and murders, they tie themselves to the lawes of a ceremonie, and there fasten their deuouires. A strange thing, that iniustice should complaine of inciuility, malice of indiscretion! The act of a ceremonie doth it not preuaile against nature? The ceremonie forbiddeth vs to expresse naturall things and lawfull, and wee giue credit thereunto: Nature and reason forbiddeth vs things vnlawfull, and no man beleeueth it: A man sends his conscience to the brothell-house, and keeps his outward countenance in order. All this is monstrous, and the like is not found amongst beasts. I will not for all this say (as I perceiue malice doth already mutter) that ceremonie and decencie ought not carefully be kept, which is the salt and seasoning of our actions and conuersations. *Amo verecundiam, in ea ornatus vita, & vis decori. I loue modestie, for in it is the ornament of our life, and the force of comelines.* But I say to them as our Sauour to men of the like spirit: *O hypocrita excolantes culicem, camelum degluti-* Math. 23.  
*mes, qui minima curatis, graviora spernitis: Hec oportet primum facere, tum illa non omittere.* O yee hypocrites that straine a gnat, and swallow a Camell, which are carefull for small things, and dispiſe greater matters: These ought yee first to doe, and also not to omitt the rest.

From this generall and vniuersall alteration and corruption it is come to passe, that there is nothing of Nature known in vs. If we must say what the lawes thereof are, and how many they are, we are much hindred. The ensigne & marke of a naturall law is the vniuersitie of approbation: for that which Nature shall haue truly ordeined for vs, we with a common consent shall follow without doubting; and not onely euery nation, but euery particular person.

Now there is not any thing in the world which is not denied and contradicted, not by one nation, but by diuers: and there is not any thing so strange and vnnaturall in the opinion of diuers, which is not approoued and authoris'd in many places by common vse. The little care of hauing children, the murder of parents, of children, of himself, marriage of the

T neceff

10  
In such sort,  
that it is no  
more known  
in man.

neerest in blood, theft, publike marchandize of their libertie and bodies, as well of males as females, are receiued by publike vse in many nations.

11  
*And we must  
seeke it else-  
where.*

Doubtlesse there remaineth no more any image or trace of nature in vs, we must go seeke it in beatts, where this troublesome and vnquiet spirit, this quick-siluer, neither arte, nor beaurifull ceremonie hath power to alter it; they haue it pure and entire, if it be not corrupted by our vsage and contagion, as sometimes it is. All the world followeth nature, the first and vniuersall rule which the author thereof hath giuen and established, except man only who troubleth the policie and state of the world with his gentle spirit, & his free-will to wickednes; he is the only irregular creature, and enemy of nature.

12  
*The true honestie.*

So then the true honestie ( the foundation pillar of wisdom ) is to follow nature, that is to say, reason. The good & the end of man, in whom consisteth his rest, his libertie, his contentment, and in a word, his perfection in this world, is, to liue and do according to nature, when that which is the most excellent thing in him commaundeth; that is to say, reason. True honestie is a right and firme disposition of the will to follow the counsell of reason: And as the needle touched with the adamant neuer resteth it selfe vntill hee see the north point, and thereby ordereth and directeth the navigation; so a man is neuer well, yea, he is as it were vndone, and dislocated, vntill he see this law, and directeth the course of his life, his maners, his iudgements and wisses, according to the first, diuine, naturall law, which is an inward domesticall light, wherof all the rest are but beames.

13  
*The distinction  
of true honestie.*

But to effect it, and to come to the practise, it is farre more easie to some, than to others. There are some that haue their particular nature, that is to say, their temper and temperature so good and pleasing ( which especially proceedeth from the first formation in the womb of the mother, and afterwards from the milke of the nurse, and this first and tender education ) that they find themselves without endeuor, and without arte or discipline, whollie caried and disposed to goodnesse and honestie, that is to say, to follow and conforme themselves to the vniuersall nature, whereby they are rewarded well-borne; *gaudeant bene nati.*

This

This kind of naturall and easie honestie, and as it were borne with vs, is properly called goodnesse, a qualitie of a soule well borne and well gouerned, it is a sweetnesse, facilitie, and debonaire mildnesse of nature: and not (lest any bodie should be deceiued) a softnesse, a feminine, sortish calmenesse and vitious facilitie, whereby a man delighteth to please all, and not to displease or offend any, although he haue a iust and a lawfull cause, and it be for the seruice of reason and iustice; whereby it comes to passe, that they will not employ themselves in lawfull actions, when it is against those that take offence thereat; nor altogether refuse the vnlawfull, when they please thereby those that consent thereunto. Of these kind of people it is said (& this commendation is iniurious) He is good, since he is good euen to the wicked; and this accusation true, How should he be good, since he is not euill, to those that are euill? We should rather call this kind of goodnesse innocencie, as men call little children sheepe, and the like, innocent creatures. But an active, valiant, manly, and effectuall goodnesse is that I require, which is a readie, easie, and constant affection vnto that which is good, right, iust, according to reason and nature.

There are others so ill borne and bred, that it seeme (that like monsters) their particular natures are made, as it were in despite of the vniuersall nature, so crosse and contrarie are they thereunto. In this case the remedie to correct, reforme, sweeten, make tame, and amend this euill, rough, sauage, and crooked nature, to bend it and applie it to the rule of this generall and great mistris the vniuersall nature, is to haue recourse to the studie of Philosophie (as Socrates did) and vnto vertue, which is a combate and painfull endeuer against vice, a laborious studie, which requireth time, labour, and discipline. *Virtus in arduo & circa difficile: ad iannam virtutis excubant labor & sudor. Dij mortalibus virtutem laboris pretio vendiderunt. Vertue is alwaies employed about things difficult, at whose gate attends labour and paine. God for great paine and traueil hath sold vertue vnto men.* This is not to bring in a new, strange, or artificall honestie; and so accidentall, and such, as I haue said before, is not the true, but it is by taking away the lets and hinderances, to stirre vp and enlighten this.

light almost extinct and languishing, and to reuiue those seeds almost choked by the particular vice, and ill temperature of the particular person; as by taking away the moat from the cie, the light is recouered, and the dust from off the glasse, a man seeth the clearer.

14

Three degrees  
of perfection.

By all this that hath bene said, it appeareth that there are two sorts of true honestie; the one naturall, sweet, easie, iust, called goodnesse; the other acquired, difficult, painefull, and laborious, called vertue. But to say the truth, there is also a third, which is as it were, composed of the two, and so there should be three degrees of perfection. The lowest of the three is a facill and debonaire nature, distasted by it selfe by reason of vice; we haue named it goodnesse, innocencie. The second more high, which we haue named vertue, is with a liuelie force to hinder the progresse of vice, and hauing suffered himselfe to be surpris'd, with the first motions of the passions, to arme and bind himselfe to staie their course, and to overcome them. The third and chiefest, is out of a high resolution, and a perfect habit, to be so well framed, that temptations cannot so much as grow in him, and the seeds of vice are whollie rooted out, in so much that his vertue is turned into a complexion, and into nature. This last may be called perfection, That & the first, which is called goodnesse, do resemble one the other, and differ from the second, in that they are without stirre, paine, or endeavour. This is the true tincture of the soule, his naturall and ordinarie course, which costeth nothing. The second is alwaies in care and awe. The last and perfect is acquired by the long studie and serious exercise of the rules of philosophie, ioined to a beautifull and rich nature. For both are necessarie, the naturall and the acquired. This is that, those two sects did so much studie, the *Stoicks* and much more the *Epicures* (which would haue seemed strange if *Seneca* and other ancient Philosophers did not testifie it, who are rather to be credited, than all the other more moderne) who made a sport and play game of shame, want, sickness, griefes, tortures, death: They did not only contemne, patiently endure and vanquish all asperities and difficulties, but they sought them, they tooke pleasure and delight in them, and all to keepe their vertue in breath, and in action,

which

which made them not only firme, constant, graue and seuer, as *Cato* and the *Stoicks*, but cheerefull, merry, wanton, and if a man may so say, foole-hardy too.

By the comparision of these three together, it seemeth to some (who vnderstand not the height and value of the third) that the second, which we call vertue, by reason of the difficulties, dangers, endeouours thereof, carrieth the honour, and that as *Metellus* said, to doe euill is an idle and a base thing; to doe good where there is neither paine nor danger, is a common thing and too easie; but to doe good where there is danger and paine, is the part of an honest man, and of vertue: it is the mot of that diuine Philosopher *Aristotle*. But to speake in truth that which it is, besides that difficultie (as elsewhere hath bene said) is not true, nor iust and lawfull cause, why a thing should be the more esteemed; it is certaine, that in the like thing the naturall is more worth than the acquired; that it is far more noble, more excellent and diuine to worke by nature than by Art, easily, equally, vniiformedly, than painfully, vnequally, with doubt and danger. God is good after the first maner, that is, the naturall and essentiall goodnesse, we dare not call him vertuous, nor the Angels and spirits fortunate: they are called good. But because vertue maketh a greater clamor and stirre, and worketh with greater vehemencie than goodnesse, it is more admired and esteemed of the vulgar sort (who are but foolish iudges) but wrongfully. For these great exalters and extrauagant productions, which seeme to be all zeale and fire, are no part of the play, and doe not in any sort appertaine to true honesty; they are rather maladies and furious entrances, farre distant from that wisdome we heere require, which is sweet, equall, & vniforme.

Thus much be spoken in grosse of honestie; for the parts thereof and the duties shall be handled in the third booke, especially in the vertue of Iustice. I will heere adde a word or two (according to promise) to rebate and blunt the point of detraction, and to stay the plaints of those, that dislike that I attribute so much to nature (although it be God as hath been said, and this booke speaketh not but of the naturall and humane) as if that were all, and there were nothing else to be required. Wherefore besides all that hath been said, there remaineth



maineth yet one thing to make this worke complete and perfect, and that is the grace of God, whereby this honestie, goodnes, vertue, hath life, is brought forth in his due time, and receiueh it last and perfect portraict, it is eleuated, christned, crowned, that is to say, accepted, verified, approved by God, and made (after a sort) worthie it due reward. Honestie is like to a good Organist, who toucheth well and truly according to arte: the grace and spirit of God, is the blast and wind which expresseh the touch, giueh life, and maketh the instrument to speake, and to make a pleasant melodie. Now this good consisteth not in long discourse, precepts and instructions, neither is it attained by our owne proper act and labour, it is a free gift from aboue, whereof it taketh the name, Grace: but we must desire it, aske, implore it, both humbly and ardentlie: O God, vouchsafe of thy infinit goodnesse to looke vpon me with the eye of thy clemencie, to accept & to like of my desire, mine essaye, my little worke, which comes originallie from thee, by that obligation and instruction, which thou hast giuen mee in the law of nature, which thou hast planted in me, to the end it may returne vnto thee, and that thou mayest end that thou hast begun, that so thou mayest be both my  $\alpha$  and  $\omega$ : Sprinkle mee with thy grace, keepe me, and account me thine, and so forth. The better to obtaine it, that is to say to incline God vnto vs, is this honestie (as hath been said in the Preface, whither (that I may not iterate it) I resend the reader) the matter being well prepared, is the fitter for the forme, the grace, it is not contrarie, neither doth it enforce or destroy nature, but sweetly it releueh and perfecteth it, so that it must not oppose it selfe thereunto as to it contrarie, but put it on as a crowne. They are both of God, they must not therefore be confounded, euery one hath his iurisdiction, his action a part: The organist and he that worketh at the bellows are two, so are honestie and grace, the action good in it selfe naturally, morally, humainly, and that by grace made acceptable. That may well be without this, and hath his worth, as in those philosophers & great men in times past, admirable in nature, and in all kind of morall vertue, and is likewise found in misbelievers or Infidels; but this cannot be without that, no more than the couering, the

Art. 14



the crowne and perfection can be without the entire bodie. The player or organist may in every point exercise his arte, without the bellows-blower, and so likewise honestie without grace. It is true that this cannot be but as *sonans*, and *cymbalum tinniens*, but this requireth that : wherein I see many to mistake themselves very grossely, who neuer haue any taste, or do euer conceiue the image of true honestie, and continue puffed vp with a perswasion of grace, which they thinke to practise, to attract, to attaine by certaine easie & idle meanes, after the maner of the Pharisees, wherewith they rest contented, not troubling themselves any farther for the true honestie, *promoti per saltum*, Masters without apprenticeship. Doctors and nobles in parchment. Now I see many of these kind of people in the world, but very few such as *Aristides*, *Phocion*, *Cato*, *Regulus*, *Socrates*, *Scipio*, *Epaminondas*, that is to say, professors of an exact, true, and solid morall vertue, and philosophicall probitie. That complaint and reproch so frequent of the soueraigne Doctor of the truth, against hypocriticall Pharisees, will alwaies haue place, for such people will neuer be wanting, no not amongst the Censors and reformers of the world. Now hauing spoken much of honestie, we must likewise in a word or two touch the contrarie thereunto.

Wickednes is against nature, it is foule, deformed, and vnprofitable, it offendeth every good iudgement, it breedeth a hatred of it selfe being well known, whereupon some haue said, that it was bred and brought forth by idlenesse and ignorance. Again, wickednes ingendreth offence and repentance in the soule, which like an vicer in the flesh, eateth and fretteth it, malice and mischief buildeth vp torments against it selfe: *Malitia ipsa maximam partem veneni sui bibit : malum consilium consultoris pessimum : Malice it selfe supbeth vp the greatest part of his owne poyson : Enill counsell is worst to him that giueth it* : like the waspe, which with his sting offendeth another, but much more himselfe, for he leaueth behind him, and that for euer, both his sting and his strength : vice hath pleasure in it, otherwise it would not be receiued, nor find place in the world, *Nemo enim animi causa malus est ; No man is wicked for his mind sake* ; but it doth withall ingender displeasure & offence, paine followeth sinne, saith *Plato*, yea it groweth with it, saith

17

The description  
of wickednesse.

*Hesiodus*, which is quite contrarie to the will and to vertue which reioyceth and contenteth. There is a congratulation, a pleasing contentment and satisfaction in well doing; it is the true and essentiall reward of a good soule, which can neuer faile him, & wherewith he must content himselfe in this world.

18  
*Whether it be  
newer permitted  
to sinne.*

There is no man maketh a doubt, whether vice be to be avoided, and hated aboue all thing; but it is a question, whether there may be any such profit or pleasure, as may carrie with it a sufficient excuse for the committing of such or such a sinne. It seemeth to diuers, that there may. Touching profit, if it be publicke, there is no doubt (but yet with limitation, as shall be said in the vertue of politike prudence) but some will say as much of particular profit and pleasure. A man might speake and iudge heereof more certainly, if some certaine fact or example were proposed: but to speake simplie, we are firmly to hold the negatiue.

*Lib. 3. cap. 2.*

19  
*Whether all sin  
sunder reputa-  
tion.  
The distinction  
of vice or wicked-  
nesse.*

That sinne can not inwardly furnish vs with such pleasure and content, as honestie doth, there is no doubt; but that it tormenteth (as hath beene said) it is not vniuersally and in all senses true: we must therefore distinguish it. There are three sorts of wickednesse and wicked people: some are incorporated into euill, by discourse and resolution, or by long habit, in such sort, that their vnderstanding it selfe approueth it and consenteth thereunto. This falleth out, when sinne hauing met with a strong and vigorous heart, is in such sort rooted therein, that it is there forined and as it were naturalized, and the soule infected and wholly tainted therewith. Others contrariwise do ill by impullions, according as the violent winde of temptation troubleth, stirreth and precipitateth the soule vnto sinne, and as they are surprisid and carried by the force of passion. The third, as midlings betwixt these two, account their vice such as it is, they accuse and condemne it, contrarie to the first, and they are not carried by passion or temptation as the second, but in colde blood, hauing well thought thereof, they enter into the market, they ballance it with some great pleasure or profit, and in the end at a certaine price and measure they yeeld thereunto, and they thinke they haue some excuse to doe it. Of this sort of sinnes are vsuries, obscenities or venereous pleasure, and other sinnes manie times

times resumed, consulted, deliberated, as also the sinnes of complexion.

Of these three, the first do neuer repent, without some extraordinary touch from heaven: for being settled and hardened in wickednesse, they feele not the pricke and sting thereof: for since the vnderstanding approveth it, and the soule is wholly tainted therewith, they will hath no will to gaine say it. The third repent, or seeme in a certaine fashion, that is to say, simply considering the dishonest action in it selfe, but afterwards weighing it with profit or pleasure, they repent not at all: and to say the truth, and to speake properly, they do not repent, since both their reason and conscience willet and consenteth to the fault. The second are they that repent and readuise themselves, and of whom properly it is called repentance; whereof I will heere take occasion to speake a word or two.

Repentance is a disauowing or deniall, and a retraction of the will, that is, a sorrow or grieve ingendred in vs by reason, which driueth away all other sorrowes and griefes which proceed from outward causes. Repentance is inward, inwardly ingendred, and therefore more strong than any other, as the heat and colde of a feauer is more violent than that which is outward. Repentance is the medicine of the soule, the death of sinne, the cure of our willes and consciences: but it is necessarie that we well know it. First, it is not of euerie sinne, as hath beene said, not of that which is inueterate, habituated, authorized by the iudgement it selfe, but of the accidental, and that which happeneth either by surpris or by force; nor of things that are not in our power, whereof we are sorrie we cannot repent; neither can it be in vs, by reason of bad issues, and contrary to our counsels and designments. If a matter fall out besides a mans thought, concept, and aduice; for that he must not repent him of his counsell and aduice, if he therein carrie himselfe as he ought, for a man cannot diuine of euents; and if a man did know them, yet he hath no place to consult of them; and we neuer are to iudge of counsels by their issues; neither must it grow in him by the age, impotencie, & distaste of things, this were to suffer his iudgement to be corrupted: for the things are not changed, because

cause wee are changed, by age, sicknesse, or other accidents. The growing wise, or amendment, which comes by anxietie, distaste, or feeblenes, is not true and religious, but idle and languishing. The weaknesse of the bodie is no fit post to carie vs to God, and to our duty and repentance, but true repentance is the gift of God, which toucheth our heart, and must grow in vs not by the weaknesse of the bodie, but by the force of the soule and of reason.

22

Of confession &  
excuse.

Now from true repentance there ariseth a true, free, and religious confession of our faults. As in the maladies of the bodie we see two kinds of remedies the one which healeth, taking away the cause and roote of the maladie, the other which doth only cover it and bring it asleepe, and therefore the former is more forcible and more wholsome. So likewise in the maladies of the soule, the true remedie which clenseth and healeth, is a serious and modest confession of our faults; the other false which doth only disguise and cover, is excuse, a remedie inuented by the author of euill it selfe, whereof the proverbe is, That sinne soweth it selfe a garment, that is, excuse, the garment made of figge leaues by the first offenders, who couered themselues both with words and deeds, but it was a garment without warmth. We should therefore learne to accuse our selues, boldly to confesse all our actions & thoughts, for besides that it were a faire and generous libertie, it were likewise a meane not to doe or thinke any thing, which were not honest and fit to be published: for he that will be content to be bound to tell all, will be likewise content to bind himselfe to do nothing that a man is constrained to hide, but contrarily, euery man is discret and secret in confession, but not in action. Boldnes to sinne, is in some sort bridled by boldnes to confesse. If it be vndecent to do a thing, it is farre more vndecent not to dare to auouch it. Many great and holy men, as *Saint Austine, Origen, Hippocrates*, haue published the errors of their opinions, and we should doe the like of our maners. By going about to hide them, a man falleth many times into great euils, as he that solemnly denieth that he hath abused his bodie with another, by thinking to mend the matter marres it, at least wise multiplies his sinne. This is not to excuse vice, but to adde thereunto.

## CHAP. IIIL

To haue a certaine end and forme of life, the second  
foundation of Wisdom.

**A**fter this first foundation of true and inward honestie, there commeth as it were by way of preamble, a second foundation, necessary for the government of our life, which is to prepare and frame our selues to a certaine and assured course of life, to make choice of that calling which doth best besit vs: and is proper vnto vs; that is to say, which our particular nature (following alwaies the vniuersall, our great and generall mistris and gouernor) doth willinglie accommodate and applie it selfe vnto. Wisdom is a sweet and regular conduct and cariage of our soule, guiding it with measure and proportion, and consisteth in an equality of life and maners.

This choice then is a matter of great difficulty, wherein a man carieth himselfe very diuersly, and wherein hee findeth himselfe hindered by diuers considerations, which draw him into diuers parts, and many times hurt and hinder one another. Some are happie therein, who by a great goodnes and felicitie of nature, haue knowen both speedily and easily how to choose, and either by a certaine good hap, without any great deliberation; are, as it were, wholly caried into that course of life, which doth best besit them, in such sort that fortune hath beene their chooser, and led them vnto it, or by the friendly and prouident hand of another, they haue beene guided and directed. Others contrarily are vnhappy, who hauing failed euen from the entrance, and wanting the spirit, or industrie to know themselves, and in a good houre to be readuised how they might cunningly withdraw their stake in the midst of the game, are in such sort engaged, that they can no more recall themselves, and so constrained to lead a life full of inconuenience and repentance.

But it likewise proceedeth many times from the great default of him that deliberateth, either in not knowing himselfe well, and presuming too much of himselfe, whereby it falleth out that he must either shamefully delist from that which he hath vndertaken, or endure much paine and torment in persisting therein. Hee must remember that to cary a burthen,

it

2  
*This choice a  
difficult thing,  
wherin a man  
carieth himselfe  
diuersly.*

it is necessary there be more strength than burthen, otherwise a man is constrained either to leaue it, or to linke vnder it. A wise man doth neuer charge himselfe with more businesse, than he knoweth how to goe thorow : or in not setting himselfe in any thing, but changing from day to day, as they doe that are neuer pleased nor satisfied with any thing, but that which they haue not, euery thing discontenteth them, as well ease, as businesse, to command as to obey. These kind of people liue miserable, and without rest, as men constrained. The other likewise cannot hold themselves quiet, they cease not to go and come to no purpose, they seeme to do much and do nothing; the actions of a wise man doe alwaies tend to some certaine end. *Magnum rem puta unum hominem agere, prater sapientem nemo unum agit, multiformes sumus. Thinke it a great matter for a man to doe one thing; Except wo man, but a wise man doth one thing, for we are of many and diuers fashions and shapes,* But the most part doe not deliberate, and consult of any thing, they suffer themselves to be led like oxen, or carried according to the times, company, occasion, and then know not how to giue a reason, why they are rather of this calling than another, except it be because their father profess the same, or that they were vnawares carried into it, and so haue continued therein, in such sort, that as they did neuer well consider of their entrance, so they know not which way to get out, *Pauci sunt qui consilio se suaque disponant, ceteri eorum more qui fluminibus innatant, non eunt sed feruntur. Few dispose aduisedly of themselves or their affaires: others doe it in that maner as men swimme; who goe not, but are carried with the water and course of the streame.*

3  
 Counsell in  
 these affaires.

Now, that a man may carry himselfe well heerein, choose well, and well acquite himselfe, he must know two things and two natures: his owne, that is, his complexion, his port and capacity, his temperature, in what a man excelleth, in what hee is feeble, what he is fit for, for what he is vnfit: For to goe against his owne nature, is to tempt God, to spit against the heavens, to leaue the businesse vndone, because hee cannot doe it, *nec quidquam sequi quod assequi nequeat, Attempt not any thing, that thou canst not attaine to,* and to expose himselfe to laughter and mockery. Afterward hee must know that  
 which

which belongs to his affaires, that is to say, the estate, profession, and kinde of life that is proposed. There are some where in the affaires are great and weightie, others where they are dangerous, others where they are not so great, but are mingled, and full of entanglements, and that draw after them many other busineses; these charges doe much afflict the spirit. Every profession requireth more specially one certaine facultie of the soule, one the vnderstanding, another the imagination, another the memorie. Now to know these two natures, his owne, and that of the profession and course of life, that which hath beene said of the diuers temperatures of the inward parts and faculties, will helpe much. Knowing these two natures, we must compare them together, to see whether they can well ioine and endure together, for it is necessary that they agree, if a man be to contest with his owne nature, and to enforce it for the seruice and performance of a function and charge which he vndertaketh; or contrarily, if to follow his nature, whether willingly, or that by force and insensibly it draw him, a man happen to faile or erre in his dutie, what disorder is there? Where is equitie? Where is decencie? *Si quicquam decorum, nihil profecto magis quam aequalitas vite vniuersae, & singularium actionum, quam conseruare non possis: si aliorum inueteris naturam, omittas tuam.* If anything be comely, nothing is more comely than the equallitie of the whole life, and of euery particular action, which thou canst not preserue, if thou wilt follow the nature of other men, and omit thine owne. This is the account wee must make, when wee thinke to doe any thing that hath worth or grace in it, if nature it selfe be wanting.

*Tu nihil inuita disces faciesue Minerva:*

*If nature be not bent thereto,*

*Nothing shalt thou speake or doe.*

*Id quaeque decet quod est suum maxime: sic est faciendum, ut contra naturam vniuersam nil contendamus, ea seruata propriam sequamur.* That becomes euery man best, that is his owne: so ought wee to carrie ourselues, as wee contend not against vniuersall nature, but that being kept, follow our owne. And if it fall out, that by mishap, imprudencie, or otherwise a man finde himselfe engaged in a vocation and course of life painfull and vnprofitable, and that a man cannot flie backe; it is the part of

wisdome,



290 To studie true pietie, the first office of Wisdome.

wisdome, to resolue to beare it, to sweeten it, to accommodate it vnto himselfe as much as he can, doing as in a game at hazard, according to the counsell of *Plato*, wherein if the die or card fall not out to be good, a man taketh it patiently, and induoureth to mend his ill chaunce by his good play; and like Bees, who from Tyme, a sharpe and drie herbe, gather sweet honye, and as the proverbe is, make a vertue of necessitie.

## CHAP. V.

To studie true pietie, the first office of Wisdome.

THE preparatiues made, and the two foundations laid, it is time to build, and to set downe the rules of wisdome, whereof the first and most noble concerneth the religion and worship of God. Pietie holdeth the first place in the ranke of our duties, and it is a thing of great importance, wherein it is dangerous and very easie to erre and be mistaken. It is necessary therefore to be aduised, and to know how he that studieth wisdome should gouerne himselfe; which we purpose to doe, hauing a little discoursed of the state and successe of religions in the world, referring the rest vnto that which I haue said in my three Verities.

1  
Diuersitie of  
religions.

It is first a very fearefull thing, to consider the great diuersitie of religions which haue bene and are in the world, and much more of the strangenesse of some of them, so fantastical and exorbitant, that it is a wonder that the vnderstanding of man should be so much befotted and made drunken with impostures; for it seemeth, that there is nothing in the world high or low, which hath not bene desired in some place or other, and that hath not found a place wherein to be worshipped.

2  
That all agree  
in many principles.

They all agree in many things, and haue likewise taken their beginning in the same climate. *Palestina* and *Arabia* which ioine together (I meane the more renowned and famous mistresse of the rest) haue their principles and foundations almost alike; The beleefe of one God the author of all things, of his prouidence and loue towards mankinde, the immortalitie of the soule, reward for the good, chastisement



chastisement for the wicked after this life, a certaine outward profession of praying, invocating, honoring and serving God: To win them credit, and that they may be received, they allege and furnish themselves, whether in deed and in veritie, as the true; or by imposture and faire semblance, with revelations, apparitions, prophets, miracles, prodigies, holy mysteries, Saints. All have their fountaine and beginning small, feeble, humble, but by little and little by the imitation and contagious acclamation of the people, with some fictitious as forerunners, they have taken footing, and become authorized, in so much that they all are held with affirmation and devotion, yea the absurdest amongst them. All hold and teach that God is appeased and wooed by prayers, presents, vows, and promises, and the like: All beleue that the principall and most pleasant service of God, and the powerfulllest meane to appease him, and to obtaine his grace, is to punish, to cut themselves, to impose vpon themselves some painefull and difficult labour, with little thorowout the world, and almost in all religions, and rather in the false than in the true, in Mahometisme, than Christianitie, so many orders, companies, hermitages and frieries destinated to certaine and diuers exercises very painfull and of a strict profession, even to the lancing and cutting of their bodies, thinking thereby to merit much more than the common sort, who purifie not themselves with afflictions and torments as they doe, and euery day they provide new: and the nature of man doth neuer cease to inuent meanes of paine and torment, which proceedeth from the opinion that God taketh pleasure, and is pleased with the torment and ruine of his creatures, which opinion is founded vpon the sacrifices, which were vniuersall thorowout the world before the birth of Christianitie, and exercised not only vpon innocent beasts, which were massacred, with the effusion of their blood, for a pretious present vnto God, but (a stranger thing that man should be so sottish) vpon infants, innocents, and men, as well good and honest as offenders, a custome practised with great religion almost in all nations: As the *Geta* a people of *Seythia*, who among other ceremonies and sacrifices dispatched vnto their god *Zamolxiu*, from five yeeres to five, a man amongst them to demand things necessarie

farie for them. And because it was thought necessarie that one should die suddenly, at an instant, and that they did expose themselves vnto death after a doubtfull maner, by running themselves vpon the points of three iavelins, whereby it fell out, that many were dispatched in their order, vntill there came one that lighted vpon a mortall wound, and died suddenly, accounting him the fittest messenger, and in greatest fauour with their god, and not the rest: as the *Perians*, witnesseth that fact of *Amestris* the mother of *Xerxes*, who at one instant buried aliue foureteene yooing men of the best houses, according to the religion of the countrey: as the ancient *Gawles*, the *Carthaginians*, who sacrificed to *Saturne* their children, their fathers and mothers being present: the *Lacedemonians*, who flattered their goddesse *Diana*, by whipping their youths in fauour of her, many times euen to death: the *Greekes*, witnesseth the sacrifice of *Iphigenia*: the *Romans*, witnesseth the two *Decij*: *qua fuit tanta iniquitas deorum ut placari pop. Rom. non possent, nisi tales viri occidissent: which was such iniustice of the gods, as they could not please the Romans, vntill they had slain such men.* *Turkes*, who so massacre their vilage, their brests, their members, to gratifie their Prophet: the new East and West *Indies*; and in *Themsistuan*, where they cement their idols with the blood of children. What madnesse was this, to thinketo flatter the Diuinitie with inhumanitie; to content the Diuine Goodnesse with our affliction, and to satisfie the iustice of God with crueltie! Iustice then thirsting after humane blood, innocent blood; drawen and shed with so much paine and torment, *Ut sic dy placentur quemadmodum in homines quidem sentiunt: As the gods might be pleased, without the crueltie of men.* From whence can this opinion and beleefe spring, that God taketh pleasure in torment, and in the ruine of his works, and humane nature? Following this opinion, of what nature should God be? But all this hath beene abolished thorowout Christendome, as before hath beenesaid.

Seneca.

3  
They differ.

They haue also their differences, their particular articles, whereby they are distinguished amongst themselves, & euery one preferres it selfe aboue the rest, assuring himselfe it is the better, and more true than the rest, reproching the one the other with some things, and so condemne & reiect one another.

But

But no man doubteth, neither is it a matter of labour to know which is the truest, the Christian religion hauing so many aduantages and priuileges, so high and so authentically aboue others, and especially these. It is the subiect of my second veritie, where is shewed how farre all others are inferiour vnto it.

4  
Christians' religion aboue all.

Now as they spring vp one after another, the younger doth alwayes build vpon the more ancient and next precedent, which from the toppe to the bottome it doth not whollie disproue & condemne; for then it could not be heard or take footing; but it only accuseth it either of imperfection, or of the end, & that therefore it commeth to succeed it and to perfect it? and so by little and little ouerthroweth it, and enricheth it selfe with the spoiles therof: as the Iudaicall, which hath retained many things of the Gentile Egyptian religion the elder, the Hebrewes not being easily purified of their customes: the Christian built vpon the verities and promises of the Iudaicall; the Turkish vpon them both, retaining almost all the verities of Christ Iesus, except the first and principall, which is his Diuinity: so that if a man will leape from Iudaisme to Mahumatisme, he must passe by Christianitie: & such there haue beene among the Mahumatists; as haue exposed themselves to torments, to maintaine the truth of Christian religion, as a Christian would do to maintaine the truth of the Old Testament. But yet the elder and more ancient doe wholly condemne the yonger, and holde them for capitall enemies.

5  
The latter are built vpon the former.

All religions haue this in them, that they are strange and horrible to the common sense; for they propose and are built and composed of parts, whereof some seeme to the iudgement of man base, vnworthy and vnbesitting, wherewith the spirit of man somewhat strong and vigorous, iesteth and sporteth it selfe; others too high, bright, wonderfull, and mysticall, where he can know nothing, wherewith it is offended. Now the spirit of man is not capable but of indifferent things, it contemneth and disdaineth the small, it is astonished and confounded with the great; and therefore it is no maruell if it be hardly perswaded at the first onset to receiue all religion, where there is nothing indifferent and common, and therefore must be drawen thereunto by some occasion: for if it be

6  
All are strange to nature.

strong, it disdaineth and laugheth at it; if it be feeble and superstitious, it is astonished and scandalized: *Prædicamus Iesum crucifixum, Iudeis scandalum, gentibus stultitiam. We preach Iesus crucified, a scandale to the Iewes, to the people folie.* Whereof it comes to passe, that there are so many mis-beleeuers and irreligious persons, because they consult and hearken too much to their owne iudgements, thinking to examine and iudge of the affaires of religion according to their owne capacitie, and to handle it with their owne proper and naturall instrument. We must be simple, obedient, and debonaire, if we will be fit to receiue religion, to belecue and liue vnder the law, by reuerence and obedience to subiect our iudgement, and to suffer our selues to be led and conducted by publike authoritie, *Captiuantes intellectum ad obsequium fidei. Submitting our understanding to the obedience of faith.*

But it was required so to proceed, otherwise religion should not be respected and had in admiration as it ought; now it is necessarie that it be receiued and sworne to, as well authentically and reuerentlie, as difficultlie: If it were such as were whollie pleasing to the palat and nature of man without strangenesse, it would be thought more easily, yet lesse reuerently received.

7  
Why they are  
not to be gotten  
by humane  
meanes.

Now the religions and beliefs being such as hath been said, stragge vnto the common sense, very farre exceeding all the reach and vnderstanding of man, they must not, nor cannot be gotten nor setled in vs by naturall and humane meanes (for then among so many great minds as there haue been rare and excellent, some had attained thereunto) but it must needs be, that they be giuen vs by extraordinarie and heavenly reuelation, gotten and receiued by diuine inspiration, and as sent from heauen. In this maner likewise all do affirme, that they hold their religion and belecue it, not from men, or any other creature, but from God.

8  
And yet they  
are gotten by  
humane meanes

But to say the truth and not to flatter or disguise, this is nothing; they are, whatsoever some say, held by humane hands and meanes, which is true in euery respect, in false religions, being nothing but prayers, and humane or diabollicall inuentions: the true, as they haue another iurisdiction, so are they both receiued and held by another hand; neuertheless

we

we must distinguish. As touching the receiving of them, the first and generall publication and installation of them hath been, *Domino cooperante, sermoni confirmante sequentibus signis, God working, his word confirming, and signes following*, diuine and wonderfull, the particular is done by humane hands and meanes; the nation, countrie, place, giues the religion, and that a man professeth which is in force in that place and among those persons where he is borne, and where he liueth; He is circumcised, baptised, a Jew, a Christian, before he knowes that he is a man; for religion is not of our choyce or election, but man without his knowledge is made a Jew or a Christian, because he is borne in Iudaisme or Christianitie; and if he had beene borne elsewhere among the Gentiles, or Mahumetans, he had beene likewise a Gentile or a Mahumetan. As touching the obseruation, the true & good professors thereof, besides the outward profession, which is common to all, yea to misbeleevers, they attribute to the gift of God, the testimonie of the Holy Ghost within; but this is a thing not common nor ordinarie, what faire colour soeuer they giue it, witnes the liues and maners of men, so ill agreeing with their beleeve, who for humane occasions and those very light, goe against the tenor of their religion. If they were held & planted with a diuine hand, nothing in the world could shake vs, such a tyewould not be so easily broken: If it had any touch or ray of diuinitie, it would appeare in all, it would produce wonderfull effects that could not be hid, as Truth it selfe hath said, If you haue but as much faith as a mustard seed, you should remoue mountaines. But what proportion or agreement is there betwixt the perswasion of the immortalitie of the soule, and a future reward so glorious and blessed, or so inglorious, and accursed, and the life that a man leadeth? The only apprehension of those things that a man saith he doth firmly beleeue, will take his senses from him: The only apprehension and feare to die by iustice, and in publicke place, or by some other shamefull and dishonorable action, hath made many to lose their senses, and cast them into strange trances: and what is that in respect of the worth of that which religion teacheth vs is to come? But is it possible in truth to beleeue, to hope for that immortalitie so happie, and yet to feare death

a necessarie passage thereunto? to feare and apprehend that, infernall punishment, and lue as we do? These are things as incompatible as fire and water. They say they beleue it, they make themselves beleue they beleue it, and they will make others beleue it too; but it is nothing, neither do they know what it is to beleue. For a beleefe, I meane such as the scripture calleth historicall, is diabolicall, dead, informed, vprofitable, and which many times doth more hurt than good: Such beleeuers (saith an ancient Writer) are mockers and impostors; and another saith, that they are in one respect, the most fierce and glorious, in another the most loose, dissolute, and villanous of the world; more than men in the articles of their beleefe, and worse than swine in their liues. Doubtlesse if we hold our selues vnto God, and our religion, I say not by a diuine grace as we should, but only after a simple and common maner, as we beleue a historie, or a friend or companion, we should place them farre about all other things for that infinite goodnesse that shineth in them, at the least they should be put in the same ranke or degree with honour, riches, friends. Now there are very few that doe not feare lesse to commit an offence against God, and any point of his religion, than against his father, his master, his friend, his equals. All this hurteth not the dignitie, puritie, and height of Christianitie, no more than the dunghill infecteth the beames of the Sunne, which shines vpon it; for as one saith, *Fides non à personis, sed contra*. But a man cannot pronounce so great a *Va* against those false hypocrites, whom Verity it selfe so much condemneth, as they belch out of their owne mowthes against themselves.

Math 23.

*A distinction  
betweene the  
true and false  
religion.*

The better to know true piety, it is necessarie first to separate it from the false, fained and counterfeite, to the end, wee may not equiuocate as the most part of the world doth. Ther is nothing that maketh a fairer shew, and that taketh greater paines to resemble true pietie and religion, and yet that is more contrarie and enemy thereunto, than superstition: like the Woofe, which doth not a little resemble the dogge, but yet hath a spirit and humour quite contrarie; and the flatterer who counterfeith a zealous friend, and is nothing lesse; or like false coine which maketh a more glittering shew than the

the true. *Gens superstitioni obnoxia, religionibus aduersa.* The *Taine* people is subject to superstition, contrarie to true religion. It is like-wisfe enuious and iealous like an amorous adulteresse, who with her smooth speeches makes shew of greater affection, & care of the husband, than the true and lawfull wife, whom she endeuoureth to make odious vnto him. Now the notable differences of these two are, that religion loueth and honoureth God, setteth a man in peace and rest, and lodgeth in a liberall, free and generous soule: Superstition troubleth a man, and makes him wild, and iniureth God himselfe, teaching to feare with horror and astonishment, to hide himselfe, and to flie from him, if it were possible; it is a weake, poore, and base malady of the soule; *Superstio error insanus, amandus* August. *timet, quos colit violat: morbus pusilli animi, qui superstitione imbutus est, quietus esse nusquam potest.* Varro ait Denique a religioso vereri, a superstioso timeri. Superstition is a franticke error, it feareth friends; corrupteth those that love it: It is the disease of a weake mind, which being infelled with superstition, can neuer be at rest. Varro saith, religious men feare God for love, the superstitions for punishment. Let vs speake of them both apart.

A superstitious man suffereth neither God nor man to liue in peace. Hee apprehendeth God as one anxious, spitefull, hardly contented, easily moued, with difficulty appeased, examining our actions after the humane fashion of a seuerer Iudge, that watcheth our steps; which hee proueth true by his maner of seruing him, which is all after one fashion. He trembleth for feare, he is neuer secure, fearing he neuer doth well enough, and that he hath left something vndone, by the omission whereof all is worth nothing that he hath done; he doubteth whether God be well content, and laboureth to flatter him, to the end he may appease and winne him; he importuneth him with prayers, vowes, offerings; he faineth to himselfe miracles, easily beleeueth & receiueth such as are counted by others, and interpreteth all things though purely naturall, as expresse sent and done by God, and runneth after whatsoeuer a man saith with all the care that may be, *Duos superstitionis propria, nimius timor, nimius cultus.* Two things are proper to superstition; to much feare, to much honour.

10  
Superstition  
described.



What is all this but by punishing himselfe, vilely, basely, and vnworthily to deale with God, & more mechanicallie, than a man would doe with a man of honour? Generally all superstition & fault in religion, proceedeth from this, that wee make not that account of God that we should, we reuoke him, and compell him into order, wee iudge of h'm according to our selues, we put vpon him our humours. O what blasphemie is this!

11  
*It is naturall.*

Now this vice and malady is almost naturall vnto vs, and we haue all a kind of inclination thereunto. *Plutarch* deplo-  
reth the infirmity of man, who neuer knoweth how to keepe  
a measure, or to settle himselfe vpon his feet: for it leaneth &  
degenerateth either into superstition and vanity, or into a  
contempt and carelesnesse of diuine things. We are like to an  
ill aduised husband, besotted and couened with the coyn-  
ing subtilties of a light woman, with whom he conuerseth more  
by reason of hir artificiall flatteries, than with his honest  
spouse, who honereth and serueth him with a simple and na-  
turall shamesfastnes: and euen so superstition pleaseth vs more  
than true religion

12  
*Popular.*

It is likewise vulgar, it proceedeth from a weaknesse of the  
soule, an ignorance or mis-knowledge of God, and that very  
grosse, and therefore it is most commonly found in children;  
women, old men, sicke, and such as haue beene assaulted with  
some violent accident. To be brieife, it is in barbarous natures,  
*Inclinant naturam ad superstitionem barbari. Barbarous natures  
incline soonest to superstition.* Of this then it is said, and not of  
true religion, that it is true that *Plato* affirmeth, that the weak-  
nesse and idlenesse of men hath brough in religion, & made  
it preuaile, whereby children, women, and old men should be  
most capable of religion, more scrupulous and deuout: this  
were to wrong true religion to giue it so poore and fraile a  
foundation.

13  
*Nourished and  
maintained by  
humane reason.*

Besides these seeds and naturall inclinations to superstiti-  
on, there are many that shake hands with it, and fauour it  
greatly for the great gaine and profit they receiue by it.  
Great men likewise and mightie, though they know what it  
is, will not trouble nor hinder it, because they know it is a  
very fit instrument to leade a people withall, and therefore they



they do not only enflame and nourish that which is already grafted in nature, but when neede requireth they forge and inuent new, as *Scipio, Sertorius, Sylla*, and others, *Qui faciunt Curia. animos humiles formidine diuim, depressosq, premunt ad terram. Nulla res multitudinem efficacius regit, quam superstitio.* Which makes their mindes humble for offending the gods, and lowly prostrate themselves to the ground. Nothing more forcibly carrieth a multitude then superstition.

Now quitting our selues of this foule and base superstition, (which I would haue him to abhorre, whom I desire to instruct vnto wisdom) let vs learne to guide our selues to true religion and pietie, whereof I will giue some grounds and pourtraies as lesser lights thereunto. But before we enter thereinto, let me heere lay in generall, and by way of preface, that of so many diuers religions, and maners of seruing God, which are, or may be in the world, they seeme to be the most noble, and to haue greatest appearance of truth, which without great externall and corporall seruice, draw the soule into it selfe, and raise it by pure contemplation to admire and adore the greatnesse and infinite maiestie of the first cause of all things, and the essence of essences, without any great declaration or determination thereof, or prescription of his seruice; but acknowledging it indefinitely, to be goodnes, perfection, and infinitnes, wholly incomprehensible & not to be known, as the *Pythagorians*, and most famous Philosophers do teach. This is to approach vnto the religion of the angels, and to put in practise that word of the sonne of God, to adore in spirit and truth, for God accounteth such worshippers the best. There are others on the other side, and in another extremitie, who will haue a visible Deitie, capable by the senses, which base and grosse error hath mocked almost all the world, euen Israel in the desert, in framing to themselves a molten calfe. And of these they that haue chosen the sunne for their god, seeme to haue more reason than the rest, because of the greatness, beautie, and resplendent and vnknowne vertue thereof, euen such as enforce the whole world to the admiration and reuerence of it selfe. The eye seeth nothing that is like vnto it, or that approacheth neere vnto it in the whole vniuerse, it is one Sunne, and without companion, Christianitie, as in the

middle, tempereth the sensible and outward with the insensible and inward, serving God with spirit and body, and accommodating it selfe to great and little, whereby it is better established, and more durable. But even in that too, as there is a diuersitie, and degrees of soules, of sufficiencie and capacitie of diuine grace; so is there a difference in the maner of serving of God; the more high & perfect incline more to the first maner more spirituall and contemplatiue, and lesse externall, the lesse and imperfect *Quasi sub pedagogo. As it were vnder a Tutor* remaine in the other, and do participate of the outward and vulgar deformities.

15 *Diuers descriptions of religion.* Religion consisteth in the knowledge of God, and of our selues: (for it is a relatiue action betwene both) the office thereof is to extoll God to the vttermost of our power, and to beate downe man as low as low may be, as if he were vtterly lost, and afterwards to furnish himselfe with meanes to rise againe, to make him feeble his misery & his nothing, to the end he may put his whole confidence in God alone.

16 The office of religion is to ioine vs to the author and principall cause of all our good, to reunite, and fasten man to his first cause, as to his roote, where-in so long as he continueth firme and settled, he preferueth himselfe in his owne perfection; and contrariwise when he is separated, he instantly fainteth and languisheth.

17 The end and effect of religion is faithfullie to yeeld all the honor and glorie vnto God, and all the benefit vnto man. All good things may be reduced to these two; The profit, which is an amendment, and an essentiall and inward good, is due vnto poore, wretched, and in all points miserable man: the glorie, which is an outward ornament, is due vnto God alone, who is the perfection and fulnes of all good, whereunto nothing can be added, *Gloria in excelsis Deo, & in terra pax hominibus. Glorie be to God on high, and peace with men vpon earth.*

18 *An instruction to pietie.*  
1. *To know God.* Thus much being first known, our instruction to pietie is first to learn to know God: for from the knowledge of things proceedeth that honor we do vnto them. First then we must beleue that he is, that he hath created the world by his power, goodnesse, wisdom, and that by it he gouerneth it; that his

his prouidence watcheth over all things; yea the least that are; that whatsoeuer he sendeth vs is for our good, and that whatsoeuer is euill proceedeth from our selues. If we account those fortunes euill that he sendeth vs, we blaspheme his holy name, because naturally we honour those that doe vs good, and hate those that hurt vs. We must then resolute to obey him, and to take all in good part which commeth from his hand, to commit and submit our selues vnto him:

Secondly, we must honour him: and the most excellent and deuoutest way to doe it, is first, to mount vp our spirits from all carnall, earthly, and corruptible imagination, and by the chastest, highest and holiest conceits exercise our selues in the contemplation of the Diuinitie; and after that we haue adorned it, with all the most magnificall and excellent names and praises that our spirit can imagine, that we acknowledge that we haue presented nothing vnto it worthy it selfe: but that the fault is in our weakenesse and imbecillitie, which can conceiue nothing more high. God is the last endeouour and highest pitch of our imagination, every man amplifying the *Idea* according to his owne capacitie: and to speake better, God is infinitely aboue all our last and highest endeouours and imaginations of perfection.

Againe, we must serue him with our heart and spirit, it is the seruice answerable to his nature: *Deus spiritus est: si Deus est animus, sit tibi puramente colendus.* God is a spirit: if God be a spirit, worship him in puritie of spirit. It is that which he requirith, that which pleaseth him: *Pater tales querit adoratores.* The Father desireth such worshipers. The most acceptable sacrifice vnto his Maiestie, is a pure, free, and humble heart: *Sacrificium Deo spiritus.* A pure heart is a sacrifice vnto God. An innocent soule, an innocent life: *Optimus animus, pulcherrimus Dei cultus: religiosissimus cultus imitari: vnicus Dei cultus, non esse malū.* A pure mind is the best seruice of God; the most religious worshiping of God is to follow him, the only honor of God, is not euill. A wise man is a true sacrifice of the great God, his spirit is his temple, his soule is his image, his affections are his offerings, his greatest and most solemne sacrifice, is to imitate him, to serue and implore him: for it is the part of those that are great, to giue; of those that are poore, to aske: *Beatus*

19

2. To honour him.

20

3. To serue him in spirit.

Seneca.

Laetan.

Merc.

Trism.

tius

*ius dare quam accipere : It is better to giue than to take.*

21

4. To serue him outward and publike seruice, which must be as an assistant to the other, by obseruing the ceremonies, ordinances and customes with moderation without vanitie, without ambition, or hypocrisie, without auarice, and alwaies with this thought, That God will be serued in spirit : and that that which is outwardly done, is rather for our selues than for God ; for humane vnitie and edification than for diuine veritie : *que potius ad morem quam ad rem pertinent : which rather belong to manners and custome, than to the thing it selfe.*

22

5. To pray vnto him.

Our vowes and praiers vnto God should bee all subiect vnto his will : wee should neither desire nor aske any thing, but as he hath ordained, hauing alwaies for our bridle, *Fiat voluntas tua.* To aske any thing against his providence, is to corrupt the Iudge and Gouvernour of the world ; to thinke to flatter him, and to winne him by presents and promises, is to wrong him. God doth not desire our goods : neither, to say the truth, haue we any : all is his. *Non accipiam de domo tua vitulos. &c. meus est enim orbis terra, & plenitudo eius : I will not take the calves from thy house, &c. for the whole world is mine, and all that is therein.* But his will is, that wee only make our selues fit to receiue from him, neuer expecting that wee should giue vnto him, but aske and receiue : for it is his office to giue as beeing great, and it belongeth to man as being poore and needie to begge and to receiue ; to prescribe vnto him that which wee want, and we will, is to expose our selues to the inconueniences of *Midas*, but that is alwaies best, which pleaseth him best. To be brieue, we must thinke, speake, and deale with God, as if all the world did behold vs ; we must liue and conuerse with the world, as if God saw vs.

23

6. To vse his name.

It is not with respect to honour the name of God as wee ought, but rather to violate it, lightly and promiscuously to mingle it in all our actions and speeches, as it were by acclamation or by custome, either not thinking thereof, or cursorily to passe him ouer ; we must speake of God and his workes soberly, but yet seriously with shamefastnesse, feare, and reuerence, and neuer presume to iudge of him.

24

And thus much summarily of pietie, which should be in high

high esteeme, contemplating alwaies God, with a free, cheerful, and filiall soule, not wilde, nor troubled, as the superstitious are. Touching the particularities as well of the beleefe as obseruation, it is necessarie that we tie our selues to the Christian, as to the true, more rich, high, and honorable to God, commodious and comfortable to man, as we haue shewed in our second Veritie, and therein remaining, wee must with a sweet submission submit and settle our selues to that which the Catholike Church in all times hath vniuersally held, and holdeth, and not intangling our selues with nouelties, or selected and particular opinions, for the reasons set downe in my third Verity, and especially in the first and last Chapters, which may suffice vnto him, that cannot, or will not read the whole booke.

Let me only giue this one aduice necessary for him that intendeth to be wise, and that is, not to separate pietie from true honestie, wherof we haue spoken before, and so content himselfe with one of them, much lesse to confound and mingle them together. These are two things very different, & which haue diuers iurisdictions, pietie and probitie, religion and honestie, deuotion and conscience; I will that both of them be iointly in him whom I heere instruct, because the one cannot be without the other entire and perfect, but confused. Behold heere two rocks whereof we must take heed, and few there be that know them, to separate them, and to rest contented with the one, to confound and mingle them, in such sort, that the one be the iurisdiction of the other.

The first that separate them, and that haue but one of them, are of two sorts, for some doe wholly giue themselves to the worship and seruice of God, taking no care at all of true vertue and honestie, wherof they haue no taste, a vice noted as naturall to the Iewes especially (a race aboue all other superstitious, and for that cause odious to all) and much displayed by their prophets, and afterwards by the *Messias*, who reproched them, that of their temple they had made a denne of theeces, a cloake and excuse for many wickedneses, which they perceiued not, so were they besotted with this outward deuotion, wherein putting their whole confidence, they thought themselves discharged of all dutie, yea they were

*The conclusion.*

25

*An aduise-  
ment  
to ioyne pietie  
and probitie to-  
gether.*

26

*Of those which  
haue piety with-  
out p. obis.*

*Math. 15. and  
22.*

made

made more hardie to do any wickednesse. Many are touched with this feminine and popular spirit, wholly attentive to those small exercises of outward deuotion, whereby they are made neuer the better, from whence came that prouerb, *An angell in the Church, a duell in the house*, they lend the shew and outward part vnto God, like the Pharisies, they are sepulchers, white walles, *populus hic labijs me honorat, cor eorum longe à me*; *This people honour me with their lippes, but their heart is farre from me.* yea they make piety a couer for impietie, they make it (as they say) an occupation or a merchandize, and alleadge their offices of deuotion, to extenuate and recompence their sinne and iniquitie. Others quite contrary make no account but of vertue and honestie, little caring for any thing that belongs to religion, a fault of many Philosophers, and which is likewise too common amongst our Atheists. These are two vitious extremities, but which is the more or the lesse extreame, or which of the two is the more worthie, religion, or honestie, it is not my purpose to determin; I will only say (to compare them in three points) that the first is far more easie, of greater shew, of simple and vulgar spirits: the second is far more difficult and laborious in the performance, of lesse shew of spirits valiant and generous.

27

*A comparison,*

28

*Against those  
that confound  
pietie and pro-  
bitie.*

I come to others, who differ not much from the first, who take no care but of religion. They peruert all order, and trouble all, confounding honestie, religion, the grace of God (as hath beene sayd before) whereby it comes to passe that they haue neither true honestie, nor true religion, nor consequently the grace of God; as they thinke, a people only content with themselves, and ready to censure and condemne others, *qui confidunt in se, & aspernant alios. Who trust in themselves, and condemne others.* They thinke that religion is a generality of all good and of all vertue, that all vertues are contained in it, and necessarily follow it, whereby they acknowledge no other vertue nor honestie but that which is opened with the key of religion. Now it is quite contrarie; for religion which is the later, is a specjall and particular vertue, distinguished from all other vertues, which may be without them and without probitie, as hath beene sayd of the Pharisies, religious and wicked; and they without religion, as in many Philosophers

Philosophers good and vertuous, but yet irreligious. It is likewise, as all diuinitie teacheth, a morall humane vertue, appertaining to iustice, one of the foure cardinall vertues, which Thom 2.2.  
2981. teacheth vs in generall to giue vnto euery one that which belongeth vnto him, reseruing to euery one his place. Now God being aboue all, the vniuersall author and master; wee must giue vnto him all soueraigne honour, seruice, obedience, and this subalterne religion, and the *Hypothesis* of iustice, which is the generall *Thesis*, more ancient and naturall. They on the other side, will that a man be religious before he be honest, and that religion (which is acquired and gotten by an outward cause, *ex auditu*; *Quomodo credent sine predicante? by hearing*; *How can they beleue, without preaching?*) engendreth honestie, which we haue shewed should proceed from nature, from that law and light which God hath put into vs, from our first beginning. This is an inuerted order. These men will that a man be an honest man, because there is a Paradise and a hell: so that if they did not feare God, or feare to be damned (for that is often their language) they would make a goodly peece of worke. Miserable honestie! What thanks deseruest thou, for that thou doest? O cowardly and idle innocencie, *quia mis metum non places! which pleaseth not without feare!* Thou keepest thy selfe from wickednesse, because thou darest not be wicked, and thou fearest to be beaten, and even therein art thou wicked. *Oderunt peccare mali formidine piena: The wicked forbear to offend, for feare of punishment.* Now I will that thou dare, but yet that thou wilt not though thou be neuer chidden; I will that thou be an honest man, not because thou wouldest goe to Paradise, but because nature, reason, God willet it, because the law and the generall policie of the world, wherof thou art a part, requireth it; so as that thou canst not consent to be any other, except thou goe against thy selfe, thy essence, thy end. Doubtlesse such honestie occasioned by the spirit of religion, besides that it is not true and essentiall, but accidentall, it is likewise very dangerous, producing many times very base and scandalous effects (as experience in all times hath taught vs) vnder the faire and glorious pretext of pietie. What execrable wickedneses hath the zeale of religion brought forth? Is there any other subiect



308 *To studie true pietie, the first office of it is done.*

or occasion that hath yeelded the like? It belongeth to so great and noble a subiect, to worke great and wondertfull effects:

*Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum,  
Qua peperit saepe scelerosa atque impia facta.  
Religion workes so farre in euill men,  
As wicked deeds it alleth now and then.*

Net to loue him, yea to looke vpon him with a wicked eie, as a man should looke vpon a monster, that beleeueth not as he beleueth. To thinke to be polluted by speaking, or conuersing with him, is one of the sweetest and most pleasing actions of these kinde of people. He that is an honest man by scruple, and a religious bridle, take heed of him, and account of him as he is. And he that hath religion without honestie, I will not say he is more wicked, but farre more dangerous than he that hath neither the one nor the other: *Omnis qui interficiet vos, putabit se obsequium prestare Deo*; Who so killeth you, thinkes he doth an acceptable seruice vnto God: not because religion teacheth, or any way fauoureth wickednesse, as some very foolishly and maliciously from this place doe obiekt, for the most absurd and falsest religion that is, doth it not; but the reason is, that hauing no taste, nor image, nor conceit of honestie, but by imitation, and for the seruice of religion, and thinking that to be an honest man is no other thing, than to be carefull to aduance religion, they beleue all things whatsoeuer, be it treason, treacherie, sedition, rebellion, or any other offence to be not onely lawfull and sufferable, being coloured with zeale and the care of religion, but also commendable, meritorious, yea worthy canonization, if it serue for the progresse and aduancement of religion, and the ouerthrow of their aduersaries. The Iewes were wicked and cruell to their parents, vnjust towards their neighbours, neither lending, nor paying their debts, and all because they gaue vnto the Temple, thinking to be quit of all duties, and reiecting the whole world, by saying *Corban*.

I will then (to conclude this discourse) that there be in this my wise man a true honestie, and a true pietie, ioined and married together, and both of them compleat and crowned with the grace of God, which he denieth none that shall aske

it

Matth. 15. 5.  
Marc. 7. 11.  
6. Hierom.



it of him. *Deus dat spiritum bonum omnibus petentibus eum* : God giveth a good spirit to all that aske it of him : as hath beene said in the preface, article the 14.

## CHAP. VI.

To governe his desires and pleasures.

**I**T is a principall dutie of a wise man, to know well how to moderate and rule his desires and pleasures ; for wholly to renounce them, I am so farre from requiring it in this my wise man, that I hold this opinion to be not only fantastickall, but vitious and unnaturall. First then we must confute this opinion, which banisheth and wholly condemneth all pleasures, and afterwards learne how to governe them.

It is a plausible opinion, and studied by those that would seeme to be men of vnderstanding, and professors of singular sanctitie, generally to contemne and tread vnder foot all sorts of pleasures, and all care of the bodie, ret'ring the spirit vnto it selfe, not hauing any commerce with the bodie, but eleuating it selfe to high things, and so to passe this life as it were insensibly, neither tasting it, nor attending it. With these kinde of people that ordinarie phrase of passing the time, doth very well agree; for it seemeth to them, that well to vse and employ this life, is silently to passe it ouer, and as it were to escape it, and rob themselues of it, as if it were a miserable, burthensome, and tedious thing, being desirous so to slide thorow the world, as that not onely recreations and pastimes are suspected, yea odious vnto them, but also naturall necessities, which God hath seasoned with some pleasure. They come not where any delight is, but vnwillingly, and being where it is, they hold their breath till they be gone, as if they were in a place of infection: and to be brieve, their life is offensive vnto them, and death a solace, pleasing themselues with that saying, which may be as well ill taken and vnderstood, as well, *Non habere in patientia, mortem in desiderio* : Not impatient of life, but rather to desire death.

But the iniquitie of this opinion may many waies be shewed. First, there is nothing so faire and lawfull, as well and duly to play the man, well to know how to leade this life. It is

*The first part.*

*An opinion of the contempt of the world.*

*2. Rejected.*

a diuine knowledge and very difficult, for a man to know how he should lawfully enioy his owne essence, lead his life according to the common and naturall modell, to his proper conditions, not seeking those that are strange; for all those extravagancies, all those artificiall and studied endeouours, those wandering waies from the naturall and common, proceed from follie and passion: these are maladies, without which whilest these men would liue, not by playing the men, but the diuines, they play the fooles; they would transforme themselves into angels, and they turne themselves into beasts: *aut dem aut bestia: homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto: Either a God or a beast: I am a man, and I account my selfe no other than humane.* Man is a body and a soule, and it is not well done to dismember this building, to diuide and separate this brotherly and naturall coniunction; but contrariwise, wee should renewe it by mutuall offices, the spirit must awaken and reuiue the heauie bodie, the bodie must stay the lightnesse of the spirit, which many times prooues but a trouble-feast; the spirit must assist and fauour the bodie, as the husband the wife, and not reiect it, not hate it. It must not refuse to participate the naturall pleasures thereof, which are iust, and such as besit that marriage that is betwixt them, alwaies holding therein, as the more wise, a true moderation. A man must studie, know, and meditate on this life, to the end he may returne condigne thanks vnto him who hath lent it. There is nothing which God hath made for vs in this present life vnworthy our care, and wee are accountable for them, euen to the very haire of our head; for it is no friuolous warrant or commission for a man to direct himselfe and his life according to his naturall condition, but God hath giuen it him seriously and expressly.

But what greater follie is there, and more against nature, than to account our actions vitious, because they are naturall; vnworthie because they are necessarie? Now this necessitie and pleasure is an excellent marriage made by God himselfe. Nature willethe very wisely, that those actions which it hath enioined vs for our necessitie, be also delightfull, inuiting vs thereunto not only by reason, but also by appetite; and these rules these kinde of men goe about to breake. It is an equall fault and iniustice, to loath and condemne all pleasures, and to abuse

abuse them, by louing them over-much, we must neither run to them, nor flee from them, but receiue them, and vse them discreetly and moderatly, as shall presently be said in the rule, Temperance which is the rule of our pleasures, condemneth as well the insensibilitie and priuation of all pleasure, *stuporem natura*, which is the failing extremitie, as intemperancie, *Libidinem*, which is the exceeding extremitie. *Contra naturam est torquere corpus suum, faciles odisse munditias & squallorem appetere: delicatas res cupere luxuria est, viciatias & non magno parabiles fugere, dementia est.* It is against nature to inforce our selues, to hate and contemne neate and necessarie things, and to desire filthinesse and deformity: It is wantonnes to desire delicate things, and meere madnes to auoid those that are common and needfull.

He that desireth to discard his soule, let him boldly do it if he can, when his bodie is not in health, but endureth some torment, to the end he may disburthen himselfe of that contagion: but he cannot do it, as likewise he ought not to do it, for to speake according to right and reason, it should neuer abandon the bodie; it is apishnesse to doe it, it should behold pleasure and sorrow with a like setled countenance, in the one liue seuerely, the other cheerefully: but in all cases it should assist the bodie, to maintaine it alwaies in order.

To contemne the world, is a braue proposition and many delight, nay glory to speake, to discourse thereof, but I can not perceiue that they well vnderstand it, much lesse that they practise it: what is it to contemne the world? What is this world? Is it the heauen, the earth, and in a word the creatures that are therein? No I thinke not so; What then? Is it the vse, the profit, the seruice, and commoditie that we gather thereby? If so, what ingratitude is this against the author that hath made them to these ends? What accusation against nature? What reason to contemne them? If (in the end) thou wilt say that it is neither the one, nor the other, but it is the abuse of them, the vanities, follie, excelsse and wickednes that is in the world; I may answere that it were well said, if this were of the world, but they are not so, but against the world, and the policie thereof, they are thy owne additions, not naturall, but artificiall. To preserue thy selfe from them as wisdom and the rule following teacheth, is not to contemne the

world, which remaineth wholly entire without it, but it is well to vse the world, well to gouerne thy selfe in the world, and as diuinitie teacheth, to make vse and benefit of the world, and not to enioy it, *uti, non frui*. Now these kind of people thinke to practise the contempt of the world, by certaine outward particular maners and fashions, separated by the common course of the world: but this is but mockerie. There is nothing in the world so exquisite, the world laugheth not, and is not so wanton within it selfe, as without, in those places where men make profession of flying it, and trampling it vnder foot, which is spoken against hypocrites, who haue so much degenerated from their beginning, that there remaineth nothing but the habit, and is also very much changed, if not in forme, at the least in matter, which serueth them for no other vse, than to puffed them vp, to make them more bold and impudent, which is quite contrarie to their institution, *Va vobis qui circumitis mare & aridam, et faciatis vnum proselytum, & cum factus fuerit, facitis solum gehenne*: Worbe to you that compasse sea and land, to make one of your profession, and when he is made, yee make him twofold more the childe of hell: and not against the good, much lesse against the estate in it selfe which is the schoole of true and holy Philosophie. It is then a fantastickall and vnnaturall opinion, generally to reiect and condemne all desires and pleasures. God is the creator and author of pleasure, *Plantauit dominus paradisum voluptatis, posuit hominem in paradiso voluptatis, protulit omne lignum pulchrum, suauē, delectabile*, God planted the paradise of pleasure, wherein he placed man, which brought forth all kind of beautifull, sweete and delectable trees, as shall be said. But we must first learne how to carry our selues therein.

Mar. 23.

6  
The second part  
the rule in our  
pleasures and  
desires.

This instruction may be reduced to foure points (which if these mortified men, and great contemners of the world did know how to put in practise, they would worke wonders) to know little, naturally, moderately, and by a short relation to himselfe. These foure go almost alwaies together, and make an entire and perfect rule, and he that will may gather and comprehend all these foure in this word, Naturally, for nature is the fundamentall and sufficient rule for all. But yet to make the matter more cleare and easie, we will distinguish these foure

four points. The first point of this rule, is to desire little: A short good, but an assured meane to braue fortune, taking from it all accidents, and all power ouer vs to hinder the happy content of our life: and in a word, to be wise, is to shorten our desires, to desire either little, or nothing at all. He that desireth nothing, although he haue nothing, is as rich as he that possesseth the whole world, for both come to one end: *Nihil uere est au habere, an non concupiscas: It is all one whether thou hast it, or no, if thou desirest it not*; and therefore it was well said, That it is not multitude and abundance that contenteth and enricheth, but want, yea nothing. It is the want of desire, for he that is poore in desires is rich in contentment, *Summa opes inopia cupiditatum. The want of desires, is great riches.* To be briefe, he that desireth nothing is in some sort like vnto God, and those that are alreadie blessed, who are happy & blessed, not because they haue and possess all, but because they desire nothing: *Qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Ioue de felicitate contendit. Who bridleth his desire, contendeth euen with Iupiter in felicitie.* Contrarily, if we let loose the bridle to our appetite to follow abundance and delicacie, we shall continue in perpetual paine & labour; superfluous things will become necessary, our soules will be made slaues to our bodies, & we can liue no longer, than that we liue in pleasure & delight. If we moderate not our pleasures & desires, & measure them not by the compasse of reason, opinion will carie vs into a headlong downfal, where there is neither bottome nor brinke: as for example, we will make our shooes of veluet, afterwards of cloth of gold, & lastly of embroderie with pearles and diamonds; we will build our houses of marble, afterwards of iasper & porpherie. Now this meane for a man to enrich himselfe, & to make him content, is very iust, & in the power of euery man: he need not to seeke this contentment elswhere and without himselfe, let him but aske it, and he presently obteineth it of himselfe. Let him stay the course of his desires, it is iniustice to importune God, Nature, the world by vowes and prayers, to giue him any thing. since he hath so excellent a meane in his owne power to attaine thereunto. Why should I rather desire another to giue vnto me, than my selfe not to desire? *Quare potius a fortuna impetrem ut det, quam a me ne petam? quare autem petam*

*petam oblitus fragilitatis humanae? Wherefore should I rather desire fortune to giue vnto mee, then I seeke it of my selfe? but wherefore should I desire the obliuion of humane fragilitie? If I cannot or will not obtaine of my selfe not to desire, how and with what face can I preise another to giue, ouer whom I haue no right nor power? The first rule then touching our desires and pleasures is, that this (little) or at least a mediocritie and sufficiency is that which doth best content a wise man and keeps him in peace. And this is the reason why I haue chosen for my deuice, *Peace and pouertie*. With a foole nothing sufficeth, nothing hath certaintie or content: he is like the Moone, who asketh a garment that might fit it; but it was answered, That that was not possible, because it was sometimes great, sometimes little, and alwaies changeable*

Plutarch.

7  
Naturally.

Seneca.

The other point couzen-germane to this, is (naturally): for we know that there are two sorts of desires and pleasures, the one naturall, and these are iust and lawfull, and are likewise in beasts limited and short, whose end a man may see: according to these, no man is indigent, for every thing yeelds something to content. Nature is contented with little, and hath so provided, that in all things, that which sufficeth is at hand and in our owne power, *Parabile est quod natura desiderat & expositum: ad manum est quod sat est. Readie and at hand is it, that nature desires; and at hand also that which sufficeth.* It is this which nature demandeth for the preseruatiō of it owne essence, it is a fauour for which we are to thanke Nature, that those things that are necessarie for this life, it hath made easie to finde, and such as are hardly obtained are not so necessarie; and that seeking without passion that which nature desireth, fortune can no way deprive vs of it. To these kinde of desires a man may adde (though they be not truly naturall, yet they come very neere) those that respect the vse and condition of euery one of vs, which are somewhat beyond, and more at large than those that are exactly naturall, & so are iust & lawfull in the second place. The other desires are beyond nature, proceeding from an opinion and fantasie, artificiall, superfluous, and truly passions, which we may to distinguish them by name from others, call cupidities or lusts, whereof we haue spoken before at large in the passions: from which a wise

wise man must whollie and absolutely defend himselfe.

The third, which is moderately and without excelsse, hath <sup>8</sup> *Moderately, Soul. 3. cap. 38.*  
a large field and diuers parts, but which may be drawn to two heads; that is to say, to desire without the hurt of another, of himselfe; of another without his scandall, offence, losse, preiudice; of himselfe; without the losse of his health, his leasure, his functions and affaires, his honour, his duty.

The fourth is a short and essentiall relation to himselfe; <sup>9</sup> *By relation.*  
besides that the carriere of our desires and pleasures must be circumscribed, limited, and short, their course likewise must be managed, not in a right line, which makes an end elsewhere and without it selfe; but in a circle, the two points whereof doe meet and end in our selues. Those actions that are directed without this reflexion, and this short and essentiall turning, as of couetous and ambitious men, and diuers others, who runne point blanke, and are alwaies without them, are vaine and vnfound.

## CHAP. VII.

*To carrie himselfe moderately and equally in prosperitie and aduersitie.*

**T**Here is a twofolde fortune, wherewith we are to enter the list, good and ill, prosperity and aduersitie; these are the two combats, the two dangerous times, wherein it standeth vs vpon to stand vpon our guard, and to gather our wits about vs: they are the two schooles, essayes, and touch-stones of the spirit of man.

The vulgar ignoraut sort doe acknowledge but one: they do not beleue that we haue any thing to do, that there is any <sup>2</sup> *The opinion of the vulgar.*  
difficultie, any fight or contradiction with prosperitie and good fortune, wherein they are so transported with ioy, that they know not what they do, there is no rule with them: and in affliction they are as much astonished and beaten downe as they that are dangerously sicke, and are in continuall anguish, not being able to endure either heat or colde.

The wise men of the world acknowledge both, and im- <sup>3</sup> *Which of the two is more difficult to beare, prosperity or aduersitie?*  
pute it to one and the same vice and follie, not to know how to command in prosperitie, and how to carrie our selues in ad-



Arist.  
Senec.

uerſitie: but which is the more difficult and dangerous, they are not wholly of one accord, ſome ſaying it is aduerſitie, by reaſon of the horror and bitterneſſe thereof, *Difficilius eſt triſtitiā ſuſtinere quā à delectabilibus abſtinere: maius eſt difficultia perſtringere quā leta moderari.* Harder it is to ſuſteyne grieſe, then to abſtaine from pleaſures, but more hard to paſſe through difficult things, then to moderate our pleaſures. Some affirming it to be proſperitie, which by her ſweet and pleaſing flatterie doth abate and molliſieth the ſpirit, and inſenſibly robbeth it of it due temperature, force and vigor, as *Dalila* did *Samſon*, in ſuch ſort that many that are obdurate, obſtinate, and invincible in aduerſitie, haue ſuffered themſelues to be taken by the flattering allurements of proſperitie, *Magni laboris eſt ferre proſperitatem: ſegetem nimia ſternit ubertas, ſic immoderata felicitas rumpit.* Great labour is it to live in proſperitie: too much plentie plaſteth downe the corne: ſo too much felicitie caſteth vs downe. And againe, affliction moueth euen our enemies to pitie, proſperitie our friends to enuie. In aduerſitie a man ſeeing himſelfe abandoned by all, and that all his hopes are reduced vnto himſelfe, he taketh heart at graiſe, he rowzeth himſelfe, calles his wits about him, and with all his power addes his owne endeuours to his owne helpe: in proſperitie ſeeing himſelfe aſſiſted by all that laugh at him, and applaud all he doth, he groweth lazie and careleſſe, truſting in others, without any apprehenſion of danger or difficultie, and perſwading himſelfe that all is in ſafetie, when he is many times therein much deceiued. It may be, that according to the diuerſitie of natures and complexions both opinions are true: but touching the vtilitie of either, it is certaine, that aduerſitie hath this preheminence, it is the ſeed, the occaſion, the matter of well-doing, the field of heroicall vertues, *Vireſcit vulnere virtus, agra fortuna ſana conſilia melius in malis ſapimus, ſecunda rectum auferunt.* Vertue flouriſheth by aduerſitie, we better know ſound aduiſe by the difficult fortune of diſaſterous things; proſperity blindeth the truth.

Now wiſedome teacheth vs to hold our ſelues indifferent and vpright in all our life, and to keepe alwaies one and the ſame countenance, pleaſant and conſtant. A wiſe man is a ſkilfull artifice, who maketh profit of all; of euery matter he worketh

4  
The aduice of  
the wiſe vpon  
both.



worketh and formeth vertue, as that excellent Painter *Phidias*, all maner of images, whatsoeuer lighteth into his hands he maketh it a fit subiect to doe good, and with one and the same countenance hee beholdeth the two different faces of Fortune. *Ad utroque casus sapiens aptus est, bonorum rector, malorum victor: In secundis non confidit, in aduersis non deficit, nec anidus periculi, nec fugax, prosperitatem non expectans, ad utrumque paratus; aduersus utrumque intrepidus, nec illustri multum, nec huius fulgore percussus. Contra calamitates fortis & contumax, luxuria non aduersus tantum, sed & infestus: hoc precipuum in humanis rebus erigere animum supra minas & promissa fortuna.* A wise man futeeth himselfe for all fortunes, he gouerneth the good, subdueth the euill; He presumes not in prosperitie, nor despaire in aduersity, he neither desires danger, nor shunneth it, he expecteth not prosperity, but is readie at all assaies; fearing neither felicitie nor aduersitie; not moued with the clamor of the one, nor the glorie of the other. Strong and despising all miseries, not only against all superfluitie and excesse, but euen an enemy vnto it; who in worldly things, hath a spirit erected aboue fortunes threats or promises. Wisdome furnisheth vs with armes & discipline for both combats; against aduersity with a spurre, teaching vs to raife, to strengthen & incite our courage; & this is the vertue of fortitude: against prosperitie, it furnisheth vs with a bridle, and teacheth vs to keepe & clap downe our wings, & to keepe our selues within the bounds of modestie; and this is the vertue of temperancie: these are the two morall vertues, against the two fortunes, which that great Philosopher *Epictetus* did very well signifie, containing in two words all morall Philosophie, *sustine & abstine*, beare the euill, that is, aduerlitie; abstaine from the good, that is, from pleasure & prosperity. The particular aduiselements against the particular prosperities and aduersities shall be in the third booke following; in the vertue of fortitude and temperancie. Heere we will only set downe the generall instructions and remedies against all prosperitie and aduersitie, because in this booke we teach the way in generall vnto wisdome, as hath been said in the preface thereof.

Against all prosperity, the common doctrine and counsell consisteth in three points: The first, that honors, riches, and the fauours of fortune, are ill and wrongfullie accounted and

5  
Of Prosperitie.

called goods, since they neither make a man good, nor reforme a wicked man, and are common both to good and wicked. He that calleth them goods, and in them hath placed the good of man, hath fastned our felicitie to a rotten cable, and ancred it in the quick-sands. For what is there more vncertaine and inconstant, than the possession of such goods, which come and goe, passe and runne on like a riuier? like a riuier they make a noyse, at their comming in, they are full of violence, they are troubled; their entrance is full of vexation, and they vanish in a moment; and when they are quite dried vp, there remaineth nothing in the bottome but the mud.

- 6 The second point is to remember, that prosperitie is like a honnied poison, sweet and pleasant, but dangerous, whereof we must take very good heed. When fortune laugheth, and euery thing falleth out according to our owne hearts, then should we feare most, and stand vpon our guard, bridle our affections, compose our actions by reason, aboue all auoid presumption, which ordinarily followeth the fauour of the time. Prosperitie is a slipperie pafe, wherein a man must take sure footing, for there is no time wherein men doe more forget God. It is a rare and difficult thing to find a man who dorth willingly attribute vnto him the cause of his felicitie. And this is the cause why in the gretest prosperity wee must vse the counsell of our friends, and giue them more authority ouer vs, than at other times; and therefore we must cary our selues as in an euill and dangerous way, go with feare and doubt, desiring the hand and helpe of another. In these times of prosperitie, aduersitie is a medicine, because it leadeth vs to the knowledge of our selues.

- 7 The third is to retaine our desires, and to set a measure vnto them. Prosperity puffeth vp the heart, spurreth vs forward, findeth nothing difficult, breedeth alwayes a desire of great matters (as they that by eating get an appetite) and it carrieth vs beyond our selues, & in this state it is where a man loseth himselfe, drowneth & maketh a mockery of himselfe. He playeth the Monkey, who leapeth from bough to bough, till he come to the top of the tree, and then sheweth his taile. Oh how many haue been lost, and haue perished miserablie, by the want of discretion to moderate themselves in their prosperitie!

prosperitie / We must therefore either stay our selues, or go forward with a slower pace, if we will enioy the benefit of our prosperity, and not hold our selues alwaies in chase and purchase. It is wisdom to know how to settle our owne rest, our owne contentment, which cannot be where there is no stay, no end. *Si qua finire non possunt, extra sapientiã sunt.* What can not be determined is beyond wisdom.

Against all aduersitie, these are the generall aduise-  
ments. In the first place, we must take heed of the common and vulgar opinion, erroneous and alwaies different from true reason for to discredit and to bring into hatred and horror all aduersitie and afflictions, they call them evils, disasters, mischiefs, although all outward things be neither good nor euill. Neuer did aduersitie make a man wicked, but hath rather serued as a meane to mend those that are wicked, and are common both to the good and to the wicked.

8  
*Of aduersitie,  
and that it is no  
euill.*

Doublelesse, croises and heauie accidents are common to all, but they worke diuers effects, according to that subiect whereupon they light. To fooles and reprobate persons they serue to driue them into despaire, to afflict and enrage them: Perhaps they enforce them (if they be heauy & extreame) to stoope, to crie vnto God, to looke vp vnto heauen; but that is all: To sinners and offenders they are so many liuelie instructions, & compulsi-  
ons to put them in minde of their dutie, and to bring them to the knowledge of God: To vertuous people, they are the lists and theaters wherein to exercise their vertue, to winne vnto themselves greater commendations and a neerer alliance with God: To wise men they are matter of good, and sometimes stages and degrees whereby to passe and mount vp to all height and greatnesse, as we see and may read of diuers, who being assailed by such and so great croises, as a man would haue thought them their vtter ouerthrow and vndoing, haue beene raised by the selfe same meanes to the highest pitch of their owne desires, and contrariwise without that infelicitie, had still remained vnder hatches, as that great Athenian Captaine knew well, when hee said, *Perieramus nisi perissemus.* We should vnto this haue perished, if we had not perished. A very excellent example heereof was Ioseph the son of Iacob. It is true that these are blowes from  
heauen,

9  
*It is common to  
all, but diuersly.*

heaven, but the vertue and wisdom of man serueth as a proper instrument, from whence came that wise saying of the Sages, *To make of necessitie a vertue*. It is a very good husbandry, and the first propertie of a wise man, to draw good from euill, to handle his affaires with such dexteritie, and so to winne the winde, and to set the bias, that of that which is ill, he may make good vse, and better his owne condition.

10

*It hath thre  
causes & thre  
effects.*

Afflictions and aduersities proceede from three causes which are the three authors & workers of our punishments; sinne the first inuentor which hath brought them into nature; the anger and iustice of God, which setteth them aworke as his Commissaries and executioners; the policie of the world troubled and changed by sinne, wherein as a generall reuolt, and ciuill tumult, things not being in their due places, and not doing their office, all euils do spring and arise; as in a body the disioining of the members, the dislocation of the bones bringeth great paine, and much vnquietnesse. These three are not fauourable vnto vs, the first is to be hated of all as our enemy, the second to be feared as terrible, the third to be auoided as an imposture. That a man may the better defend and quit himselfe from all three, there is no better way than to vse their owne proper armes, wherewith they punish vs, as *Dauid* cut off *Goliaths* head with his owne sword, making of necessitie a vertue, profit of paine and affliction, turning them against themselves. Affliction is the true fruit or science of sin, being well taken is the death and ruine thereof, and it doth that to the author thereof, which the viper doth to his damme that brought him forth. It is the oile of the Scorpion, which healeth his owne sting, to the end it may perish by it owne inuention: *perijt arte sua: patimur quia peccauimus: patimur ut non peccemus*. He perisheth by his owne arte: we suffer because wee haue sinned: we suffer that we should not sin. It is the file of the soule, which scoureth, purifieth & clenseth it from all sin. And consequently it appeaseth the anger of God, & freeth vs from the prisons and bands of Iustice, to bring vs into the faire & cleare sun-shine of grace and mercy. Finally, it weaneth vs from the world, it plucketh vs from the dug, and maketh vs distaste with the bitternesse thereof, like wormwood vpon the teat of the nurse, the sweet milke and food of this deceitfull world.

A

A great and principall meane for a man to carrie himselfe well in aduersitie, is to be an honest man. A vertuous man is more peaceable in aduersity, than a vitious in prosperitie : like those that haue a feuer, who feele and finde more harme and violence in the heat and cold thereof, and in the extremitie of their fittes, than such as are found in the heat and cold of Summer and Winter. And euen so they that haue their consciences sicke, are much more tormented, than they that are sound, that are honest men. For hauing the inward part whole and healthfull, they can noway bee endangered by the outward, especially opposing against it a good courage.

Aduersities are of two sorts : some are true and naturall, as sicknesse, griefes, losse of those things we loue : others are false & fained, either by a common or particular opinion, and not in veritie. That it is so, man hath his spirit and body as much at command, as before they hapned. To these kind of men, only this one word ; That which thou complaineest of, is neither painfull nor troublesome, but thou makest it such, and makest thy selfe to beleue it.

As touching the true and naturall, the more prompt and popular and more sound opinions are the more naturall and more iust. First we must remember, that a man indureth nothing against the humane and naturall law, since euen at the birth of man all these things are annexed, and given as ordinary. In whatsoeuer doth afflict vs, let vs consider two things, the nature of that that hapneth vnto vs, and that which is in our selues : and vsing things according to nature, we can receiue no tediousnesse or offence thereby. For offence is a maladie of the soule contrary to nature, and therefore should by no meanes come neere vnto vs. There is not any accident in the world which may happen vnto vs, wherein nature hath not prepared an aptnesse in vs to receiue it, and to turne it to our contentment. There is no maner of life so strait that hath not some solace and recreation. There is no prison so strong and darke that gives not place to a song sometimes to comfort a prisoner. *Jonas* had leasure to make his prayerr vnto God euen in the bellie of the Whale, and was heard. It is a fauour of nature that it findeth a remedie and ease vnto our

320 *To carie himselfe moderately and equally*  
cuils in the bearing of them, it being so that man is borne to  
be subiect to all sorts of miseries, *omnia ad que gemimus, qua ex-*  
*pauescimus tributa vite sunt. All things that afflict or greene vs, are*  
*the tributes of life.*

14 *It toucheth but*  
*the lesser part*  
*of man.*  
Secondly, we must remember, that there is only the lesser  
part of man subiect to fortune; we haue the principall in our  
owne power, and it cannot be ouercome without our owne  
consent. Fortune may make a man poore, sicke, afflicted, but  
not vitious, dissolute, deiected; it cannot take from vs probi-  
tic, courage, vertue.

15 *It is against*  
*reason and in-*  
*justice.*  
Afterwards we must come to fidelitie, reason, iustice. Many  
times a man complaineth vniustlie, for though he be some-  
times surprisid with some ill accident, yet he is more often  
with a good, and so the one must recompence the other. And  
if a man consider well thereof, he shall find more reason to  
content himselfe with his good fortunes, than to complaine  
of his bad: and as we turne our eyes from those things that  
offend vs, and delight to cast them vpon greene and pleasant  
colours, so must we diuert our thoughts from heauie and mel-  
ancholike occurrents, and applie them to those that are plea-  
sant and pleasing vnto vs. But we are malicious resembling  
cupping-glasses, which draw the corrupt bloud, and leaue the  
good, like a couetous man who selleth the best wine, and  
drinks the worst, like little children, from whom if you take  
away one of their play-games, in a furie they cast away all  
the rest. For if any misfortune happen vnto vs, wee torment  
our selues, and forget all the rest that may any way comfort  
vs: yea some there are that for small losses terme themselves  
vnfortunate in all things, and forget that they euer receiued  
any good, in such sort that an ounce of aduerlity brings them  
more hartie grieffe then ten thousand of prosperitie, pleasure  
or delight.

16 *It is little in*  
*comparison.*  
We must likewise cast our eyes vpon those that are of a  
far worse condition than our selues, who would thinke them-  
selues happie if they were in our place.

*Cum tibi displiceat rerum fortuna tuarum,*  
*Alterius spectu, quo sis discrimine peior.*  
*When as thy fortune doth vnpleasant seeme*  
*The difference by another mayst thou deeme.*

It were good and necessarie that these complainers did practise the saying and aduice of a wise man, that if all the euils that men suffer should be compared with the blessings they enioy, the diuision being equallie made, they may see by the ouerplus of that good they enioy, the iniustice of their complaint.

After all these opinions, we may conclude that there are two great remedies against all euils and aduertities, which may be reduced almost to one; Custome for the vulgar and baser sort, and meditation for the wiser. Both of them haue their force from time, the common & strongest salve against all euils; but the wise take it before hand, this is foresight, and the feeble and vulgar sort after hand. That Custome preuaileth much it doth plainly appeare, in that those things that are most tedious and offensive, are made thereby ealie and pleasing. *Natura calamitatum mollimentum consuetudinem inuenit. Custome mitigateth calamitie.* Slaves weepe when they enter into the gallies, and before three months be ended they sing. They that haue not bene accustomed to the sea, are afraid, though it be at the calmest, when they wey ankor, whereas the mariners laugh in the midst of a tempest. The wife groweth desperate at the death of hir husband, and before a yeere be expired she loues another. Time and custome brings all things to passe; that which offendeth vs is the noueltie of that which happeneth vnto vs, *Omnia nouitate grauiora sunt. All new and vnexpected crosses, are more intolerable.*

Meditation performeth the same office with wise men, and by the force thereof things are made familiar and ordinarie, *Que aly diu patiendo leuius faciunt, sapient leuia facit diu cogitando.* That which some make light by long suffering, a wise man makes light and easie by long cogitation. Hee considereth exactly the nature of all things that may offend him, and presenteth vnto himselfe whatsoeuer may happen vnto him most grieuous and insupportable, as sickenesse, pouertie, exile, iniuries, and examineth in them all that which is according to nature or contrary to it. For foresight or prouidence is a great reinedy against all euils, which can not bring any great alteration or change, hapning to a man that attendeth them; whereas contrarie they wound and hurt him greatly, that suffereth himselfe.

himselfe to be surprised by them. Meditation and discourse is that which giueth the true temper to the soule, prepareth it, confirmeth it against all assaults, makes it hard, steellie, impenetrable against whatsoever would wound or hurt it. Sudden accidents how great soeuer, can giue no great blow to him that keepes himselfe vpon his guard, and is alwaies ready to receiue them. *Premeditati mali mollis ictus venit : quicquid expectatum est diu, lenius accidit :* The hurt is small, if the harme before bee knowne : whatsoever wee doe long expect, doth happen the lighter. Now to attaine this foresight, wee must first know that nature hath placed vs heere, as in a thorny and slippery place; that that which is happened vnto another, may also light vpon vs; that that which hangeth ouer all, may fall vpon euery one of vs; and that in all the affaires that wee vndertake, wee premeditate the inconueniences and euill encounters which may happen vnto vs, to the end wee bee not surprised vnawares. O how much are wee deceiued, and how little iudgement haue wee, when wee thinke that that which hapneth to others cannot likewise fall vpon vs ! When wee will not be warie and prouident, for feare lest wee should bee thought fearefull. Contrariwise, if wee take knowledge of things, as reason would haue vs, we would rather wonder that so few crosses happen vnto vs, and that those accidents that follow vs so neere, haue staied so long before they catch vs, and hauing caught vs, how they should handle vs so mildly. Hee that taketh heede, and considereth the aduerlitie of another, as a thing that may happen vnto himselfe, before it shall happen, is sufficiently armed. We must thinke of all, and expect the worst; they are fooles, and ill aduised, that say, I had not thought it. It is an old saying, that hee that is suddenly surprised, is halfe beaten, and he that is warned is halfe armed, nay it is two against one. A wise man in time of peace makes his preparation for warre : A good mariner before hee goe forth of the haven, makes prouision of what is necessarie to resist the violence of a tempest: it is too late to provide against an euill, when it is already come. In whatsoever we are prepared before hand, wee finde our selues apt and admirable, what difficultie soeuer it haue; and contrariwise there is not any thing so easie that doth not hurt and hinder vs, if wee bee  
but



but nouelists therein ; *Id videndum ne quidinopinatum sit nobis, quia omnia nouitate grauiora sunt : We ought to foresee that nothing happen vnto vs vnlooked for, because all nouelties are the more grieuous.* Doubtlesse it seemeth that if we were so prouident as we should and may be, we should wonder at nothing. That which thou sawest before it came, is hapned vnto thee, why then wonderest thou ? Let vs then take a course that accidents doe not surpris vs ; let vs euer stand vpon our guard, and foresee what is to come. *Animus aduersus omnia formandus, vt dicere possimus, non villa laborum, O virgo, noua mis facies inopinane surgit, Omnia percepi atque animo mecum ipse peregi. Tu hodie ista denuntias ; ego semper denuntiaui mihi : hominem paraui ad humana.* The minde must be armed for all things ; that we may hold nothing tedious or painfull. *O virgin, there seemes vnto mee a new and vnexpected countenance to appeare. I haue considered of all things, and am resolved thereof in minde. To day hast thou shewed mee all these things, which alwaies I foretold to my selfe : I haue framed man for humane things.*

## CHAP. VIII.

To obey and obserue the Lawes, Customs, and Ceremonies  
of the Countrey, how and in what sense.

**E**VEN as a sauage and vntamed beast, will not suffer himselfe to be taken, led, and handled by man, but either flie-  
eth and hideth himselfe from him, or armeth himselfe against  
him, and with furie assaulteth him, if hee approach neere vnto  
him ; in such sort that a man must vse force mingled with Art  
and subtiltie to take and tame him : So follie will not be handled  
by reason, or wisdom, but striueth and stirreth against  
it, and addeth follie vnto follie ; and therefore it must be taken,  
and led, like a wilde beast, (that which a man is to a beast, a wise  
man is to a foole) astonished, feared, and kept short, that with the  
more ease it may be instructed and won. Now the proper meane or  
helpe thereunto, is a great authoritie, a thundring power and grauitie,  
which may dazell it with the splendor of his lightning. *Sola  
auctoritas est que cogit stultos vt ad sapientiam festinent : It is  
onely authoritie that inforceth fooles to apply themselves to  
wisdom.* In a popular fight or sedition,

**I**  
The beginning,  
institution and  
authoritie of the  
lawes.

*1. 2. 3.*

dition, if some great, wise, ancient and vertuous personage come in presence, that hath wonne the publike reputation of honour and vertue, presently the mutinous people being stricken and blinded with the bright splendor of this authoritie, are quieted, attending what he will say vnto them.

*Veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta  
Seditio est, saeuitque animis ignobile vulgus,  
Iamque faces & saxa volant, furor arma ministrat:  
Tum pietate grauem ac meritis, si forte virum quem  
Conspexere, silent, arreclisq; auribus astant,  
Ille regit dictis animos, & pectora mulcet.*

*When as the commons in tumultuous guise,  
With furious rage doe in sedition rise,  
Then stones, and fire, and all things sue about,  
As furie files the hands of that base rout,  
And if by chance a man both grave and sage  
Of good desert, and reuerenc<sup>t</sup> for his age,  
They hap to see, then silent straight they stand  
With listning eares, his words to vnderstand,  
He with faire words their anger doth assuage,  
Rules their stout mindes, and doth appease their rage.*

There is nothing greater in this world than authoritie, which is an image of God, a messenger from Heauen: if it be soueraigne, it is called maiestie; if subalterne, authoritie: and by two things it is maintained, admiration and feare mingled together. Now this maiestie and authoritie is first and properly in the person of the soueraigne prince and law-maker, where it is liuely, actuall and moouing, afterwards in his commandements and ordinances, that is to say, in the law, which is the head of the worke of the prince, and the image of a liuely and originall maiestie. By this are fooles reduced, conducted, and guided. Behold then of what weight, necessitie and vilitie, authoritie and the law is in the world.

2  
Of Customs.

The next authoritie and that which is likest to the law, is custome, which is another powerfull and emperious mistres; It seaseth vpon this power, and vsurpeth it traiterously and violently, for it planteth this authoritie by little and little, by stealth, as it were insensibly, by a little pleasing, and humble beginning; hauing settled and established it selfe by the helpe  
of

of time it discovereth afterwards a furious and tyrannicall visage, against which there is no more libertie or power left, so much as to lift vp ones eies; It taketh it authoritie from the possession and vse thereof, it increaseth and ennobleth it selfe by continuance like a riuier; it is dangerous to bring it backe to his originall fountaine.

Law & custome establish their authoritie diuersly, custome by little and little, with long time, sweetly and without force, *A comparison of them both.* by the common consent of all, or the greater part, and the authority thereof are the people. The law springeth vp in a moment with authoritie and power, and taketh his force from him that hath power to command all, yea many times against the liking of the subiect, whereupon some compare it to a tyrant, and custome to a king. Againe, custome hath with it neither reward nor punishment; the law hath them both, at least punishment, neuertheless they may mutually helpe and hinder one another. For custome which is but of sufferance, authorized by the soueraigne, is better confirmed: and the law likewise setleth it owne authoritie by possession and vse; and contrariwise custome may be caschiered by a contrarie law, and the law loseth the force thereof by suffering a contrary custome: but ordinarily they are together, that is law and custome; wise and spirituall men considering it as a law, idiots and simple men as a custome.

There is not a thing more strange, than the diuersitie and strangenes of some lawes and customes in the world; Neither *4 Their diuersity and strangenes.* is there any opinion or imagination so variable, so madde, which is not established by lawes and customes in some place or other, I am content to recite some of them, to shew those that are hard of beleefe heerein, how farre this proposition doth go. Yet omitting to speake of those things that belong to religion, which is the subiect where the greatest wonderments and grossest impostures are: but because it is without the commerce of men, and that it is not properly a custome, and where it is easie to be deceiued, I will not meddle with it. See then a brief of those that for the strangenes are best worth the noting. To account it an office of pietie in a certaine age to kill their parents & to eate them. In Innes to pay the shot, by yeelding their children, wiues and daughters to the pleasure

sure of the holste : publike brothelhouses of males : old men  
 lending their wiues vnto yong : women common : an honor  
 to women to haue accompanied with many men, and to cary  
 their locks in the hembes of their garments : daughters to go  
 with their priue parts vncovered, and married women care-  
 fullie to keepe them couered : to leaue the daughters to their  
 pleasures, and being great with child to enforce an abort in  
 the sight and knowledge of all men ; but married women to  
 keepe themselves chaste and faithfull to their husbands : wo-  
 men the first night before they companie with their hus-  
 bands, to receiue all the males of the estate and profession of  
 their husbands, inuited to the mariage, and euer after to bee  
 faithfull to their husbands : yoong married women to present  
 their virginitie to their prince, before they lie with their  
 husbands : mariages of males : women to go to war with their  
 husbands : to die and to kill themselves at the decease of their  
 husbands, or shortly after : to permit widowes to marie a-  
 gaine, if their husbands die a violent death, and not other-  
 wise : husbands to be diuorced from their wiues without al-  
 ledging any cause : to sell them if they bee barren, to kill  
 them for no other cause but because they are women, and af-  
 terwards to borrow women of others at their neede : women  
 to be deliuered without paine or feare : to kill their children  
 because they are not faire, well featured, or without cause : at  
 meate to wipe their fingers vpon their priuities and their  
 fecte : to liue with mans flesh : to eate flesh and fish raw : many  
 men and women to lie together to the number of tenne or  
 twelue : to salute one another by putting the finger to the  
 ground, and afterwards lifting it towards heauen : to turne  
 the back when they salute, and neuer to looke him on the face  
 whom a man will honour : to take into the hand the spetle of  
 the prince : not to speake to the king but at a peepe-hole ; in  
 a mans whole life neuer to cut his haire nor nailes : to cut the  
 haire on one side, and the nailes of one hand, and not of the o-  
 ther : men to pisse sitting, women standing : to make holes  
 and pits in the flesh of the face, and the dugs, to hang rings  
 and iewels in : to contemne death, to receiue it with ioy, to  
 sue for it, to pleade in publike for the honor thereof, as for a  
 dignitie and fauour : to account it an honourable buriall to be  
 eaten

eaten with dogs, birds, to be boyled, cut in peeces and pounded, and the powder to be cast into their ordinarie drinke.

When wee come to iudge of these customes, that is the complaint and the trouble: the vulgar for and pedante, are not troubled heerewith, for every seditious rout condemneth as barbarous and beastly whatsoever pleaseth not their palat, that is to say, the common vse and custome of their country. And if a man shall tel them, that others doe speake and iudge the same of ours, and are as much offended with ours, as wee with theirs, they cut a man short after their maner, tearing them beasts and barbarians, which is alwaies to say the same thing. A wise man is more aduised, as shall be said, he maketh not such haste to iudge, for feare lest he wrong his owne iudgment: and to say the truth, there are many lawes and customes which seeme at the first view to be sauage, inhumane, and contrarie to all reason, which if they were without passion, and soundly considered of, if they were not found to be altogether iust and good, yet at the least they would not bee without some reason and defence. Let vs take amongst the rest for example the two first which wee haue spoken of, which seeme to be both the strangest and farthest off from the dutie of pietie: to kill their owne parents at a certaine age, and to eate them. They that haue this custome doe take it to be a testimonie of pietie and good affection, endeouoring thereby first of meere pitie to deliuer their old parents, not onely vnprofitable to themselves and others, but burthensome, languishing, and leading a painfull and troublesome life, and to place them in rest and ease; afterwards giuing them the most worthie and commendable sepulchre, lodging in themselves and their owne bowels the bodies and reliques of their parents, in a maner reuiuing them againe, and regenerating them by a kinde of transmutation into their liuing fleshy by the meanes of the digestion and nourishment. These reasons would not seeme ouer-light to him that is not possessed with a contrarie opinion: and it is an easie matter to consider, what crueltie and abomination it had beene to these people, to see their parents before their owne eyes to suffer such grieve and torment, and they not able to succour them, and afterwards to cast their spoiles to the corruption of the earth, to stench and

5  
*Examination  
and iudgement.*

rottennes, and the spoode of wormes, which is the worst that can be done vnto it. *Darius* made a triall, asking some Greekes for what they would bee perswaded to follow the custome of the Indians in eating their dead fathers. To whom they answered, that they would not do it for any thing in the world. And on the other side assaying to perswade the Indians to burne the bodies of their dead parents, as the Greekes did, it seemed to them a matter of such difficultie and horror, as that they would neuer be drawn vnto it. I will adde only one other, which concerneth only matter of decencie and comelinetse, and is more light and more pleasant : One that alwaies blew his nose with his hand, being reprehended for inciuitie, in the defence of himselfe, asked what priuiledge that filthie excrement had, that a man must affoord it a faire handkerchiefe to receiue, and afterwards carefullie wrap & fold it vp, which he thought was a matter of greater lothsomnes than to cast it from him. So that wee see that for all things there may bee found some seeming reason, and therefore we are not suddenly and lightlie to condemne any thing.

6

*The authority  
sheweth.*

Gen. 11. 20.

19. 35.

Exod. 6.

Leuit. 18.

Deut. 25.

1. Reg. 12.

3 Reg. 2.

But who would beleue how great and imperious the authoritie of custome is ? He that said it was another nature, did not sufficiently expresse it; for it doth more than nature, it conquereth nature : for hence it is that the most beautifull daughters of men draw not vnto loue their naturall parents, nor brethren, though excellent in beautie, winne not the loue of their sisters. This kind of chastitie is not properly of nature, but of the vse of lawes and customes, which forbid them, and make of incest a great sinne, as we may see in the fact not only of the children of *Adam*, where there was an inforced necessitie, but of *Abraham* and *Nachor* brethren; of *Iacob* and *Indas* Patriarches, *Amram* the father of *Moses*, and other holy men : And it is the law of *Moses* which forbid it in these first degrees; but it hath also sometimes dispensed therewith, not only in the collaterall line, and betwixt brothers, and their brothers wiues, which was a commandement, and not a dispensation : and which is more, betweene the naturall brother and sister of diuers wombs; but also in the right line of alliance, that is to say, of the sonne with the mother in law; for in the right line of blood, it seemeth to be altogether against nature,

ture,

ture, notwithstanding the fact of the daughters of *Lor* with their father, which neuertheless was produced purely by nature, in that extreame apprehension and feare of the end of humane kind, for which cause they haue bene excused by great and learned doctors. Now against nature there is not any dispensation, if God the only superior thereunto giue it not. Finally of casuall incests and not voluntarie the world is full, as *Terrullian* teacheth. Moreouer, custome doth enforce the rules of nature, witnes those Physitians who many times leaue the naturall reasons of their arte by their owne authoritie, as they that by custome doe liue and sustaine their liues with poyson, Spiders, Emmets, Lizards, Toades, which is a common practise amongst the people of the West Indies. It likewise dulleth our senses, witnes they that liue neere the fall of the river of *Nilus*, neere clocks, armories, milles, and the whole world according to some Philosophers, with the sound of a heauenly kind of musicke, and the continuall and diuers motions of the heauens dulleth our senses, that we heare not that which we heare. To conclude, (and it is the principall fruit thereof) it ouercommeth all difficultie, maketh things easie that seeme impossible, sweetneth all sowe; and therefore by the meanes heereof a man liues in all things content, but yet it mastereth our soules, our beliefs, our iudgements, with a must vniust and tyrannicall authoritie. It doth and vndoeth, authoriseth and disauthoriseth whatsoever it please, without rhythme or reason, yea many times against all reason: It establisheth in the world against reason & iudgement all the opinions, religions, beleeves, obseruances, maners, and sorts of life most fantastickall and rude, as before hath been said. And contrarily, it wrongfully degradeth, robbeth, beateh downe in things that are truly great and admirable, their price and estimation, and maketh them base and vile.

*Ni adeo magnum, nec tam mirabile quidquam*

*Principio, quod non cessent mirari et omnes*

*Paulatim. —*

*Nothing so great, or at first admirable,*

*Which all cease not to admire, or count a fable*

*As time by little goes, or as acquaintance grows.*

So that we see that custome is a thing great and powerfull.

Senec.

*Plato* hauing reprehended a youth for playing at cobnut, or chery-pit, and receiuing this answer from him; That he controuled him for a matter of small moment, replied, My child, custome is not a matter of small moment. A speech wel worth the noting for all such as haue youth to bring vp. But it exerciseth it power with so absolute authority, that there is no struiuing against it, neither is it lawfull to reason, or call into question the ordinances thereof: it enchanteth vs in such sort, that it maketh vs beleue that what is without the bounds thereof, is without the bounds of reason, and there is nothing good and iust, but what it approueth; *ratione non componimur, sed consuetudine abducimur: honestius putamus quod frequentius: recti apud nos locum tenet error, ubi publicus factus.* We are not made by reason, but misled by custome; wee hold that most honest, that is most used. Error hath place in vs before right. This is tolerable with idiots and the vulgar sort, who wanting sufficiencie to looke into the depth of things, to trie and to iudge, doe well to hold and settle themselves to that which is commonlie held and receiued: but to wise men, who play another part, it is a base thing to suffer themselves to bee caried with customes.

7  
*An aduice.*

Now the aduice which I heere giue vnto him that would be wise, is to keepe and obserue both in word and deede the lawes & customes which he findeth established in the countrie where he is: and in like maner to respect and obey the magistrates and all superiors, but alwaies with a noble spirit, and after a generous maner, and not seruilely, pedantically, superstitiously, and withall not taking offence, nor lightly condemning other strange lawes and customes, but freely and soundly iudging and examining the one and the other, as hath bene sayd, and not binding his iudgement and beleefe but vnto reason only. Heereof a word or two.

3  
*Lawes and customes are to be obserued.*

In the first place according to all the wisest, the rule of rules, and the generall law of lawes, is to follow and obserue the lawes and customes of the countrie where hee is, *ὅμοιως ἑπαιδευμένοι πᾶσι ἰσχυροὶ καὶ ἀνδρῶν*, auoyding carefully all singularitie, and strange extrauagant particularitie, different from the common and ordinarie, for whatsoeuer it be it alwaies hurteth and woundeth another, is suspected of folliē, hypocrisie, ambitiou



ambitious passion, though perhaps it proceede from a licke and weake soule. *Non conturbabit sapiens publicos mores, nec populum in se, non iuste vita conuertet.* He that is wise will not seeke to alter the maners of the people, neither pull men upon him with his innovations. We must alwaies walke vnder the court of the lawes, customes, superiours, without disputation or tergiversation, without vndertaking sometimes to dispense with the lawes, sometimes like a frugall seruant to enhaunce the price.

But that it be (which is the second rule) out of a good mind and after a good maner; nobly and wisely, neither for the loue nor feare of them, nor for the iustice or equity that is in them, nor for feare of that punishment that may follow for not obeying them: to be briefe, not of superstition, nor constrained, scrupulous, fearefull seruitude, *eadem que populus, sed non eodem modo, nec eodem proposito faciet sapiens*, a wise man doth those things that other men doe; but not in that fashion, nor to the same end, but freely and simply for publike reuerence, and for their authoritie. Lawes and customes are maintained in credit, not because they are iust and good, but because they are lawes and customes; this is the mysticall foundation of their authoritie, they haue no other, and so is it with superiours, because they are superiours, *quia supra cathedram sedent*, Because they sit in the chaire of authoritie, not because they are vertuous and honest, *qua faciunt, nolite facere*. What they doe, doe not you. He that obeyeth them for any other cause, obeyeth them not because he should; this is an euill and a dangerous subiect, it is not true obedience, which must be pure & simple, *unde vocatur depositio discretionis mera executio, abnegatio sui*. Now to go about to measure one obedience by the iustice & goodnes of lawes and superiours, were by submitting them to our iudgement, to serue them with procelse, and to call our obedience into doubt and disputation, and consequently the state and policie according to the inconstancie and diuersitie of iudgements. How many vniust and strange lawes are there in the world, not only in the particular iudgements of men, but of vniuersall reason, wherewith the world hath liued a long time in continuall peace and rest, with as great satisfaction

2  
Not for their  
iustice and  
equity.

tistaction as if they had beene very iust and reasonable? And he that should goe about to change or mend them, would be accounted an enimie to the weale-publike, and neuer be admitted: The nature of man doth accomodate it selfe to all with the times, and hauing once caught his fish, it is an act of hostilitie to goe about to alter any thing: wee must leaue the world where it is; these trouble houses and new fangled spirits, vnder a pretext of reformation marre all.

*Against in-  
nouatours.*

All change and alteration of lawes, beleeves, customes and obseruances is very dangerous, and yeeldeth alwaies more euill than good; it bringeth with it certaine and present euils, for a good that is yncertaine and to come. Innouatours haue alwaies glorious and plausible titles, but they are but the more suspected, and they cannot escape the note of ambitious presumption, in that they thinke to see more cleerly than others, and that to establish their opinions, the state, policie, peace and publike quiet must bee turned topsie turuy.

3  
*Strange things  
are not lightly  
to be condem-  
ned.*

I will not say for all this that hath beene said before, that wee must absolutely obey all lawes, all commandments of superiours, for such as a man knoweth evidently to be either against God or nature, he is not to obey, and yet not to rebell and to trouble the state: how he should gouerne himselfe in such a case shall be taught heereafter, in the obedience due vnto princes; for to say the truth, this inconuenience and infelicitie, is rather, and more common in the commandements, of princes, than in the lawes: neither is it sufficient to obey the lawes and superiours because of their worth and merit, nor seruilely and for feare, as the common and prophane sort doe; but a wise man doth nothing by force or feare, *Soli hoc sapienti contingit, ut nil faciat iniustus, restu sequitur, gaudet officio.* This is only incident to wise men, that they doe nothing by constraint, they follow the right, and performe their dutie, he doth that which he should, and keepe the lawes, not for feare of them, but for the loue of himselfe, being iealous of his dutie; he hath not to doe with the lawes, to doe well, that is that wherein he differeth from the common sort, who cannot do well, nor know what they ought to do, without lawes; *As iusto & sapienti non est lex posita.* The law was not ordained for the iust and righteous.

By

By right a wise man is above the lawes, but in outward & publicke effect, he is their voluntarie and free obedient subiect. In the third place thereof, it is an act of lightnesse and iniurious presumption, yea a testimonie of weakenesse and insufficiency, to condemne that which agreeth not with the law and custome of his countrey. This proceedeth either from want of leasure or sufficiency to consider the reasons and grounds of others; this is to wrong and shame his owne iudgement, whereby he is enforced many times to recant, and not to remember that the nature of man is capable of all things; It is to suffer the eye of his spirit to be hoodwinked, and brought asleepe by a long custome, and prescription to haue power ouer iudgement.

Finallie, it is the office of a generous spirit and a wise man (whom I heere endeavour to describe) to examine all things, to consider apart, and afterwards to compare together all the lawes and customes of the world, which shall come to his knowledge, and to iudge of them (not to rule his obedience by them, as hath beene said, but to exercise his office, since he hath a spirit to that end) faithfully and without passion, according to the rule of truth and vniuersall reason and nature, whereunto he is first obliged, not flattering himselfe, or staining his iudgement with error: and to content himselfe to yeeld obedience vnto those whereunto hee is secondly and particularly bound, whereby none shall haue cause to complaine of him. It may fall out sometimes, that we may doe that, by a second, particular and municipall obligation (obeying the lawes and customes of the countrey) which is against the first and more ancient, that is to say, vniuersall nature and reason; but yet we satisfie nature by keeping our iudgements and opinions true and iust according to it. For we haue nothing so much ours, and whereof we may freely dispose; the world hath nothing to do with our thoughts, but the outward man is engaged to the publicke course of the world, and must giue an account thereof: so that many times, wee doe iustlie that, which iustly we approue not. There is no remedie, for so goes the world.

After these two mistresses, Law and Custome, comes the third, which hath no lesse authoritie & power with many, yea

Of Ceremonies.

is more rough & tyrannicall to those that too much tie themselves thereunto. This is the ceremony of the world, which to say the truth, is for the most part but vanity, yet holdeth such place, and vsurpeth such authority, by the remifnesse and contagious corruption of the world, that manie thinke that wisdome consisteth in the obseruation thereof, and in such sort doe voluntarily enthrall themselves thereunto, that rather than they will contradict it, they preiudice their health, benefit, businesse, liberty, conscience and all; which is a very great follie, and the fault and infelicitie of manie Courtiers, who aboue others are the idolaters of ceremonie. Now my will is, that this my Wife-man, do carefully defend himselfe from this captiuitie; I doe not meane, that out of a kinde of loose inciuilitie, he abuse a ceremonie, for we must forgieue the world in some thing, and as much as may be outwardlie conforme our selues to that which is in practise; but my will is, that he tie not, and enthrall himselfe thereunto, but that with a gallant and generous boldnesse hee know how to leaue it when he will, and when it is fit, and in such maner, as that he giue all men to know, that it is not out of carelesnes, or delicacie, or ignorance, or contempt, but because he would not seeme ignorant how to esteeme of it as is fit, not suffer his iudgement and will to be corrupted with such a vanitie, and that he lendeth himselfe to the world when it pleaseth him, but neuer giueth himselfe.

## CHAP. IX.

*To cary himselfe well with another.*

1 **T**His matter belongeth to the vertue of iustice, which teacheth how to liue well with all, and to giue to euery one that which appertaineth vnto him, which shall be handled in the booke following, where shall be set downe the particular and diuers opinions according to the diuersitie of persons. Heere are only the generall, following the purpose and subiect of this booke.

2 There is heere a two-fold consideration (and consequently two parts in this Chapter) according to the two maners of conuersing with the world, the one is simple, generall and common;

common; the ordinarie commerce of the world, whereunto the times, the affaires, the voyages, and encounters doe daily leade, and change acquaintance from those we know, to those wee know not, strangers, without our choice, or voluntarie consents: the other speciall is in affected and desired companie and acquaintance, either sought after and chosen, or being offered and presented, hath beene embraced, and that either for spirituall or corporall profit or pleasure, wherein there is conference, communication, priuie, and familiaritie: each of them haue their aduiselements apart. But before we enter into them, it shall not be amisse by way of preface, to giue you some generall and fundamentall aduice of all the rest.

It is a great vice (whereof this our Wise-man must take heed) and a defect inconuenient both to himselfe and to another, to be bound and subiect to certaine humours and complexions, to one only course; that is, to be a slave to himselfe, so to be captiuated to his proper inclinations, that hee cannot be bent to any other, a testimonie of an anxious scrupulous minde, and ill bred, too amorous, and too partiall to it selfe. These kinde of people haue much to endure and to contest; and contrariwise it is a great sufficiency and wisdom to accommodate himselfe to all. *Istud est sapere, qui ubicunq; opus sit animus possit flectere;* It is wisdom to frame the minde, as occasion shall still require. To be supple and manable, to know how to rise and fall, to bring himselfe into order when there is need. The fairest mindes, and the best borne, are the more vniuersall, the more common, appliable to all vnderstandings, communicative and open to all people. It is a beautifull qualitie, which resembleth and imitateth the goodnesse of God, it is the honour which was giuen to old Cato. *Huic versatile ingenium, sic pariter ad omnia fuit, ut natum ad id unum diceret, quodcumque ageret:* Whose minde was apt for all things: which generally was such, as whatsoeuer he did, hee was said to be borne to the same purpose.

Let vs see the aduiselements of the first consideration, of the simple and common conuersation, I will here set downe some, whereof the first shall be, to keepe silence and modestie.

The second, not to be ouer-formall, in not applying himselfe to the follies, indiscretions and lightnes which may be

3  
Facilitie and  
vniuersalitie  
of humours.

4  
The first part.  
Aduice touch-  
ing simple  
and common  
conuersation.

be committed in his prefence; for it is an indiscretion to condemne all that pleaseth not our palat.

- 6 The third, to spare, and thriftily to order that which a man knoweth, and that sufficiencie that he hath attained, and to be more willing to heare than to speake, to learne than to teach; for it is a vice to bee more readie and forward to make himselfe knowne, to talke of himselfe, and to shew all that is in him, than to learne knowledge of another, and to spend his owne stock than to get new.

- 7 The fourth, not to enter into discourse and contestation against all, neither against great men to whom we owe a dutie and respect, nor against our inferiours, where the match is not equall.

- 8 The fift, to be honestlie curious in the enquiry of all things, and knowing them, to order them frugallie, to make profit by them.

- 9 The sixt and principall is, to employ his iudgement in all things, which is the chiefe part which worketh, ruleth, and doth all; without the vnderstanding all other things are blind, deafe, and without a soule, it is least to know the historie, the iudgement is all.

- 10 The seuenth is, neuer to speake affirmatiuely, and imperiously, with obstinacy and resolution; that hurteth and woundeth all.

Peremptorie affirmation and obstinacie in opinion, are ordinary signes of senselesnesse and ignorance. The stile of the ancient *Romans* was, that the witnesses deposing, and the Iudges determining that which of their owne proper knowledge they knew to bee true, they expressed their minde by this word, It seemeth (*ita videtur*). And if these did thus, what should others do? It were good to learne to vse such words as may sweeten and moderate the temeritie of our propositions, as, It may be, It is said, I thinke, It seemeth, and the like: and in answering, I vnderstand it not, What is that to say? It may be, It is true. I will shut vp this generall part in these few words; To haue the countenance and the outward shew open and agreeable to all, his minde and thought couered and hid from all, his tongue sober and discreet, alwaies to keepe himselfe to himselfe, and to stand on his guard, *frons aperta, lingua parca*,

*The conclusiō.*

*parca, mens clausa, nulli fidere*, His force open; his tongue silent; his minde secret; and to trust none, to see and heare much, to speake little, to iudge of all, *Vide, audi, iudica.*

Let vs come to the other consideration, and kind of conuersation morespeciall, whereof the instructions are these. The first is to seeke, to conferre, and conuerse with men of constancie and dexteritie; for thereby the minde is confirmed and fortified, and is eleuated aboue it selfe, as with base and weake spirits it is debased, and vtterly lost: the contagion heerein is, as in the bodie, and also more.

11  
The second part  
of speciall con-  
uersation.

The second is not to be astonished at the opinions of another, for how contrarie soeuer to the common sort, how strange, how friuolous or extrauagant they seeme, yet they are sutable to the spirit of man, which is capable to produce all things, & therefore it is weaknes to be astonished at them.

12

The third is, not to feare or to be troubled with the rude incivilitie and bitter speeches of men, whereunto he must harden and accustom himselfe. Gallant men beare them with courage; this tendernes, and fearefull & ceremonious mildnes is for women. This societie and familiaritie must be valiant and manly, it must be couragious both to giue hard speeches, and to endure them, to correct and to be corrected. It is a fading pleasure, to haue to do with a people that yeeld, flatter, and applaud a man in all things.

13

The fourth is to ayme alwaies at the truth, to acknowledge it, ingenuously and cheerefully to yeeld vnto it, of what side soeuer it be, vsing alwaies and in all things sinceritie, and not as many especiallie pedanties, by right or by wrong to defend himselfe, and to quell his aduersarie. It is a fairer victorie to range himselfe according to reason, and to vanquish himselfe, than to ouercome his aduersarie, whereunto his own weaknesse doth many times helpe, being farre from all passion. To acknowledge his fault, to confesse his doubt and ignorance, to yeeld when there is occasion, are actes of iudgement, gentlenes and sincerity, which are the principall qualities of an honest and wise man; whereas obstinacie in opinion accuseth a man of many vices and imperfections.

14

The fift is, in disputation not to imploy all the meanes that a man may haue, but such as are best and fittest, that are more pertinent

15

pertinent and pressing, and that with breuitie, for euen in a good cause a man may say too much, for long discourses, amplifications and repetitions are a testimonie of ostentation, desire to speake, and tedious to the whole companie.

16

The sixth and principall is, in all things to keepe a forme, order and aptnes. O what a troublesome thing it is to dispute and confere with a foole, a trifier, that vttereth nothing but matter impertinent to the matter ! It is the only iust excuse to cut off all conference : for what can a man gaine but torment, that knowes not how, or what to speake as he should ? Not to vnderstand the argument that is made, to wedd himselfe to his owne opinion, not to answer directly, to tie himselfe to words, and to leaue the principall, to mingle and trouble the conference with vaine amplifications, to denie all, not to follow the forme of disputation, to vse vnprofitable prefaces and digressions, to be obstinate in opinion, and to mouth it out, to tie himselfe to formes, and neuer to diue into the bottome, are things that are ordinarily practised by pedanties and Sophisters. See heere how wisdom is discerned from follie ; this is presumptuous, rash, obstinate, assured ; that neuer satisfieth it selfe, is fearefull, aduised, modest : this pleaseth it selfe, goes forth of the lists merily and gloriously, as hauing wonne the victorie, when it neuer came neere it.

17

The seventh, if there be place of contradiction, hee must take heed that hee be not bold, obstinate, bitter ; for either of these three makes it vnwelcome, and doth more hurt himselfe, than another. That it may winne good entertainment of the companie, it must arise from that very houre of the controuerisie that is handled, from the present occasion, and not from elsse where, nor from any former precedent ground ; neither must it touch the person, but the matter onely, with some commendation of the person, if there be cause,

## CHAP. X.

*To cary himselfe wisely in his affaires.*

**T**His doth properly belong to the vertue of prudence, whereof wee shall speake in the beginning of the booke following, where shall bee set downe in particular diuers counsels



counsell and aduise-ments according to the diuers kinds of prudence and occurrents in our affaires. But I will heere set downe the principall points and heads of wisdom, which are general and common aduise-ments to instruct in grosse our discip-ple, to carrie himselfe well and wisely in the trafficke and commerce of the world, and the managing of all affaires; and they are eight.

The first consisteth in vnderstanding, that is, well to know the persons with whom a man hath to deale, their proper and particular nature, their humour, their spirit, inclination, designement, and intention, their proceedings: to know likewise the nature of the businesse which hee hath in hand, and which is proposed vnto him, not onely in their superficial and outward appearance, but to penetrate into the inside thereof, not onely to see and know things in themselves, but the accidents and consequents that belong thereunto. The better to doe this, he must looke into them with all manner of visages, consider them in all senses; for there are some that in one side are very pretious and pleasing, and on the other base and pernicious. Now it is certaine, that according to the diuers natures of the persons and affaires, wee must change our stile and manner of proceeding, like a Sea-man, who according to the diuers state of the sea, and the diuersitie of the windes, doth diuersly turne and guide his sailes and his oares. For he that in all things shall direct and carrie himselfe after one and the same fashion, would quickly marre all, play the foole, and make himselfe ridiculous. Now this twofold knowledge of the persons and affaires is no easie matter, so much is man disguised and counterfeited; but the way to attaine thereunto, is to consider them attentiuely and aduisedly, reuoluing them many times in our mindes, and that without passion.

1  
Knowledge of  
the persons and  
affaires.

Wee must likewise learne to esteeme of things according to their true worth, giuing vnto them that price and place which appertaineth vnto them, which is the true office of wisdom and sufficiencie. This is a high point of philosophie; but the better to attaine thereunto, wee must take heed of passion, and the iudgement of the vulgar sort. There are six or seuen things which moue and leade vulgar spirits, and make them to esteeme of things by false ensignes, whereof

2  
Estimation of  
things.

Not according  
to the vulgar  
iudgements.

wife

wise men will take heed ; which are, noueltie, raritie, strangeneisse, difficultie, Art, inuention, absence, and priuation or deniall, and aboue all, report, shew, and prouision. They esteeme not of things if they be not polished by Art and science, if they be not pointed and painted out. The simple and naturall, of what value soeuer they be, they attend not ; they escape and drop away insensibly, or at least are accounted plaine, base, and foolish, a great testimony of humane vanitie and imbecillitie, which is paid with winde, with false and counterfet money, in stead of currant, from whence it is, that a man preferreth Art before nature, that which is studied and difficult, before that which is easie ; vehement motions, and impulsions, before complexion, constitution, habit ; the extraordinary before the ordinary ; ostentation & pompe, before true and secret veritie ; another mans, and that which is strange, which is borrowed, before that which is proper and naturall. And what greater follie can there beethan all this ? Now the rule of the wise is, not to suffer themselves by all this, to be caught and carried, but to measure and iudge and esteeme of things, first by their true, naturall and essentiall value, which is many times inward and secret, and then by their profit and commoditie ; the rest is but deceit or mockerie. This is a matter of difficultie, all things being so disguised and sophisticated : many times the false and wicked being more plausible, than the true and good. And *Aristotle* saith, that there are many falsehoods, which are more probable, and haue a better outward appearance, than verities. But as it is difficult, so is it excellent and diuine : *Sis separaueris pretiosum à vili, quasi os muneris* : If thou wilt separate the pretious, from those things that are base and vile, thou shalt be as it were my mouth. And necessarie before all workes ; *quàm necessarium pretia rebus imponere* ? how necessarie is it to put a price upon things ? for to small purpose doth a man endeavour to know the precepts of a good life, if first he know not in what ranke to place things, riches, health, beautie, nobilitie, science, and so forth, with their contraries. This precedencie and preheminance of things is a high and excellent knowledge, and yet difficult, especially when many present themselves ; for pluralitie hindreth, and heerein men are neuer of one accord. The particular

*But according  
to the wise.*

*Eff. ult.  
Excellent.  
Necessarius.  
Seneca.*

*From hence  
cometh the  
knowledge of  
things.*

Iar tastes and iudgements of men are diuers, and it is fit and commodious it should be so, to the end that all runne not together after one and the same thing, and so be a let or hindrance to another. For example, let vs take the eight principall heads, of all goods spirituall and corporall, soure of each kind, that is to say, *Honesty, Health, Wisdome, Beauty, Ability* or *Aptnesse, Nobility, Science, Riches*. We doe heere take the words according to the common sense and vse, Wisdome for a prudent and discret maner of life and carriage with and towards all; Abilitie for sufficiencie in affaires; Science for the knowledge of things acquired out of bookes: the other are cleare enough. Now touching the ranging of these eight, how many diuers opinions are there? I haue told my owne, and I haue mingled and in such sort enterlaced them together, that after and next vnto a spirituall, there is a corporall correspondent thereunto, to the end we may couple the soule & the body together. Health is in the body, that which honestie is in the soule; the health of the soule, is the honestie of the body: *Mens sana in corpore sano: A perfect mind in a sound body*: Beauty, is as wisdom, the measure, proportion, and comelineesse of the body, and wisdom a spirituall beauty. Nobility is a great aptnesse & disposition to vertue. Sciences are the riches of the spirit. Others doe range these parts otherwise, some place all the spirituall first, before they come to the first corporall, and the least of the spirit about the greatest of the body: some place them apart, and all diuersly, euery one abouteth in his owne sense.

*Eight principall heads of goods spirituall and corporall.*

After and from this sufficiencie and part of prudence, to know well how to esteeme of things, dorth spring and arise another, that is to know well how to chuse, where not only the conscience, but also the sufficiencie and prudence is likewise many times shewed. There are choices very easie, as of a difficultie, & of a vice, of that which is honest, and that which is commodious. of durie and of profit: for the preheminance of the one is so great about the other that when they come to encounter, honestie alwaies winneth the field, except (it may be) some exception very rare, and with great circumstance, and in publike affaires only, as shall be said heereafter in the vertue of Prudence: but there are other choices farre more

<sup>3</sup>  
*Choice and election of things.*

hard and troublesome, as when a man is caught or driven in to a narrow strait betweene two vices, as was that Doctor *Origen*, either to become an Idolater, or to prostitute himselfe to the carnall pleasure of a base impure *Ethiopian*. The rule is, that when a man findeth himselfe in any doubt or perplexitie touching the choice of those things that are not euill, he must choose that part that hath most honestie and iustice in it, for though it fall out otherwise than well, yet it shall bee alwaies some comfort and glorie to a man to haue chosen the better; and besides, a man knoweth not (if hee had chosen the contrarie part) what would haue hapned, or whether hee had escaped his destinie: when a man doubteth which is the better and shortest way, hee must take the straitest. And in those things that are euill (whereof there is neuer any choice) a man must auoid the more base and vniust: this is a rule of conscience, and belongeth to honestie. But to know which is the more honest, iust, and profitable, which the more dishonest, vniust, and vnprofitable, it is many times very difficult, and belongeth to prudence and sufficiency. It seemeth that in such like straits and extremities the surer and better way is to follow nature, and to iudge that the more iust and honest which commeth neere to nature, that the more vniust and dishonest which is farthest from it. Before wee leaue this discourse of the choice & election of things, in two words let vs remoue this question: From whence commeth in our soules the choice of two indifferent things in all things alike? The *Stoicks* say, from an extraordinarie, immoderate, strange and rash operation of the soule. But a man may say, that neuer do two things present themselves vnto vs, wherein there is not some difference or other, be it neuer so little, and that there is alwaies something in the one, which moueth vs to that choice, although it be insensible, and such as wee cannot expresse. He that is equally ballanced betwixt two desires, can neuer choose; for euery choice and inclination doth inferre an inequality.

4

*Consolation.*

Another precept in this matter, is to take aduice and counsell of another: for, for a man to beleue himselfe, and to trust only in him selfe, is very dangerous. Now heere are required two aduertisements of Prudence, the one is in the choice of those,

those, to whom a man must addresse himselfe for counsell; for there are some whose counsell wee should rather auoid, and flie from. First, they must be honest and faithfull men (which is heere all one) and secondly, men sensible, aduised, wise, and of experience. These are the two qualities of good counsellers, honestie, and sufficiencie. A man may adde a third, and that is, that neither they nor their neere and inward friends haue any particular interest in the businesse; for although a man may say, that this cannot hinder them to giue good counsell, being, as is said, honest men: yet I may answer, that besides that this so great and philosophicall honestie, which is no way touched with it owne proper interest, bee very rare, it is also a great point of follie to bring it into doubt and anxietie, and as it were to put the finger betwixt two stones. The other aduertisement is, well to heare and entertaine the counsels, receiuing them without attending the euent, with iudgement and gentlenesse, delighting in the free deliuerie of the truth. Hauing entertained and followed it as good, and coming from a good hand and a friendly, hee must not repent himselfe of it, although it succeed not well, and according to expectation. Many times good counsels haue bad euents. But a wise man must rather content himselfe to haue followed good counsell which hath brought forth bad effects, than bad counsell which hath had a happie euent, as *Marius, sic correctis Marij temeritas gloriam ex culpa inuenit*, So the rashnesse and temeritie of *Marius* receiued glorie and honour euen from his fault, and not to doe like fooles, who hauing aduisedly deliberated and chosen, thinke afterwards to haue chosen the worse, because they weigh only the reasons of the contrarie opinion, neuer counterpoising them with those which first induced them thereunto. Thus much breely bee sayd of those that seeke counsell: of those that giue it, wee shall

Lib. 3. ca. 2.  
art. 17.

speake in the vertue of Prudence, whereof the counsell is a great and sufficient part.

The first aduice which I heere giue, to carie himselfe well in his affaires, is a temperature and mediocritie betwixt too great a confidence, and distrust, feare and assurance. To trust and secure himselfe, doth many times hurt, and to distrust sendeth: he must take speciall heed of making any shew of

5  
Temperature  
betwixt feare  
and assurance.

Z z

distrust,

distrust, euen when there is cause; for it displeaseth, yea offendeth much, and many times maketh a friend an enemy. But yet a man is not to be ouer credulous, and confident, except it be of his best assured friends, he must alwaies keepe the bridle in his hands, holding it neither too loose nor too straight. Hee must neuer speake all, and let that which he speaketh be euer true. He must neuer deceiue, but yet let him take heed he be not deceiued. He must euer temper and moderate that columbine innocencie and simplicitie, in not offending any man with his serpentine wisdom and subtiltie, and keeping himselfe vpon his guard, and preserving himselfe from the deceits, treasons, and ambushments of another. Subtiltie to defend, is as commendable, as it is dishonest to offend. He must neuer therefore aduance and engage himselfe so farre, but that he haue alwaies a meane when he will, and when it shall be necessarie to retire himselfe without great damage or dislike. He must neuer forsake his owne hold, nor so much despise another, and presume of himselfe, that he fall into a kind of presumption and carelesnes of his affaires, like those that thinke that no man sees so cleer as themselves, that looke that euery man should yeeld vnto them, that no man should dare to entertaine a thought to displease them, and by that meanes become dissolute, and cast away care, and in the end they are blinded, surpris'd, and deceiued.

6

*To take time  
and occasion.  
Against precipitation.*

Another aduice and very important, is to take all things in their times and seasons, and to good purpose, and for that cause, he must about all things auoid precipitation, an enemy to wisdom, the step mother of all good actions, a vice much to be feared in yong and youthfull people. It is in truth the worke of a skillfull and actiue man, to applie euery thing to his true end, well to manage all occasions and commodities, to make vse both of the times and the meanes. All things haue their seasons, and euen the good which a man may doe without purpose. Now too much speed and precipitation is contrarie heereunto, which troubleth, marreth, and confoundeth all: *Canis festinans cecos facit catulos.* A forward bitch bringeth forth blind whelpes. It proceedeth commonly from that passion which carieth vs, *Nam qui cupit festinat: qui festinat euerit: unde festinatio improuida & ceca: duo aduersissima rella*

m: m i

*inimiceterris & ira:* For who so desires, doth hasten; who hasteth, destroyeth: hastinesse therefore is improuident and blinde: hastinesse and anger are two of the greatest aduersaries to a discret minde: and often enough from insufficiencie. The contrarie vice, *idleness*, lazinesse, sloth, carelesnesse, which seemeth sometimes to haue some aire of maturitie and wisdom, is likewise pernicious and dangerous especiallie in the execution. For it is said, that it is lawfull to be slow and long in deliberation and consultation, but not in the execution; and therefore the wisest say, That a man must consult slowly, execute speedily, deliberate with leisure, and with speede accomplish. It falleth out sometimes that the contrarie is practised with good successe, and that a man is happie in the euent, though he haue been suddaine and rash in his deliberation; *Subiti consilij, euentu felices:* Sudden counsels, happie euent: but this is very seldome, and by chaunce or fortune, according to which we must not rule and direct our selues, but take heed lest enuie and emulation ouertake vs; for commonly a long and vnprofitable repentance is the reward of headlong hastinesse. Behold then two rocks and extremities which we must equallie auoid; for it is as great a fault to take occasions before they be readie, whilest they be greene and raw, as to suffer them to grow till they be over-ripe & past the taking. The first fault, yong men and forward hot-spurres commit, who for want of patience, giue no leasure to time and the heauens to do any thing for them, they runne, but they catch nothing: The second, heauie, lazie and dull spirited men do commonly fall into. To know the occasion, and to take it, a man must haue his spirit valiant and vigilant, and likewise patient: he must foresee it, watch, attend it, see it comming, and prepare for it, and so take it iust at that instant when it is readie.

The seventh aduice is, well to cary himselfe: with these two masters & superintendants of the affaires of the world, which are industrie or vertue, and fortune. It is an ancient question which of these two hath most credit, force, and authoritie: for it is out of all doubt, that both haue; and it is clearely false, that one only doth all, and the other nothing. It were perhaps to be wished that it were true, and that one only had the whole empire, the businesse would go the better, a man would

7  
*In industrie  
and Fortune.*

wholly attend that, whereby it would be the more easie, the difficultie is to ioyne them together, and to attend them both. Cōmonly they that settle themselves vnto the one, contemne the other, the yonger & bolder sort respect & trust to fortune, hoping much good from it, & many times by them it worketh great matters, in so much that it seemes to fauour them; the more ancient & staied, trust to their industrie; & these of the two, haue the more reason. If we should compare them, and chuse one of the two, industrie is the more honest, the more certaine, glorious; for though fortune be contrary to it, and shall make all industrie and diligence vaine, yet neuertheless there remaineth great contentment, in that a man hath not kept holy day, hath performed his office or duty, hath caried himselfe like a man of courage. They that follow the other part, are in danger to attend in vaine, & though perhaps things succeed according to their owne desires, yet they want that honor & glory that the former hath. Now the aduice of wisdom is, not wholly, and so much to settle our selues to the one, that we contemne, & exclude the other; for they haue both a good part, yea many times they help, & do mutually attend one the other. A wise man then must cary himselfe with them both, but yet vnequally, for the aduantage and preheminance must be giuen, as hath been said, to vertue, industrie; *Virtute duce, comite fortuna. Vertue the guid, fortune the companion, she follower.* This aduice likewise is required, to keepe discretion, which seasoneth and giueth a taste or relish to all things; this is not a particular qualitie, but common, which minglith it selfe in all: Indiscretion marreth all, and taketh away the grace from the best actions, whether it be to doe good to another; for all gratifications are not well bestowed vpon all sorts of people; or to excuse himselfe; for inconsiderate excuses serue for accusations, or to play the part of an honest & curteous man, for a man may exceed & degenerate into rusticity, or whether it be to offer, or to accept.

## CHAP. XI.

*To keepe himselfe alwaies ready for death, a fruit of wisdom.*

The



**T**He day of death is the master day, and iudge of all other daies, the triall and touchstone of all the actions of our life. Then doe we make our greatest assay, and gather the whole fruit of all our studies. He that iudgeth of the life of a man, must looke how he carieth himselfe at his death; for the end crowneth the worke, and a good death honoureth a mans whole life, as an euill defameth and dishonoureth it: A man cannot well iudge of any, without wronging of him, before hee hath plaied the last act of his Comedie, which is without all doubt the most difficult. *Epaminondas* one of the wise men of *Greece*, being demanded whō of three men he esteemed most, himselfe, *Chabrias*, or *Iphicrates*, answered, We must first see all three die, before we resolute that question: the reason is, because in all the rest a man may be masked, but in this last part, it is to no purpose to dissemble,

<sup>1</sup>  
The day of death.

*Nam vera voces tum demum pectore ab imo*

*Eyciuntur, & eripitur persona, manet res.*

*For then true speeches from the heart are cast,*

*The mask remou'd, the truth remain's at last.*

Fortune from farre seemeth to watch, and lie in wait for vs, against this last day, as a day long since named and appointed, to shew her power, and in a moment to ouerthrow all that wee haue built, and gathered together in many yeers, and to make vs crie out with *Laberius*, *Nimirum hac die vna plus vixi mihi, quam viuendum fuit*: Surely I haue liued more to my selfe in this one day, then in all the time before. And so was it well and wisely said of *Solon*, to *Crasus*, *Ante obitum nemo beatus*. Before death no man is happy.

It is an excellent thing to learne to die, it is the studie of wisdom, which aimeth whollie at this end: hee hath not spent his life ill, that hath learned to die well; and he hath lost his whole time, that knowes not well how to end it. *Male viuet, quisquis nesciet bene mori: non frustra nascitur qui bene moritur: nec inutiliter vixit, qui feliciter desijt: Alterita vita discendum est, & precipuum ex vita officij est.* Hee liueth badly, that knoweth not how to die well; hee was not borne in vaine, that dyeth well; neither hath he liued vnprofitably, that departeth happily: To die, is the studie and learning of all our life, and the chiefest thing, and duty of life. He

<sup>2</sup>  
To know how to die.

*Seneca.*

shootes not well, that lookes not on the marke; and hee cannot liue well that hath not an eie to his death. To bee brieue, the science of dying is the science of libertie, the way to feare nothing, to liue well, contentedly and peaceably; without this knowledge there is no more pleasure in life, than in the fruition of that thing which a man feareth alwaies to lose.

3

First and above all, wee must endeavour, that our sinnes die before ourselues: Secondly, that wee be alwaies ready and prepared for death. O what an excellent thing is it for a man to end his life before his death, in such sort, that at that houre he haue no other thing to doe, but to die! that hee haue no more need of any thing, not of time, not of himselfe, but sweetlie and contentedly departeth this life, saying:

*Vixi, & quem dederat cursum fortuna peregi:*

*I luid that race orepast, whose fortune bad me plaiſt.*

Thirdly, wee must endeavour, that our death be voluntarie; for to die well, is to die willingly.

4

*A fivefold manner of carriage in death.*

It seemeth that a man may carrie himselfe in death fīue diuers waies: He may feare and flie it, as a very great euill; attend it sweetly and patiently, as a thing naturall, ineuitable, reasonable; contemne it, as a thing indifferent, and of no great importance; desire and seeke after it, as the only haue of rest from all the torments of this life, yea a very great gaine; giue it to himselfe, by taking away his owne life. Of these fīue, the three middlemost are good, befitting a good and settled soule, although diuersly, and in a different condition of life; the two extremes are vitious and out of weaknesse, though it be with diuers visages. A word or two of them all.

*To feare death.*

The first is not approved by men of vnderstanding, though by the greater part it be practised: a testimonie of great weaknesse. Against these kinde of men, and for your better comfort, either against your owne death, or the death of another, thus much briefly. There is not a thing that men feare more, or haue more in horreur than death: neuerthelesse, there is not a thing where there is lesse occasion or matter of feare, or that contrarily yeeldeth greater reasons to perswade vs with resolution to accept of it. And therefore wee must say, that it is a meere opinion, and a vulgar error that hath woone the world thus to thinke of it. Wee giue too much credit to the  
inconsiderate

*It is opinion.*

inconsiderate vulgar sort, who tell vs, That it is a very great euill, and to little credit to wisdom it selfe which teacheth vs, that it is a freedome from all euils and the haue of life. Neuer did a present death doe hurt to any man; and some that haue made triall, and partly knew what it is, complaine not of it: and if death be counted an euill, it is of all the euils the only that doth no harme, that hath no euill in it; it is the imagination only of death before it come, that maketh vs to feare it when it is come. It is then but opinion, not veritie; and it is truly where opinion bandeth it selfe most against reason, and goeth about to deface it in vs, with the maske of death: there cannot be any reason to feare it, because no man knowes what it is, that he should feare it: for why, or how should a man feare that he knoweth not? And therefore wisely said he, that of all others was accounted the wisest, that to feare death is to make shew of greater vnderstanding and sufficiencie than can be in a man, by seeming to know that, that no man knoweth: and what he spake he practised himselfe; for being solicited at his death by his friends, to pleade before the Iudges, for his iustification, and for his life, this oration he made vnto them: My masters and friends, if I should pleade for my life, and desire you that I may not die, I doubt I may speake against my selfe, and desire my owne losse and hinderance, because I know not what it is to die, nor what good or ill there is in death: they that feare to die presume to know it, as for my selfe I am vtterly ignorant what it is, or what is done in the other world; perhaps death is a thing indifferent, perhaps a good thing, and to be desired. Those things that I know to be euill, as to offend my neighbour, I flie and auoid; those that I know not to be euill, as death, I cannot feare. And therefore I commit my selfe vnto your selues; and because I cannot know whether it is more expedient for mee to die, or not to die, determine you thereof as you shall thinke good.

For a man to torment himselfe with the feare of death, it is first great weaknesse and cowardlinesse: There is not a woman that in few daies is not appeased and content with the death, yea the most painefull that may be, either of her husband or her childe; And why should not reason and wisdom doe that in an houre, at an instant (as we haue a thousand ex-

6  
*It is weaknesse.*

amples) which time performeth in a foole, in the weakest sex? What vse is there of wisdom and constancie in man, to what end serue they, if they speed him not in a good action, if he can do no more with their help, than a foole with his follie; From this weaknes it is, that the most part of men dying, cannot resolue themselves, that it is their last houre, and there is not any thing where this deceitfull hope doth more busie man, which, it may be, doth likewise proceed from this, that we account our death a great matter, and that all things haue an interest in vs, and at our death must suffer with vs, so much do we esteeme our selues.

7  
To be enemy to  
his owne life.

Againe a man sheweth himselfe heerein vniust; for if death be a good thing, as it is, why doth he feare it? If an euill thing, why doth he make it worse, and adde vnto death euill vpon euill, sorrow & griefe where there is none? like him that being robbed of a part of his goods by the enemy, casteth the rest in to the sea, to let mē know how little he is grieued with his losses

8  
To be enemy to  
his owne life.

Finally to feare death, is for a man to be an enemy to himselfe, & to his owne life: for he can neuer liue at ease & contentedly, that feareth to die. That man is only a free man, which feareth not death; & contrarily, life is but a slavery if it were not made free by death: For death is the only stay of our liberty, the common & ready receptacle of all euils: It is then a misery (& miserable are all that do it) to trouble our life with the care & feare of death, and our death with the care of life:

9

But to say the truth, what complaints & murmuring would there bee against nature, if death were not, if we should haue continued heere, will we, nill we, with and against our owne wils? doubtlesse men would haue cursed nature for it. Imagine with thy selfe how much more insupportable, and painefull a durable life would haue beene, then a life with a condition to leaue it. Chiron refused immortalitie, being informed of the conditions thereof by the god of Time, Saturne his father. Doubtlesse death is a very beautifull and rich inuention of nature, *optimum natura inuentum nusquam satis laudatum*, The best inuention of nature, neuer sufficiently to be praised, and a very proper and profitable, necessary to many things; If it were quite taken from vs, wee should desire it more, than now wee feare it, yea thirst after it more than life it selfe; such a remedy

is it against so many evils : such a meane to so many goods. What were it on the other side, if there were not mingled with death some little bitterneſſe ? doubtleſſe men would runne vnto it with great deſire and indiſcretion. To keepe therefore a moderation, that is, that men might neither loue life too much, nor ſlie it, feare death, nor runne after it, both of them, ſweetneſſe and ſharpeſſe, are therein tempered together.

The remedie that the vulgar ſort do giue heerein, is too ſimple; and that is, neuer to thinke or ſpeake thereof: Beſides that ſuch a kind of careleſſneſſe cannot lodge in the head of a man of vnderſtanding, it would likewiſe at the laſt coſt him deere: for death comming vnawares, & vnexpected, what torments, outcries, furies and diſpaires are there commonly ſcene? Wiſdome aduiſeth much better, that is, to attend & expect death with a conſtant foot, and to encounter it: and the better to do this, it giueth vs contrarie counſell to the vulgar ſort, that is, to haue it alwaies in our thoughts, to praſtiſe it, to accuſtome our ſelues vnto it, to tame it, to preſent it vnto vs at all houres, to expect it, not only in places ſuſpected and dangerous, but in the middeſt of feaſts and ſports: that the burthen of our ſong be, *Remember thy end*; that others are dead, that thought to haue liued as long as our ſelues; that, that which hapned then to them may happen now to vs; following heerein the cuſtome of the Egyptians, who in their ſolemne banquets placed the image of death before their eies; and of the Chriſtians and all other, who haue their Church-yards neere their temples, and other publike and frequented places, that men might alwaies (as ſaith *Licurgus*) be put in mind of death. It is vncertaine in what place death attends vs, and therefore let vs attend death in all places, and be alwaies ready to receiue it.

*Omnia crede diem tibi diluxiſſe ſupremum.*

*Grata ſuperueniet qua non ſperabitur hora.*

*Thinke euerie day the laſt hath ſhone on thee.*

*The houre, thou hop'ſt not for will welcome be.*

But let vs conſider the excuſes and grieuances that theſe poore people alledge to couer and colour their complaints, which are all vaine and frivolous: It grieueth them to die young, and they complaine as well in regard of others as themſelues, that death preuenteth them and cutteth them off

20  
Remedies not to  
feare death.

II  
The grieuances  
and excuſes of  
fearefull men  
answered.

in

in the flowre and strength of their yeares. The complaint of the vulgar sort, who measure all by the ell, and account nothing pretious, but that which is long, and durable, whereas contrarily, things exquisite and excellent are commonly thin, fine, and delicate. It is the marke of a skilfull worke-master to enclose much in a little space: and a man may say, that it is fatal to great and glorious men, not to liue long; Great vertue, and great or long life do seldome or neuer meet together. Life is measured by the end, provided that that bee good, and all the rest hath a proportion thereunto: the quantitie is nothing to make it more or lesse happie, no more than the greatness of a circle makes the circle more round than the lesse; the figure heere doth all: A little man is as perfect a man as a greater: Neither men nor their liues are measured by the ell.

2 Againe, it troubleth them to die farre from their friends, or to be slaine, and to remaine vnburied: they desire to die in peace, in their beds, amongst their friends, being comforted by them & comforting them. All they that follow the warres, and ride post to be in the battell, are not of this minde: these men runne willingly to their end, and seeke a tombe amongst the dead bodies of their enemies. Little children feare men when they are masked; discover their faces, and they feare them no more: And euen so beleue it, fire and sword astonish vs, when we thinke of them; take off their maske, the death wherewith they threaten vs, is but the same death wherewith women and children die.

3 They are troubled to thinke they must leaue all the world. And why? They haue seene all, one day is like another, there is no other light, nor other night, nor other sunne, nor other course of the world. One yeare telleth vs that all things grow every yeare worse and worse, they haue seene the childhood, the youth, the virility, the old age of the world: there is no arte, no way to begin againe.

4 Yea, but they leaue their parents and their friends. Where they goe they shall find more, and such as they haue neuer yet seene, and those they leaue behind them and desire so much shall shortly follow them.

5 But what shall become of their small children and orphans left without guide, without support? As if those their children

dren were more theirs than Gods, or as if they could loue them more than he that is their first and their truest father; and how many such so left haue risen to higher place and greater abilitie than other men?

But it may be they feare to go alone. This is great simplicity, so many people dying with thē, & at the selfe same houre.

Finallie, they go into a place where they shall not desire this life. How desire it? If it were lawfull to resume it, they would refuse it, and if a man were worthie to know what it is before he receiue it, he would neuer accept of it, *Vitam nemo acciperet, si daretur scientibus.* No man would accept of life, if he knew what he receined. Why, or how should they desire it, since they are either whollie nothing as miscreants beleue, or in farre better state than before, as the wisest of the world do affirme? Why then are they offended with death, since it quints them of all grieve? The selfe same iourney they haue made from death, that is to say, from nothing to life, without passion, without feare, they make againe from life vnto death; *Reverti unde veneris, quid graue est?* To returne from whence thou camest, what burden, what grieve is it?

But it may be that the spectacle of death displeaseth them, because they that die looke gattly. It is true, but this is not death, but the maske of death, that which is hid vnder it, is very beautifull, for death hath nothing in it that is fearefull: we haue sent idie & poore spies, to know it, who report not what they haue seene, but what they haue heard, & what they feare.

But it taketh out of our hands so many things, or rather taketh vs from them, and vs from our selues, it taketh vs from that we know, and haue been accustomed vnto, and bringeth vs to an estate vnknowne, *At horremus ignota;* But we abhorre things vnknowne; it taketh vs from the light, to bring vs into darknes; and to conclude, it is our end, our ruine, our dissolution. These are the weightiest objections: whereunto in a word a man may answere, that death being the ineuitable law of nature (as shall be said hereafter) we neede not dispute so much thereof, for it is a follie to feare that which a man cannot auoid. *Dementis est timere mortem; quia certa expectantur, dubia metuntur;* mors habet necessitatem aquam & iun. Etiam. It is more follie to feare death, because things certaine are expected: doubtfull

doubtfull things are feared; the necessitie of death is most iust and inuincible. But these kind of people make not their count well, for it is quite contrarie to that which they say, for in steed of taking any thing from vs, it giueth vs all, in steed of taking vs from our selues, it sets vs in libertie, & makes vs free to our selues; in steed of bringing vs into darknes, it taketh it from vs, and puts vs into the light, and it doth the same to vs, that we do to all fruits, spoiling them of their barks, their shells, their foldings, their speres, their skinnies, to bring them into sight, vse, nature; *Ita solet fieri, pereunt semper velamenta nascentium*; So it was wont to be done, for alwaies the veils and couering of euery thing doth perish; it taketh vs from a strait, incommodious, rumatike darke place, where we see but a small part of the heauens, and the light but afar off, through the two narrow holes of our eyes, to bring vs into an open liberty, an assured health, a perpetuall light, into such a place, such an estate, where we may wholly see the whole heauens, & the light in his naturall place; *Aqualiter tibi splendeat omne calidius, totam lucem suo loco prope totius aspicias quam nunc per angustissimas oculorum vias procul intueris & miraris*. Euery part of heauen shall together shine upon thee, who wholly shalt behold all the glorie thereof in his due place, which now through the streight & narrow passage of the sight, thou dost but see and discern a far off. To conclude, it taketh vs from that death, which began in the wombe of our mother, & now endeth, to bring vs to that life which shall neuer end. *Dies iste quæ tanquam extremum reformidas, æterni natalis est. This day which thou fearest as thy last, is the birth day of eternity.*

12  
To attend death  
is good.

The second maner of the cariage of man in this matter of death, is of a good, sweete, and moderate soule, and is iustly practised in a common and peaceable life, by those that with reason make account of this condition of life, and content themselves to indure it, but governing themselves according to reason, and accepting of death when it commeth. This is a well tempered mediocritie, suitable to such a condition of life, between the extremities (which are to desire and feare, to seeke and to flie, vitious and faultie, *Summum ne metuas diem nec optes (mortem concupiscentes, & timentes aquæ obuiat Epicurus)* Feare not thy last day, neither wish for it (for both to desire death, and to feare it, is alike condemned by Epicurus) if they be not



not covered and excused by some reason, not common & ordinarie, as shall be said in his place. To seeke and desire death is ill; it is iniustice to desire death without a cause, & to be out of charitie with the world, which our liues may be beneficiall vnto. It is to be vnthankfull to nature to contemne it, & not to make the best vse thereof; to be ouer anxious and scrupulous, and not to endure that estate that is not burthensome, and we are called vnto. To flie and fear death on the other side, is against nature, reason, iustice, and all dutie.

For to die it is a thing naturall, necessarie, and inuitable, iust and reasonable; Naturall, for it is a part of the order of the whole Vniuerse, & of the life of the world: wilt thou then that the world be ruinated, and a new made for thy selfe? Death holdeth a high place in the policie & great common-wealth of the world, and it is very profitable for the succession and continuance of the workes of nature: the fading or corruption of one life, is the passage to a thousand others: *Sic rerum summa nouatur*: And it is not only a part of this great whole Vniuerse, but of our particular essence, not lesse essentiall than to liue, to be borne. In flying death, thou fliest thy selfe: thy essence is equally parted into these two, life and death, it is the condition of thy creation. If it grieueth thee to die, why wert thou borne? Men come not into the world with any other purpose but to goe forth againe, and therefore he that is not willing to goe forth, let him not come in. The first day of thy birth bindeth thee, and setteth thee as well in the way to death as to life.

13  
Death is  
naturall.

*Nascentes morimur, finisq; ab origine pendet.*

*As we are borne we die,*

*The end to the entry hath a tie.*

*Sola mors ius aequum est generis humani, viuere noluit qui mori non vult, vita cum exceptione mortis data est, tam stultus qui timet mortem, quam quis senectutem. Death only is mans due right; he should not desire to live, that would not desire to die; life is giuen vs with exception of death; As foolish is he that feareth to die, as to be old.*

To be vnwilling to die, is to be vnwilling to be a man, for all men are mortall, and therefore a wise man said, and that without passion, hauing receiued newes of the death of his sonne;

sonne;

sonne ; I knew I begot, and bred him vp a mortall man, Death being then a thing so naturall and essentiall, both for the world in grolle, and for thy self in particular, why should it be horrible vnto thee? Thou goest against nature, the feare of griefe and paine is naturall, but not of death : for being so seruiceable to nature, and nature hauing instituted it, to what end should it imprint in vs a hatred and horror thereof? Children & beasts feare not death, yea many times they suffer it cheerefully : it is not then nature that teacheth vs to feare it, but rather to attend and receiue it, as being sent by it.

24  
Necessum.

Secondly, it is necessarie, fatall, ineuitable ; and this thou knowest that fearest and weepest. What greater follie can there be, than for a man to torment himselfe for nothing, and that willingly and of purpose, to pray and importune him, whom he knowes to be inexorable ; to knocke at that dore that cannot be opened ? What is there more inexorable and deafe than death ? Wee must therefore feare things vner-taine, doe our best endeouours in things that are not remediable ; but such as are certaine, as death, we must attend, and grow resolute in things past remedie. The foole feareth and flieth death, the foole seekes and runs after it ; the wise man attendeth it : It is follie to grieue at that, that cannot be mended ; to feare that, that cannot be auoided ; *Feras non culpes, quod vitari non potest* ? Wilt thou not beare the blowes thou canst not auoid ? The example of *Dauid* is excellent, who vnderstanding of the death of his deare childe, put on his best apparell, and made himselfe merry, saying to those that wondered at this kinde of carriage, that whilest his son liued, hee importuned God for his recouerie, but being dead, that care was ended, and there was no remedie. The foole thinks hee maketh a better answer to say, that that is the cause of his griefe, and that hee tormenteth himselfe, because there is no remedie, but hee doubleth and perfecteth his owne folly thereby. *Scienter frustra niti extrema dementie est.* It is extreame madnesse to labour wittingly, and on set purpose in vaine. Now death being so necessarie and ineuitable, it is not only to no purpose to feare, but making of necessitie a vertue, we must welcome it and receiue it kindly ; for it is better for vs to go to death, than that death should come to vs, to catch that, before that catch vs.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, to die is a thing reasonable and iust, it is reason to ariue to that place, towards which we are alwaies walking and if a man feare to come thither, let him not walke, but stay himselfe, or turne backe againe, which is impossible to doe. It is reason that thou giue place to others, since others haue giuen place to thee: If thou haue made thy commoditie of this life, thou must be satisfied and be gone, as he that is inuited to a banquet takes his refection and departeth. If thou haue not knownen how to make vse and profit thereof, what needest thou care, if thou lose it, or to what end wouldest thou keepe it? It is a debt that must be paid, a pawne that must be restored, whensoever it is demanded. Why pleadest thou against thy own schedule, thy faith, thy duty? It is then against reason to spurne against death, since that thereby thou acquitest thy selfe of so much, and dischargest thy selfe of so great an account. It is a thing generall and common to all to die, why then troublest thou thy selfe? Wilt thou haue a new priuiledge, that was yet neuer seene, and bee a lone man by thy selfe? Why fearest thou to goe whither all the world goeth, where so many millions are gone before thee, and so many millions shall follow thee? Death is equally certaine to all, and equality is the first part of equity, *omnes eodem cogimur: omnium versatur urna: serius ocyus fors exitura, &c.* Wee all are drinen thereunto: men daily die, enen as their lotte falls forth, &c.

15  
Iust and reasonable.

The third is the part of a valiant and generous minde, which is practised with reason, in a publike, eleuated, difficult, and busie condition of life, where there are many things to be preferred before life, and for which a man should not doubt to die. In such a case howsoever matters go, a man must more account thereof than of his life, which is placed vpon the stage and scaffold of this world: hee must runne his race with resolution, that he may giue a lustre to his other actions, and performe those things that are profitable and exemplary. Hee must lay downe his life, and let it runne his fortune. He that knoweth not how to contemne death, shall neuer not only performe any thing of worth, but he exposeth himselfe to diuers dangers; for whilest he goeth about to keepe his life safe and sure, hee laieth open and hazardeth his deuoir, his

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To contemne death is good, if it be for a thing that deserues it.

honour, his vertue and honestie. The contempt of death is that which produceth the boldest, and most honourable exploits whether in good or euill. Hee that feareth not to die feares nothing: he doth whatsoeuer he will, hee makes himselfe a master both of his owne life, and of anothers: the contempt of death is the true and liuely source of all the beautiful and generous actions of men: from hence are deriued the braue resolutions and free speeches of vertue vttered by so many great personages. *Fludius Priscus* whom the Emperour *Vespasian* had commanded not to come to the senat, or coming, to speake as he would haue him, answered, That as he was a Senator it was fit he should be at the Senate; and if being there, he were required to giue his aduice, hee would speake freely that which his conscience commaunded him. Being threatned by the same man, that if hee spake he should die; Did I euer tell you (saith he) that I was immortall? Doe you what you will, and I will do what I ought: It is in your power to put me vniuistly to death, and in me to die constantly. The *Lacedemonians* being threatned much hard dealing, if they did not speedily yeeld themselues to *Philp* the father of *Alexander*, who was entred into their countrie with a great power; one for the rest answered, What hard dealing can they suffer that feare not to die? And being told by the same *Philp* that he would breake and hinder all their designments; What, say they, will he likewise hinder vs from dying? Another being asked by what meanes a man may liue free, answered, By contemning death. And another youth being taken and sold for a slaue, said to him that bought him, Thou shalt see what thou hast bought, I were a foole to liue a slaue whilest I may be free, and whilest he spake, cast himselfe down from the top of the houle. A wise man said vnto another, deliberating with himselfe how he might take away his life, to free himselfe from an euil that at that time pressed him sore, Thou dost not deliberate of any great matter: it is no great thing to liue, thy slaues, thy beasts do liue, but it is a great matter to die honestly, wisely, constantly. To conclude and crowne this article, our religion hath not had a more firme and assured foundation, and wherein the authour thereof hath more insisted, than the contempt of this life. But many there are that

that make a shew of contemning death, when they feare it. Many there are that care not to be dead, yea they wish they were dead, but it greeueth them to die. *Emorinolo, sed me esse mortuum nihili estimo.* I would not die, but I make little account of death. Many deliberate in their health and soundest iudgements to suffer death with constancie, nay to murder themselves, a part played by many, and for which end *Heliogabalus* made many sumptuous preparations; but being come to the point, some were terrified by the bleeding of their nose, as *Lucius Domitius*, who repented that he had poisoned himselfe. Others haue turned away their eyes and their thoughts, as if they would steale vpon it, swallowing it downe insensibly as men take pilles, according to that saying of *Cesar*, that the best death was the shortest; and of *Plinie*, that a short death was the happiest houre of a mans life. Now no man can bee said to be resolute to die, that feareth to confront it, and to suffer with his eyes open, as *Socrates* did, who had thirtie whole daies to ruminate & to digest the sentence of his death, which he did without any passion or alteration, yea without any shew of endeuor, mildly and cheerfully. *Pomponius Atticus*, *Tullius Marcellinus*, Romans, *Cleantes* the Philosopher, all three almost after one maner: for hauing assayed to die by abstinence, hoping thereby to quit themselves of those maladies that did torment them, but finding themselves rather cured thereby, neuertheless they would not desist till they had ended that they went about, taking pleasure by little and little to pine away, and to consider the course and progresse of death. *Otho* and *Caro* hauing prepared all things fit for their death, vpon the very point of the execution settled themselves to sleepe, and slept profoundly, being no more astonished at death, than at any other ordinarie and light accident.

The fourth is the part of a valiant and resolute mind, practised in former times by great and holy personages, and that in two cases, the one the more naturall and lawfull is a painfull and troublesome life, or an apprehension of a far worse death: To be brieue, a miserable estate which a man cannot remedy. This is to desire death as the retrair and only haue from the torments of this life, the soueraigne good of nature, the only stay and pillar of our libertie. It is imbecillitie to yeeld vnto

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To desire death.

cuils, but it is follie to nourish them. It is a good time to die, when to liue is rather a burthen than a blessing, and there is more ill in life than good; for, to preferue our life, to increase our torment, is against nature. There are some that say, that we should desire to die, to auoid those pleasures that are according to nature; how much more then to flie those miseries that are against nature? There are many things in life farre worse than death, for which we should rather die and not liue at all, than liue. And therfore the *Lacedemonians* being cruelly threatned by *Antipater*, if they yeilded not to his demand, answered, If thou threaten vs with any thing that is woorse than death, death shall be wellcome vnto vs. And the wisest were wont to say, That a wise man liueth as long as hee should, not so long as he can, death being more at his command and in his power, than life. Life hath but one entrance, and that too dependeth vpon the will of another. Our death dependeth on our owne willes, and the more voluntary it is, the more honorable; and there are a thousand waies vnto it. We may want meanes whereby to liue, but not to die. Life may bee taken away from euery man, by euery man, but not death, *ubiq; mors est, optimè hoc cavit deus, eripere vitam nemo non homini potest, at nemo mortem: mille ad hanc aditus patent.* Death is euery where, God best foresaw this; one man may beaue another of life, but of death no man; whereunto there are infinite wayes and meanes. The most fauourable present that nature hath bestowed vpon vs, and that taketh away from vs all meanes of complaint, is, that it hath left vnto vs the key of the closet, libertie to die when we will. Wherefore complaine thou in this world? it holdeth thee not: if thou liue in paine, thy idlenesse and feare is the cause; for to die, there is nothing necessary, but a will.

The other case is a liuely apprehension and desire of the life to come, which maketh a man to thirst after death, as after a great gaine, the seed of a better life, the bridge vnto paradise, the way to all good, and an earnest penny of the resurrection. A firme beleefe and hope of these things is incompatible with the feare and horror of death: it perswadeth vs rather to bee wearie of this life, and to desire death, *vitam habere in patientia, & mortem in desiderio*, To endure our life with patience, but rather

to desire death, to haue life in affliction, & death in affection: their life is a crosse, their death a comfort, and therefore their vows and their voices are, *cupio dissolui: mihi mors lucrum: quis me liberabit de corpore mortis huius?* I desire to be dissolved: for death is profitable vnto me: who shall then free me from death? And for this cause those Philosophers and Christians haue bene iustly reproched (which is to be vnderstood of those that are weake and idle, & not of all) that play the publike dissemblers, & do not in verity beleue that which they do so much talk of & so highly commend touching that happy immortality, and those vnspokeable pleasures in the second life, since they doubt, & feare death so much, the necessarie passage therunto.

The fift and last, is the execution of this precedent desire, which is for a man to be his owne executioner, and the author of his owne death. This seemeth to proceed from vertue, and the greatnesse of a mans courage, hauing bene anciently practised by the greatest and most excellent men and women of euerie nation and religion, *Greekes, Romans, Egyptians, Persians, Medes, French, Indians*, Philosophers of all sects, *Jewes*, witnes that good old man *Razis*, called the father of the *Jewes* for his vertue; and his wiues, who vnder *Antiochus*, hauing circumcised their children, cast themselves headlong from the rocke with them: And Christians too, witnesse those two canonized Saints, *Pelagius* and *Sophronia*, whereof the first, with his mother and sisters cast himselfe into the riuer, and the other killed hir selfe with a knife, to auoid the violence of *Maxentius* the Emperour: Yea witnesse diuers people and whole cities, as *Capona* in Italy, *Astupa*, *Numantia* in Spaine besieged by the *Romans*; the *Abideens* enforced by *Philip*, a citie in *India* besieged by *Alexander*. But this resolution hath been likewise approoued and authorized by many common-weales, by lawes and rules established thereupon, as at *Marseilles*, in the Ile of *Cea*; in *Nigropont*, and other nations, as in the *Hyperborean* Ilands, and iustified by many great reasons, drawn from the precedent article, which is of the iust desire of death. For if it be permitted to desire, to aske, to seeke after death, why should it bee an ill act to giue it vnto our selues? If a mans owne death bee iust in the will, why should it not be as iust in the hand, and the execution? Why

should I expect that from another, which I can do my selfe? and why should it not be better to giue it, than to suffer another to giue it; to meet, than to attend it? for the fairest death is the more voluntarie. Finally, I offend not the law made against theues and robbers, when I take but my owne goods, and cut but my owne purse; neither am I guiltie of the lawes made against murderers by taking away my owne life. But this opinion is reprooued by diuers, not only Christians, but Iewes, as *Iosephus* disputeth against his captaines in the cause of *Puis*: and Philosophers, as *Plato*, *Scipio*, who held this proceeding not only for a vice of cowardlines and impatiencie, for it is for a man to hide himselfe from the blowes of fortune. Now a true and liuely vertue must neuer yeeld, for euils and crosses are nourishments thereunto, and it is greater constancie well to vse the chaine wherewith wee are tied, than to breake it; and more settled resolution in *Regulus*, than in *Caio*.

*Rebus in aduersis facile est contemnere vitam,*

*Fortius ille facit, qui miser esse potest.*

*Si fractus illabatur orbis*

*Impavidum ferient ruina.*

*Tis easie in hard fortune life to scorne;*

*More stout he is, whose miserie is well borne.*

*If all the world should broken on him fall,*

*Strike him vnterrified the ruine shall.*

But also for a fault of desertion; for a man ought not to abandon his charge without the expresse commandement of him that gaue it him; we are not here for our selues, nor our own masters. This then is not a matter beyond all doubt or disputation.

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It is first beyond all doubt, that wee are not to attempt this last exploit without very great and iust cause (nay I cannot see how any cause should be great and iust enough) to the end that it be as they say *εὐλογος ἐκπαγωγή*, an honest and reasonable departure. It must not then be for any light occasion, whatsoever some say, that a man may die for light causes, since they that hold vs in life are not weightie. It is ingratitude to nature not to accept and vse hir present, it is a signe of lightnes to be too anxious and scrupulous, to breake companie for matters of no moment, and not for such as are iust and lawfull, if there be any such. And therefore they had not a sufficient



sufficient excuse, and iust cause of their death, of whom I made mention before, *Pomponius Atticus*, *Marcellinus*, and *Cleantes*, who would not stay the course of their death, for this onely reason, because they were alreadie neerevnto it. The wiues of *Petus*, of *Scannus*, of *Labio*, of *Fulvius* the friend of *Augustus*, of *Seneca*, and diuers others, who died only to accompanie their husbands in death, or rather to encourage them therein. *Cato* and others, who died because their businesse succeeded not well, and because they would not fall into the hands of their enemies, notwithstanding they feared no ill vsage at their hands. They that haue murdered themselves because they would not liue at the mercie, and by the grace and fauor of those whom they hated, as *Granius Silvanus*, and *Statius Proximus*, being pardoned by *Nero*. They that die to recouer a shame and dishonor past, as that Romane *Lucretia*, *Spartacus* the sonne of *Queene Tomyris*, *Boges* the Lieutenant of *King Xerxes*. They that for no particular cause, but only because they see the weale-publike in a bad and declining estate murder themselves, as *Nerua* that great Lawyer, *Vibius Tircus*, *Inbellius* in the taking of *Capona*. They that are weary with liuing, or for priuate cause loath to liue any longer. Neither is it sufficient that the cause be great and iust, but that it be necessarie and remediless, and that all maner of meanes to preferue life be first put in practise. For precipitation and anticipated despaire is very vitious, as in *Brutus* and *Cassius*, who killing themselves before the time and occasion, lost the reliques of the Romane libertie whereof they were protectors. A man, saith *Cleomenes*, must manage his life, and make vse thereof to the vttermost: for to take it away, a man neuer wants time, it is a remedy which he hath alwaies in his owne hands; but the state of things may change and grow better. *Ioseph* and diuers others haue to their great benefit practised this counsell: things that seeme altogether desperate, do many times change and haue a happie successe; *aliquis carnisici suo superstes fuit. Some men haue out-lined their miseries.*

*Multa dies varisque labor mutabilis ani  
Retulit in melius.*

*Time and the diuers paines of changing age,  
Haue many things brought to a better stage.*

A man must carie himselfe in his place and calling as a defendant against him that assaileth him, *cum moderamine inculpatæ tuelæ*, with the government of blamelesse protection: he must trie all manner of meanes before hee come to this extremitie. Secondly, and without doubt it is farre better and more commendable to suffer, and to continue constant and firme to the end, than fearfully and cowardly to flie or die: but forasmuch as it is a gift not giuen vnto all no more than continencie is: *Non omnes capiunt verbum istud, unde melius nubere quam vri: Almen like not this saying, Better to marie than to burne*: the question is, whether an insupportable and remedlesse euill happening, which may vterly vndo & turne topsie-turue our whole resolution, and driue vs into despaire, despite and murmuring against God, it be more expedient, or a lesse euill for a man couragiously to deliuer himselfe, hauing his senses sound and setled, than by standing to it, for feare of failing in his dutie, expose himselfe to the danger of sinking and being vtterly lost. It is not a lesse euill to quit the place, than to be obstinate and perish, to flie, than to be taken. It is true that it seemeth by all humane and philosophicall reason to be practised, as hath beene said, by so many famous people of all countries and climates. But Christianitie doth no way approoue it, nor alloweth therein any dispensation.

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Finally, it is a great point of wisdom to learne to know the point and period, to chuse a fit houre to die: Euery man hath his time and season to die; some preuent it, others prolong it: there is weaknesse and valour in them both, but there is required discretion. How many men haue suruiued their glory, and by a desire to lengthen their life but a little, haue darkened it againe, and liued to helpe burie their owne honour? And that which lastly sticketh by them, hath no relish or feeling of what is past, but continueth like an old filthie clout sowed to the hemme of a rich and beautifull ornament. There is a time to gather fruit from the tree, which if it hang too long, it rotteth and growes worse and worse; and the losse is as great too, if it be gathered too soone. Many saints and holy men haue fled from death, because they are yet profitable to the Church and weale publike, though in respect of their owne particular they could be content to die. It is an act of charitie to desire to liue

for

for the benefit of another : *Sipopulo ino sum necessarius, non recuso laborem* : If I am needfull to thy people, I refuse not labour.

Death hath diuers formes, some more ealie than other, and taketh diuers qualities according to the fantasie of euery one. 21  
Formes of  
deaths diuers. Among those that are naturall, they that proceed from weakness and a nummette of the members are the sweetest and the easiest : among those that are violent, the best is the shortest, and the least premeditated. Some desire to make an exemplarie and demonstratiue death of constancie and sufficiency ; this is to consider another thing, and to seeke their owne reputation : but this is vanitie, for this is no act of societie, but of one only person, who hath enough to do with himselfe, to minister to himselfe inward comfort, and hath no need to trouble himselfe with what belongeth to another, especially all the interest he hath in his reputation, ceasing with his death. That is the best death which is well recollected in it selfe, quiet, solitarie, and attendeth wholly to that, which at that time is fittest. That great assistance of parents and friends, bringeth a thousand discomforts, it oppresseth and smothereth him that is dying, one tormenteth his eares, another his eies, another his mouth ; their cries and complaints, if they be true, stifle the heart ; if fained, afflict and torment it. Many great personages haue sought to die farre from their friends, to auoid this inconuenience, accounting it a childish thing, and a foolish humour, to be willing by their miseries to moue sorrow and compassion in their friends ; we commend constancie to suffer bad fortune, we accuse and hate it in our friends, and when it is our owne case, it is not sufficient that they suffer with vs, but they must afflict themselues too : A wise man that is sicke should content himselfe with the settled countenance of his assistants.

## CHAP. XII.

*To maintaine himselfe in true tranquillitie of spirit, the fruit and crowne of wisdom, and the conclusion of this Booke.*

**T**He tranquillitie of the spirit is the soueraigne good of man. This is that great and rich treasure, which the wisest seeke by sea and by land, on foot and a horsebacke ; all  
our

our care should tend thereunto, it is the fruit of all our labors and studies, the crowne of wisdom. But lest a man should mistake himselfe heerein, you must know that this tranquillitie is not a retrait or vacation from all affaires, a delightfull solitarinesse and corporally pleasant, or a profound carelesnesse of all things: if it were so, many women, idle, dissolute and voluptuous persons, would at their pleasure enioy as great a good, as the wisest can aspire vnto with all their studie: Neither multitude nor scarcitie of businesse doth any thing heerein. It is a beautifull, sweete, equall, iust, firme and pleasant estate of the soule, which neither businesse nor idleness, nor good accidents, nor ill, nor time can any way trouble, alter, mend, or depresse; *Vera tranquillitas non concit. Nothing troubles true tranquillitie.*

2 The meanes to attaine thereunto, to get and preserue it, are the points that I haue handled in this second booke, whereof this is a brieve collection. They consist in freeing and disfurnishing of a man from all lets and impediments, and furnishing him with those things that entertaine and preserue it. The things that doe most hinder & trouble the rest and tranquillitie of the spirit, are common and vulgar opinions, which for the most part are erroneous; and secondlie desires and passions, which ingender in vs a kinde of delicacy and diffcultie: which are the cause that a man is neuer content, and these are kindled and stirred in him by those two contrarie fortunes, prosperity and aduersitie, as with two violent and mightie winds: and finally that vile and base captiuitie wherewith the spirit (that is to say, the iudgement and will) is enthralled like a beast vnder the yoke of certaine locall and particular rules and opinions. Now he must emancipate and free himselfe from these stockes and vniust subiections, and bring his spirit into libertie, restore himselfe to himselfe, free, vniuersall, open, seeing into all, and wandering through the beautifull and vniuersall circuit of the world and of nature. *In commune genitus, mundum ut unam domum spectans, totum inferens mundo, & in omnes eius actus contemplationem suam mittens.* He that is begotten generally, holds this world but as one house, applying himselfe to the whole world, and exercising his contemplation in all the actions thereof.

The place being thus trimmed and made ready, the first foundations that are to be laid, are a true honestie, and to liue in such an estate and vocation whereunto a man is fir. The principall parts wherewith he must raise, assure, and settle this building, are first true piety, whereby, with a soule not astonished, but settled, pure, free, deuout, a man contemplateth God, the great, soueraigne, and absolute work-master of all things, who can neither be seene nor known: but yet he must be known, adored, worshipped, serued with the whole heart, from whom he is to hope for all maner of good, and to feare no euill: afterwards he must walke roundly in simplicity and truth, according to the lawes and customes, liue with a heart open both to the eies of God and the world, *Conscientiam suam aperiens semperque tanquam in publico viuens, se magis veritus, quam alios.* Shewing his conscience, and alwaies lying as it were in publicke, more afeard of himselfe, then of others. Againe hee must keepe in himselfe and with others, and generally in all things, in his thoughts, speeches, delignments, actions, a moderation the mother or nurse of tranquillitie, laying aside all pompe and vanity, rule his desires, content himselfe with a medioeritie and sufficiency, *Quod sit esse velit, nihilq; malit, reioyce in his fortunes.* A tempest hath a great deale lesse force, and doth lesse hurt! when the sailes are taken downe, than when they are hoised vp, and laid open to the windes. He must bee constant against whatsoeuer may wound or hurt him, raise himselfe aboue and beyond all feare, condemning all the blowes of fortune, of death, holding it as the end of all euils, and not the cause of any, *Contemptor omnium, quibus torquetur vita, supra omnia que contingunt acciduntque emittens. Imperturbatus, intrepidus.* A contemptor or despiser of all things, where with mans life may be afflicted, raising himselfe aboue all things that may chance or happen, without perturbation, without feare. And so hold himselfe firme: vnto himselfe, agree with himselfe, liue at ease without any paine or inward contention, full of ioy, of peace, of comfort and content in himselfe; *Sapiens plenus gaudio, hilaris, placidus cum dijs ex paris vinit: Sapientie effectus gaudij equalitas, solus sapiens gaudet.* A wise man is full of ioy, merrie, peaceable, liueth in equall pleasure with the gods: the effect

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effect of wisdom is the equality of ioy, wherein only a wise man delighteth: He must I say entertaine himselfe, and continue content in himselfe, which is the proper fruit & effect of wisdom; *Nisi sapienti sua non placent: omnis stultitia laborat fastidio sui. Non est beatus, esse se qui non putat.* No man, but a wise man is content with his owne: euery fool es trauels dislikes him. No man is happie, but he that so thinkes himselfe.

To conclude to this tranquillity of spirit 2. things are necessarie, innocencie & a good conscience; this is the first & principall part which doth maruellously arme and confirme him with assurance; but this is not alwaies sufficient, in the force of the tempest, as it is many times seene in diuers that are troubled & lost: *Erit tanta tribulatio ut seducantur iusti.* There shall be so great tribulation, that euen the righteous shall be seduced. And therefore the other is likewise necessarie, which is force and constancie of courage, as likewise this alone were not sufficient: for the force and resistance of the conscience is maruellous, it makes vs to betray, to accuse our selues, & for want of other witnesses, it is as a thousand witnesses against vs.

*Occultum quatiens animo tortore flagellum.*

Shaking a whip that's hid within

His mind, the torturer of his sinne.

It frameth an enditement, condemneth & executeth vs, there is no closet close enough for wicked men, saith *Epicurus*, because they neuer can assure themselues to be hid; their owne conscience alwaies discovering them to themselues. *Prima est hac ultio, quod se iudice nemo nocens absoluitur.* So likewise neither a weake & fearefull soule, be it neuer so holy, nor a strong and courageous, if it be not sound & pure, can neuer enioy this so rich & happie tranquillitie, but he that hath them all worketh wonders, as *Socrates*, *Epaminondas*, *Cato*, *Scipio*, of whom there are 3. admirable exploits touching this subiect. These two Romans being publicly accused, made their accusers to blush, woon the Iudges and the whole assemblie being stricken with an admiration. Hee had a heart too great by nature, saith *Titus Livius* of *Scipio*, to know how to be faultie, and to debase himselfe so much, as to defend his owne innocencie.

FINIS.

OF



OF  
W I S D O M E,  
THE  
T H I R D B O O K E.

*Wherein are handled the particular  
aduifements of Wifdome, by the foure  
morall vertues.*

T H E P R E F A C E.



Orasmuch as our purpose in this Booke, is by peecemeale to instruct vnto wisedome, and to giue the particular aduifements after the generall handled in the Second Booke, that we may the better hold a certaine course and order therein, we haue thought that we cannot do better, than to follow the four mistris and morall vertues, Prudence, Iustice, Fortitude, and Temperance; for in these foure almost all the duties of our life are comprehended. Prudence, is as a generall guide and conduct of the other vertues, and of our whole life, though properlie it be exercised in the affaires that belong thereunto. Iustice concerneth the persons of men; for it is to giue vnto euery one that which belongeth vnto him. Fortitude and temperance, concerneth all accidents good and euill, pleasant and painefull, good and ill fortune. Now in these three, persons, affaires, and accidents,

dents, is contained all our life and humane condition, and the trafficke of this world.

## Of Prudence, the first vertue.

### CHAP. I.

#### Of Prudence in generall.

1  
The excellency  
thereof.

PRudence is with reason put in the first rancke, as the generall Queene, superintendent, & guide of all other vertues, *Auriga virtutum*; without which there is nothing good, beautifull, fit, and decent; it is the salt of our life, the lustre, the ornament, the sauce or seasoning of our actions, the square and rule of our affaires; and in a word, the Arte of our life, as physicke the arte of our health.

2  
The definition.

It is the knowledge and choice of those things wee must either desire or flie; it is the iust estimation and triall of things, it is the eye that seeth all, that directeth and ordaineth all. It consisteth in three things, which are all of one rancke; to consult and deliberate well, to iudge & resolute well, to conduct and execute well.

3  
It is vniuersall.

It is a vniuersall vertue, for it extendeth it selfe generally to all humane things, not only in grosse, but by peccemeale to euery particular thing, & is as infinite, as are the individuals.

4  
Difficult.

It is very difficult, both by reason of the aforesaid infiniteness, for the particulars are without knowledge, as without number, *Si qua finiri non possunt, extra sapientiam sunt*; Things infinite and that cannot be defined, are beyond wisdom; And of the great vncertaintie and inconstancie of humane things, which are the greater by reason of their accidents, circumstances, appertinances, dependancies, times, places, persons; in such sort, that in the change of one only, and that the least circumstance, the whole thing it selfe is altered: And likewise in the office thereof, which is the gathering together and temperature of contrarie things, the distinction and triall of those that are like one another; the contrarietie and resemblance hindereth much.

5  
Obscure:

It is very obscure, because the causes and iurisdicitions of things are vnkowne, the seeds & roots are hidden, and such



as the nature of man cannot find, nor ought to seeke after. *Occul- Plin. in*  
*at corum semina Deus, & plerunque bonorum malorumq; cau- paneg.*  
*sa sub diuersa specie latent. Their seedes God keepeth vnknowne,*  
*and for the most part the causes of good and euill lie hid vnder diuers*  
*similitudes. Moreouer, fortune, destinie, (vse what words you*  
*will) a soueraigne, secret, and vnknowne power and authority*  
*hath alwaies the aduantage, and maintaineth it against all*  
*counsels, foresights, and preuentions whatsoeuer: where-*  
*by it manytimes comes to passe, that the best counsels haue*  
*the worst issues, that one and the same counsell doth very*  
*happilie succede to one, vnappily to another, in one and*  
*the same case, and with one and the same man, things went*  
*luckilie yesterday, vnluckily to day. It is an opinion iustlie*  
*receiued, that wee ought not to iudge of counsels, nor of the*  
*sufficiencie and capacitie of persons by the euent. And*  
*therefore one answered those well that maruelled and were*  
*astonished at the ill successe of their businesse, considering*  
*with how wise and mature deliberation they were vndertaken,*  
*That they were masters of their deliberations, not of the suc-*  
*cesse of their affaires: for that was in the power of fortune,*  
*which seemeth to sport it selfe with all our fairest design-*  
*ments and counsels, ouerthroweth in a moment that which*  
*hath a long time been proiected and deliberated, and seemeth*  
*to be stronglie fortified, choking, as they say, our artillarie.*  
*And indeed fortune to shew it authority in all things, and to*  
*abate our presumption, not being able to make men wise, that*  
*are not apt thereunto, maketh them neuerthelesse happie in*  
*despite of vertue, whereby it many times comes to passe, that*  
*simple men bring to a happie end great matters both publike*  
*and priuate. Prudence then is a sea without either bottome*  
*or brinke, and which cannot be limitted and prescribed by*  
*precepts and aduiselements. It doth but compasse things and*  
*goeth about them, like a darke cloude, many times vaine and*  
*frivolous.*

Neuerthelesse it is of such weight and necessitie, that alone  
 and of it selfe it can do much, and without it all the rest is no-  
 thing, no not riches, meanes, force, *Vis consilij experts mole ruit*  
*sua, Mens vna sapiens plurimum vincit manus. Et multa que*  
*natura impedita sunt, consilio expediuntur. Strength void of*  
*counsell*

6  
*Necessarie.*  
*Horat. 3. od;*  
*Euripid.*  
*Liuius.*

Senec. 1. de  
element.

Xenophon in  
paedag.

7

The acqui-  
sition thereof.

counsell falleth to ruine even of it selfe, One wise mind overcommeth the hands of many, And many things that are hindered by nature, are ended by counsell. And the principall cause of this necessitie is the peruerse nature of man, the roughest and hardest to tame of all other creatures; *Impatiens equi, nedum, seruitutis*; Impatient of equity, much more of seruitude; and which must be handled with arte and industrie, for it doth not more willingly set it selfe against any, than against those that would contraine it. Now prudence is the arte to handle it, and a gentle bridle, that holdeth it within the compasse of obedience.

Now though the seed of Prudence, as of other vertues, be in vs by nature, yet it is acquired and learnt more than any other, and that in some sort by precepts and aduiseiments; this is the Theorick: but much better & principally (though with more time) by experience and practise, which is twofold: the one, and the true, is that which is proper and personall, whereof it takes the name; this is the knowledge of those things which we haue seene and handled: the other is strange by the acte of another; this is historie which we know by relation or by reading. Now experience and vse is more firme & more assured; *Vsus efficacissimus omnium rerum magister*, Vse and experience is a most effectfull maister of all things, the father and mistris of all the artes, but more long; it is old, *Seris venit vsus ab annis*, Experience cometh in a mans latter daies, more difficult, painefull, rare. The knowledge of historie, as it is lesse firme and assured, so is it more easie, more frequent, open and common to all. A man is made more resolute and assured at his owne charges, but it is more easie at the charge of another. Now from these two properly, Experience, and Historie, doth prudence arise, *Vsus me genuit, mater peperit memoria, seu memoria anima & vita historia*. Experience beget me, my mother memorie bare me; the soule and life of memorie is historie.

8

The distinction.

Now Prudence may and must be diuerslie distinguished according to the persons and the affaires. In regard of the persons there is priuate prudence, whether it be solitarie and indiuiduall, which can hardlie be tearmed prudence; or sociable & Oeconomically among a small companie, & prudence publike and politike. This more high, excellent, difficult, and  
vnto

vnto which those foresaid qualities doe properly belong, and it is twofold, peaceable and militarie.

In regard of the affaires, forasmuch as they are of two sorts, the one ordinarie, easie; the other extraordinarie. These are accidents which bring with them some new difficultie and ambiguitie. A man may likewise say that there is an ordinarie and easie prudence, which walketh according to the lawes, customes, and course already established, another extraordinarie and more difficult.

There is likewise another distinction of prudence both in respect of the persons, and of the affaires, which concerneth rather the degrees, than the kindes thereof, that is to say, proper prudence whereby a man is wise, and taketh counsell of himselfe; the other borrowed, whereby a man followeth the counsell of another. The wise say, that there are two sorts and degrees of wise men; the first and chiefest is of those that haue a cleere insight into all things, and know of themselves how to finde the remedies and helps; but where are these to be found? Doubtlesse they are rare and singular: the other is of those that know how to take, to follow, to make vse of the good counsels of another; for they that know neither how to giue, nor to take counsell, are fooles.

Hesiod.  
Luilius.  
Cicero.

The generall and common aduiselements, which belong to all sorts of prudence, all sorts of persons and affaires, hath beene touched and briefly deliuered in the second booke, and they are eight; first, knowledge of the persons and affaires; Chap. 10. secondly, estimation of things; thirdly, choice and elections; fourthly, from them to take counsell vpon all; fifthly, temperature betweene feare and assurance, confidence and diffidence; sixthly, to take all things in their season, and to cease vpon the occasion; seuenthly, to carrie himselfe well, with industrie and fortune; lastly, discretion in all. We must now handle the particulars, first of publike wisdom, which respecteth the persons, afterwards of that which respecteth the affaires.

*Of the politicke prudence of a soueraigne  
to gouerne states.*

THE PREFACE.

**T**His doctrine belongeth to soueraignes and gouernours of states. It is vncertaine, infinite, difficult, and almost impossible to be ranged into order, to be limited and prescribed by rules and precepts: but wee must endeouour to giue some small light, and brieve instruction thereof. Wee may referre this whole doctrine to two principall heads, which are the two duties of a soueraigne. The one comprehendeth and intreateth of the props and pillars of a state, principal and essentiall parts of publike gouernment, as the bones and sinewes of this great bodie, to the end that a souereigne may prouide for himselfe and his state; which are seuen principall, that is to say, knowledge of the state, vertue, maners and fashions, counsels, treasure, forces and armes, alliances. The three first are in the person of the souereigne, the fourth in him and neere him, the three latter without him. The other is to act, well to employ and to make vse of the aforesaid meanes, that is to say, in grosse, and in a word, well to gouerne and maintaine himselfe in authoritie, and the loue both of his subiects and of strangers, but distinctly; this part is twofold, peaceable and militarie. Behold heere summarily and grossely the worke cut out, and the first great draughts that are to be handled heereafter. Wee will diuide then this politicke matter, and of state, into two parts; the first shall be of prouision, that is to say, of the seuen necessarie things; the second, and which presupposeth the first, shall be of the action of the prince. This matter is excellently handled by *Lipsius*, according as he thought good: the marrow of his booke is heere: I haue not taken, nor wholly followed his method, nor his order, as you may already see in this generall diuision, and more you shall heereafter: I haue likewise left somewhat of his, and added something of my owne; and other mens.

## CHAP. II.

*The first part of this politicke prudence and gouernment of state, which is of prouision.*

**T**He first thing that is required before all others, is the knowledge of the state : for the first rule of all prudence consisteth in knowledge, as hath beene said in the second booke. The first in all things, is to know with whom a man hath to deale. For in as much as this ruling and moderating prudence of states, which is a knowledge and sufficiencie to gouerne in publike, is a thing relatiue, which is handled betweene the soueraigne and the subiects ; the first dutie and office thereof is in the knowledge of the two parts, that is, of the people, and the soueraigntie, that is to say, of the state. First then the humours and natures of the people must be knownen. This knowledge formeth, and giueth aduice vnto him that should gouerne them. The nature of the people in generall, hath beene described at large in the first booke, (light, inconstant, mutinous, vaine, a louer of nouelties, fierce and insupportable in prosperitie, cowardly and deiested in aduersitie) but it must likewise be knownen in particular : so many cities and persons, so many diuers humours. There are people cholericke, audacious, warriors, fearefull, giuen to wine, subiect to women, some more than others : *Noscenda natura vulgi est, & quibus modis temperanter habeatur* : The nature of the vulgar sort is to be knownen, and by what meanes it may be temperately ruled. And in this sense is that saying of the wise to bee vnderstood : Hee that hath not obeyed, cannot tell how to command : *Nemo bene imperat, nisi qui ante paruerit* Senec. imperio. Not because souereignes should or can alwaies take vpon them the name of subiects ; for many are borne kings and princes : and many states are successiue : but that he that will well command, should acquaint himselfe with the humors and willes of his subiects, as if himselfe were of their ranke, and in their place. Hee must likewise know the nature of the state, not onely in generall, such as it hath beene described, but in particular that which he hath now in hand, the forme, establishment, birth thereof, that is to say, whether it be old

*The chiefe point of this prouision, is to know the state.*

or new, fallen by succession, or by election, obtained by the lawes, or by armes, of what extent it is, what neighbors, means, power it hath. For according to these and other circumstances, hee must diuersly manage the scepter, loose and straiten the raines of his gouernment.

After this knowledge of the state, which is as a preamble, the first of those things that are required, is vertue, necessarie in a soueraigne, as well for himselfe as for the state. It is first necessarie and conuenient that hee that is aboue all should be better than all, according to the saying of *Cyrus*. And then it standeth him vpon for his credit and reputation. For common fame and report gathereth and spreadeth abroad the speeches and actions of him that gouerneth. Hee is in the cie of all, and can no more hide himselfe than the sun: and therefore what good or ill hee doth, shall not want meanes to blasphem it, shall be talked of enough. And it importeth him much, both in respect of himselfe and his state, that his subiects haue a good opinion of him. Now a soueraigne ought not only in himselfe, and in his life and conuersation to be vertuous, but hee must likewise endeuour that his subiects be like vnto himselfe. For as all the wisest of the world haue euer taught, a state, a citie, a companie cannot long continue nor prosper where vertue is banished; and they doe grossly equiuocate, who thinke that princes are so much the more assured in their states, by how much the more wicked their subiects are, because, say they, they are more proper, and as it were borne to seruitude and the yoke, *patientiores seruitutis, quos non decet nisi esse seruos*: Very patient of seruitude, whom it becommeth not to be other than seruants. For contrarily, wicked men beare their yoke impatiently; and they that are good and debonaire feare much more than their cause is. *Pessimus quisque asperissime rectorem patitur*: Contra facile imperium in bonos, qui metuentes magis quam metuendi. Now the most powerfull meanes to induce them, and to forme them vnto vertue, is the example of the Prince, for as experience telleth vs, all men doe frame themselves to the paterne and modell of the Prince. The reason is, because example prelsseth more than law. It is a mute law which carrieth more credit than a command, *nec tam imperio nobis opus quam exemplo*: & *minus iubetur exemplo*: Neither

2  
The second  
head of this  
promission is  
vertue.

Salu9. ad  
Cezar.

Plin. Pan.

Salust. ad  
Cezar.

Pli. Paneg.

ther doe we so much need commandment, as example; and it is more gentle to command by example. Now the eyes and thoughts of the lesse are alwaies vpon the great; they admire and simply beleue, that all is good and excellent that they doe: and on the other side, they that commaund, thinke they sufficientlie enioyne and bind their inferiors to imitate them by acting only. Vertue then is honorable and profitable in a soueraigne, yea, all vertue.

But especially and aboue all, Pietie, Iustice, Valour, Clemencie. These are the foure principall and princely vertues in principallitie. And therefore that great Prince *Augustus* was wont to say, that Pietie and Iustice did deifie Princes. And *Seneca* saith, that clemencie agreeth better with a Prince, than any other. The pietie of a soueraigne consisteth in his care for the maintenance and preservation of religion, as the prote<sup>ctor</sup> thereof. This maketh for his owne honor, and preservation of himselfe: for they that feare God, dare not attempt, nay thinke of any thing either against their Prince, who is the image of God vpon earth, or against the state. For as *Lactantius* doth many times teach, it is religion that maintaineth humane societie, which cannot otherwise subsist, and would soone be filled with all maner of wickednes and sauage cruelties, if the respect and feare of religion did not bridle men and keepe them in order. The state of the Romans did increase, and flourish more by religion, saith *Cicero* himselfe, than by all other meanes. Wherefore a Prince must take care and endeuer that religion be preserved in it puritie, according to the ancient lawes and ceremonies of the countrie, and hinder all innouation, and controuersies therein, roughlie chastising those that goe about to breake the peace thereof. For doubtlesse change in religion, and a wrong done thereunto, draweth with it a change and declination in the Commonwealth, as *Aleceus* well discourseth to *Augustus*. Dion.

After pietie commeth Iustice, without which states are but robberies, which a Prince must keepe and practise both in himselfe and others: In himselfe, for he must detest all those tyrannicall & barbarous speeches, which dispence with soueraignes, quitting them from all lawes, reason, equitie, obligation; which tell them that they are not bound vnto any o- Iustus.

ther dutie, than to their owne willes and pleasures; that there is no law for them; that all is good and iust that serueth their turnes; that their equity is their force, their dutie is in their power. *Principi leges nemo scripsit: lucet, si libet. In summa fortuna, id æquius quod validius: nihil iniustum quod fractuosum: Sanctitas, pietas, fides, primata bona sunt: qua iuuat reges eam.* None hath written lawes for the Prince: his will is his law. In the highest degree of fortune, that is most iust, that is of most force; Nothing is vnjust that is profitable: Sanctity, piety, faith are priuate goods, and goe that way that may benefit the Prince. And he must oppose against them those excellent and holy counsels of the wise, that he that hath most power in him to breake lawes, should take most care to keepe them, and liue most in order. The greatest power should be the straightest bridle; the rule of power is dutie: *minimum decet liberè, cui minimum licet, non sui ppetentes posse, fieri quod nefas.* Hee that hath power to doe too much, ought to be least free; it is not lawfull that mightie men should doe that, which is vnlawfull to be done. The Prince then must first be iust, keeping well and inuiolable his faith, the foundation of iustice to all and every one whoeuer he be. Then he must cause that his iustice be kept and maintained in others, for it is his proper charge, and for that cause he is installed. He must vnderstand the causes and the persons, giue vnto every one that which appertaineth to him, iustly according to the lawes, without delay, labyrinth of suits and controuersies, inuolution of processe, abolishing that villanous and pernicious mystery of pleading, which is an open faire, or marchandize, a lawfull and honorable robbérie, *concessum latrocinium*; auoiding the multiplicite of lawes and ordinances, a testimonie of a sicke Common-weale, *Corruptissima respublica plurima leges*, Plenty of lawes cause most corrupt common-weales, as medicines and plaisters of a bodie ill disposed: and all this, to the end that that which is established by good lawes bee not destroyed by too many lawes. But you must know, that the iustice, vertue, and prohibie of a soueraigne goeth after another manner, than that of priuate men: it hath a gate more large and more free by reason of the great weight and dangerous charge which hee carrieth and swayeth, for which cause it is fit to march with a pafe, which seemeth to others vn easie and

Plin. Pan.  
Tacitus.  
Senec. in tr.

Senec.  
Euripides.

Colum.  
Tacit.

Plin. Pan.

An aduerti-  
ment.



and irregular, but yet is necessarie and lawfull for him. He must sometimes step aside, and goe out of the way, mingle prudence with iustice, and as they say, couer himselfe with the skirne of the Lion, if that of the Foxe serue not the turne. But this is not alwaies to be done, and in all cases, but with these three conditions, that it be for the euident and important necessitie of the weale publike, (that is to say, of the State and of the Prince, which are things conioyned) vnto which he must runne; this is a naturall obligation, and not to be dispensed with: and to procure the good of the Common-weale, is but to doe his durie.

For the  
weale-bep.

*Salus populi suprema lex esto.*

*Be it as supreme lawe awarded,*

*To keepe the people safely guarded.*

That it be to defend, and not to offend; to preserve himselfe, and not to increase his greatnes, to saue and shield himselfe either from deceits and subtilties, or from wicked and dangerous enterprises, and not to practise them. It is lawfull by subtiltie to prevent subtiltie and among foxes to counterfet the fox. The world is full of arte and malicious couenage, and by deceits and cunning subtilties, states are commonlie ouerthrowne, saith *Aristotle*. Why then should it not be lawfull, nay why should it not be necessarie to hinder, and to diuert such euill, and to saue the weale publike by the selfesame meanes that others would vndermine and ouerthrow it? Alwaies to deale simplic and plainly with such people, and to follow the streight line of true reason and equitie, were many times to betray the State, and to vndo it.

For defense and  
conservation.

Thirdly it must be with discretion, to the end that others abuse it not, and such as are wicked take from thence occasion to giue credit and countenance to their owne wickednes. For it is neuer permitted to leaue vertue and honellie, to follow vice and dishonestie. There is no composition or compensation betwixt these two extremities. And therefore away with all iniustice, treacherie, treason, and disloyaltie. Cursed be the doctrine of those, who teach (as hath beene said) that all things are good and lawfull for soueraignes: but yet it is sometimes necessarie and required, that he mingle profit with honestie, and that he enter into composition with

5  
Discreetly  
without wicked  
life.

both. He must neuer turne his back to honesty, but yet sometimes goe about and coast it, employing therein his skill and cunning, which is good, honest and lawfull, as saith that great *S. Basil*, *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμπροσθεν παύσις*; and doing for the weale-publike as mothers and physitians, who feede their children and sick with faire speeches, & deceiue them for their health. To be brieue, doing that closely which he may not do openly, ioyne wisdom to valor, arte and spirit, where nature and the hand sufficeth not; be, as *Pindarus* saith, a Lyon in his blowes, a Fox in his counsell; a Doue and a Serpent as diuine veritie speaketh.

6

*Distrust required in a Prince.*

And to this matter more distinctly, there is required in a soueraigne, distrust, and that he keepe himselfe close, yet so, as that he be still vertuous and iust. Distrust, which is the first, is wholly necessary, as the contrary, which is credulitie, and a carelesse trust or confidence, is vitious, and very dangerous in a soueraigne. He watcheth ouer all, and must answer for all, his faults are not light, and therefore he must be well aduised. If he trust much, he discouereth himselfe, and is exposed to shame, and many dangers, *opportunus sit iniuria*, yea, he encourageth such as are false and treacherous, who may with little danger, and much recompence commit great wickednesse, *aditum nocendi perfido praestat fides*. Trust makes way for the treacherous to doe mischief. It is necessary therefore that he couer himselfe with this buckler of distrust, which the wisest haue thought to be a great part of prudence, and the sinowes of wisdom, that is to say, that he watch, beleue nothing, take heed of all: and heereunto doth the nature of the world induce him, wholly composed of lies, coloured, counterfeite, and dangerous, namely such as are neere vnto him in the court and houses of great personages. Hee must then trust but few, and those knowen by long experience and often trials: Neither is it necessary that he abandon them, and in such sort leaue all the cord, that he still hold it not by one end, and haue an eye vnto them: But he must couer and disguise his diffidence, yea when he distrusteth, he must make a shew and countenance of great trust and confidence. For open distrust wrongeth, and inuiceth as much to deceiue, as an ouer-carelesse confidence, and many by making too great a shew of feare to be deceiued,

shew

Senec.

Epichar.  
Euripid.  
Cicero.

show the way how they may be deceived. *Multifallere docuerunt dum timent falli: Many haue taught to deceiue, whilst they feare to be deceiued: as contrarily a professed and open trust, hath taken away the desire to deceiue, hath obliged to loyalty, and ingendred fidelitie; vult quisque sibi credi, & habita fides ipsam plerumque obligat fidem. Every man would be beleueed, and to be credited for the most part bindeth trust the more.* Senec.

From distrust comes dissimulation the science or seed thereof; for if that were not, and that there were trust and fidelitie in all, dissimulation which openeth the front, and couereth the thought, could haue no place. Now dissimulation which is vitious in priuat persons, is very necessarie in Princes, who otherwise could not know how to reigne, or well to commaund, And they must many times dissemble not onely in warre, with strangers and enemies, but also in time of peace, and with their subiects, though more sparingly. Simple and open men, and such as cary, as they say, their hearts in their forcheads, are not in any sort fit for this mysterie of commanding, and betray many times both themselves and their state: But yet he must play this part with arte and dexterity, and to the purpose, neither so openly nor so simplie as that it may be discerned. For to what purpose doest thou hide and couer thy selfe, if a man may see thee obliquely or sidewaies; Wilie deceits and cunning subtilties, are no more deceits and subtilties when they are knowen and vented out. A Prince then the better to couer his arte, must make profession of louing simplicitie, must make much of free and open minded men, as being enemies, to dissimulation; and in matters of lesse importance he must proceed openly; to the end he may be taken for such as he seemeth.

All this is in omission, in reteining himselfe, not acting; but it is likewise required sometimes that hee passe farther and come to action, and this is two-fold. The one is to make and frame seeret practises and intelligences, cunningly to winne and draw vnto him the hearts and seruices either of the officers, seruants, and trustiest friends of other Princes and foraine Lords, or of his owne subiects. This is a subtiltie which is much in request and authoritie, and very common among Princes, and a great point of prudence, saith *Cicero*. It is wrought

wrought in some sort by perswasion, but especiallie by presents and pensions, meanes so powerfull, that not only the Secretaries, the chiefe of the counsell, the most inward friends and fauorites, haue been thereby drawne to giue aduice, and to diuert the designments of their master, yea, great capitaines to giue their helping hand in the warre, but also wiues haue beene wooon to discouer the secrets of their husbands. Now this subtile policie is all allowed and approoued by many without difficultie or scruple. And to say the truth, if it be against an enemy, against a subiect whom he suspecteth, and likewise against any stranger, with whom he hath no alliance nor league of fidelitie and amitie, it is not greatlie to be doubted: But against his alliance, his friends and confederates, it cannot be good; and it is a kind of trecherie, which is neuer permitted.

9

Subtilties.

The other is to winne some aduantage, and to obtaine his purpose, by close and couert meanes, by equiuocations and subtilties, to circumuent by faire speeches and promises, letters, ambassages, working and obtaining by subtile meanes, that which the difficultie of times and affaires will not permit him otherwise to doe, and to doe that closely which hee cannot doe openly. Many great and wise men say that this is lawfull and to be permitted, *Crebro mendacio & fraude uisim-perantes debent ad commodum subditorum. Decipere pro moribus temporum, prudentia est.* Great commanders ought to use lying and fraude for the commoditie of their subiects. To deceiue according to the state and condition of times, is wisdom. It were ouerboldnes simply to affirme that it is permitted. But a man may say, that in a case of great necessitie, in troublesome and tumultuous time, when it is not only to procure the great good, but to diuert a great mischiefe from the state, and against such as are wicked and traiterous, that it is no great fault, if it be a fault.

Plato.  
Plin.  
Val. Max.

10

Iniustice profi-  
zable to the  
weale publicke.

But there is a greater doubt and difficultie in other things, because they haue a smell of much iniustice in them. I say much, and not wholly, because with their iniustice there are mingled in them some graines of iustice. That which is wholly and apparently iniust, is reprobued of all, euen of the wicked, at leastwise in word and shew, if not in earnest and in deede. But of these actions ill mingled, there are so many reasons

reasons and authorities on the one side and the other, that a man hardly knoweth how to resolve himselfe. I will reduce them hère to certaine heads. To dispatch and secretly to put to death, or otherwise without forme of iustice, some certaine man that is troublesome and dangerous to the state, and who well deserveth death, but yet cannot without trouble and danger be enterprised and repressed by an ordinarie course; heerein there is nothing violated but the forme. And the prince, is he not about formes?

To cut the wings, and to lessen the great meanes of any one, that shall raise and fortifie himselfe too much in the state, and maketh himselfe fearefull to his soueraigne; not staying till hee bee invincible and able to attempt any thing against the state, and the head of his soueraigne when it pleaseth him.

To take by authoritie the riches of the richest in a great necessity and pouertie of the state.

To weaken and cancell the lawes and priuiledges of some subiects, who hold them to the prejudice and diminution of the authority of the souereigne.

To take by preuention, and to possesse himselfe of a place, city or prouince, very commodious for the state, rather than to suffer another strong and fearefull neighbour to take and possesse it, to the great hurt, subiection and perpetuall alarm of the said state.

All these things are approued as iust and lawfull by many great and wise men, provided that they succede well and happily; of whom these are the sayings and sentences: To doe iustice in great matters, a man may sometimes goe astray in small; and To execute iustice in grosse, it is permitted to doe wrong by retaile: for commonly the greatest actions and examples haue some iniustice, which satisfieth particular men by the profit which ariseth to all in generall, *Omne magnum exemplum habet aliquid ex iniquo, quod aduersus singulos utilitate publica rependitur* That a prudent and wise prince should not only know how to command according to the lawes, but also the lawes themselves, if necessitie require; and they must make the lawes to will it, when they cannot doe that they would. In confused and desperate affaires, a prince must

Plutarch.

Tacit.

Plutarch.  
in Rom.

Senec.

must not follow that which may be well spoken of, but that which is necessarie to be executed. Necessitie, a great support, and excuse to humane fragility, infringeth all law, and therefore he is not very wicked, that doth ill by constraint. *Necessitas magnum imbecillitatis humanae patrocinium, omnem legem frangit: non est nocens quicumque non sponte est nocens.* If a prince cannot be wholly good, it sufficeth if he be halfe good, and that he be not wholly wicked: That it cannot possibly be that good princes should commit no iniustice. To all this I would adde for their iustification, or diminutiō of their faults, that princes finding themselves in such extremities, they ought not to proceed in such actions, but with great unwillingness and griefe of mind, acknowledging that it is an infelicity and a disfauour from heauen, and so carrying themselves therein as a father when hee is enforced to cauterise or cut off a member of his childe, to saue his life, or to plucke out a tooth to purchase ease. As for other speeches more bolde, which referre all to profit, which they either equall or preferre before honestie, an honest man must euer abhorre them.

Wee haue staied long vpon this point of the vertue of iustice, because of the doubts & difficulties that arise from the accidents and necessities of states, and which doe many times hinder the most resolute and best aduised.

II  
Valour.

After iustice commeth valour. I meane that militarie vertue, wisdom, courage, and sufficiencie to play the warriour, necessarie in a Prince for the defence and safetie of himselfe, the state, his subiects, of the publicke peace and libertie, and without which hee can hardly deserue the name of a prince.

12  
Clemency.

But let vs come to the fourth princely vertue, which is clemency, a vertue which enclineth the Prince to a sweet kind of mildnesse and lenity, whereby he lesseneth and qualifieth the rigor of iustice, with iudgement and discretion. It moderateth and sweetly manageth all things, deliuereth those that are faultie, relieueth those that are fallen, saueeth those that are like to be lost. It is that in a prince, which humanitie is in a common person. It is contrarie to cruelty, and extreame rigour, not to iustice, from which it differeth not much, but it sweetneth

sweetness and moderateth it. It is necessarie by reason of our humane infirmity, the frequency of offences, the facilitie to offend; for an ouer great and continuall rigour and feuerity, ruinateth all, and maketh chastisements contemptible; *Seneca. vitæ amittit assidue autoritatem*: It stirreth malice and rancor moueth rebellions, and men by dispite are made wicked. For feare that keepeth men in their dutie, must be sweet and temperate; if it be too sharp and continuall, it is changed into rage and reuenge. *Temperatus timor est qui cohibet, assiduus & acer in vindictam excitat.* *Seneca.* Temperate feare is that which restraineth, but continuall stirreth vp reuenge. It is likewise very profitable to a Prince and a State, it winneth the loue & good willes of his subiects, and consequently confirmeth and assureth the state, *Firmissimum id imperium quo obedientes gaudent, That Empire is most firme, which the obedient doe inioy,* *Tit. Linius cap. 3. in the beginning.* as shall be said heereafter. It is likewise very honorable to a soueraigne, for his subiects will honour and adore him as a god, as their tutor, their father, and in stead of fearing him, they will feare all for him, lest any ill happen vnto him. This then shall be the lesson of the Prince, to know all that passeth, not to belecue all, yea, many times to dissemble, wishing rather to be thought to haue found good subiects, than to haue made them such, to pardon light faults, to lessen the rigour of the great: not to be ouer-streight and exact in punishing, (which is as great a dishonor and infamie to a Prince, as to a Physitian many patients that die vnder his hand) to content himselfe many times with repentance as a sufficient chastisement.

— *ignoscere pulchrum*

*Iam misero, pœnæque genus vidisse precantem.*

*Tis praise to pardon him who hath long wretched been;*

*He's punisht in a kind, who on his knees is seene.*

And let him not feare that which some obiect very vntruly, that it debaseth, vilifieth, and weakneth the authoritie of the soueraigne and of the state; for contrarily it fortifieth it, and giues credit and vigour thereunto: And a Prince beloued, shall do more by loue, than by feare, which makes men feare and tremble, but not obey: and as *Salust* discoursed to *Cæsar*, *Salust. ad those states that are gouerned with feare, are neuer durable.* *Cæsar.*

No

No man can be feared by many, but he must likewise feare many, and that feare which he would put vpon all, falleth vpon his owne head. That life is doubtfull wherein a man neither before nor behinde, nor on any side is couered, but is alwaies in agitation, in danger, in feare. It is true as hath been said in the beginning, that it must be with iudgement; for, as tempered and well conducted it is very venerable, so being too loose, too remisse, it is very pernicious.

13  
After which  
are required al-  
so liberalitie.

After these foure principall and royall vertues, there are also others, though lesse worthie and necessarie, yet in a second place very profitable, and requisite in a soueraigne, that is to say, liberalitie, so fit and necessarie for a Prince, as it is lesse befitting him to be vanquished by arme, than by magnificence. But yet there is heerein required a great discretion, otherwise it will be more hurtfull, than commodious.

Liberalitie two-  
fold.

There is a two-fold liberalitie, the one consisteth in charge and shew, and this serues to small purpose. For it is an idle thing in soueraignes, and to little end, to induce by great and excellie charges to make shew of themselves, or to increase their credit especiallie with their subiects where they haue power to doe what they list. It is a testimonie of pusillanimitie, and that they vnderstand not what they are, and besides that, it seemeth to their subiects, the spectators of these triumphs, that they make this glorious shew with their owne spoiles, that they feast it at their charges, that they feede their eyes with that, that should feede their bellies. And againe a Prince should thinke that he hath nothing properlie his: hee oweth himselfe to another. The other liberality, consisteth in gifts bestowed vpon another, and this is farre more commodious and commendable, but then it must be well gouerned, and he must be well aduised to whom, how, and how much hee must giue. Hee must giue to those that haue deserved it, that haue done seruice to the weale-publike, that haue runne their fortunes, and spent themselves in the warres. No man will enuy them, if they bee not very wicked. Whereas contrarily, great gifts, bestowed without respect and merit, shame the giuer, and purchase enuie to the receiuer, and is receiued without thankfulnessse and acknowledgement. Some tyrants haue beene sacrificed to the malice of the people, euen by those



those whom they haue aduanced, railing on them with the rest of the people, and securing their goods, by making known how much they contemne and hate him from whom they receiued them. Againe, this liberalitie must bee with measure, for if it be not, and that he giue vnto all, and vpon all occasions, the ruine of the state and soueraigne must needs ensue: This is to play, and to lose all. For men will neuer be satisfied, but bee as excessiue in asking as the Prince shall bee in giuing, framing themselves not according to reason, but example; so that when the common treasurie shall faile, he shall be enforced to lay hands vpon the goods of another, and supplie by iniustice, that which ambition and prodigalitie did dissipate, *quod ambitione exhaustum, per scelera supplendum*. Now it is farre better not to giue at all, than to take away to giue; for a man shall neuer enioy in so high a degree the loue and good will of those whom hee hath clothed, as the hatred and ill will of those whom he hath robbed and spoiled. And againe, this liberalitie without measure, worketh the ruine of himselfe, for a fountaine drieth vp, if it be ouer-much drawn.

*Liberalitate liberalitas perit. By liberality, liberalitie perissheth.* Hieronym.

Liberalitie likewise must be spun with a gentle thread by little and little, and not all together, for that which is done ouerspeedily, be it neuer so great, is in a maner insensible, & soone forgotten. Pleasant and pleasing things must bee exercised with ease & leasure, that a man may haue time to tastethem: Things rude and cruell (if they must needs be done) must contrarily be executed speedily. There is then arte and prudence in giuing, and in the practise of liberalitie. *Falluntur Tacit. quibus luxuria specie liberalitatis imponit: perdere multi sciunt, donare nesciunt.* They are deceived whom riot blindeth, in shew of liberality, many know how to waste, but not how to giue. And to say the truth, liberality is not properly any of the royall vertues, for it agreeth & carieth it selfe well with tyranny it selfe. And such as are the gouernours of yoong Princes do wrong in working so strong an impression of this vertue of bountie in their minds and willes, that they should refuse no meanes to put it in practise, and thinke nothing well employed but that which they giue (this is their common language) but they doe it either for their owne benefit, or else they know not to whom they

they speake it. For it is a dangerous thing to imprint liberality in the minde of him that hath meanes to furnish himselfe as much as he will at the charges of another. A prodigall or liberall Prince without discretion and measure, is worse than a couetous: but if this liberality be well ruled and ordered, as hath been said, it is well becoming a Prince; and very profitable both to himselfe and the state.

14

*Magnanimitie  
and moderation  
of choler.  
Senec.*

Another vertue requisite in a Prince in a second degree, is magnanimitie, and greatnes of courage, to contemne iniuries and bad speeches, and to moderate his choler; neuer to vex himselfe for the outrages and indiscretions of another, *magnam fortunam magnus animus decet: Iniurias & offensiones superne despicere indignus Cesaris ira. A great minde becommeth a great fortune; and highly to despise iniuries and offences, which be unworthy the anger of Cesar.* For a man to afflict himselfe, and to be moued, is to confesse himselfe to be faulty, whereas by

Tacit.

neglect and light account it easily vanislieth. *Conuicta si irascere, agnita videntur: spreta exolescunt.* And if there be fit place, and a man must be angry; let it be openly and without dissimulation, in such sort that he giue not occasion to suspect a hidden grudge and purpose of reuenge: this is a token of a bad and incurable nature, and best befitting the baser sort: *Obscure & irrenocabiles reponunt odia: Sana cogitationis indicium secreto suo satiari. Base persons and unrecoverable doe conceale their hatreds: It is a token of a barbarous and cruell minde, to bee glutted with secret grudge.* It doth better become a great personage to offend, than to hate. The other vertues are lesse royall and more common.

Tacit.

After vertue come the maners, cariages, and countenances that become and belong vnto Maiestie, very requisite in a Prince. I will not stand vpon this point: I only say as it were passing by, that not nature helpeth much heereunto, but also arte and studie. Heereunto do appertaine the good and beautifull composition of the visage, his port, pale, speech, habilliments. The generall rule in all these points, is a sweet, moderate and venerable grauitie, walking betwixt feare and loue, worthy of all honor and reuerence. There is likewise his residence and conuersation or familiarity. Touching his residence or abode, let it be in some glorious, magnificent, & eminent

*The third head  
of this prouision:  
The maners  
of the Prince.*

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minent place, and as neere as may bee in the middle of the whole state, to the end hee may haue an eye ouer all, like the Sunne, which from the middle of heauen giueth light to all: for keeping himselfe at one end, he giueth occasion to those that are farthest from him to rise against him, as he that standeth vpon one end of a table, maketh the other end to rise vp. His conuersation and companie, let it be rare; for to shew and to communicate himselfe too much, breedeth contempt and deiecteth maiestie; *continui aspectus minus verendus magnos* Lucius. *homines ipsa satietate facit. Maiestati maior ex longinquo rene.* Tacit. *rentia, quia omne ignotum pro magnifico est.* Often and daily aspect causeth great men the lesse to be feared: But the rarenesse of their presence procures the greater reuerence, because all strange and vnknewen things seemes strangely and magnificently.

After these three things, knowledge of the state, vertue and maners, which are in the person of the prince, come those things which are neere and about the prince; That is to say, in the fourth place Counsell, the great and principall point of this politrique doctrine, and so important, that it is in a maner all in all. It is the soule of the state, and the spirit that giueth life, motion and action to al the other parts: and for that cause it is said, that the managing of affaires consisteth in prudence. Now it were to be wished that a Prince had in himselfe counsell and prudence sufficient to gouerne and to provide for all, which is the first and highest degree of wisdom, as hath bene sayd; and if so it were, the affaires would goe farre better: but this is rather to bee wished than hoped for, whether it be for want of a good nature, or a good institution; and it is almost impossible that one only head should be sufficiently furnished for so many matters; *Ne quis princeps sua scientia cuncta complecti, nec vnus mens tanta molis est capax.* The Prince cannot comprehend all things by his owne knowledge, neither is the minde of one alone capable of so much greatnesse. Alone man seeth and heareth but little. Now kings haue neede of many eyes, and many eares; and great burthens, and great affaires haue neede of great helpes. And therefore it is requisite that he provide and furnish himselfe with good counsell, and such men as know how to giue it: for he, whosoever hee bee, that will take all vpon himselfe, is rather lield to bee proud,

16  
The fourth head  
of the prouision.  
Counsell.

Chap. 1.

Tacit.

than discreet or wise. A Prince then had neede of faithfull friends and seruitours to be his assistants, *quos assumat in partem curarum. Whom he may take to beare part of his cares.* These are his true treasures, and profitable instruments of the state: In the choice whereof hee should especially labour and employ his whole iudgement, to the end hee may haue them good. There are two sorts of them, the one aide the prince with their dutie, counsell and tongue, and are called Counsellors; the other serue him with their hands and actions, and may bee called Officers. The first are farre more honourable: for the two greatest philosophers say, that it is a sacred and diuine thing, well to deliberate, and to giue good counsell.

Tit. Liui.  
Tacit.

Plin.

17  
The condition of  
good counsellors.  
F. deliue.  
Plin.  
Sufficiencie.

Now Counsellors must be first faithfull, that is: to say in a word, honest men, *Optimum quicunque fidelissimum puto. Enarie man that is truly honest, I hold to be most faithfull.* Secondly, they must be sufficient in this point, that is to say, skilfull in the state, diuersly experimented and tried (for difficulties and afflictions are excellent lessons and instructions, *mihi fortuna multis rebus ereptis usus dedit bene suadendi. Fortune having taken from me many things, hath given me the facultie of well persuading.*) And in a word, they must be wise and prudent, indifferent quicke and not ouer sharpe: for such kind of men are too moucable, *non audis quam gerendioribus aptiora ingenia illis ignea.* These sixe vits are fitter for inuouation, than administration. And that they may be such, it is requisite, that they be old & ripe, for besides that yoong men by reason of the soft and delicate tendernesse of their age, are easily deceiued, they doe as easily belecue and receiue euery impression. It is good that about Princes there be some wise, some subtil, but much more such as are wise, who are required for honour and for all times, the subtil only sometimes for necessity. Thirdly, it is necessary that in proposing and giuing good and wholesome counsell, they carrie themselves freely and couragiously, without flatterie, or ambiguity, or disguise, not accommodating their language to the present state of the prince; *Ne cum fortuna potius principis loquantur quam cum ipso. Lest they speak rather with the fortune of the prince, than with himselfe,* but without sparing the truth, speake that which is fit & requisite. For although li-

Curtius.

Liberty.

Tacit.

berry

berty, roundnesse of speech and fidelitie, hurt and offend for the time, those against whom it opposeth it selfe, yet afterwards it is reuerenced and esteemed. *In presentibus quibus resistis, offensis, deinde illis ipsis suspicitur laudaturque.* For the present, thou offendest them whom thou contradictest, but afterward thou art euen of them respected and praised. And fourthly constantly, without yeelding, varying and changing at euerie meeting to please and follow the humour, pleasure and passion of another, but without opinatiue obstinacie, and a spirit of contradiction, which troubleth and hindereth all good deliberation, he must sometimes change his opinion, which is not inconstancy but prudence. For a wise man marcheth not alwaies with one and the same pace, although hee follow the same waie, hee changeth not, but accommodateth himselfe; *non semper in uno gradu, sed una via; non se mutat, sed adaptat.* As Seneca a good mariner ordereth his sailes according to the times, and the winde, it is necessarie many times to turne and winde, and to arriue to that place obliquely, by fetching a compasse, when he can not doe it directly, and by a straight line. Again, *Silenti.* a religious dexteritie to keepe secret the counsels and deliberations of Princes, is a thing very necessarie in the managing of affaires; *res magne sustineri nequeunt ab eo cui tacere graue est.* Great affaires cannot be sustained by him, who cannot be secret. And it sufficeth not to bee secret, but hee must not prye and search into the secrets of his Prince, this is an ill, and a dangerous thing; *exquirere abditos principis sensus illicitum.* & *an-* Tacit.  
*teps:* yea he must be vnwilling, and auoid all meanes to know them. And these are the principal good conditions and qualities of a counsellor, as the euill which they must warily auoid are presumptuous confidence, which maketh a man to deliberate and determine ouer boldly and obstinately; for a wise man in deliberating, thinketh and rethinketh, *The wise that*  
redoubting whatsoeuer may happen, that hee may be the bold- *counsellors must*  
der to execute, *Nam animus cereri quis scit, scit tunc aggredi.* For *auoid.*  
the minde that knoweth how to feare, knoweth how with safetie to *Presumptuous*  
execute: Contrarily the foole is hardie & violent in his delibe- *confidence.*  
ration: but when he comes to the issue, his nose falles a bleeding, *Tit. Liuius.*  
*Consilia valida & audacia prima specie laeta sunt, tractata*  
*dura euentu tristitia.* Hastie and audacious counsels at the first

Passion.

Tacit.

Precipitation.

See lib 2.

cap. 10.

Tacit.

18

The duty of the  
prince in choo-  
sing good coun-  
sellors.

Curtius.

few are plausible; but in the managing prove hard, and in the end full of discontent. Secondly, all passion of choler, envie, hatred, avarice, concupiscence, and all private and particular affection, the deadly poison of iudgement, and all good vnderstanding, *privatus res sumptus affectus efficientque publicis consilij, possimus veri affectus & iudicij venenum sua cuique utilitas.* Private affaires have ever beene hurtfull, and doe hinder publike counsels, and every mans particular profit is the worst poison of true affection and iudgement. Lastly, precipitation an enemy to all good counsell, and only fit to doe mischief. And thus you see what manner of men good counsellors ought to be.

Now a prince must make choice of such as are good, either by his owne knowledge and iudgement, or if hee cannot so doe, by their reputation, which doth seldome deceiue; whereupon one of them said to his prince, Hold vs for such as we are esteemed to be. *Nam singuli decipere & decipi possunt, ne- mo omnes, neque enim omnes fefellerunt.* For every one may deceiue and be deceiued, no man all; all have deceiued none. And let him take heed that he chuse not his minions and favorites, courtiers, flatterers, slaves who shame their masters and betray them. There is nothing more dangerous than the counsell of the cabiner. And having chosen and found them, hee must wisely make use of them, by taking counsell of them at due times and houres, not attending the quaint and execution, and losing the time whilest he harkneth to them; and this must he doe with iudgement, not suffering himselfe to be carried over-loosely by their counsels, as that simple Emperor *Claudius* was; and with mildnesse, without roughnesse, being more reasonable, as that wise *Attilius* *Ansonius* was wont to say, to follow the counsell of a good number of friends, than such as are constrained to bend vnto his will. And making use of them, doe it with an indifferent authoritie, neither rewarding them with presents for their good counsell, lest by the hope of the like presents hee draw such as are wicked vnto him, nor use them over-roughly for their bad counsels; for he shall hardly finde any to give him counsell, if there be danger in giuing it: and againe, many times bad counsell hath a better successe than good, by the provident care and direction of the soueraigne. And such as give good counsell, that is to say, happie and cer-  
taine,

taine, are not therefore alwaies the best, and most faithfull seruitours, nor for their libertie of speech neither, which hee should rather agree vnto, looking into such as are fearefull and flatterers with a warie eie. For miserable is that prince with whom men hide or disguise the truth, *cuius aures ita formatae sunt, ut aspera que uisita, & nil nisi incundum & lesurum accipiant*: whose cares are so framed, that they will not hearken to profitable things that are harsh, nor any thing but what is pleasing though hurtfull. And lastly, he must conceale his owne iudgement and resolution, secrecie being the soule of counsell: *Nul. Veget. la meliora consilia, quam que ignorauerit aduersarius antequam fierent*: They are the best counsels which the aduersarie knoweth not before they be effected.

Astouching officers which are in the next place, and who serue the Prince and state in some charge, hee must make choice of honest men, of good and honest families. It is to be thought that such as serue the Prince, are the best sort of people, and it is not fit that base people should be neere him, and command others, except they raise themselves by some great and singular vertue, which may supplie the want of Nobilitie: but by no meanes let them be infamous, double, dangerous, and men of some odious condition. So likewise they should be men of vnderstanding, and emploied according to their natures. For some are fit for the affaires of the warre, others for peace. Some are of opinion that it is best to choose men of a sweet cariage, and indifferent vertue, for these excellent surpassing spirits, that keepe themselves alwaies vpon the point, and will pardon nothing, are not commonly fit for affaires, *ut pares negotijs, neque supra: sint reſti, non erecti.*

After counsell, we place treasure, a great & puissant meane. This is the sinewes, the feet, the hands of the state. There is no sword so sharpe and penetrable, as that of siluer, nor master so imperious, nor orator that winneth the hearts and willes of men, or conquer Castles and Cities, as riches. And therefore a Prince must prouide that his treasure neuer faile, neuer be dried vp. This science consisteth in three points, to lay the foundation of them, to imploy them well, to haue alwaies a reseruation, and to lay vp some good part thereof for all needs and occasions that may happen. In all these three a Prince



mult auoid two things, iniustice, and base nigardlines, in pre-  
seruing right towards all, and honor for himselfe.

21  
To lay the  
foundation.

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2

3

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Touching the first, which is to lay the foundation and to  
increase the treasury, there are diuers meanes, and the sources  
are diuers, which are not all perpetuall, nor alike assured, ~~that~~  
is to say, the demaine and publicke reuenuue of the state, which  
must be managed and vsed, without the alienating of it in any  
sort, forasmuch as by nature it is sacred and inalienable. Con-  
quests made vpon the enemy, which must be profitably em-  
ployed, and not prodigally dissipated, as the ancient *Romans*  
were wont to doe, carying to the Exchequer very great  
summes, and the treasuries of conquered cities and countries,  
as *Livy* reporteth of *Camillus Flaminius*, *Paulus Emilius*, of  
the *Scipios*, *Luculus*, *Cesar*; and afterwards receiuing from  
those conquered countries, whether from their naturall coun-  
tries left behind them, or from colonies sent thither, a cer-  
taine annuall reuenuue. Presents, gratuities, pensions, free do-  
nations, tributes of friends, allies, and subiects, by testaments,  
by donations amongst the liuing, as the Lawyers tearme it, or  
otherwise. The entrance, comming and going, and passages  
of merchandize, into docks, hauens, riuers, as well vpon stran-  
gers as subiects, a meane iust, lawfull, ancient, generall, and  
very commodious with these conditions: Not to permit the  
trafficke and transportation of things necessary for life, that  
the subiects may be furnished, nor of raw vnwrought wares,  
to the end the subiect may be set on worke, and gaine the pro-  
fit of his owne labours. But to permit the trafficke of things  
wrought and dressed, and the bringing in of such wares as are  
raw, and not of such as are wrought; and in all things to  
charge the stranger much more than the subiect. For a great  
forraigne impolition increaseth the treasure, & comforteth the  
subiect: to moderate neuerthelesse the imposts vpon those  
things that are brought in, necessary for life. These foure  
meanes are not only permitted, but iust, lawfull, and honest.  
The first which is hardly honest, is the trafficke which the so-  
ueraigne vseth by his factors, and is practised in diuers ma-  
ners more or lesse base; but the vilest and most pernicious is of  
honors, estates, offices, benefices. There is a meane that com-  
meth neere to trafficke, and therefore may bee placed in this  
ranke,

Antonius  
Pius.  
Seuerus.  
August.



ranke, which is not very diihonest, and hath becne practised by very great and wise princes, which is, to imploy the coine of the treasure or exchequer to some small profit, as five in the hundred, and to take good security for it, either gages, or some other sound and sufficient assurance. This hath a three-fold vse, it increaseth the treasure, giueth meanes to particular men to traffick and to make gaine; and which is best of all, it saueth the publicke treasure from the pawes of our theeuing courtiers, the importunate demaunds and flatteries of fauorites, and the ouer great facility of the prince. And for this only cause, some princes haue lent their publicke treasure without any profit or interest, but only vpon paine of a double forfeiture for not paiement at the day. The sixt and last is in the lones and subsidies of subiects, whereunto hee must not come but vnwillingly, and then when other meanes do faile, and necessity presseth the state. For in this case it is iust, according to that rule, That all is iust that is necessary. But it is requisit, that these conditions be added, after this first of necessity, To leuy by way of lone (for this way will yeeld most siluer, because of the hope men haue to recouer their owne againe, and that they shall lose nothing, besides the credit they receiue by succoring the weale-publike) and afterwards the necessitie being past, and the warres ended, to repay it againe, as the *Romans* did, being put to an extremitie by *Hanibal*. And if the common treasure be so poore that it cannot repay it, and that they must needs proceed by way of imposition, it is necessary that it bee with the consent of the subiects, making knowne vnto them the pouerty and necessitie, and preaching the word of that King of Kings, *Dominus ists opus habet*, *The Lord hath need of them*, inso much that they make them see, if need bee, both the receit, and the charge. And, if it may be, let perswasion preuaile without contraint, as *Themistocles* said, *Impetrare melius quam imperare*. It is better to obtaine by request than by command. It is true that the praiers of foueraignes are commandements, *Satis imperat qui rogat potentia, armata sunt preces regum*; He commandeth sufficiently that intreateth with power, the requests of kings are armed; but yet let it bee in the forme of a free donation, at the least that they bee extraordinarie monies, for a certaine prefixt time, and

3

4

not ordinarie; and neuer prescribe this law vpon the subiects, except it be with their owne consent. Thirdly, that such impositions be leuied vpon the goods, and not the heads of men (capitation being odious to all honest people) be reall and not personall (being vniust that the rich, the great, the nobles, should not pay at all, and the poorer people of the country should pay all.) Fourthly that they be equallie vpon all. Inequality afflicteth much, and to these ends these monies must be bestowed vpon such things as the whole world hath need of, as salt, wine, to the end that all may contribute to the present necessity. Well may a man, and he ought, to lay ordinary imposts and great, vpon such marchandize & other things as are vitious, and that serue to no other end, than to corrupt the subiects, as whatsoeuer serueth for the increase of luxury, insolency, curiosity, superfluity in viands, apparell, pleasures, & all maner of licentious liuing, without any other prohibition of these things. For the deniall of a thing sharpeneth the appetite.

22

*To employ the  
treasure.*

The second point of this science, is well to employ the treasure. And these in order are the articles of this employment and charge; The maintenance of the kings house, the pay of men of warre, the wages of officers, the iust rewards of those that haue deserued well of the Common-weale, pensions and charitable succors to poore, yet commendable persons. These five are necessary, after which come those that are very profitable, to repaire cities, to fortifie and to defend the frontiers, to mend the high waies, bridges, and passages, to establish colledges of honour, of vertue, and learning; to build publicke houses. From these five sorts of reparations, fortifications, and foundations, commeth very great profit, besides the publicke good: artes and artificers are maintained; the enuie and malice of the people because of the leuie of monies ceaseth, when they see them well employed; and these two plagues of a common-weale, idleness and pouerty, are driuen away. Contrarily, the great bounties, and vnreasonable gifts, to some particular fauorites; the great, proud, and vnecessary edifices, superfluous and vaine charges are odious to the subiects, who murmure that a man should spoile a thousand to cloath one; that others should braue it with their substance,

substance, build vpon their blood and their labours.

The third point consisteth in the reseruatiō, which a man must make for necessity, to the end he be not constrained at a need to haue recourse to ready, vniust & violent means & remedies: this is that which is called the treasury or exchequer. Now as to gather together too great abundance of treasure of gold and siluer, though it be by honest and iust meanes, is not alwaies the best, because it is an occasion of warre actiue or passiue, either by breeding enuie in others to see it done, when there is no cause, there being plenty of other meanes, or else because it is a bait to allure an enemy to come, and it were more honourable to employ them as hath been sayd: So to spend all and to leaue nothing in the Exchequer is far worse, for this were to play to lose all; wise princes take heed of this. The greatest treasuries that haue beene in former times, are that of *Darius* the last king of the *Persians*, where *Alexander* found foure score millions of gold. That of *Tiberius* 67. millions; of *Traian* 55. millions kept in *Egypt*. But that of *Dauid* did farre exceed all these (a thing almost incredible in so small a state) wherein there were sixe score millions. Now to provide that these great treasuries be not spent, violated or robbed, the ancients caused them to be melted, and cast into great wedges and bowles, as the *Persians* and *Romans*: or they put them into the temples of their gods as the safest places, as the *Greeke* in the temple of *Apollo*, which neuerthelesse hath bin many times pilled and robbed; the *Romans* in the temple of *Saturne*. But the best and securest way and most profitable is, as hath been said, to lend them with some small profit to particular persons, vpon good gages, or sufficient securitie. So likewise for the safer custodie of the treasures from theues and robbers, the managing of them, and the exchequer offices must not be sold to base and mechanicall persons, but giuen to gentlemen and men of honour, as the ancient *Romans* were accustomed to doe, who chose out yoong men from amongst their nobles and great houses, and such as aspired to the greatest honors and charges of the common-wealth.

After counsell and treasure I thinke it not amisse to put armes, which cannot subsist, nor be well and happily leuied and conducted without thesetwo. Now an armed power is

23

3 To make spare and reseruatiō.

Esay 30.

2. Paralip.

24

The first head of this provision.

An armed power.

very

very necessarie for a prince, to guard his person and his state: for it is an abuse to thinke to gouverne a state long without armes. There is neuer any surety betweene the weake and the strong; and there are alwaies some that will bee stirring either within or without the state. Now this power is either ordinarie at all times, or extraordinary in times of warre. The ordinarie consisteth in the persons and places; The persons are of two sorts; the guard for the bodie and person of the souereigne, which serue not only for the surety and conseruation, but also for his honour and ornament: for that good saying of *Ageselam* is not perpetually true, and it were too dangerous to trie & trust vnto it, That a prince may liue safely enough without guard, if he command his subiects, as a good father doth his children (for the malice of man stayeth not it selfe in so faire a way). And certaine companies, maintained and alwaies ready for those necessitities and sudden occurrences that may fall out. For at such times to be busied in leuying powers is great imprudencie. Touching the places, they are the fortresses and cittadels in the frontiers, in place of which, some, and they ancient too, doe more allow of the colonies. The extraordinary force consisteth in armes, which he must leuie and furnish in times of warre. How he should gouerne himselfe therein, that is to say, enterprize and make warre, it belongeth to the second part, which is of the action: this first belongeth to prouision. Only I heere say, that a wise prince should besides the guard of his body, haue certaine people alwaies prepared, and experienced in armes, either in great number or lesse, according to the extent or largenesse of his state, to repress a sudden rebellion or commotion, which may happen either without or within his state, reseruing the raising of greater forces, vntill hee must make warre, either offensive or defensive, willingly and of purpose; & in the meane time keeping his arsenals and store-houses well furnished, and provided with all sorts of offensive and defensive armes, to furnish both foote and horsemen, as likewise with munitions, engins, and instruments for warre. Such preparation is not only necessarie to make warre, (for these things are not found and prepared in a short time) but to let and hinder it. For no man is so foole hardy, as to attempt

*In the chapter  
following.*

tempt a state, which he knoweth to be readie to receiue him, and thoroughly furnished. A man must arme himselfe against warres, to the end he may not be troubled with it, *Qui cupit pacem, paret bellum.* Hee that desireth peace, let him prouide for warre.

After all these necessarie and essentiall prouisions, we will lastly put alliances or leagues, which is no small proppe and stay of a state. But wisdom is very necessarie in the choice thereof, to build well and to take heede with whom and how he ioyne in alliance; which hee must doe with those that are neighbours and puissant: For if they be weake and farre off, wherewith can they giue aide? It is rather likely, that if they be assaulted, that from their ruine ours may follow: For then are wee bound to succour them, and to ioyne with them because of this league, whosoeuer they be. And if there be danger in making this alliance openly, let it be done secretly, for it is the part of a wise man to treat of peace and alliance with one, in the view and knowledge of all, with another secretly; but yet so, as that it be without treacherie and wickednesse, which is vtterly forbidden, but not wisdom and policie, especially for the defence and surety of his state.

25

*The seventh  
head of this  
prouision.  
Alliances or  
leagues.  
With whom.*

Finally, there are many sorts and degrees of leagues or alliances: the lesser and more simple is for commerce and traf-  
fike only, but commonly it comprehendeth amitie, commerce and hospitalitie; and it is either defensiu only, or defensiu and offensiu together, and with exception of certaine princes and states, or without exception. The more strait and perfect is that which is offensiu and defensiu towards all, and against all, to be a friend to his friends, and an enemy to his enemies: and such it is good to make with those that are strong and puissant, and by equall alliance. Leagues are likewise either perpetuall, or limited to certaine times; commonly they are perpetuall, but the better and surest is, to limit it to certaine times, to the end he may haue meanes to reforme, to take away, or adde to the articles, or wholly to depart if neede be, as he shall see it most expedient. And though a man would iudge them to be such, as should be perpetuall, yet it is better to renew them (which a man may and must do before the time be expired) than to make them perpetuall.  
For

For they languish and grow cold, and whosoever findeth himselfe aggrieved will sooner breake them, if they be perpetuall than if they bee limited, in which case he will rather stay the time. And thus much of these seven necessarie provisions,

## CHAP. III.

*The second part of this politike prudence and gouernment of the state, which concerneth the action and gouernment of the Prince.*

**I**  
*A summarie  
description of  
the action of  
the prince.*

*Beneuolence,  
Authoritie, two  
pillars of a  
prince & state.*

**Tacit.**

**2**  
*Beneuolence is  
attained by  
clemency.*

**H**Auing discoursed of the provision, and instructed a soueraigne with what and how he should furnish and defend himselfe and his state, let vs come to the action, & let vs see how hee should emploie himselfe, and make vse of these things, that is to saie, in a word, well to command and gouern. But before we come to handle this distinctlie, according to the diuision which we haue made, wee may say in grosse that well to gouerne and to maintaine himselfe in his state, consisteth in the acquisition of two things, good will and authoritie. Good will is a loue and affection towards the soueraigne and his state, Authoritie is a great and good opinion, an honourable esteeme of the soueraigne and his state. By the first, the soueraigne and the state is loued, by the second feared. These are not contrarie things, but different, as loue and feare. Both of them respect the subiects and strangers, but it seemeth that more properlie, Beneuolence belongeth to the subiect, and authoritie to the stranger; *Amorem apud populares, metum apud hostes quarat.* To speake simplie and absolutelie, authoritie is the more strong and vigorous, more large and durable. The temperature and harmonie of both is a perfect thing, but according to the diuersitie of states, of peoples, their natures and humours, the one is more easie and more necessarie in some places than in others. The meanes to attaine them both, are contained and handled in that which hath bene said before, especially of the maners and vertue of a soueraigne; neuertheless of each we will speake a little.

Beneuolence or good will (a thing very profitable and almost wholly necessarie, inso much that of it selfe it preuaileth much, and without it all the rest hath but little assurance) is attained

attained by three meanes, gentlenes or clemencie, not only in words and deeds, but much more in his commaunds and the administation of the state, for so doe the natures of men require, who are impatient both of seruing wholly, and maintaining themselves in entire libertie, *Nec totam seruitutem pati, nec totam libertatem.* Neither to endure wholly seruitude, nor altogether libertie. They obey willinglie as subiects, not as slaues, *Domus ut pareant, non ut seruiant.* And to say the truth, a man doth more willingly obey him which commandeth gentle and mildly; *Remissius imperanti melius paretur: qui vult amari languida regnet manu.* He that will be beloued, let him raigne with a soft hand. Power (saith Cesar a great doctor in this matter) indifferentlie exercised preserueth all; but he that keepeth not a moderation in his commaunds, is neuer beloued nor assured. But yet it must not be an ouerloose, and soft effeminate mildnes, lest a man thereby come into contempt, which is worse than feare. *Sed incorrupto ducis honore.* It is the part of wisdom to temper this, neither seeking to be feared by making himselfe terrible, nor loued by too much debasing himselfe.

The second meane to attaine beneuolence is beneficence, I meane first towards all, especially the meaner people, by prouidence and good policie, whereby corne and all other necessarie things for the sustenance of this life may not be wanting, but sold at an indifferent price, yea may abound if it be possible, that dearenesse and dearth afflict not the subiect. For the meaner sort haue no care for the publike good, but for this end, *Valgo una ex republica annona cura.* The only care the vulgar sort haue of the common wealth is the promise of victuall, and other necessaries.

The third meane is liberalitie (beneficence more speciall) which is a bait, yea, an enchantment, to draw, to winne and captivate the willes of men: So sweete a thing is it to receiue, honorable to giue. In such sort, that a wise man hath said, That a state did better defend it selfe by good deeds, than by armes. This vertue is alwaies requisite, but especially in the entrance and in a new state. To whom, how much, and how liberalitie must be exercised, hath bene said before. The meanes of beneuolence haue bene wisely practised by Augustus.



Tacit.

*gustus. qui militem donis, populum annona, cunctos dulcedine oris pect. xir. Who wanne the souldiers with giftes, the people with provision of vittuals, and all with the sweetnes of rest and peace.*

5

Authoritie.

Authoritie is another pillar of state, *Maiestas imperij, salutis tutela. The maiestie of Empire is the gardian of safety*; The inuincible fortresse of a prince, whereby he bringeth into reason all those, that dare to contemne or make head against him: Yea because of this they dare not attempt, and all men desire to be in grace and fauor with him. It is composed of feare and respect, by which two a prince and his state is feared of all, and secured. To attaine this authoritie, besides the prouision of things aboue named, there are three meanes which must carefully be kept in the forme of commaunding.

By what it  
is acquired.

6

Seueritie.

The first is seueritie, which is better, more holosome, assured, durable, than common lenitie, and great facilitie, which proceedeth first from the nature of the people, which as *Aristotle* saith is not so well borne and bred, as to be ranged into dutie and obedience by loue, or shame, but by force and feare of punishment; and secondly from the general corruption of the maners, and contagious licentiousness of the world, which a man must not thinke to mend by mildnes and lenitie, which doth rather giue aid to ill attempts. It ingendreth contempt, and hope of impunitie, which is the plague of Common-weales and states, *Illecebra peccandi maxime spes impunitatis. Hope of impunitie is the greatest allureement to offend.* It is a fauour done to many, and the whole weale publicke sometimes well to chaslice some one. And hee must sometimes cut off a finger, lest the Gangrene spread it selfe through the whole arme, according to that excellent answer of a king of *Thrace*, whom one telling that he played the mad man, and not the king, answered, That his madnesse made his subiects sound and wise. Seueritie keepeth officers and magistrates in their deuoir, driueth away flatterers, courtiers, wicked persons, impudent demaunders, and pety tyrannies. Whereas contrariwise too great facilitie openeth the gate to all these kind of people, whereupon followeth an exhaulting of the treasuries, impunitie of the wicked, impouerishing of the people, as rheumes & fluxes in a rheumatike and diseased bodie, fall vpon those parts that are weakest. The goodnes

Cicero.



of *Pertinax*, the licentious libertie of *Heliogabalus* are thought to haue vndone and ruinated the Empire: The seueritie of *Seuerus*, and afterwards of *Alexander*, did reestablish it, and brought it into good estate. But yet this seueritie must be with some moderation, intermission, and to purpose, to the end that rigour towards a few might hold the whole world in feare, *ut paena ad paucos, metus ad omnes*. And the more seldome punishments serue more for the reformation of a state, saith an ancient writer, than the more frequent. This is to be vnderstood, if vices gather not strength, and men grow not opiniatiuely obstinate in them; for then he must not spare either sword or fire, *Crudelem medicum intemperans aeger facit. An intemperate sicke person, maketh a cruell physician.*

The second is constancie, which is a stayed resolution, whereby the prince marching alwaies with one and the same 7  
pase, without altering or changing, mainteineth alwaies, and enforceth the obseruation of the ancient lawes and customes. To change and to be readuised, besides that it is an argument of inconstancie and irresolution, it bringeth both to the lawes and to the soueraigne, and to the state contempt and sinister opinion. And this is the reason why the wiser sort do so much forbid the change, and rechange of any thing in the lawes and customes, though it were for the better: for the change or remoue bringeth alwaies more euill and discommoditie, besides the vncertaintie and the danger, than the noueltie can bring good. And therefore all innouators are suspected, dangerous, and to be chased away. And there cannot be any cause or occasion strong and sufficient enough to change, if it be not for a very great, euident, and certaine vtilitie, or publike necessitie. And in this case likewise he must proceed as it were stealthingly, sweetly and slowly, by little and little and almost insensible, *leuter & lentè*. Constancy.

The third is to hold alwaies fast in the hand the sterne of the state, the raines of gouernment, that is to say, the honour and power to commaund and to ordaine, and not to trust or commit it to another, referring all things to his counsell, to the end that all may haue their eye vpon him, and may know that all dependeth vpon him. That soueraigne that loseth neuer so little of his authoritie marreth all. And therefore it  
standeth

Aristot.

standeth him vpon, not ouer-much to raise and make great any person, *Communis custodia principatus, neminem unum magnum facere. The common and surest yard of principalltie is to make no one man too great.* And if there be alreadie any such, he must draw him backe and bring him into order, but yet sweetly and gently; and neuer make great and high charges and offices perpetuall or for many yeares, to the end a man may not get meanes to fortifie himselfe against his master, as it many times falleth out. *Nil tam vile, quam breuicis potestatem esse, que magna sit. Nothing so profitable, as short authoritie, if it be great.*

Senec.

9  
*Agredi vniuersi  
authoritatem et  
tyranniam.*

Behold heere the iust and honest meanes in a soueraigne to maintaine with beneuolence and loue his authoritie, and to make himselfe to be loued and feared altogether: for the one without the other is neither secure nor reasonable. And therefore we abhorre a tyrannicall authoritie, and that feare that is an enemy to loue and beneuolence, and is with a publike hate, *Oderint quem metuant, They will hate whom they feare*, which the wicked seeke after abusing their power. The conditions of a good prince & of a tyrant are nothing alike, & easily distinguished. They may be all reduced to these two points, the one to keepe the lawes of God and of nature, or to trample them vnder foot; the other to do all for the publike good and profit of the subiect, or to employ all to his particular profit & pleasure. Now a Prince that he may be such as he should, must alwaies remember, that, as it is a felicitie to haue power to doe what a man will, so it is true greatnesse to will that that a man should; *Casars cum omnia licent, propter hoc minus licet: ut felicitatis est posse quantum velis, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis, vel potius quantum debeas.* Seeing all things are lawfull for Caesar to doe, it is therefore the lesse lawfull for him to doe it: *As it is a felicitie to be able to doe whatsoever thou wilt, so it is a point of greatnes to will what thou shouldest, or rather what thou oughtest.* The greatest infelicitie that can happen to a prince, is to beleeue that all things are lawfull that he can, and that please him. So soone as he consenteth to this thought, of good he is made wicked. Now this opinion is settled in them by the help of flatterers, who neuer cease alwaies to preach vnto them the greatnes of their power; and very few faithfull serui-  
tours

Plin. de  
Traia.

tours there are, that dare to tell them what their duty is. But there is not in the world a more dangerous flattery, than that wherewith a man flattereth himselfe, when the flatterer and flattered is one and the same; there is no remedie for this disease. Neuerthelesse it falleth out sometimes in consideration of the times, persons, places, occasions, that a good king must doe those things which in outward appearance may seeme tyrannicall, as when it is a question of repressing another tyranny, that is to say, of a furious people, the licentious libertie of whom, is a true tyranny: or of the noble and rich, who tyrannize ouer the poore and meaner people: or when the king is poore and needy, not knowing where to get siluer, to raise loanes vpon the richest. And we must not thinke that the severity of a prince is alwaies tyranny, or his gards & fortrelles, or the maiesty of his imperious commands, which are sometimes profitable, yea necessary, and are more to be desired than the sweet prayers of tyrants.

These are the two true stayes and pillars of a prince, and of a state, if by them a prince know how to maintaine and preserve himselfe from the two contraries, which are the murderers of a prince and state, that is to say hatred and contempt, whereof the better to avoid them, and to take heed of them, a word or two. Hatred contrary to bencuolence, is a wicked and obstinate affection of subiects against the prince; and his state: It ordinarily proceedeth from feare of what is to come, or desire of reuenge of what is past, or from them both. This hatred when it is great, and of many, a prince can hardly escape it, *Multorum odys nulle opes possunt resistere*. No power or riches can resist the hatred of many. He is exposed to all, and thereneeds but one to make an end of all. *Multa illis manus, illi una cernix*. They haue many handes, he but one necke. It standeth him vpon therefore to preserve himselfe, which he shall do by flying those things that ingender it, that is to say, cruelty and auarice, the contraries to the aforesaid instruments of bencuolence.

10  
Hate and contempt two murderers of a prince.

Arist. lib. 5.  
Pol.  
Hatred.

Cicero.

He must preserve himselfe pure and free from base cruelty, vnworthy greatnesse, very infamous to a prince: But contrarily he must arme himselfe with clemency, as hath bene said before, in the vertues required in a prince. But forasmuch as

11  
Hatred proceedeth from cruelty.  
Cap. 2.  
art. 12.

DD

punishments

An aduice for  
punishments.  
Senec.

punishments, though they be iust and necessary in a state, haue some image of crueltie, hee must take heed to carie himselfe therein with dexterity, and for this end I will giue him this aduice : Let him not put his hand to the sword of iustice, but very seldome and vnwillingly : *libenter damnat qui cito : ergo illi parsimonia etiam vilissimi sanguinis* : He condemneth willingly, that doth it hastily : therefore he is to bee sparing euen of the basest blood. 2. Enforced for the publicke good, and rather for example, and to terrifie others from the like offence : 3. That it be to punish the faultie, and that without choler, or ioy, or other passion : And if he must needs shew some passion, that it be compassion : 4. That it be according to the accustomed maner of the country, and not after a new, for new punishments are testimonies of cruelty : 5. Without giuing his assistance, or being present at the execution : 6. And if hee must punish many, he must dispatch it speedily, and all at a blow, for to make delayes, and to vse one correction after another, is a token that he taketh delight, pleaseth and feedeth himselfe therewith.

12  
Aduice.

He must likewise preferue himselfe from avarice, a sinne ill besitting a great personage. It is shewed either by exacting and gathering ouermuch, or by giuing too little. The first doth much displease the people, by nature covetous, to whom their goods are as their blood and their life : The second, men offeruice and merit, who haue laboured for the publicke good, and haue reason to thinke that they deserue some recompence. Now how a prince should gouerne himselfe heerein, and in his treasure and exchequer affaires, either in laying their foundation, or spending or preserving them, hath bene more at large discoursed in the second chapter. I will heere onely say, that a prince must carefully preferue himselfe from three things : First from resembling, by ouer great and excessive impositions, these tyrants, subiect-mongers, canibals, *quid deuorant plebem sicut escam panis Inuicem, quorum ararium spoliarium, cinium cruentarumq, praedarum receptaculum*, Who deuoure the people as a morsell of bread ; and whose storehouse is the receptacle of the spoiles of the citizens, and bloodie priees, for this breeds danger of tumult, witnesse so many examples, and miserable accidents : Secondly, from

from base vnhoneſt parſimony, as well in gathering together, (*indignum, lucrum, ex omni occasione odorari; & ut dicitur, etiam à mortuo auferre*); To ſwell vnworthie gaine out of euery occaſion, and as it is ſayd, to take away euen from the dead, and therefore he muſt not ſerue his turne heerein with accuſations, confiſcations, vnluſt ſpoiles) as in giuing nothing, or too little, and that mercenarily, and with long and importunate ſuite: Thirdly, from violence in the leuie of his prouiſion, and that if it be poſſible, he neuer ſeiſe vpon the moucables and vtensils of husbandry. This doth principally belong to receiue and purueyers, who by their rigorous courſes, expoſe the prince to the hatred of the people, and diſhonour him; a people ſubtile, cruell, with ſix hands and three heads, as one ſaith. A prince therefore muſt prouide that they be honeſt men, & if they faile in their duties, to correct them ſeuerely, with rough chaſtiſement, and great amends, to the end they may reſtore and diſgorge like ſponges, that which they haue ſucked and drawn vniuſtly from the people.

Let vs come to the other worſe enemy, contempt; which is a ſiniſter, baſe, and abieſt opinion of the prince, and the ſtate: This is the death of a ſtate, as authoritie is the ſoule and life thereof. What doth maintaine one onely man, yea an old and worneman, ouer ſo many thouſands of men, if not authoritie and the great eſteeme of his perſon? which if it be once loſt by contempt, the prince and ſtate muſt neceſſarily fall to the ground. And euen as authoritie, as hath been ſaid, is more ſtrong and large than beneuolence, ſo contempt is more contrarie and dangerous than hatred, which dareth not any thing, being held backe by feare, if contempt which ſhaketh off feare, arme it not, and giue it courage to execute. It is true that contempt is not ſo common, eſpecially if he be a true and lawfull prince, except he bee ſuch a one, as doth wholly degrade and proſtitute himſelfe, & *videatur exire de Plin. in Pan. imperio.* And ſeeme to giue ouer his empire. Neuertheleſſe we muſt ſee from whence this contempt doth come, that wee may the better know how to auoid it. It proceedeth from things contrarie to thoſe meanes that winne and get authoritie, & eſpecially from three, that is to ſay, from too looſe, effeminate, milde, languiſhing and careleſſe, or very light forme

*An ill forme of  
gouernment.*

of gouernment, without any hold or stay; this is a state without a state, vnder such princes the subiects are made bold, and insolent, all things being permitted, because the prince takes care of nothing. *Malum principem habere, sub quo nihil vlti liceat: peius sub quo omnia omnibus.* It is an euill thing to haue a prince, vnder whom nothing is lawfull for any man: But worse to haue him vnder whom all things are lawfull for all men. Secondly, from the ill hap and infelicity of the prince, whether it bee in his affaires, which succeed not well, or in his line and issue, if he haue no children, who are a great proppe and stay to a prince, or in the vncertainty of his successours, whereof *Alexander the great complained, Orbis mea quod sine liberis sum, spernitur: Minimen aula regy liberi.* My want of children maketh me to be despised: *Royal children are a defence to the kings house.* Thirdly, from maners, especially dissolute, loose and voluptuous, drunkenness, gluttonie, as also rusticitie, childishness, scurtilitie.

*Infelicitie.**Maneri.*

14  
*The distinction  
of the action of  
a prince.*

Thus in grosse haue I spoken of the action of a prince. To handle it more distinctly and particularly, wee must remember, as hath beene sayd in the beginning, that it is twofold, peaceable and military; by the peaceable I heere vnderstand that ordinary action, which is cuerie day done, and at all times of peace and of warre; by the military, that which is not exercised, but in time of warre.

*Of the peaceable.**An aduice.*

The peaceable and ordinarie action of a soueraigne cannot be wholly prescribed, it is an infinite thing, and consisteth as well in taking heed to doe, as to doe. Wee will heere giue the principall and more necessary aduiselements. First therefore a Prince must provide that he be faithfully and diligently aduertised of all things. This all things may bee reduced to two heads, whereupon there are two sorts of aduertisements and aduertisers, who must be faithfull and assured, wise and secret, though in some there be required, a greater liberty and constancy than in others. Some are to aduertise him of his honor and duty, of his defects, and to tell him the truth. There are no kind of people in the world, who haue so much need of such friends, as Princes haue; who neither see nor vnderstand but by the eyes and eares of another. They maintain and hold vp a publike life, are to satisfie so many people, haue so many things

things hid from them, that before they be aware, they fall into the hatred and detestation of their people, for matters that would be easily remedied and cured, if they had beene in time aduertised of them. On the other side free aduertisements, which are the best offices of true amity, are perillous about soveraignes, though Princes be ouer delicate & shew great infirmitie, if for their good and profit, they cannot endure a free aduertisement, which enforceth nothing, it being in their power, whatsoeuer they heare, to do what they list. Others are to aduertise the Prince of whatsoeuer passeth, not onely amongst his subiects, and within the circuit of his state, but with his bordering neighbours. I say of all, that concerneth either a farre off, or neere at hand, his owne state or his neighbours. These two kind of people answer in some sort to those two friends of *Alexander*, *Ephesion* and *Crateras*, of whom the one loued the King, the other *Alexander*, that is to say, the one the state, the other the person.

Secondly, a Prince must alwaies haue in his hand a little booke or memoriall containing three things: first and principally a brieue register of the affaires of the state: to the end he may know what he must doe, what is begun to bee done, and that there remaine nothing imperfect, and ill executed: A catalogue or bedrowle of the most worthy personages that haue well deserued, or are likely to deserue well of the weale-publike: A memoriall of the gifts which he hath bestowed, to whom and wherefore; other wise without these three, there must necessarily follow many inconueniences. The greatest princes and wisest polititians haue vsed it, *Augustus*, *Tiberius*, *Vespasian*, *Traian*, *Adrian*, the *Antonies*.

Thirdly, in asmuch as one of the principall duties of a prince, is to appoint and order both rewards and punishments, the one whereof is fauorable, the other odious, a prince must retaine vnto himselfe the distribution of rewards, as estates, honours, immunities, restitutions, graces and fauours, and leaue vnto his officers, to execute and pronounce condemnations, forfeitures, confiscations, depriuations, and other punishments.

Fourthly in the distribution of rewards, gifts, and good deeds, he must alwaies be readie and willing, giue them be-

15  
To haue a memoriall of the  
1 Affaires.

2 Person.

3 Gifts.

16  
To appoint re-  
wards and pu-  
nishments.

17  
To distribute  
rewards.

fore they be asked, if he can, and not to looke that he should refuse them; and he must giue them himselfe, if it may be, or cause them to be giuen in his presence. By this meanes gifts and good turnes shall be better receiued, and giuen to better purpose, and he shall auoid two great and common inconueniences, which deprive men of honour and worth of those rewards that are due vnto them: the one is a long pursuit, difficult and chargeable, which a man must vndergoe, to obtaine that which he would, and thinketh to haue deserued, which is no small griefe to honorable minds, and men of spirit: The other, that after a man hath obtained of the prince a gift, before he can possesse it, it costeth the one halfe, and more, of that it is worth, and many times comes to nothing.

18

*Of this militarie  
action which  
consisteth in  
three points.*

*To enterprise,  
where two  
things are re-  
quired.*

*Plin in Pan.*

*Salust.*

Let vs come to the militarie action, wholly necessary for the preservation and defence of a prince, of the subiects, and the whole state, let vs speake thereof briefly. All this matter or subiect may bee reduced to three heads, To enterprise, make, finish warre. In the enterprise there must be two things, iustice and prudence, and an auoidance of their contraries, iniustice and temeritie. First, the warre must be iust, yea iustice must march before valour, as deliberation before execution. These reasons must be of no force, yea abhorred, That right consisteth in force; That the issue or euent decideth it; That the stronger carrieth it away. But a prince must looke into the cause, into the ground and foundation, and not into the issue; Warre hath it lawes and ordinances as well as peace. God fauoreth iust warres, and giueth the victorie to whom it pleaseth him, and therefore we must first make our selues capable of this fauor by the equity of the enterprise. Warre then must not be begun and vndertaken for all causes, vpon euery occasion, *non ex omni occasione querere triumphum: Not to seeke triumph for euery occasion:* And aboue all a prince must take heed that ambition, avarice, choler, possesse him not and cary him beyond reason, which are alwaies, to say the truth, the more ordinarie motiues to warre: *vna & eadem causa bellandi est profunda cupido imperij & diuitiarum: maximam gloriam in maximo imperio putans: Rupere foedus impius lucri furor, & ira preceps.* One, and that an ancient cause of warre is the greedie desire of rule and of riches: they esteeme the greatest glorie in the greatest command:



and government of the state, which concerneth &c. 411  
command: the wicked rage of gaine breaketh leagues, and stirs  
up wrath.

That a warre may be in all points iust, three things are necessary, that it bee denounced and vndertaken by him that hath power to doe it, which is only the soueraigne.

19  
Three things  
make an enter-  
prise iust.

20

That it be for a iust cause, such as a defensiu war is, which is absolute iust, being iustified by all reason amongst the wise, by necessitie amongst barbarians, by nature amongst beasts: Cic. pro Milo.

I say defensiu, of himselfe, that is, of his life, his liberty, his parents, his countrie: of his allies and confederates, in regard of that faith he hath giuen; of such as are vniustly opprelled, *Quinon defendit, nec obstitit, si potest, iniuria, tam est inuitie,* In officia.

quam si parentes, aut patriam, aut socios deserat. He that defendeth not, nor resisteth iniurie, if he can, is as much in fault, as if hee betrayed his parents, his countrie or his friends.

Sakst.

These three heads of defence are within the bounds of iustice, according to S. Ambrose, *Fortitudo, qua per bella tuetur à barbaris patriam, vel defendit infirmos, vel à latronibus socios, plena iustitia est.* It is fortitude full of iustice, which by warres defendeth the country from barbarians, or protecteth the weake, or companions and friends from robbers. Another more briefly, diuideth it into two heads, faith and health; *Nullum bellum à ciuitate optima suscipitur, nisi aut pro fide, aut pro salute:* No warre is vndertaken by any worthe ciitie, but either for faithfulnessse or for safety: and to offensiu warre he puts two conditions; That it proceed from some former offence giuen, as outrage or vsurpation, and hauing redemanded openly by a herald that which hath beene surprised and taken away (*post clarigatum*) and sought it by way of iustice, which must euer goe formost. For if men be willing to submit themselves vnto iustice, and reason, there let them stay themselves; if not, the last, and therefore necessarie, is iust and lawfull, *iustum bellum, quibus necessarium; pia arma quibus nulla nisi in armis relinquitur spes.* That warre is iust to whom, it is necessarie; armes are honest and righteous to them, that haue no other hope or refuge left but onely in armes.

Plin. l. 22. nat.  
hist. ca. 2.

Liuius.

Thirdly to a good end, that is to say, peace and quietnesse. *Sapientes pacis causa bellum gerunt, & laborem spe otij sustinent: ut in pace sine iniuria viuant.* Wise men wage warre for peace

*sake, and sustaine labour in hope of rest ; that they may liue in peace without iniurie.*

23  
Prudence

After iustice commeth prudence, whereby a man doth aduisedly deliberate before by sound of trumpet hee publisheth the warre. And therefore, that nothing be done out of passion, and ouer-rashly, it is necessarie that he consider of the points: of forces and meanes, as well his owne, as his enemies ; secondly of the hazard and dangerous reuolution of humane things, especially of armes, which are variable, and wherein fortune hath greatest credit, and exerciseth more her empire, than in any other thing, wherein the issue may be such, that in an houre it carieth all : *Simul parva ac sperata decora unius hora fortuna euertere potest* : The fortune of one houre may overthrow all honour both gotten and hoped for.

Liuius.

Thirdly, of those great evils, infelicities, and publike and particular miseries, which warre doth necessarily bring with it, and which be such as the onely imagination is lamentable. Fourthly of the calumnies, maledictions, and reproches that are spread abroad against the authours of the warre, by reason of those evils and miseries that follow it. For there is nothing more subiect to the tongues and iudgements of men than warre. But all lighteth vpon the Chieftaine. *Iniquissima bellorum conditio hac est, prospera omnes sibi vendicant, aduersa uni imputantur.* This is a most vniust conditio of warre, when all doe challenge to themselves the prosperous euents, and the unhappie successes are imputed to one alone. All these things together make the iustest warre that may be, detestable, saith *S. Augustine* ; and therefore it standeth a soueraigne vpon, not to enter into warres but vpon great necessitie, as it is said of *Augustus* ; and not to suffer himselfe to be caried by those incendiaries and fire-brands of warre, who for some particular passion, are readie to kindle and enflame him : *quibus in pace durius seruitium est, in id nati, ut nec ipsi quiescant, neque alios sinant* . They to whom seruice is hard in peace, are borne to this, that neither themselves can be quiet, nor yet suffer others. And these men are commonly such, whose noses do bleed when they come to the fact it selfe. *Dulce bellum inexpertis* : Warre is sweetest to them that haue not knownen it. A wise soueraigne will keepe himselfe in peace, neither prouoking, nor fearing warre, neither disquieting either his

Tacit.

Pindar.

his owne state, or anothers, betwixt hope and feare, nor coming to those extremities of perishing himselfe, or making others to perish.

The second head of militarie action, is to make war, where-

unto are required three things, Munitions, Men, Rules of war. The first is prouision and munition of all things necessarie for warre, which must be done in good time and at leasure, for it were great indiscretion in extremities to be employed about the search and prouision of those things which hee should haue alwaies readie. *Diu apparandum est, ut vincas celerius: It must be long preparing, that thou maist the speedier overcome.*

Now of the ordinarie and perpetuall prouision required for the good of the prince and the state at all times, hath beene spoken in the first part of this Chapter, which is wholly of this subiect. The principall prouisions and munitions of warre are three, Money, which is the vitall spirit, and sinewes of warre, whereof hath beene spoken in the second Chapter. 2. Armes both offensive and defensiue, whereof likewise heere tofore. These two are ordinarie, and at all times. 3. Victuals, without which a man can neither conquer, nor liue, whole armies are ouerthrowen without a blow stricken, souldiers grow licentious, and vnrule, and it is not possible to doe any good.

*Disciplinam non seruat ieiunus exercitus: A fasting and hungrie* armie obserueth no discipline. But this is an extraordinary prouision, and not perpetuall, and is not made but for warre. It is necessarie therefore that in the deliberating of warre, there be great store-houses made for victuals, corne, powdered flesh, both for the armie which is in the field, and for the garisons in the frontiers, which may be besieged.

The second thing required to make warre, are men fit to assaile and to defend: we must distinguish them. The first distinction is, into souldiers, and leaders or captaines, both are necessarie. The souldiers are the bodie, the captaines the soule, the life of the armie, who giue motion and action: wee will speake first of the souldiers who make the bodie in grosse. There are diuers sorts of them: There are footmen and horsemen, naturall of the same countrey, and strangers; ordinarie and subsidiarie. Wee must first compare them all together, to the end wee may know which are the better, and to be preferred,

23

*The second head to make warre, whereunto three things are required.*

*Prouision, and munition.*

*Cassiod.*

24

*Men.*

ferred, and afterwards we will see how to make our choice, and lastly how to gouerne and discipline them.

25  
*Rather foote  
than horse.*

In this comparison all are not of one accord. Some, especially rude and barbarous people, preferre horsemen before footmen; others quite contrarie. A man may say that the foote are simplie and absolutely the better, for they serue both throughout the warre, and in all places, and at all occasions; whereas in hillie, rough, craggie, and strait places, and in sieges, the caualarie is almost vnprofitable. They are likewise more readie and lesse chargeable: and if they be well led and armed, as it is fit they should, they endure the chocke of the horsemen. They are likewise preferred by such as are doctors in this arte. A man may say that the caualarie is better in a combart; and for a speedie dispatch; *Equestrum virum, proprium cito parare, cito cedere victoriam.* It is proper to the troupes of horsemen quickly to get, and quickly to lose the victorie. For the foote are not so speedie, but what they doe, they performe more surely.

26  
*And naturall  
than strangers.*

As for naturall souldiers and strangers, diuers men are likewise of diuers opinions touching their precedencie; but without all doubt the naturall are much better, because they are more loyall then mercenarie strangers.

*Venaleſq; manus, ibi ſas, vbi maxima merces.*

*Hands ſet at ſale, there chiefeſt right,*

*Where greateſt pay doth call to fight.*

More patient and obedient, carrying themſelues with more honor and reſpect towards their leaders, more courage in combats, more affection to the victorie, and good of their countrie: They coſt leſſe, and are more readie than ſtrangers, who are many times mutinous, yea in greateſt neceſſities, making more ſtir, than doing ſeruice, and the moſt part of them are importunate, and burthenſome to the Common-weale, cruell to thoſe of the countrie, whom they forrage as enemies. Their coming and departure is chargeable, and many times they are expected and attended with great loſſe and inconuenience. If in ſome extremitie there be neede of them, be it ſo, but yet let them be in farre leſſe number than the naturall, and let them make but a member and part of the armie, not the bodie. For there is danger that if they ſhall ſee themſelues  
equall

equall in force, or more strong than the naturall, they will make themselves their masters that called them, as many times it hath fallen out. For hee is master of the state, that is master of the forces. And againe, if it be possible, let them be drawne from allies and confederates, who bring with them more trust and seruice than they that are simplie strangers. For to make more vse of strangers, or to employ them more than naturall subiects, is to play the tyrants, who feare their subiects, and because they handle them like enemies, they make themselves odious vnto them, whereby they feare to arme them or to employ them in the warres.

As touching ordinarie souldiers and subsidiaries, both are necessarie, but the difference betweene them is, that the ordinarie are in lesse number, are alway a foote and in armes both in peace and in warre: and of these we haue spoken in the prouision, a people wholly destinated and confined to the warres, formed to all exercise of armes, resolute. This is the ordinarie force of the prince, his honor in peace, his safeguard in warre: such were the *Romane* legions, These should be diuided by troopes in times of peace, to the end they raise no commotions. The subsidiaries are in farre greater number, but they are not perpetuall, and wholly destinated to warre: they haue other vocations: At a neede and in times of warre they are called by the sound of a trumpet, enroled, mustred, and instructed to the warres; and in times of peace they returne, and retire themselves to their vocations.

27  
As well ordina-  
rie as subsidia-  
rie.

We haue vnderstood their distinctions and differences, we must now consider of the good choice of them: A matter whereof we must be carefullie aduised, not to gather many, and in great numbers, for number winneth not the victorie, but valour; and commonly they are but few that giue the ouerthrow. An vnbridled multitude doth more hurt than good. *Non vires habet sed pondus, potius impedimentum quam auxilium.* It is not of force, but a burden; a hinderance rather then a help. Victorie then consisteth not in the number, but in the force and valor, *Manibus opus est bello, non multis nominibus.* In warre there is need of hands, not of many names. There must therefore be a great care in the choice of them (not pressing them pell-mell) that they be not voluntarie aduenturers,

28  
Well to choose.

ignorant

ignorant of warre, taken forth of cities, corrupt, vitious, dissolute in their maners, arrogant boasters, hardie and bold to pillage, farre enough off from blowes, leuerets in dangers, *As fucti latrocinij bellorum, insolentes, galeati lepores, purgamenta urbium, quibus ob egestatem & flagitia maxima peccandi necessitudo. Accuslomed to pillage, and the robberies of the warres, insolent, armed hares, the off-scume of the citty, on whom want and the crimes they be subiect vnto, haue brought a necessity of offending.*

29

*El. Aliu. f  
souldiers con-  
sisteth in five  
things.  
1 Country.  
Veget.*

To chuse them wel, there needs iudgement, attention and instruction, and to this end fīue things must be considered of, that is to say, the place of their birth and education. They must be taken out of the fields, the mountaines, barren and hard places, countries neere adioining to the sea, and brought vp in all maner of labor. *Ex agris supplendum precipuē robur exercitus, aptior armis rustica plebs sub dio & in laboribus enutrita, ipso terra sua solo & caelo acris animantur. Et minus mortem timet, qui minus deliciarum nouit in vita. The strength of the army is chiefly to be supplied out of the fieldes; countrie people are fitter for armes, being trained vp abroad in the aire, and in labours, and are more egerly encouraged by the soyle, and open aire of the fieldes. And he feareth death least, who hath least tasted of delightes in his life. For they that are brought vp in Cities, in the pleasant shadow and delights thereof, in gaine, are more idle, insolent, effeminate; Vernaculo multitudo, lascinia sucta, laborum intolerans. The home-bread multitude, used to sloth and wantonneſſe, are impatient of labour. Secondly the age, that they be taken young, at eightene yeares of age, when they are most pliant and obedient: the elder are possessed with many vices, & not so fit for discipline. Thirdly the bodies, which some will haue to be of a great stature, as *Marinus & Pirrhus*: but though it be but indifferent, so the body be strong, drie, vigorous, sinowie, of a fierce looke, it is all one. *Dura corpora ferili artus, minax vultus, maior animi vigor. Hard bodies, well knit ioynts, a fierce and threatning countenance, great courage & vigor of spirit.**

Tacit.

2 Age.

3 Bodies.

4 Spirit.

5 Condition.

Fourthly the spirit, which must be liuely, resolute, bold, glorious, fearing nothing so much as dishonour and reproch. Fifthly the condition, which importeth much; for they that are of a base and infamous condition, of dishonest qualities,

or

and government of the state, which concerneth, &c. 417

or such as are mingled with effeminate artes, seruing for delicacie and for women, are no way fit for this profession.

After the choice and elections commeth discipline: for it is not enough to haue chosen those that are capable, and like-ly to prooue good souldiers, if a man make them not good; and if he make them good, if he keepe and continue them not such. Nature makes few men valiant, it is good institution and discipline that doth it. Now it is hard to say how necessarie and profitable good discipline is in warre: This is all in all, it is this that made *Rome* to flourish, and that woon it the seignorie of the world: yea, it was in greater account, than the loue of their children. Now the principall point of discipline is obedience, to which end serued that ancient precept, that a souldier must more feare his captaine, than his enemy.

Now this discipline must tend to two ends; to make the souldiers valiant, and honest men: and therefore it hath two parts, valour, and maners. To valour three things are required; daily exercise in armes, wherein they must alwaies keepe themselves in practise without intermission; and from hence commeth the Latine word *Exercitus*, which signifieth an armie. This exercise in armes, is an instruction to manage and vse them well, to prepare themselves for combats, to draw benefit from armes, with dexteritie to defend themselves, to discover and present vnto them whatsoeuer may fall out in the fight, and come to the triall, as in a ranged battell: to propose rewards to the most apt and actiue, to enflame them. Secondly, trauell or paines, which is as well to harden them to labour, to sweatings, to dust, *Exercitus labore proficit, orio consenscit*, An armie profueth by labour, and decaeth with ease and idlenes, as for the good and seruice of the army, and fortification of the field, whereby they must learne to digge, to plant a pallisade, to order a barricado, to runne, to carrie heauie burthens. These are necessarie things, as well to defend themselves, as to offend and surprise the enemy. Thirdly order, which is of great vse, and must be kept in warre for diuers causes, and after a diuers maner. First, in the distribution of the troopes, into battallions, regiments, ensignes, camerades. Secondly, in the situation of the campe, that it be

30  
well discipli-  
ned.

Veget.

31  
Discipline hath  
two parts.  
1. Valour which  
is attained by  
exercise.

2. Trauell.

3. Order.

be disposed into quarters with proportion, hauing the places, entries, issues, lodgings fitted both for the horsemen and footemen, whereby it may bee easie for euerie man to finde his quarter, his companion. Thirdly, in the march in the field, and against the enemy, that euerie one hold his ranke; that they bee equally distant the one from the other, neither too neere, nor too farre from one another. Now this order is very necessarie and serues for many purposes. It is very pleasing to the eye, cheereth vp friends, astonisheth the enemy, secureth the armie, maketh all the remooues, and the commands of the captaines easie; in such sort, that without stir, without confusion the General commandeth, and from hand to hand his intents and purposes come euen to the least. *Imperium ducis simul omnes copie sentiunt; & ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondent.* All the armie together know their leaders command, and answer without tumult the will of the General. To be brieue, this order well kept, maketh an armie almost inuincible; and contrariwise, many haue lost the field for want of this order, and good intelligence.

32  
Manners the second part of discipline.

Continencie.

Tacit.

Modestie.

The second part of this militarie discipline concerneth manners, which are commonly very dissolute and in armes hardly ordered, *Affidue dimicantibus difficile morum custodire mensuram.* It is a hard matter for souldiers that are in continuall employment to keepe a measure in their manners. Neuerthelesse there must be paines taken, and especially to enstall (if it may be) three vertues; Continencie, whereby all gluttonie, drunkenness, whoredome, and all maner of dishonest pleasures are chased away, which doe make a souldier loose and licentious. *Degenerat a robore ac virtute miles assuetudine voluptatum;* A souldier degenerateth from courage and vertue, by custome of sensuall pleasures; witnesse Hannibal who by delicacie and delights in a winter was effeminated, and he by vice was vanquished, that was inuincible, and by armes vanquished all others. Modestie in words, driuing away all vanitie, vaine boasting, brauerie of speech; for true valour stirreth not the tongue, but the hands, doth not speake but execute. *Vir inatimulie factis magni, ad verborum linguaq; certamina rudes: discrimen ipsum certaminis differunt: viri fortes, in opere acres, ante id placidi.* Men that are



are borne for warfare be stout in deeds, and rude in words: prolong the danger of the conflict: valiant men are fierce in execution. And contrarily great speakers are small doers. *Nimij verbis lingua feroces.* Now the tongue is for counsell, the hand for combat, saith *Homer*; Modestie in action, (that is, a simple and readie obedience, without merchandizing or contradicting the commands of the captaines) *Hac sunt bona militie, velle, vereri, obedire.* These things are fit in good souldiers, to stand in feare and readie to obey. Abstinencie, whereby souldiers keepe their hands cleane from all violence, forraging, robbery. And this is a brieue summe in the militarie discipline; the which the Generall must strengthen by rewards and recompences of honour towards the good & valorous, & by seuerer punishments against offenders: for indulgence vndoeth souldiers. *Abstinentia.*

Let this suffice of souldiers: Now a word or two of captaines, without whom the souldier can doe nothing: they are a body without a soule, a ship with oares without a matter to hold the sterne. There are two sorts, the Generall and first, and afterwards the subalterne, the master of the Campe, Colonels: But the Generall (who must neuer be but one, vnder paine of losing all) is all in all. And therefore it is said, that an armie can doe as much as a Generall can doe, and as much account must be made of him as of all the rest, *Plus in ducere repones, quam in exercitu.* Repose more in the Generall, then in the armie. Now this Generall is either the prince himselfe and soueraigne, or such as hee hath committed the charge vnto, and made choise of. The presence of a prince is of great importance to the obtaining of a victorie; it doubleth the force and courage of his men; and it seemeth to bee requisite when it standeth vpon the safegard and health of his state, and of a prouince. In warres of lesse consequence hee may depute another: *Dubij praeliorum, exentius summa rerum, & imperij seipsum reserues.* Finallie, a Generall must haue these qualities, he must be wise and experienced in the arte militarie, hauing seene and suffered both fortunes: *Secundarum, ambignarumq; rerum sciens eoque interitum.* Hauing tasted both good and bad fortune, and therefore fearelesse. Secondly, hee must be prouident and well aduised; and therefore staid, cold, and settled; farre from all temerity and precipitation, which is not

33

*Of captaines.*

*Of the Generall.*

*Tacit.*

*Tacit.*

*Tacit.*

Sertori, in  
Plut.

not only foolish, but vnfortunate. For faults in warre cannot be mended; *Non licet in bello bis peccare. Faultes may not twice be committed in warre.* And therefore hee must rather looke backe, than before him, *Ducem oportet potius respicere, quam prospicere.* Thirdly, he must be vigilant and actiue, and by his owne example, teaching his souldiers to doe his will. Fourthly happie, good fortune comes from heauen, but yet willingly it followeth and accompanieth these three first qualities.

34  
The third head  
of the rules and  
counsell to make  
warre.

After the munitions and men of warre, let vs come to the rules and generall aduiselements to make warre. This third point is a very great and necessarie instrument of warre, without which both munitions and men, are but phantasies, *Plura consilio quam vi perficiuntur. More things are brought to passe by counsell than by force.* Now to prescribe certaine rules and perpetuall, it is impossible. For they depend of so many things that are to be considered of, & whereunto a man must accommodate himselfe, wherupon it was well said, That men giue not counsell to the affaires, but the affaires to men, that a man must order his warre by his eie. A man must take his counsell in the field, *Consilium in arena*: for new occurrences yeeld new counsels. Neuerthelesse there are some so generall, and certaine, that a man cannot faile in the deliuerie and obseruation of them. We will brieflie set down some few of them, whereunto a man may adde as occasions shall fall out. Some are to be obserued throughout a warre, which we will speake of in the first place, others are for certaine occasions and affaires.

Rules for the  
whole time of  
warre.

1 The first is carefully to watch and to meet the occasions: not to lose any, nor to permit, if it be possible, the enemy to take his: occasion hath a great place in all humane affaires, especially in warre, where it helpeth more than force.

2 To make profit of rumours and reports that runne abroad, for whether they be true or false, they may doe much, especially in the beginning. *Fama bella constant, fama bellum conficit, in spem metumue impellit animos.* By fame or report warres continue, fame endeth warre, and moueth mens minds either to hope or feare.

3 But when a man is entred his course, let not reports trouble him: he may consider of them, but let them not hinder

der him to do that he should, and what he can, and let him stand firme to that which reason hath counselled him.

4 Above all, he must take heed of too great a confidence and assurance, whereby he growes into contempt of his enemy, and thereby becomes negligent and careless: it is the most dangerous euill that can fall out in warre. He that contemneth his enemy, discouereth and betrayeth himselfe, *Frequentissimum initium calamitatis securitas. Nemo celerius opprimitur quam: qui non times. Nil tibi in hoste despicitur: quem sperueris, valentiam negligentia facies. Securitas is the most common beginning of calamitie. No man is sooner overcome, then he that feareth not; Nothing safely is to be despised in an enemy: thou wilt make by thy negligence him whom thou despisest more strong and valiant. There is nothing in warre that must be despised: for therein there is nothing little: and many times that which seemeth to a man to be of small moment, yeeldeth great effects. Sape paruis momentis magni casus: ut nihil timenda, sic nihil contemnenda. From things of small moment oftentimes arise great euents: As nothing is to be feared, so nothing to be contemned.*

5 To enquire very carefully, and to know the estate and affaires of the enemy, especially these points, 1. The nature, capacitie, and designments of the Chieftaine. 2. The nature, manners, and maner of life of his enemies. 3. The situation of the places, & the nature of the countrie where he is. Hannibal was excellent in this.

6 Touching the fight or maine battell, many things are aduisedly to be considered of, when, where, against whom, and how, to the end it be not to small purpose. And a man must not come to this extremitie, but with great deliberation, but rather make choise of any other means, and seeke to breake the force of his enemy by patience, and to suffer him to beate himselfe with time, with the place, with the want of many things; before he come to this hazard. For the issue of battailes is very vncertaine, and dangerous: *Incerti exitus pugnarum. Mars communis, qui saepe spoliantem & iam exultantem ouertit; & perculit ab abiecto. The issue and euents of warre is vncertaine, Mars is common to all, who often ouerthroweth him that spotteth, and now exulteth: and confoundeth and striketh him by whom he is abiect, and by him that was vanquished.*

When.

7 A man then must not come to the battell, but seldome; that is to say, in great necessities, or for some great occasion. In necessity as if the difficulties grow on his part; his viands, his treasure faileth; his men begin to distaste the warres, and will be gone, and hee cannot long continue, *capienda rebui in malis precepta via est*; In extremities a sudden course is to be taken; upon great occasion, as if his part be clearly the stronger; that the victorie seemeth to offer it selfe, that the enemy is weak and will shortly bee stronger, and will offer the battell; that he is out of doubt and feare, and thinketh his enemy far off; that he is weary and faint, reuietualleth himselfe; his horses feed vpon the litter.

Where.

8 Hee must consider the place, for this is a matter of great consequence in battells. In generall, he must not attend (if he may preuent it) his enemy till he enter within his owne territories. He must goe forth to meet him, or at least stay him in the entrance. And if he be already entered, not hazard the battell, before he haue another army in readinesse, to make a supply; otherwise he puts his state in hazard. More particularly hee must consider the field where the battell is to bee fought, whether it be fit for himselfe, or his enemy: for the field many times giues a great aduantage. The plaine champion is good for the caualary; strait and narrow places, set with piles, full of ditches, trees, for the infanterie.

With and against whom.

9 He must consider with whom he is to fight, not with the strongest, I meane not the strongest men, but the strongest and stoutest courages. Now there is not any thing that giueth more heart and courage, than necessity, an enemy inuincible. And therefore I say, that a man must neuer fight with such as are desperate. This agreeth with the former, that is, not to hazard a battell within his owne countrie, for an enemy being entered fighteth desperatly, knowing if hee bee vanquished, he cannot escape death, hauing neither fortresse, nor any place of retraite or succor, *unde necessitas in loco, spes in viribus, salus ex victoria*. When necessity is in place, hope is in courage, and resolution, and safety out of victorie.

How.

10 The maner of fight that brings best aduantage with it, whatsoeuer it be, is the best; whether it be surprise, subtiltie, close

close and couert faining to feare, to the end he may draw the enemy, and catch him in his ginne, *spe villerie inducere, ut vincatur*; To bring him into hope of victory, that he may bee vanquished; to watch and marke his oversights and faults, that he may the better preuaile against him, and giue the charge. For ranged battels these things are required. The first and principall is a good and comely ordering of his people. 2. A supplie and succour alwaies ready, but close and hidden, to the end that comming suddainly and vnawares, it may astonish and confound the enemy. For all suddaine things though they bee vaine and ridiculous, bring feare and astonishment with them.

*Primi in omnibus praelijs oculi vincuntur & aures.*

*In skirmishes and battels all*

*The eyes and eares are first that fall.*

3. To bee first in the field, and ranged in battell ray. This a Generall doth with so much the more ease, and it much increaseth the courage of his souldiers, and abateth his enemies for this is to make himselfe the assailant, who hath alwaies more heart than the defendant. 4. A beautifull gallant, bold resolu'd countenance of the Generall & other leaders. 5. An oration to encourage the souldiers, and to lay open vnto them the honor, commoditie & securitie that there is in valor; That dishonor, danger, death, are the reward of cowards: *minus timoris minus periculi, audaciam pro muro esse, effugere mortem, quae eam contemnit*. The lesse feare the lesse danger, courage is a wall of defence, he avoideth death that contemneth it.

Being come to hand-strokes, if the army wauer, the Generall must hold him firme, do the duty of a resolute Leader, and braue man at armes, runne before his astonished souldiers, stay them recoiling, thrust himselfe into the throng, make all to know, both his owne, and his enemies, that his head, his hand, his tongue trembleth not.

And if it fall out that he haue the better, and the field bee his, hee must stay and with-hold them, lest they scatter and disband themselves, by too obstinate a pursuit of the vanquished. That is to bee feared, which hath many times come to passe, that the vanquished gathering heart, make vse of despair, gather to a head, and vanquish the vanquishers, for this

necessitie is a violent schoole-mistres. *Clausis ex desperatione crescit audacia: & cum spei nihil est, sumit arma formido.* The courage of them that are inclosed groweth out of despaire: and when there is no hope, feare taketh armes. It is better to giue passage vnto them and to remoue all lets & hinderance that may stay their flight. Much lesse must a Generall suffer himselfe or his men to attend the booty, or to be allured thereby ouer hastily, if he be conqueror. He must vse his victorie wisely, lest the abuse thereof turne to his owne harme. And therefore he must not defile it with cruelty, depriving the enemy of al hope for there is danger in it. *Ignauiam necessitas acuit; saepe desperationis spei causa est, grauissimi sunt morsus irritata necessitatis.* Necessitie sharpeneth cowardise: despaire is oftentimes the cause of hope, most bitter are the bitings of urged necessitie. But contrarily, he must leaue some occasion of hope, and ouerture vnto peace, not spoiling and ransacking the countrie which he hath conquered; for furie and rage are dangerous beasts. Again hee must not staine his victorie with insolency, but cary himselfe modestly, and alwaies remember the perpetual flux and reflux of this world, and that alternatiue reuolution, whereby from aduersity springeth prosperitie, from prosperity aduersitie. There are some that cannot digest a good fortune, *Magnam felicitatem concoquere non possunt: fortuna vitrea est, tunc cum splendet frangitur: O insidam fiduciam!* & saepe victor victus. They cannot digest great felicitie: fortune is brittle, and slipperie, when it shineth it breaketh: O faithlesse confidence, that often the victor is vanquished. If he be vanquished, wisdom is necessarie well to waigh and consider of his losse, it is sottishnesse to make himselfe beleue that it is nothing, and to feed himselfe with vaine hopes, to suppress the newes of the ouerthrow. Hee must consider thereof as it is at the worst, otherwise how shall he remedie it; And afterwards with a good courage hope for better fortunes, renew his forces, make a new leuy, seeke new succours, put good and strong garrisons into his strongest places. And though the heauens be contrary vnto him, as sometimes they seeme to oppose themselves to holy and iust armes; it is neuertheless neuer forbidden to die in the bed of honour, which is farre better than to liue in dishonour.

which is to make warre, except one scruple that remaineth: That is to say, whether it bee lawfull to vse subtiltie, policie, stratagems in warre. There bee somethat hold it negatiuely, that it is vnworthie men of honour and vertue, reiecting that excellent saying, *Dolus, an virtus quis in hoste requiritur?* Whether deceit or courage is most requisit in an enemy? Alexander would take no aduantages of the obscuritie of the night, saying, that he liked not of the euing victories, *malò me fortune pigeat, quam victoria pudeat. I had rather be sorie for my fortune, then victorie should shame mee.* So likewise the first Romanes sent their schoolemaster to the Phaliscians; to Pyrrhus his traiterous Physitian, making profession of vertue, disauowing those of their country that did otherwise, reprouing the subtilty of the Greekes and Aphricanes, and teaching that true victorie is by vertue, *qua salua fide & integri dignitate paratur, which is gotten with a safe faith, and true honor,* that which is gotten by wit and subtiltie, is neither generous, nor honorable, nor secure. The vanquished hold not themselves to be well vanquished, *non virtute, sed occasione & arte thei esse victos vult. ergo non fraude neq; occultis sed palam & armatum hostes suos occidet.* Thinke not themselves to be conquered by courage, but by occasion, and by the cunning and subtilty of the Generall: Therefore they would not be reuenged on their enemies by deceit, or secret fraud, but openlie and by force of armes. Now all this is well said and true, but to be vnderstood in two cases, in priuat quarrels, and against priuat enemies, or where faith is not given, or a league and alliance made. But without these two cases, that is to say, in war, and without the preiudice of a mans faith, it is permitted by any means whatsoeuer to conquer the enemy that is already condemned. This, besides the iudgement of the greatest warriors (who contrarily haue preferred the victorie gotten by occasion, and by subtile stratagems, before that which is won by open force; whereupon to that they haue ordained an ox for a sacrifice, to this only a cocke) is the opinion of that great Christian Doctor, *Commistum bellum suscipitur, ut aperte pugnet quis, aut ex insidijs, nihil ad iustitiam interest.* When a iust warre is undertaken, it is no preiudice to iustice, whether any fight openly, or by lying in waite, and by wiles. Warre hath naturallie reasonable priuiledges, to the preiudice of reason.

A question of the stratagem of warre.

Polyb.  
Plut. in Marc.  
Vlp. lib. 1. de Prob.  
Aug. quæst. sup. 10. lue.



In time and place it is permitted to make vse and aduantage of the fortificknesse of an enemy, as well as of his weaknesse or idlenesse.

39

*The third head  
of this military  
subiect, to finish  
warre.*

*Of peace in re-  
spect of the  
vanquished.*

*In respect of the  
vanquishers.*

Let vs come to the third head of this militarie matter more short and pleasing than the rest, which is to finish the warre by peace. The word is sweet, the thing pleasant, and good in all respects, *pax optima rerum, quas homini non esse datum est. Pax unatrimphis innumeris potior.* Peace is the best thing that is giuen to man. One peace is better then innumerable triumphs, and very commodious to both parts, the conquerours and conquered. But first to the vanquished, who are the weaker: to whom I doe first giue this counsell, to continue armed, to make shew of security, assurance and resolution. For hee that desireth peace, must be alwaies ready for warre, whereupon it hath bene sayd, That treatises of peace doe well and happily succeed when they are concluded vnder a buckler. But this peace must bee honest, and vpon reasonable conditions: otherwise, though it be said, that a base peace is more profitable than a iust warre, yet it is better to die freely and with honour, than to serue dishonourably. And againe it must be pure and free, without fraud and hypocritie, which finisheth the warre, deferreth it not, *pax suspecta tutius bellum.* Warre is more safe, than a doubtfull and suspicious peace. Neuerthelesse in times of necessitie a man must accommodate himselfe as hee may. When a pilot feareth a shipwrack, he casteth himselfe into the sea to saue himselfe; and many times it succedeth well, when a man committeth himselfe to the discretion of a generous aduersary. *Victores qui sunt alto animo secunde res in miserationem ex ira vertunt.* Fortunate and good success turneth the minde of a noble and generous conquerour from wrath to mercie. To the vanquishers I giue this counsell, that they bee not ouer hardly perswaded to peace, for though perhaps it be lesse profitable vnto them, than to the vanquished, yet some commodity it bringeth, for the continuance of warre is odious and troublesome. And *Lycurgus* forbiddeth to make warre often against one and the same enemies, because they learne thereby to defend themselues, & in the end to assaile too. The bitings of dying beasts are mortall. *Fractis rebus violentior ultima virtus.* The last courage is more violent in a state ouerthrowen.



state overthrowne. And againe the issue is alwaies vncertaine, *Melior tuiorque certapax sperata victoria, illa in tua, hec in deorum manu est.* Better and more safe is a certaine peace, then a hoped for victorie, the one is in thine owne hand; the other in the hand of God. And many times the poison lieth in the taile; and the more fauourable fortune is, the more it is to be feared: *Nemo se tuto diu periculis offerre tam crebris potest.* No man can with safety present himselfe long to often dangers. But it is truly honorable, it is a glory hauing a victorie in his hands, to be facill and easily perwaded vnto peace: it is to make known that he vndertaketh a warre iustly, and doth wisely finish it. And contrarie, to refuse it, and afterwards by some ill successe to repent thereof, it is very dishonourable, and will be said that glorie hath vndone him. Hee refused peace, and would haue honour, and so hath lost them both. But he must offer a gracious and a debonaire peace, to the end it may be durable. For if it be ouer rough and cruell, at the first aduantage that may be offered, the vanquished will reuolue. *Si bonam dederitis, fidam & perpetuam; si malam, haud duramuram.* Livius. If thou shalt graunt a good peace, it will be faithfull and perpetual, if euill, it will not last long. It is as great greatnesse to shew as much lenitie toward the suppliant vanquished, as valour against the enemye. The Romanes did verie well put this in practise, and it did them no harme.

### CHAP. IIII.

Of that prudence which is required in difficult affaires and ill accidents, publicke and private.

#### THE PREFACE.

**H**Auing spoken of that politicke prudence required in a soueraigne, for the cariage of himselfe and his good government, wee will heere seuerally speake of that prudence that is necessarie for the preservation of himselfe, and the remedying of those affaires; and difficult and dangerous accidents, which may happen either to himselfe, or his particular subjects.

First these affaires and accidents are very diuers: they are either

**xx8** *Of the evils and accidents that doe threaten vs.*

*of this matter  
by distinction of  
the accidents.*

either publike or particular: either to come, & such as threaten vs, or present and prelling vs: the one are onely doubtfull and ambiguous; the other dangerous and important, because of their violence. And they that are the greater and more difficult, are either secret and hid; and they are two, that is to say, conspiracy against the person of the Prince, or the state, and treason against the places and companies: or manifest & open, and these are of diuers sorts. For they bee either without forme of warre and certaine order, as popular commotions for small and light occasions, factions and leagues betwene subjects, of the one against the other, in small and great number, great or little: seditions of the people against the prince or magistrate, rebellion against the authoritie and head of the Prince: or they are ripe and formed into a warre, and are called ciuill warres which are of so many kinds, as the aboue named troubles and commotions, which are the causes, foundations and feedes of them: but have growen, and are come into consequence and continuance. Of them all wee will speake distinctly, and wee will giue aduice and counsell, as well to foueraignes, as particular persons, great and small, how to carrie themselves wisely therein.

*I. Of the evils and accidents that doe threaten vs.*

**I**N those crosse and contrarie accidents, whereunto wee are subject, there are two diuers maners of carriage: & they may be both good, according to the diuers natures both of the accidents, and of those to whom they happen. The one is strongly to contest, and to oppose a mans selfe against the accident, to remoue all things that may hinder the diuerting thereof, or at least to blunt the point, to dead the blow thereof, either to escape it, or to force it. This requireth a strong and obstinate mind, and hath need of hard and painfull care. The other is incontinently to take and receiue these accidents at the worst, and to resolute himselfe to beare them sweetly and patiently, and in the meane time to attend peaceable whatsoeuer shall happen, without tormenting himselfe, or hindring it. The former studieth how to range the accidents; this himselfe. That seemeth to be more couragious; this more sure

sure. That continueth in suspence, is tossed betweene feare and hope; this putteth himselfe into safetie, and lieth so low that he cannot fall lower. The lowest march is the surest, and the fear of constancie. That laboureth to escape; this to suffer; and many times this maketh the better bargain. Often times it falleth out, that there is greater inconuenience and losse in pleading and contending, than in losing; in flying for safety, than in suffering. A couctous man tormenteth himselfe more than a poore, a zealous than a cuckold. In the former, prudence is more requisite, because hee is in action; in this patience. But what hindereth, but that a man may performe both in order: and that where prudence and vigilancie can do nothing, there patience may succeed? Doubtlesse in publike evils a man must assaye the first, which such are bound to doe, as haue the charge and can do it; in particular let every one chuse the best.

II. Of evils and accidents present, pressing,  
and extreame.

THE proper meanes to lighten evils, and to sweeten passions, is not for a man to oppose himselfe, for opposition enflameth and increaseth them much more. A man by the ieaousie of contention and contradiction sharpneth and stirreth the euill: but it is either in diuerting them else-where, as Physitions vse to doe, who knowing not how to purge, and wholly to cure a disease, seeke to diuert it into some other part lesse dangerous, which must be done sweetly and insensiblie. This is an excellent remedie against all evils, and which is practised in all things, if a man marke it well, whereby we are made to swallow the sowrest morsels, yea death it selfe; and that insensiblie: *Abducendus animus est ad alia studia, curas, negotia, loci denique mutatione tanquam agroti non conualescentes sepe curandus est.* The mind is to be led away to other studies, cares, businesse, lastly with change of place, like sicke persons not recovering, is often cured. As a man counselleth those that are to passe ouer some fearefull deepe place, either to shut or to diuert their eies. When a man hath occasion to launce a sore in a child, he flattereth him, and withdraweth his mind to some other

other matter. A man must practise the experiment and subtiltie of *Hypomenes*, who being to runne with *Atlanta*, a damsell of excellent beautie, and to lose his life if he lost the goale, to marrie the damsell if he woon it, furnished himselfe with three faire apples of gold, which at diuers times he let fall, to stay the course of the damsell whilest she tooke them vp, and so by diuerting hir, got the aduantage of hir, and gained hir selfe: so if the consideration of some present vnhappy accident, or the memorie of any that is past do much afflict vs, or some violent passion, which a man cannot tame, do moue and torment vs, we must change and turne our thoughts to some thing else, and substitute vnto our selues some other accident and passion lesse dangerous. If a man cannot vanquish it, he must escape it, goe out of the way, deale cunningly, or weaken and dissolue it, with other thoughts and alienations of the mind, yea breake it into many pieces; and all this by diuersions. The other aduice, in the last and more dangerous extremities that are in a maner past hope, is a little to cast downe the head, to lend vnto the blow, to yeeld vnto necessitie, for there is great danger, that by too much obstinacie in not relenting at all, a man giueth occasion to violence to trample all vnder foot. It is better to make the lawes to will that they can, since they cannot doe that they would. It was a reproch vnto *Cato* to haue been ouer rough in the ciuill warres of his time, and that he rather suffered the common-weale to runne into all extremities, than succoured it by tying himselfe ouerstrictlie to the lawes. Contrarilie *Epaminondas* in a necessitie, continued his charge beyond his time, though the law vpon the paine of his life did prohibit him: and *Philopemenes* is commended, that being borne to command, he did not only know how to gouerne according to the lawes, but also command the lawes themselves, when publike necessitie did require it. A Leader at a necessitie must stoupe a little, applie himselfe to the occasion, turne the table of the law, if not take it away, goe a little out of the way, that he lose not all, for this is prudence, which is no way contrarie either to reason or iustice.

## III. Doubtfull and ambiguous affaires.

**I**N things doubtfull, where the reasons are strong on all parts, and the inability to see and choose that which is most commodious, bringeth with it vncertaintie and perplexitie, the best and safest way is to leane to that part where there is most honestie and iustice: for notwithstanding it fall not out happily, yet there shall alwaies remaine an inward content, and an outward glorie to haue chosen the better part. Besides, a man knoweth not, if he had taken the contrarie part, what would haue hapned, and whether he had escaped his destinie. When a man doubteth which is the better and the shorter way, let him take the straighter.

## IIII. Difficult and dangerous affaires.

**I**N difficult affaires, as in agreements, to be ouer-carefull to make them ouer-sure, is to make them lesse firme, lesse assured, because a man employeth therein more time, more people are hindered, more things, more clauses are mingled and interposed, than are needfull, from whence arise all differences. Adde heereunto, that a man seemeth heereby to scorne fortune, and to exempt himselfe from his iurisdiction, which cannot be, *Vim suorum ingruentem resungi non vult. He will not weaken their approaching force.* It is better to make them briefly and quietly with a little danger, than to be so exact and curious.

In dangerous affaires a man must be wise and couragious, he must foresee and know all dangers, make them neither lesse nor greater than they are by want of iudgement, thinke that they will not all happen, or shall not all haue their effects, that a man may auoid many by industrie or by diligence, or otherwise, what they are from whom he may receiue aide and succour, and thereupon take courage, grow resolute, not fainting for them in an honest enterprise. A wise man is couragious, for hee thinketh, d. scourseth, and prepareth himselfe for all, and a couragious man must likewise be wise.

V. Coniurations

## Y. Coniurations.

**W**E are come now to the greatest, most important, and dangerous accidents, which we will handle in order, expressly describing them one after the other, giuing afterwards in euery one of them some aduisements fit for a soveraigne, and in the end for euery particular person.

<sup>1</sup>  
*The description.* Coniuration is a conspiracie and enterprise of one or many against the person of the prince or the state; It is a dangerous thing hardly avoided or remedied, because it is close and hidden. How should a man defend himselfe against a couert enemy, such a one as carrieth the countenance of a most officious friend? How can a man know the will and thoughts of another? And againe, hee that contemneth his owne life, is master of the life of another, *contemnit omnes ille, qui mortem prius.* He contemneth all men that first contemneth death. In such sort that the prince is exposed to the metcye of a priuat man, whosoever he be.

*Machiavell* setteth downe at large, how a man should frame and order, and conduct a conspiracy; wee, how it may be broken, hindered, preuented.

<sup>2</sup>  
*Remedies and aduisements.* 1 The counsels and remedies hereupon are, first a priuie search and counterminie by faithfull and discreet persons fit for such a purpose, who are the eies and eares of the prince; These must discover whatsoeuer is said and done, especially by the principall officers. Conspiratours doe willingly here and there defame the prince, or lend their eares to those, that blame and accuse him. Their discourse and conference then touching the prince must be knowen, and a prince must not sticke to be bountifull in his rewards and immunities to such discouerers: But yet he must not ouerlightly giue credit to all reports; He must lend his care to all, not his beliefe, and diligently examine, to the end hee oppresse not the innocent, and so purchase vnto himselfe the hatred and hard speech of the people.

2 The second aduice is, that he endeavor by clemencie and innocencie to winne the loue of all, euen of his enemies, *fidelissima custodia principis innocentia.* Innocency is the most faithfull safeguard

*full safeguard of the Princee.* By offending no man, a man taketh a courle to be offended by none : And it is to small purpose for a man to shew his power by wrongs and outrages. *Male vim suam potestas, aliorum contumelijs experitur :* Power doth ill make proofe of it selfe, by the contempts of others.

3 The third is to make a good shew, to shew a good countenance according to the accustomed maner, not changing or deprelling any thing ; and to publish in all places, that hee is well perswaded of those meetings and assemblies that men appoint, and to make them beleue that he hath them not in the winde, that he descrieth not their plots and purposes. This was an experiment which *Denys* the tyrant made good vse of, against an enemy of his, which cost him deere.

4 The fourth is to attend without astonishment and trouble whatsoeuer may happen vnto him. *Cesar* did well put in practise these three latter meanes, but not the first. It is better, saith he, to die once, than to liue, nay to die alwaies in a trance, and a continuall feuer of an accident, which is past remedie, and must be wholly referred vnto God. They that haue taken another course, and haue endeouored to preuent it by punishments and reuenge, haue very seldome found it the best way, and haue not for all that escaped the danger, as many Romane Emperours can well witnesse.

But the conspiracie being discouered, the truth found out, what is to be done ? The conspiratours must rigorously be punished : To spare such people, is cruelly to betray the weale publike. They are enemies to the libertie, good, and peace of all : Iustice requireth it. But yet wisdom and discretion is necessarie heerein ; and a man must not alwaies carie himselfe after one and the same maner. Sometimes hee must execute suddenly, especially if the number of the conspiratours be small. But whether the number be little or great, he must not seeke by tortures to know the confederates (if otherwise and secretly he may know them, and to make as though hee knew them not, is good) for a man seeketh that which he would not finde. It is sufficient that by the punishment of a small number, good subjects are contained in their dutie, and they diuerted from their attempts, that either are not, or thinke not themselves bewraied. To know all by tortures doth perhaps stirre

3

*Punishment of  
conspirators, and  
the aduice  
thereupon.*

3

*Conspirators  
punished.*

Iustin. li. 1.  
Tacit.

vprouens hearts against him. Sometimes hee must delay the punishment, but yet neuer bee slow in procuring his safetie. But yet the conspiratours may be such, and the treason discovered at such a time, that a man must not dissemble, and to punish them instantly is to play and lose all. The best way of all others is, to prevent the conspiracie, to frustrate it, saining neuertheless not to know the conspiratours, but so to cary himselfe, as if he would prouide for another thing, as the Carthaginians did to Hannon their Captaine. *Optimum & solum super insidiarum remedium, si non intelligantur: The best, and often times the only remedie of trecheries, is, that a man seeme not to know them.* And which is more, a prince must sometimes pardon, especially if he be a great man, that hath deserved well of the prince and state, and to whom they are both in some sort bound, whose children, parents, friends, are mightie. For what should he doe? How should hee breake this band? If with safetie hee may, let him pardon, or at least lessen the punishment. Clemencie in this case is sometimes not only glorious to a prince, *nil gloriosius principe impune laso;* but it helpeth much for safety to come, diuerteth others from the like designments, and worketh either shame in them or repentance; the example of Augustus towards Cinna is very excellent.

#### VI. Treason.

1  
Description.

**T**Reason is a secret conspiracie or enterprise against a place, or a troupe or companie: it is as a coniuration, a secret euill, dangerous and hardly auoided: for many times a traitour is in the middle and bosome of the company, or place which hee selleth and betraieeth. To this vnhappy mysterie are willingly subiect, such as are couetous, light spirits, hypocrites: and this is commonly in them, that they make a faire shew of trust and fidelitie, they commend and keepe it carefully in small matters, and by that meanes endeavouring to couer, they discover themselves. It is the marke whereby to know them.

2  
Advisements  
and remedies.

The advisements are almost the same, that belong to coniurations: except in the punishments, which heere must be speedie, grieuous, and irremissible: for they are a kinde of people



ple ill borne and bred, incorrigible, pernicious to the world;  
whom to pitie, it is crueltie.

## VII. Comotions of the people.

There are many sorts, according to the diuersitie of the  
causes, persons, manner and continuance, as wee shall see  
hereafter: faction, confederacie, sedition, tyrannie, ciuill  
warres. But wee will speake heere simply and in generall of  
those that are raised in a heat, as sudden tumults, that endure  
not long. The aduifements and remedies are to procure some  
one or other to speake, and shew himselfe vnto them, that is  
of authoritie, vertue, and singular reputation, eloquent, ha-  
uing grauitie mingled with grace, and indultie with smooth  
speech to winne the people: for at the presence of such a  
man, as at a sudden lightning, the people grow calme and  
quiet:

Aduifements  
and remedies.

*Ueluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta*

*Seditio est, sentit quod animis ignobile vulsus,*

*Interq; faces, & saxa volant: furor arma ministrat.*

*Tum putate grauem, ac meritis si forte virum quem*

*Conspexere, silent, arrectisq; auribus adstant.*

*Ille regis dicit animos, & pectora mulcet,*

*When as the commons in tumultuous guise*

*With furious rage doe in sedition rise,*

*Then stones and fire, and all things sue about,*

*And furie fills the hands of that base rout:*

*And if by chance a man both grave and sage,*

*Of good desert, and reuerence for his age,*

*They hap to see, then silent strait they stand,*

*With listning eares his words to vnderstand:*

*He with sweet words their anger doth assuage,*

*And rules their stout mindes, and doth appease their rage.*

Sometimes the captaine himselfe must vndertake this bu-  
sinesse. But it must be done with an open front, a strong as-  
surance, hauing his minde free and pure from all imagination  
of death, and the worst that may happen vnto him: for to  
goe amongst them with a fearefull, and vnconstant counte-  
nance, with flatterie and humble cariage, is to wrong him-  
selfe,

selfe, and to doe little good. This *Cæsar* did excellently put in practise vpon those mutinous legions and armies that rose vp against him.

— *stetit aggere salti*

*Cessitis intrepidus vultu, meruitq; timeri*

*Nil metuens. —*

On high vpon a heape of turffes he stood,

Undaunted courage in his lookes appeared,

And fearlesse, shewed him worthy to be feared.

And *Augustus* did as much to his *Actiac* legions, saith *Tacitus*. There are then two meanes to quiet and appease a moued and furious people: the one is by rough vsage, and pure authoritie and reason. This is the better and more noble, and becommeth a captaine, if it stand him vpon; but yet he must take heed how he doe it, as hath bene said. The other more ordinarie is by flatterie and faire speeches, for hee must not make an open resistance. Sauage beasts are neuer tamed with blowes: and therefore a man must not be sparing of good words, and faire promises. In this case the wife haue permitted a man to lie, as men vse to doe with children and licke folke. Herein *Pericles* was excellent, who wooon the people, by the eies, the eares, and the bellie, that is to say, by shewes, comedies, feasts, and hereby did what hee list. This meanes more base and seruile, but yet necessarie, must be practised by him whom the captaine sendeth, as *Memenius Agrippa* did at *Rome*. For if he thinke to winne them by maine force, when they are without the bounds of reason, no way yeelding vnto them, as *Appius*, *Coriolanus*, *Cato*, *Ptolemæus* endeuoured to doe, he is mistaken, and deceiueth himselfe.

#### VIII. Faction and confederacie.

Description.

**F**action or confederacie is a complot and association, of one against another betwene the subiects; whether it be betwene the great or the small, in great numbers or little. It ariseth sometimes from the hatreds that are betwene private men and certaine families, but for the most part from ambition (the plague of states) euery one conuening the first ranke. That which falleth out betwene great personages, is more pernicious.

pernitious. There are some that sticke not to say, that it is in some sort profitable for a soueraigne, & it doth the selfe same service to a common-weale, that brawles of seruants doe in families, saith *Cato*. But that cannot be true, except it bee in tyrants, who feare lest their subiects should agree too well, or in small and light quarrels betweene cities, or betweene ladies of the Court to know newes. But not important factions, which must bee extinguished in their first birth with their markes, names, habiliments, which are many times the seeds of villanous effects, witnesse that great deflagration, and those bloody murders happened in *Constantinople*, for the colours of greene and blew, vnder *Iustinian*. The aduise-<sup>2</sup>ments and re-<sup>2</sup>medies, heereupon are, that if the factions be betwixt two great personages, the Prince must endeouour by good words or threatenings to make peace and atonement betwixt them, as *Alexander* the great did betwixt *Ephesian* and *Craerus*, and *Archidamus* betwixt two of his friends. If he cannot doe it, let him appoint arbitrators, such as are free from suspicion and passion. The like he should do, if the faction be betwixt diuers subiects, or cities and communities. And if it fall out that it be necessarie that hee speake himselfe, hee must doe it with counsell, being called, to auoid the malice and harred of those that are condemned. If the faction be betweene great multitudes, and that it be so strong, that it cannot be appeased by iustice, the prince is to employ his force for the vtter-extinguishment thereof. But he must take heed that he cary himselfe indifferent, not more affectioned to one than to another; for therein there is great danger, and many haue vndone themselves: And to say the truth, it is vnworthie the greatnes of a prince, and he that is master of all to make himselfe a companion to the one, & an enemy to the other: And if some must needs be punished, let it light vpon those that are the principall heads, and let that suffice.

## IX. Sedition.

**S**edition is a violent commotion of a multitude against a prince or a magistrate. It ariseth and groweth either from <sup>1</sup> *The description,* oppression or feare: For they that haue committed any great offence,

offence, feare punishment; others thinke & feare they shalbe oppressed, and both of them by the apprehension of an euill, are stirred to sedition to preuent the blow. It likewise springeth from a licentious libertie, from want and necessitie, in such sort, that men fit for this bulinesse, are such as are indebted, malecontents, and men ill accommodated in all things, light persons, and such as are blowen vp, and feare iustice, These kind of people cannot continue long in peace: peace is warre vnto them, they cannot sleepe but in the midst of sedition, they are not in libertie but by the meanes of confusion. The better to bring their purposes to passe, they confer together in secret, they make great complaints, vse doubtfull speeches, afterwards speake more openly, seeme zealous of their libertie, and of the publike good, and ease of the people, and by these faire pretences they draw many vnto them. The aduise-  
ments and remedies are. First, the selfesame that serued for popular commotions, to cause such to shew themselves and to speake vnto them, that are fit for such a purpose, as hath been said. Secondly, if that profit not, he must arme and fortifie himself, and for all that, not proceed against them, but rather giue them leasure and time to put water in their wine, to the wicked to repent, to the good to reuinite themselves. Time is a great Phylitian, especially in people more ready to mutine and rebell, than to fight. *Ferocior plebs ad rebellandum, quam bellandum: tentare magis quam tueri libertatem.* The common people are more stout for rebellion, then for battell: apter to assay, then to defend their libertie. Thirdly, he must in the mean time try all meanes to shake and dissolue them, both by hope and feare; for these are the 2. waies, *spem offer, metum intende.* Fourthly, endeavour to diuioine them, and to breake the course of their intelligence. Fifthly, he must winne and draw vnto him vnder hand, some few amongst them by faire promises and secret rewards, wherby some of them withdrawing themselves from their companie, and comming vnto him, others remaining with them to serue him and to giue intelligence of their cariages and purposes, they may the better be brought a sleep, and their heat be somewhat allaied. Sixtly, to draw and winne the rest, by yeelding vnto them some part of that which they demand, and that with faire promises and doubtfull tearmes.

2  
Aduise-  
ments  
and remedies.

1

2

3

4

5

6

It shall afterwards be easie, iustly to reuoke that, which they haue iniustly by sedition extorted, *Irrua facies qua per seditionem expresserint*, and to make all whole with lenitie and clemencie. Lastly, if they returne vnto reason and obedience, and become honest men, they must be handled gently, and a man must be contented with the chastisement and correction of some few of the principal authors and firebrands, without any further inquirie into the rest of the confederates, that all may thinke themselves in safety and in grace and fauour.

7

## X. Tyrannie and rebellion.

**T**Yrannie, that is to say, a violent rule or domination against the lawes and customes, is many times the cause of great and publike commotions, from whence commeth rebellion, which is an insurrection of the people against the Prince, because of his tyrannie, to the end they may drue him away and plucke him from his throne. And it differeth from sedition in this, they will not acknowledge the Prince for their master; whereas sedition proceedeth not so farre, being raised only from a discontent of the government, complaining and desiring an amendement thereof. Now this tyranny is practised by people ill bred, cruell, who loue wicked men, turbulent spirits, tale-bearers, hate and feare men of honesty and honour, *quibus semper aliena virtus formidolosa, nobilitas, opes, omitti gestique honores pro crimine, ob virtutes certissimum exitium: & non minus ex magna fama quam mala. To whom other mens vertue is euer fearfull, nobilitie, riches, honors are accounted for crimes; for vertues they render most assured destruction: and no lesse out of good, as euill report.* But they cary their punishment with them: being hated of all, and enemies to all. They liue in continuall feare and apprehension of terror, they suspect all things: they are pricked and gauled inwardly in their consciences, and at last die an euill death, and that very soone; For an old tyrant is seldome scene.

The aduisements and remedies in this case, shall bee set downe at large hereafter in his proper place. The counsels are reduced to two, at his entrance to stay and hinder him lest he get the mastery; being entailed and acknowledged, to

Chap. 16.  
Plutarch.  
in Brutus.

440

### Ciwill warres.

suffer and obey him. It is better to tolerate him, than to moue sedition and ciuill warre, *Peius, deteriusq; tyrannide, sine iniusto imperio bellum ciuile*, Ciuill warre is worse then tyranny or vnjust gouernment; for there is nothing gotten by rebelling or spurning against him, but it rather incenseth wicked princes and makes them more cruell: *Nihil tam exasperat feruorem uulneris, quam ferendi impatientia*. Nothing so much exasperateth the heate of the wound, as impatience in suffering it. Modestie and obedience allaieth and pacifieth the fierce nature of a prince: for the clemency of a prince, saith that great prince *Alexander*, doth not onely consist in their owne natures, but also in the natures of their subiects, who many times by their ill carriage and bad speeches, doe prouoke a prince, and make him farre worse, *Obsequio mitigantur imperia, & contra contumacia inferiorum lenitatem imperantis diminui: contumaciam cum perniciē quam obsequium cum securitate maluit*. Soueraigne authorities are mitigated by dutifull seruice; and contrariwise the mildnes of the soueraigne is diminished by the contumacy of subiects: They rather loue disobedience with destruction, then dutifalnes with securitie.

Curt.  
Tacit.

### XI. Ciuill warres.

The description.

WHEN one of these forenamed publike commotions, popular insurrections, faction; sedition; rebellion, comes to fortifie it selfe, and to continue vntill it get an ordinarie traine and forme, it is a ciuill warre: which is no other thing, but a presse and conduct of armies by the subiects, either amongst themselves; and this is a popular commotion, or faction and confederacy: or against the prince, the state, the magistrate; and this is sedition or rebellion. Now there is not a mischiefe more miserable, nor more shamefull, it is a sea of infelicities. And a wise man said very well, That it is not properly warre, but a maladie of the state, a fierie sickenesse, and frensie. And to say the truth, hee that is the author thereof, should be put out from the number of men, and banished out of the borders of humane nature. There is no kind of wickednesse that it is freed from, impietie and crueltie betweene parents themselves, murders with all maner of impunitie, *Oscidere palam, ignoscere non nisi fallendo lites, non atas, non dig-*

nitae

*nitas quonquam protegit, nobilitas cum plobe perit, lateq; vagaturensis. It is lawfull to kill openly, but not to pardon but in deciding: No age, no dignitie protecteth any man; the nobilitie perissheth with the common people, and the sword wandereth farre and wide. All kind of disloyaltie, discipline abolished, In omnes fas, nefasque audios aut venales, non sacro, non prophano abstinentes. Greedie and mercenarie in all mischief, abstaining neither from sacred nor prophane. The inferiour and basest sort are companions with the best. Rhenu mihi Caesar in undis dux erat, hic socius. Facinus quos inquinat, equat. Caesar was both my Captaine and companion on the river of Rhene. Them whom mischief desileth, it maketh equall. He dareth not to open his mouth, for he is of the same profession, though he approue it not, Obnoxij ducibus & prohibere non ausis. It is a horrible confusion, Meum ne necessitate huc illuc mutantur. With feare and necessitie they are changed hither and thither. To conclude, it is nothing but miserie. But there is nothing so miserable as the victorie. For though it fall into the hand of him that hath the right on his side, yet there followeth this inconueniencie, that it maketh him insolent, cruell, inhumane, yea though he were before of a mild and generous nature. So much doth this intestine warre flesh a man in bloud, yea, it is a poison that consumeth all humanitie. Neither is it in the power of the captaines to withhold the rest.*

There are two causes to be considered of ciuill warres. The one is secret, which as it is neither knowne nor seene, so it cannot be hindred nor remedied; It is destinie, the will of God, who will chastise or wholly dispeople a state. *In se magna ruunt, letis hunc numina rebus Crescendis posuere modum. They bring great ruines on themselves; God hath set this stop to their growing prosperitie.* The other is well vnderstood by the wise, and may happily be remedied, if men will, and they to whom it appertaineth set to their helping hand. This is the dissolution and generall corruption of maners, whereby men of no worth, & that haue nothing to do, endeuor to turne all topsy turuie, to put all into combustion, couer their wounds with the hurt of the state, for they loue better to be overwhelmed with the pulblike ruine, than their owne particular. *Miscere cuncta & primata vulnere reipublica malis operare: nam ista se res*

<sup>2</sup>  
The causes

*habet, ut publica ruina quisque malis quam sua proteri, & idem passurus minus confici. They confound all things, and cover priuāt wounds by the evils of the common-wealth: for the case so stands, that euery one had rather bee troden downe in the publike ruine, then in his owne, and to bee least seene when they suffer the same.*

3  
*The counsels  
and remedies.*

Now the advisements and remedies for this mischief of ciuill warre, are to end it as soone as may be, which is done by two meates, agreement and victorie. The first is the better, although it be not such as a man desireth, time will helpe the rest. A man sometimes must suffer himselfe to be deceived, to the end he may end a ciuill war, as it is said of *Anipeter, bellum finire cupienti, opus erat decipi. He that desireth to end the war, had neede to be deceived.* Victory is dangerous, because it is to be feared that the conqueror will abuse it, whereby a tyranny may ensue. To the end a man may cary himselfe well heerein, he must quit himselfe of all the authours of troubles and other commotions, and such like bloud-suckers, as well on the one part as the other, whether it be by sending them far off with some charge, or vnder some faire pretext, and so diuiding them; or by employing them against the stranger; and handling the meaner sort with lenity and gentlenesse.

*XII. Advisements for particular persons touching*

*the foresaid publike diuisions.*

**T**HUS we haue soe many kindes of publike troubles and diuisions, for which and euery one of them, we haue giuen counsels and remedies in respect of the Prince, it remaineth that we now giue them for particular persons. This cannot be determined in a word: there are two questions; the one, whether it be lawfull for an honest man to ioyne himselfe to one part, or to remaine quiet and indifferent; the second, how a man must carry himselfe in both cases, that is to say, being ioyned to one part, or not ioyned to either. Touching the first point, it is proposed for such as are free, and are not yet engaged to any party, for if they be, this first question belongs not to them, but we send them to the second. This I say, because a man may ioyne himselfe to the one part, not of purpose

*Two questions.*

*The first.*



pose and by election, yea to that part which hee approueth not, but onely because hee findeth himselfe caried and bound with strong and puissant bands, which hee may not easily breake, which cary with them a sufficient excuse, being naturall and euivalent. Now the first question hath contrarie reasons and examples. It seemeth on the one side, that an honest man cannot do better than to keep himselfe quiet, for he knoweth not how to betake himselfe to either part without offence, because all these diuisions are in their owne nature vnlawfull, and cannot be caried, nor subsist without inhumane and iniustice. And many good people haue abhorred it, as *Asinius Pollio* answered *Augustus*, who desired him to follow him against *Marc Anthoine*. On the other side, is it not a thing reasonable for a man to ioyne with the good, and such as haue right on their side? Wise *Solon* hath iudged affirmatiuely, yea roughly chastised him, that retireth himselfe and taketh not part. The professor of vertue *Cato*, hath likewise put it in practice, not being content to take one part, but commanding it. To determine this doubt, it seemeth that men of worth and renowme, who haue both publike charge and credit, and sufficiencie in the state, may and ought to range themselves into that part which they shall iudge the better: for they must not abandon in a tempest the sterne of that ship which in a calme sea they are content to gouerne; especially being an honorable part to prouide for the safetie of the state. And secondly that priuat men, and such as are of a lower degree in the charge of the state, should stay and retire themselves into some peaceable and secure place, during the diuision: and both of them so to cary themselves as shall be said hereafter. Finally touching the choice of the part, sometimes there is no difficulty, for the one is so vniust, and so vnfortunate, that a man cannot with any reason ioyne himselfe thereunto: But at another time the difficulty is very great, and there are many things to be thought of besides the iustice and equity of the parts.

Let vs come to the other point, which concerneth the carriage of all. This is determined in a word, by the counsell and rule of moderation, following the example of *Atticus*, so renowned for his modellie and prudence in such tempests, al-

waies held to fauour the good part, yet neuer troubling, nor intangling himselfe with armes, and without the offence of the contrarie part.

*Over-zealous.  
Moderate.*

1. For they that are known to be of one part, must not be moued ouer-much, but cary themselves with moderation, not busying themselves with the affaires, if they be not wholly caried and pressed vnto it, and in this case carie themselves in such order and temperance, that the tempest being passed ouer their heads, without offence they haue not any part in these great disorders and insolencies that are committed, but contrarily sweetning and diuerting them as they can. 2. They that are not ingaged to any part (whose condition is sweetest and best) though it may be inwardly and in affection they incline rather to one than another, must not remaine as neutrals, that is, taking no care of the issue, and of the state of either the one or the other, liuing to themselves, and as spectators in a Theater, feeding vpon the miseries of other men. These kind of men are odious to all, and at the last they runne a dangerous fortune, as wee read of the Thebanes in the warre of *Xerxes*, and of *Iabes* Gilead. *Neutralitas nec amicos parit, nec inimicos tollit. Neutralitie neither getteth friends, nor taketh away enemies.* Neutralitie is neither faire nor honest, if it be not with consent of parts, as *Cesar*, who held neutrals for his friends, contrarie to *Pompey*, who held them for enemies; or that he be a stranger, or such a one, as for his greatnes and dignity ought not to mingle himselfe with such a rout, but rather reclaime them if he can, arbitrating, and moderating all. Much lesse must men in such a case be inconstant, wauering mungrels, *Protheus*, farre more odious than neutrals, and offensive to all. But they must (continuing partakers in affection if they will, for thought and affection is wholly our owne) bee common in their actions, offensive to none, officious and gracious to all, complaining of the common infelicities. These kind of people neither get enemies, nor lose their friends. They are fit to be mediators, & louing arbitrators, who are better than the common. So that of such as are not partakers, who are foure, two are euill, neutrals, and inconstant persons, two good, common, and mediators: but alwaies the one more than the other, as of partakers there are two sorts, heady outrageous, and moderate.

*Neuters.*

*Judg. 21.  
Tit. Liv.*

*Inconstant.*

*Common.*

*Mediators.*

## XIII. Of priuate troubles and diuisions.

**I**N priuate diuisions a man may commodiously and loyally Icarey himselfe betweene enemies, if not with equall affection, yet in such a temperate maner, as that he engage not himselfe so much to one more than to another, as that either part may thinke they haue more interest in him, and so contenting himselfe with an indifferent measure of their grace, report nothing but indifferent things, and such as are knowen, or that serue in common to both parts, speaking nothing to the one that he may not say to the other in it due time, changing only the accent and the forme thereof.

## Of Iustice, the second vertue.

## CHAP. V.

## Of Iustice in generall.

**I**ustice is to giue to every one that which appertaineth vnto him, to himselfe first, and afterwards to others: so that it comprehendeth all the duties and offices of every particular person: which are two-fold, the first to himselfe, the second to another, and they are contained in that generall commandement, which is the summarie of all iustice, *Thou shalt loue thy neighbour as thy selfe*, which doth not onely set downe the dutie of a man towards another in the second place, but it sheweth and ruleth it according to the paterne of that dutie and loue he oweth towards himselfe: for as the Hebrewes say, a man must beginne charitie with himselfe.

The beginning then of all iustice, the first and most ancient commandement, is that of reason ouer sensualitie. Before a man can well command others, he must learne to command himselfe, yeelding vnto reason the power of commanding, and subduing the appetite, and making it pliant to obedience. This is the first originall, inward, proper, and most beautiful iustice that may bee. This command of the Spirit ouer the brutall and sensuall part, from whence the passions doe arise,

rise, is compared to an equire or horseman, who by reason that he keepeth his horse and mounteth him often, and is euer in the saddle, he turneth and manereth him at his pleasure.

<sup>3</sup>  
The distinction  
of iustice.  
To speake of that iustice which is outwardly practised and with another, we must first know that there is a two-fold iustice; the one naturall, vniuersall, noble, philosophicall; the other after a sort artificiall, particular, politike; made and restrained to the necessity of polities and states; That hath better rules, is more firme, pure and beautifull, but it is out of vse, vnprofitable to the world such as it is; *Veris iuris germanique iustitia solidam & expressam effigiem nullam tenemus; umbra & imaginibus utimur.* We hold no sound and true Image of right and perfect iustice; we only vse the shadow and imagination thereof: it is not in a maner capable thereof, as hath been said. That is the rule of *Polycletus*, inflexible, invariable. This is more loofe and flexible accommodating it selfe to humane weaknes, and vulgar necessitie. It is the leaden Lesbian rule, which yeeldeth and bendeth it selfe as there is need, and as the times, persons, affaires, and accidents do require. This permitteth vpon a necessity, and approueth many things, which that wholly reiecteth and condemneth. It hath many vices lawfull, and many good actions vnlawfull. That respecteth wholly & purely reason; honestie; This profit, ioyning it as much as may be with honestie. Of that, which is but an Idea and in contemplation we shall not need to speake.

<sup>4</sup>  
Iustice in practice distinguished.  
The vsuall iustice; and which is practised in the world, is first two-fold, that is to say; equall, bound, and restrained to the termes of the law; according to which iudges and magistrates are to proceed: the other iust and conscionable; which not enthralling it selfe to the words of the law, matcheth more freely, according to the exigencie of the case, yea sometimes against the words of the law. Now to speake better, it handleth and ruleth the law as need requireth: And therefore saith a wise man, the lawes themselves and iustice haue need to be ordered and handled iustly, that is to say, with equitie, *que expositio & emendatio legis est, expansio sensum, emendat defectum.* Which is an exposition and vnderstanding of the law; expoundeth the meaning and vnderstandeth the defects: This is the fine floure of iustice, which is in the hand of that iudge in souerainety. Again,

to speake more particularly, there is a two-fold iustice; the one commutative; betwixt private men, which is handled and practised by Arithmetike proportion; the other distributive, publickly administred by Geometrical proportion; it hath two parts, reward, and punishment.

Now this visuall and practised iustice, is not truly and perfectly iustice: humane nature is not capable thereof no more than of all other things in their purities. As humane iustice is mingled with some graine of iniustice; fauour; rigour, too much, or too little; and there is no pure and true mediocritie; from whence haue sprung these ancient proverbes, That he is enforced to do wrong by reuail, that will doe iustice in grosse; and iniustice in small things that will do iustice in great. Lawyers to giue course and passage to commutative iustice, doe covertly and silently suffer themselves to deceive one another, and that in a certaine measure, so that they passe not the moitie of the iust price; and the reason is, because they know not how to doe better. And in distributive iustice, how many innocents are apprehended and condemned, how many guiltie quit and set at libertie, and that without the fault of the Iudges; neuer dreaming either of that too much, or too little, which is almost perpetuall in the purch iustice. Iustice is a let and hindrance to it selfe, and humane sufficiencie cannot see and prouide for all. And heere we may take notice among other matters, of a great defect in distributive iustice, in that it punisheth onely and rewardeth not; although these are the two parts and the two hands of iustice: but as it is commonly practised, it is lame, and inclineth wholly vnto punishment. The greatest fauour that a man receiueth from it, is indemnitie, which is a play too short for such as deserue better than the common sort. But yet this is not all; for if a man bee falsely accused; and vpon that accusation committed, hee is sure to endure punishment sufficient: at the last his innocencie being known, he escapeth perhaps his vttermoſt punishment; but without amends of that wrongfull affliction hee hath indured, even such perhaps as shall neuer leave him. And the accuser in the meane time, be the colour and ground of his accusation neuer so light (which is easie to doe) escapeth without punishment; so sparing is iustice in rewarding, as that

5  
There is no true iustice in the world.

it

it consisteth wholly in chastisement, whereof that common speech ariseth, That to doe iustice, and to be subject vnto iustice, is alwaies to be vnderstood of punishment. And it is an easie matter for any man that will, to bring another man into danger and punishment, euen to such an estate, as that he shall neuer know which way to get forth, but with losse.

6

*The diuision of  
this matter.*

L. 2. C. 5.

Of iustice and dutie there are three principall parts : for man is indebted to three, to God, to himselfe, to his neighbour : to one about himselfe, to himselfe, and to others beside himselfe : of his dutie towards God, which is pietie and religion, hath sufficiently beene spoken before. It remaineth that wee now speake of his dutie towards himselfe and his neighbour.

## CHAP. VI.

*Of the iustice and dutie of man towards himselfe.*

**T**His is sufficiently contained in this whole worke ; in the first booke which teacheth a man to know himselfe, and all humane condition ; in the second, which teacheth a man to be wise, and to that end giueth aduiselements and rule ; and in the rest of this booke, especially in the vertues of fortitude and temperance. Neuerthelesse I will heere summarilie set downe some aduiselement, more expresse and formall.

The first and fundamentall aduise is, to resolute not to liue carelesly, after an vncertaine fashion, and by chance and aduventure, as almost all are accustomed to doe, who seeme to mocke and deceiue themselves, and not to liue in good earnest, nor leading the life seriously and attentively, but liuing from day to day, as it falleth out. They taste not, they possesse not: they enioy not their life : but they vse it to make vse of other things. Their designments and occupations doe many times trouble, and hurt their life more than doe it seruiue. These kind of people doe all things in good earnest, except it be to liue. All their actions, and the lesser parts of their life are serious, but the whole body thereof passeth away as if they thought not thereof : it is a bare supposition, that is not worth the thinking of. That which is but an accident is principall vnto them, and the principall as an accessarie. They affect

affect and incline themselves to all things; some to get knowledge, honours, dignities, riches : others to take their pleasures, to hunt, to sport themselves, to passe away the time; others to speculations, imaginations, inuentions : others to manage and order affaires : others to oether things; but to liue is the least they thinke of. They liue as it were insensibly, being wholly addicted, and fastning their thoughts vpon oether things. Life is vnto them but as a tearme, and a procrastination or delay to employ it about other things. Now all this is very vniust, it is an infelicity and treason against a mans selfe : it is for a man to lose his life, and to goe against that which euery man should doe, that is, liue seriously, attentively, and cheerefully, *bene viuere & letari : sibi semper valere & viuere doctum*, To liue well and cheerefully: euer to doe good to himselfe and to liue learned, to the end hee may liue well, and well die : it is the fault of euery man. A man must lead and order his life, as if it were a businesse of great waight and consequence, and as a bargaine made whereof he must giue an account exactly by parts and parcels. It is our greatest businesse, in respect whereof all the rest are but toies, things accessary and superficiall. There are some that deliberate and purpose to doe it, but it is when they must liue no longer, wherein they resemble those that put off their buying and selling till the marker be past, and when they see their follie, they complaine saying, Shall I neuer haue leisure to make my retrait, to liue vnto my selfe? *quàm seruum est inespere viuere cùm definendum*. See lib. 1. cap. 36. *est? quàm stulta mortalitatis obliuio? dùm differtur, vita transeat.* How late is it to beginne to liue, when a man must cease to liue? how foolish is it to forget our mortality? whilst it is deferred, life passeth away. And this is the reason why the wise crië out vnto vs, well to vse the time, *temporis parce*; That wee haue not need of any thing so much as time, saith *Zenon*. For life is short, and arte is long; not the arte to heale, but rather to liue, which is wisdom. To this first and principall aduice, these following doe serue:

To learne to dwell, to content, to delight himselfe alone, yea to quit himselfe of the world if need bee, the greatest thing is for a man to know how to bee himselfe, vertue is content.



content with it selfe, let vs winne so much of our selues, as to be able in good earnest and willingly to liue alone, and to liue at our ease. Let vs learne to quit our selues of all those bands that fasten and binde vs to another, and that our contentment depend of our selues, neither seeking nor disdainig or refusing companie, but cheerefully to goe on, with or without company, as either our owne, or anothers need doe require: but yet nor so to shut vp our selues, and to settle and establish our pleasure, as some that are halfe lost being alone. A man must haue within himselfe wherewith to entertaine and content himselfe, *& in sinu suo gaudere, And to reioyce within himselfe.* He that hath woon this point pleaseth himselfe in all places and in al things. He must cary a countenance conformable to the company & the affaires that are in hand & present themselves, and accommodate himselfe vnto another, be sad if need be, but inwardly to keepe himselfe one and the same: this is the meditation, and consideration, which is the nourishment and life of the spirit, *cuius viuere est cogitare. Whose life is cogitation.* Now for the benefit of nature, there is not any businesse which we doe more often, continue longer, that is more easie, more naturall, and more our owne, than to meditate, and to entertaine our thoughts. But this meditation is not in all after one maner, but very diuers, according to the diueritie of spirits. In some it is weake, in others strong; in some it is languishing idlenesse, a vacancie and want of other businesse. But the greater spirits make it their principall vacation and most serious studie, whereby they are neuer more busied, nor lesse alone, (as it is sayd of *Scipio*) than when they are alone, and quitting themselves of affaires, in imitation of God himselfe, who liueth and feedeth himselfe with his eternall thoughts and meditations. It is the businesse of the gods (saith *Aristotle*) from whence doth spring both their, and our blessednesse.

3  
To know and  
entertaine himselfe.

Now this solitary imployment, and this cheerefull entertainment of a mans selfe, must not be in vanity, much lesse in anything that is vitious; but in study and profound knowledge, and afterwards in the diligent culture of himselfe. This is the price agreed, the principall, first and plainest trauell of euer



every man. Hee must alwaies watch, taste, sound himselfe, neuer abandon, but be alwaies neere, and keepe himselfe to himselfe: and finding that many things goe not well, whether by reason of vice, and defect of nature, or the contagion of another, or other casuall accident that troubleth him, he must quietly and sweetly correct them, and provide for them. He must reason with himselfe, correct and recall himselfe courageously, and not suffer himselfe to be caried away either with disdain or carelesnesse.

He must likewise in auoiding all idlenesse, which doth but rust and marre both the soule and bodie, keepe himselfe alwaies in breath, in office and exercise, but yet not over bent, violent and painfull, but about all, honett, vertuous and serious. And that he may the better doe it, he must quit himselfe of other businesse, and propose vnto himselfe such designements as may delight him, conferring with honett men, and good bookes, dispensing his time well, and well ordering his houres, and not liue tumultuously and by chaunce and hazard.

Again, he must well husband, and make profit of all things that are presented vnto him, done, said, and make them an instruction vnto him, applie them vnto himselfe, without any shew or semblance thereof.

And to particularise a little more, wee know that the dutie of man towards himselfe consisteth in three points, according to his three parts, to rule and governe his spirit, his bodie, his goods. Touching his spirit (the first and principall, whereunto especially doe belong these generall aduise-ments which wee are to deliuer) we know that all the motions thereof are reduced to two, to thinke, and to desire, the vnderstanding and the will; whereunto doe answer science and vertue, the two ornaments of the spirit. Touching the former, which is the vnderstanding, hee must preserve it from two things, in some sort contrarie and extreame, that is, sottishnesse and folly, that is to say, from vanities and childish follies, on the one side; this is to bastardise and to lose it: it was not made to play the nouice or baboun, *non ad uentum & lusum, genium sed ad seruitutem patrum*; Not borne to sport and play, but rather for grauities; and from phantasticall, absurd, and extravagant opinions,

opinions, on the other side; this is to pollute and debase it. It must be fed and entertained with things profitable and serious and furnished and indued with sound, sweet, and naturall opinions: and so much care must not be taken to eleuate and mount it, to extend it beyond the reach, as to rule, and order it. For order and continencie is the effect of wisdom, and which giueth price to the soule, and aboue all to be free from presumption and obstinacy in opinion; vices very familiar with those that haue any extraordinarie force and vigour of spirit; and rather to continue in doubt and suspence, especially in things that are doubtfull, and capable of oppositions and reasons on both parts, not easily digested and determined. It is an excellent thing; and the securest way, well to know how to doubt; and to be ignorant, and the most noble philosophers, haue not been ashamed to make profession thereof, yea it is the principall fruit and effect of science.

7

Touching the will, it must in all things be governed and submit it selfe to the rule of reason; which is the office of vertue, and not vnto fleeting inconstant opinion, which is commonly false, and much lesse vnto passion. These are the three that moue and gouerne our soules. But yet this is the difference, that a wise man ruleth and rangeth himselfe according to nature and reason, regardeth his duty, holdeth for apocryphall, and suspects whatsoever dependeth vpon opinion, or passion: and therefore he liueth in peace, passeth away his life cheerefully and pleasingly, is not subiect to repentance, recantations, changes, because whatsoever falleth out, he could neither doe, nor choose better, and therefore he is neuer kindled nor stirred; for reason is alwaies peaceable. The foole that suffereth himselfe to bee led by these two, doth nothing but wander and warre with himselfe, and neuer resteth. He is alwaies readuiling, changing, mending, repenting, and is neuer contented; which, to say the truth, belongeth to a wise man, who hath reason and vertue to make himselfe such a one. *Nulla placidior quies nisi quam ratio composuit. Non est more pleasing, then that which reason hath settled.* An honest man must gouerne and respect himselfe, and feare his reason and his conscience, which is his *bonus genius*, his good spirit, in such sort that hee cannot without shame stumble in their presence,

*varum est, ut satis se quisque vereatur. It is a rare thing, that any man should sufficiently be afrayed of himselfe.*

As touching the body, we owe thereunto assistance, and conduct or direction. It is folly to goe about to separate and sunder these two principall parts the one from the other; but contrarily it is fit and necessary they be vnited and ioyned together. Nature hath giuen vs a body as a necessary instrument to life: and it is fit that the spirit as the principall should take vpon it the guardianship and protection of the body. So far should it be from seruing the body, which is the most base, vniust, shamefull, and burthensome seruitude that is, that it should assist, counsell it, and be as a husband vnto it. So that it oweth thereunto care, not seruice: It must handle it as a Lord, not as a Tyrant; nourish it, not pamper it, giuing it to vnderstand, that it liueth not for it, but that it cannot liue heere below without it. This is an instruction to the workeman, to know how to vse, and make vse of his instruments. And it is likewise no small aduantage to a man, to know how to vse his body, and to make it a fit instrument for the exercise of vertue. Finally, the body is preferred in good estate by moderate nourishment and orderly exercise. How the spirit must haue a part and beare it company in those pleasures that belong vnto it, hath beene said before, and shall heereafter be set downe in the vertue of temperance.

Touching goods and the duty of every man in this case, there are many and diuers offices, for to gather riches, to keep them, to husband them, to employ them, to yeeld vnto them all that is fit, are different sciences. One is wise in the one of them, that in the other vnderstandeth nothing neither is it fit he should. The acquisition of riches hath more parts than the rest. The employment is more glorious and ambitious. The preservation and custody, which is proper to the woman, is the labour to couer them.

These are two extremities alike vitious, to loue and affect riches: to hate and reiect them. By riches I vnderstand that which is more than enough, and more than is needfull. A wise man will do neither of both, according to that wish and praier of *Salomon*, Giue me neither riches nor pouerty: but he will hold them in their place, esteeming them as they are, a thing

of it selfe indifferent, matter of good and euill, and to many good things commodious.

The euils and miseries that follow the affecting and hating of them, haue beene spoken of before. Now in few words we let downe a rule touching a mediocritie therein. 1. To desire them, but not to loue them. *Sapiens non amat diuitias, sed manu: A wise man doth not loue riches, but would willingly haue them.* As a little man and weak of bodie, would willingly be higher and stronger, but this his desire is without care or paine vnto himselfe, seeking that without passion, which nature desireth, and fortune knoweth not how to take from him. 2. And much lesse to seeke them at the cost and danimage of another, or by Art, and bad and base meanes, to the end no man should complaine or enuie his gaines. 3. When they come vpon him, entring at an honest gate, not to reiect them, but cheerefully to accept them, and to receiue them into his house, not his heart; into his possession, not his loue, as being vnworthie thereof. 4. When he possesseth them, to employ them honestly and discreetly, to the good of other men; that their departure may, at the least, be as honest as their entrance. 5. If they happen to depart without leaue, be lost or stolen from him, that he be not sorrowfull, but that he suffer them to depart with themselves, without any thing of his. *Si diuitie effluxerint, non auferent nisi semetipsas: If riches passe away, let them carry nothing with them but themselves.* To conclude, hee deserueth not to be accepted of God, and is vnworthie his loue, and the profession of vertue, that makes account of the riches of this world.

*Aude hospes contemnere opes, & te quoq; dignum fuge Deo:  
Be bold to set at naught base trash and pelfe,  
And worthy of a God frame thou thy selfe.*

### *Of the iustice and dutie of man towards man.*

*An aduertisement.*

**T**His dutie is great, and hath many parts, we will reduce them to two great ones: In the first wee will place the general,

nerall, simple, and common duties required in all, and every one, towards all and every one, whether in heart, word, or deed, which are amitie, faith, veritie, and free admonition, good deeds, humanitie, liberalitie, acknowledgment or thankfulness. In the second shal be the speciall duties required for some speciall and expresse reason and obligation betweene certaine persons, as between a mair and his wife, parents and children, masters and seruants, princes and subiects, magistrates, the great and powerfull, and the lesse.

*The first part, which is of the generall and common duties of all towards all,  
and first*

CHAP. VII.

*Of loue or friendship.*

**A**Mitie is a sacred flame, kindled in our breasts first by nature, and hath expressed it first heate betweene the husband and the wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters; and afterwards growing cold hath recovered heate by arte, and the invention of alliances, companies, fraternities, colleges, and communities. But forasmuch as in all this being diuided into many parts, it was weakned, and mingled with other profitable & pleasant considerations, to the end it might restrengthen it selfe and grow more seruent, it hath recollected it selfe, and vnited it owne forces into a narrower roome, betwixt two true friends. And this is perfect amitie, which is so much more seruent and spiritual than other, by how much the heart is hotter than the liuer, and the blood than the veines.

Amitie is the soule and life of the world, more necessarie (say the wise) than fire and water: *amicitia, necessitudo, amicitia necessarij, Friendship, familiaritie, are necessarie friends.* It is the summe, the stasse, the salt of our life: for without it all is darknesse, and there is no ioy, no stay, no taste of life: *amicitia iustitia consors, natura vinculum, ciuitatis presidium, senectutis solatium,*

3  
How necessary  
is the weale-  
publike.

*solacium, vita humana portus: ea omnia constant, discordia cadunt.* Friendship is the companion of Iustice, the band of nature, the defence of a citie, the comfort of old age, and the quiet harbour of mans life: By it all things consist, and discord decayes. And we must not thinke that friendship is profitable and delightfull to priuat men only, for it is more commodious to the weale-publike: it is the true nursing mother of humane societie, the preseruer of states and policies. Neither is it suspected, nor displeaseth any but tyrants and monsters, not because they honor not it in their hearts, but because they cannot be of that number, for only friendship sufficeth to preserue the world. And if it were euery where in force, there would be no need of a law, which hath not been ordained but as a helpe, and as a second remedie for want of friendship, to the end it might enforce and constraîne by the authoritie thereof that which for loue and friendship should be freely and voluntarie; but howsoeuer, the law taketh place farre below friendship. For friendship ruleth the heart, the tongue, the hand, the will, and the effects, the law cannot prouide for that which is without. This is the reason why *Aristotle* said, that good law-makers haue euer had more care of friendship, than of Iustice: And because the law and iustice doe many times lose their credit, the third remedie and least of all hath been in armes and force, altogether contrarie to the former, which is friendship. Thus we see by degrees the three meanes of publike government. But loue or friendship is worth more than the rest, for second and subsidiarie helps are no way comparable to the first and principall.

4  
The first distinction  
of the causes.

The diuerlitie and distinction of friendship is great: That of the ancients into foure kinds, Naturall, Sociable, Hospitall, Venerous, is not sufficient. We may note three; The first is drawn from the causes which ingender it, which are foure, nature, vertue, profit, pleasure, which sometimes goe together in troope; sometimes two, or three, and very often one alone: But vertue is the more noble and the stronger, for that is spirituall, and in the heart as friendship is: Nature in the blood, profit in the purse, pleasure in some part, or sense of the body. So likewise vertue is more liberall, more free, and pure, and without it the other causes are poore, and idle, and fraile. He  
that

that loueth for vertue, is neuer weary with louing, and if friendship be broken, complaineth not. He that loueth for profit, if it faile, complaineth, and is turneth to his reproch, that when he hath done all he can, he hath lost all. Hee that loueth for pleasure, if his pleasure cease, his loue ceaseth with it, and without complaint estrangeth himselfe.

The second distinction which is in regard of the persons, is in three kinds, the one is in a straight line between superiours and inferiours, and it is either naturall, as betweene parents and children, vncles and nephues; or lawfull, as between the Prince and the subiects, the Lord & his vassals, the master and his seruants, the doctour and the discipule, the prelat or gouernor and the people. Now this kind to speake properly, is not friendship, both because of the great disparitie that is betwixt them, which hindreth that inwardnesse and familiaritie and entire communication, which is the principall fruit and effect of friendship, as likewise because of the obligation that is therein, which is the cause why there is lesse libertie and lesse choice and affection therein. And this is the reason why men giue it other names than of friendship: for in inferiours there is required of them honor, respect, obedience; in superiours care and vigilancie ouer their inferiours. The second kind of friendship in regard of the persons, is in a collaterall line betweene equals, or such as are neere equals. And this is likewise two-fold, for either it is naturall, as betweene brothers, sisters, cosens, and this comes neerer to friendship than the former, because there is lesse disparitie. But yet there is a bond of nature, which as on the one side it knittereth and fastneth, so on the other it looseth: for by reason of goods, and diuisions, and affaires, it is not possible but brothers and kinsfolke must sometimes differ. Besides that many times the correspondencie and relation of humours and wills, which is the essence of friendship, is not found amongst them; He is my brother or my kinsman, but yet he is a wicked man, a foole: Or it is free and voluntarie, as betweene companions and friends, who touch not in blood, and hold of nothing but only of friendship and loue: and this is properly and truly friendship.

3 The third kind of friendship in regard of the persons, is

Gg. 3

mist,

mixt, and as it were compounded of the other two, whereby it is, or it should be more strong, this is matrimoniall of married couples, which holdeth of loue or friendship in a straight line, because of the superioritie of the husband, and the inferioritie of the wife; and of collaterall friendship, being both of them companions ioined together by equall bands. And therefore the wife was not taken out of the head, nor foot, but the side of man. Againe, such as are married, in all things and by turnes exercise and shew both these friendships, that which is in a straight line in publike; for a wife woman honoureth and respecteth her husband; that which is collaterall in priuate, by private familiaritie. This matrimoniall friendship is likewise after another fashion double and compounded; for it is spirituall and corporall, which is not in other friendships, saue only in that which is reprooued by all good lawes, and by nature it selfe. Matrimoniall friendship then is great, strong, and puissant. There are neuerthelesse two or three things that stay and hinder it, that it cannot attaine to the perfection of friendship; The one, that there is no part of mariage free but the entrance, for the progresse and continuance thereof is altogether constrained, enforced, I meane in Christian mariages; for euery where else it is lesse enforced, by reason of those diuorcements which are permitted: The other is the weaknesse and insufficiencie of the wife, which can no way correspond to that perfect conference and communication of thoughts and iudgements: her soule is not strong and constant enough to endure the straightnesse of a knot so fast, so strong, so durable: it is as if a man should sew a strong and course peece of cloth to a soft and delicate. This filleth not the place, but vanisheth, and is easily torne from the other. Againe, this inconuenience followeth the friendship of married couples, that it is mingled with so many other strange matters, children, parents of the one side and the other, and so many other distaffe busineses that doe many times trouble and interrupt a liuely affection.

7  
3. *Of degrees.* The third distinction of friendship respecteth the force and intention, or the weaknesse and diminution of friendship. According to this reason, there is a two-fold friendship, the common and imperfect, which we may call good will, familiaritie,



aritie, private acquaintance : and it hath infinite degrees, one more strict, intimate and strong than another : and the perfect, which is inuisible, and is a Phenix in the world, yea hardly conceiued by imagination.

Wee shall know them both by confronting them together, and by knowing their differences. The common may be attained in a short time. Of the perfect it is said, that wee must take long time to deliberate, and they must eat much salt together before it be perfected. 8  
*The difference  
of friendship  
common and  
perfect.*

2 The common is attained, built, and ordered by diuers profitable and delightfull occasions & occurrents ; and therefore a wise man hath set downe two meanes to attaine vnto it, to speake things pleasant, and to doe things profitable ; the perfect is acquired by an onely true and liuely vertue reciprocally known.

3 The common may be with and betweene diuers, the perfect is with one onely, who is another selfe, and betweene two onely, who are but one. It would intangle and hinder it selfe amongst many, for if two at one time should desire to be succoured, if they should request of me contrary offices, if the one should commit to my secrecie a thing that is expedient for another to know, what course, what order may be kept heerein ? Doubtlesse, diuision is an enemy to perfection, and vnion her cosen-germaine.

4 The common is capable of more and lesse, of exceptions, restraints, and modifications, it is kindled and cooled, subiect to accession and reccession, like a feuer, according to the presence or absence, merits, good deeds, and so forth. The perfect not so, alwaies the same, marching with an equall pace, firme, haughtie, and constant.

5 The common receiueth, and hath need of many rules and cautions giuen by the wise, wherof one is, to loue without respect of pietie, veritie, vertue, *Amicus vsque ad aras*. Another, so to loue as that a man may hate ; so to hate, as that he may likewise loue, that is, to hold alwaies the bridle in his hand, and not to abandon himselfe so profusely, that he may haue cause to repent, if the knot of friendship happen to vntie.

Againe to aid and succour at a need without intreatie : for a

friend is bashfull, and it costs him deare, to request that that he thinkes to be his due. Againe, not to be important to his friends, as they that are alwaies complaining, after the maner of women. Now all these lessons are very wholesome in ordinarie friendships, but haue no place in this soueraigne and perfect.

9  
The description  
of perfect  
friendship.

We shall know this better by the portraiture and description of perfect friendship, which is a very free, plaine, and vniuersall confusion of two soules. See heere three words. 1. A confusion, not only a coniunction, and joining together, as of solid things, which howsoever they be fastned, mingled, and knit together, may be separated and knowen apart. For the soules of men in this perfect amitie are in such sort plunged and drowned the one within the other, that they can no more be diuided, neither would they, than things liquid that are mingled together. 2. Very free, and built vpon the pure choice and libertie of the will, without any other obligation, occasion, or strange cause. There is nothing more free and voluntary than affection. 3. Vniuersall, without any exception of all things, goods, honors, iudgements, thoughts, willes, life. From this vniuersall and full confusion it proceedeth, that the one cannot lend or giue to the other, and there is no speech betwixt them of good turnes, obligations, acknowledgements, thankfulness, and other the like duties, which are the nourishers of common friendships, but yet testimonies of diuision and difference, as I know not how to thanke my selfe for the seruice I doe vnto my selfe, neither doth that loue which I beare vnto my selfe increase by those succours and helps I giue vnto my selfe. And in marriage it selfe, to giue some resemblance of this diuine knot, though it come farre short thereof: donations are forbid betweene the husband and the wife: and if there were place for the one to giue vnto the other, hee is the giuer that giues cause to his friend to expresse and imploy his loue, and he receiueth the good turne, that by giuing binde his companion: for the one and the other seeking about all things euen with a greedie desire to doe good to one another, he that giueth the occasion and yeeldeth the matter, is he that is liberrall, giuing that contentment to his friend, to effect that which he most desireth.

Of

Of this perfect friendship and communion, antiquity yeeldeth some examples. *Blosius* taken for a great friend of *Tiberius Gracchus* then condemned to die, and being asked what hee would doe for his sake, and hee answering that hee would refuse nothing, it was demanded what he would doe if *Gracchus* should intreat him to fire the Temples? To whom he answered, that *Gracchus* would neuer intreat such a matter at his hands, but if he should he would obey him. A very bold and dangerous answer. He might boldly haue said, that *Gracchus* would neuer haue required such a matter, and that should haue beene his answer, for according to this our description, a perfect friend doth not only fully know the will of his friend, which might haue sufficed for an answer, but he holdeth in his sleeue, and wholly possesseth it. And in that he added, that if *Gracchus* would haue required it, he would haue done it, it is as if he had said nothing, it neither altereth nor hurteth his first answer concerning that assurance that he had of the will of *Gracchus*. This of willes and iudgements. 3. Touching goods, There were three friends (this word three is some impeachment to our rule, and may make vs thinke that this was no perfect amity) two rich, and one poore charged with an old mother, and a daughter to marry; this man dying made his will, wherein he bequeathed to one of his friends his mother to be fed and maintained by him, to the other his daughter, to be married by him, enioyning him withall to bestow vpon hir the best dowry that his ability would afford and if it should happen that the one of them should die, hee should substitute the other. The people made themselves merry with this Will or Testament, the legataries accepted of it with great contentment, and each of them receiued vnto them their legacy, but hee that had taken the mother, departing this life within fise daies after, the other suruiuing and remayning the sole vniuersall inheritor, did carefully intertaine the mother, and within a few daies after hee married in one day his owne and onely daughter, and hir that was bequeathed vnto him, diuiding betwixt them by equall portions all his goods. The wife according to this description haue iudged that the first dying, exprested greatest loue, and was the more liberall, making his friends his heires,

and

and giving them that contentment, as to employ them for the supply of his wants. 4. Touching life, that history is sufficiently known of those two friends, whereof the one being condemned by the tyrant to die at a certaine day and houre, he requested that giuing baile, hee might in the meane time goe and dispose of his domesticall affaires, which the tyrant agreeing vnto vpon this condition, that if he did not returne by that time his baile should suffer the punishment. The prisoner deliuered his friend, who entered into prison vpon that condition: and the time being come, and the friend who was the baile resolving to die, his condemned friend failed not to offer himselfe, and so quit his friend of that danger. Whereat the tyrant being more than astonished, and deliivering them both from death, desired them to receiue, and to adopt him in their friendship as a third friend.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Of faith, trust, treachery, secrecy.*

1  
*The dignity of  
fidelity.*

**A**Ll men yea the most treacherous know and confesse that faith is the band of humane society, the foundation of all iustice, and that aboue all things it ought to be religiously obserued. *Nihil augustius fide, qua iustitia fundamentum est, nec ullares vehementius rempublicam continet & uiam, Sanctissimum humani preloris bonum: Nothing is more excellent then faith, which is the foundation of iustice, neither doth any thing more mightily bridle and rule the common-wealth and the life of man. It is the most sacred good in the breasts of men.*

*Cic.*

*Ante Iouem generata, decem diuinumq; hominumq;  
Qua sine non tellus pacem, non aequora norunt,  
Iustitia consors, tacitumq; in pectore numen.  
Borne before Iupiter, of gods and men the grace,  
Without which neither land, nor sea for peace haue place,  
Consort to Iustice, in mans breast,  
A God-head not to be exprest.*

2  
*Fidelity rare.*

Neuerthelesse the world is full of treacheries. There are but few that doe well and truly keepe their faith. They break it diuers waies, and they perceiue it not. So they find some pretext and colour thereof, they thinke they are safe enough.

Others

Others seeke corners, euasions, subtilties; *Quarins latebras perituro.* Now to remooue all the difficulties, that are in this matter, and truly to know how a man should carrie himselfe, <sup>The diuision of this matter.</sup> there are foure considerations, wherunto all the rest may be referred: The persons, as well he that giueth faith, as he that receiueith it; the subiect whereof the question is made, and the maner according to which the faith is giuen.

As touching him that giueth faith, it is necessarie that he <sup>3</sup> haue power to doe it: If he be subiect to another, hee cannot giue it, and hauing giuen it without the leaue and approbation of his master, it is of none effect, as it did well appeare in the Tribune *Saturnius* and his complices, who comming forth of the capitoll (which they had taken by rebellion) vpon the faith giuen by the Consuls, subiects, and officers of the Common-weale, were iustly slaine. But euery free man must keepe his faith, how great and honourable soeuer he be: yea the greater he is, the more he is bound to keepe it, because he is the more free to giue it. And it was well sayd, That the simple word of a prince should be of as great force, as the oth of a private man.

As touching him to whom faith is giuen, whosoeuer he be, it must carefully bee kept, and there are but two exceptions <sup>4</sup> which are cleare enough, the one if he receiued it not, and were not contented with it, but demanded other caution and assurance. For faith is a sacred thing, must simplie bee receiued; otherwise it is no more faith, nor trust, when hostages are demanded, suerties are giuen; to take gages or cautions with faith, is a thing ridiculous. Hee that is held vnder the guard of men, or wals, if he escape and saue himselfe is not faultie. The reason of that Roman is good: *Vult sibi quisque credi, & habita fides ipsam sibi obligat fidem: fides requirit fiduciam, & relatiua sunt.* Every one would haue himselfe to be credited, and faith giuen bindeth faith vnto him: faith requireth trust, and haue relation the one to the other. The other if hauing accepted it, he first brake it. *Frangenti fidem, fides frangatur eidem: quando in me non habes pro Senatore, nec ego te pro Consule.* With him that breaketh faith, let faith also be broken: when thou holdest not me for a Senator, I will not hold thee for Consul. A treacherous man deserueth not by the law of nature that faith should bee kept

Cap. 14.

kept vnto him, except it be after an agreement, which con-  
 cerneth the treachery and maketh reuenge vnlawfull. Now these  
 two cases excepted. a man must keepe his faith to whomsoe-  
 uer, to his subiect as shall be sayd. 2. To an enemy, witnesse  
 the act of *Attilius Regulus*, the proclamation of the Senat of  
*Rome* against all those that had beene licenced by *Pyrrhus* vp-  
 on their faith giuen to depart; and *Camillus*, who would not  
 so much as make vse of the treachery of another, but sent  
 the children of the *Faliscians* with their master. 3. To a theefe  
 and publicke offender, witnesse the fact of *Pompey* to the pi-  
 rates and robbers, and of *Augustus* to *Crocorus*. 4. To the e-  
 nemies of religion, according to the example of *Iosua* against  
 the *Gabaonites*. But faith ought not to be giuen to these two  
 latter, the eues and heretickes; or apostataes, nor taken of  
 them: for wee ought not to capitulate, nor to treat wittingly  
 of peace and alliance with such kind of people, except it bee  
 in extreame necessitie, or for the winning of them to the  
 truth, or for the publicke good; but being giuen it ought to  
 be kept.

5  
 The subiect of  
 faith.

As touching the thing subiect, if it be vniust or impossible,  
 a man is quit: and being vniust, it is well done to flie from it,  
 and a double fault to keepe it. All other excuses besides these  
 two, are of no account, as losse, damage, displeasure, dis-  
 commoditie, difficultie, as the *Romanes* haue many times  
 practised, who haue reiected many great aduantages to a-  
 uoid the breach of faith, *quibus tanta utilitate fides antiquior fuit:*  
*With whom faith was better accounted, then so much profit.*

L'uy.

6  
 The manner of  
 giuing faith.

Touching the maner of giuing faith, there is some doubt:  
 for many thinke that if it haue beene extorted either by force  
 and feare, or by fraud and sudden surpris, a man is not bound  
 vnto it, because in both cases, he that promised hath not a will  
 whereby all things are to be iudged. Others are of a contrary  
 opinion: and to say the truth, *Iosua* kept his faith and pro-  
 mise to the *Gabaonites*, though it were extorted from him  
 by a great surpris, and false intelligence, and it was after-  
 wards declared that he did therein what he ought to do. And  
 therefore it seemeth that a man may say, that where there is  
 only a simple word and promise past, a man is not bound, but  
 if faith or promise giuen bee confirmed and authorized by an  
 oath,

**Oath**, as in the fact of *Iswa*, hee is bound to performe it in regard of the name of God: but yet that it is afterwards in iudgement to seeke meanes to right himselfe of that either deceit or violence. Faith giuen with an oath, and the interposition of the name of God, bindeth more than a simple promise; and the breach thereof which includeth periury with treacherie, is farre worse. But to thinke to giue assurance of faith by new and strange oathes, as many doe, is superfluous amongst honest men, and vnprofitable, if a man will bee disloyall. The best way is to sweare by the eternall God, the reuenger of those that vainly vse his name, and breake the faith.

**Treachery** and periury is in a certaine sense, more base & execrable than atheisme. The Atheist that beleueth there is no God, is not so iniurious against him in thinking there is no God, as hee that knoweth him, beleueth in him, and in mockery and contempt doth periuriously abuse his name. He that sweareth to deceiue, mocketh God, and searcth man. It is a lesse sinne to contemne God, than to mocke him. The horror of treachery and periury cannot bee better deciphered, than it was by him that said, It was to giue a testimony of the contempt of God, and the feare of men. And what thing is more monstrous than to be a coward with men, and resolute and yalorous with God? Treachery is secondly the traitour and capitall enemy of humane society. For it breaketh and destroieth the band thereof, and all commerce which dependeth vpon the word and promises of men, which if it faile we haue nothing else to sticke vnto.

**To the keeping of faith** belongeth the faithfull guard of the secrets of another, which is a charge full of inconuenience, especially of great personages, which though it may wisely be performed, yet it is good to flie the knowledge of them, as sometimes that Poet did the secrets of *Lyfmachus*. Hee that takes into his custodie the secrets of another, drawes a greater trouble vpon him, than he dreams of: for besides the care that hee takes vnto himselfe, to keepe them well, hee bindes himselfe to faine, and to deny his owne thoughts, a thing very irksome to a noble and generous heart. Neuerthelesse hee that takes that charge vpon him, must keepe it religiously, and

7  
Treachery iniurious to God.

To man.

8  
To keepe secrets

and to the end he may do it well, and play the good secretary, he, must be such a one by nature, not by arte and obligation.

## CHAP. IX.

## Veritie and free admonition.

1  
*An excellent  
shiny.*

FREE and hearty admonition is a very wholesome and excellent medicine, and the best office of amitie. For to wound and offend a little, to profit much, is to loue soundly. It is one of the principall and most profitable Euangelicall commandements: *Si peccauerit in te frater tuus, corripe eum, &c.* If thy brother sinne against thee, reprove him, &c.

2  
*To whom profitable.*

All haue sometimes need of this remedy, but especially all those that are in prosperity, for it is a very hard thing to bee happie and wise together. And princes who lead a life so publicke and are to furnish themselves with so many things, and haue so many things hid from them, cannot see nor vnderstand, but by the eyes and eares of another. And therefore they haue great need of aduertisements, otherwise they may chaunce to runne strange and hard fortunes, if they bee not very wise.

3  
*Here, difficult,  
dangerous.*

This office is vndertaken by very few; There are required thereunto (as the wise affirme) three things, iudgement or discretion, couragious libertie, amitie and fidelitie. These are tempered and mingled together, but few there are that doe it, for feare of offending, or want of true amity, and of those that do it, few there are that know how to doe it well. Now if it be ill done, like a medicine ill applied, it woundeth without profit, and produceth almost the same effect with griefe, that flattery doth with pleasure. To be commended, and to be reprehended vnfittingly and to small purpose, is the selfe-same wound, and a matter alike faultie in him that doth it. Verity how noble soeuer it be, yet it hath not this priuiledge, to bee employed at all houres and in all fashions. A wholesome holy reprehension may be vitiously applied.

4  
*The rules of  
true admonition*

The counsels and cautions for a man well to gouerne himselfe heerein (it is to bee vnderstood where there is no great inwardnesse, familiaritie, confidence, or authority and power, for in these cases there is no place for the carefull obseruation of



of these rules following) are these: 1. To obserue place and time; that it bee neither in times nor places of scalling and great ioy, for that were (as they say) to trouble the feast; nor of sorrow and aduersitie, for that were a point of hostilitie, and the way to make an end of all; that is rather a fit time to succour and comfort a man. *Cruelius in re aduersa, obiurgatio, damnare est obiurgare, cum auxilio est opus. Chiding is cruel in aduersitie, to chide is to condemne, when helpe is needfull.* King *Persus* seeing himselfe thus handled by two of his familiar friends, killed them both. 2. Not to reprehend all things indifferently, not small and light offences, this were to be enuious, and an importunate, ambitious reprehender; not great and dangerous, which a man of himselfe doth sufficiently feeble, and feares a worse punishment to come, this were to make a man thinke hee lies in wait to catch him. 3. Secretly and not before witnesse, to the end he make him not ashamed, as it hapned to a young man, who was so much abashed, that he was reprehended by *Pythagoras*, that he hanged himselfe. And *Plutarch* is of opinion, that it was for this cause that *Alexander* killed his friend *Clitus*, because he reprehended him in companie: but especially that it bee not before those whose good opiacion he that is reprehended desireth to retaine, and with whom hee desires to continue his credit, as before his wife, his children, his disciples. 4. Out of a simple carelesse nature and freedome of heart, without any particular interest, or passion of the mind, be it neuer so litle. 5. To comprehend himselfe in the same fault, and to vse generall termes, as, We forget our selues; What doe we thinke of? 6. To begin with commendations, and to end with proffers of seruice and help, this tempereth the tartnes of correction, and giues a better entertainment: Such and such a thing becomes you well, but not so wel such and such a thing. 7. To expresse the fault with better words than the nature of the offence doth require; as, You haue not been altogether well aduised; in steed of, You haue done wickedly: Receiue not this woman into your companie, for she wil vndo you; in steed of, Allure hir not, perswade her not to yeeld to your desires, for thereby you will vadoe your selfe: Enter not into dispute with such a man; in steed of, Quarrel not, enuie not such a man. 8. The admonition being ended.

ended, be not presently gone, but stay and fall into some other common and pleasant discourse.

## CHAP. X.

## Of flatterie, lying, and dissimulation.

1  
Flatterie a pernicious and villanous thing.

Flatterie is a very dangerous poison to euery particular person, and almost the only cause of the ruine of a prince and the state: it is worse than false witnesse, which corrupteth not the Iudge, but deceiueth him onely, causing him to giue a wicked sentence against his will and iudgement: but flatterie corrupteth the iudgement, enchantereth the spirit, and makes him vnapt to be farther instructed in the truth. And if a prince be once corrupted by flatterie, it necessarily followeth that all that are about him, if they will liue in grace and fauour, must be flatterers. It is therefore a thing as pernicious as truth is excellent, for it is the corruption of truth. It is also a villanous vice of a base beggerly mind, as foule and ill bebecoming a man, as impudencie a woman. *Vi matrona meretrici dispareris atq; discolor, infido scurra distabit amicus*: Look how different and unlike a modest matron is to an impudent harlot, so farre distant is a friend from a faithlesse iester. Flatterers are likewise compared to harlots, sorcerers, oile-sellers, to woolfes; and another saith, That a man were better fall among crows than flatterers.

2  
Especially to two sorts of people.

There are two sorts of people subiect to be flattered, that is to say, such as neuer want people to furnish them with this kind of merchandize, and easily suffer themselves to be taken by it; that is to say, princes, with whom wicked men get credit thereby; and women, for there is nothing so proper and ordinary to corrupt the chastity of women, then to feed and entertaine them with their owne commendations.

3  
Hardly auoided.

Flatterie is hardly auoided, and it is a matter of difficultie to be preferred from it, not only to women by reason of their weaknesse, and their natures full of vanitie and desirous of praise, and to princes, because they are their kinsfolke, friends, principall officers, whom they cannot auoid, that profess this mysterie; (*Alexander* that great king and philosopher could not defend himselfe from it, and there is not any private man

man that would not yeeld much more vnto it than kings, if he were daily assaulted and corrupted by such base rascall sort of people as they are) but generally vnto all; yea to the wisest, both by reason of the sweetnesse thereof, in such sort, that though a man withstand it, yet it pleaseth, and though he oppose himselfe against it, yet hee neuer shutteth it quite out of doores: *vnde (sepe exclusa nonissimè recipitur; though often reiected, yet at last receiued:* and because of the hypocrisie thereof, whereby it is hardly discovered: for it is so well counterfeited and couered with the visage of amitie, that it is no easie matter to discern it.

It vsurpeth the offices, it hath the voice, it carrieth the name and counterfaite thereof so artificially, that you will say, that it is the same. It studieth to content and please, it honoreth and commendeth; It busieth it selfe much and takes much paines to doe service, it accomodateth it selfe to the willes and humours of men: What more? It takes vpon it even the highest and most proper point of amitie, which is to chide, and freely to reprehend. To be brieue, a flatterer will seeme to exceed in loue him that he flattereth, whereas contrariwise, there is nothing more opposite vnto loue, not detraction, not iniurie, not professed enmitie: It is the plague and poison of true amitie; they are altogether incompatible, *non potes esse simul amico & adulatore vti: Thou canst not use me together both for a friend and a flatterer.* Better are the sharpe admonitions of a friend, than the killles of a flatterer. *Meliora vulnera diligentiù, quam oscula blandientiù.*

*It imitateth and resembleth amitie, but it is the plague thereof.*

Wherefore not to mistake it, let vs by the true picture thereof, find out the meanes to know it, and to discern it from true amitie. 1. Flatterie respecteth for the most part it owne particular benefit, and thereby it is known; but true friendship seeketh not the good of it selfe. 2. The flatterer is changeable and diuers in his iudgements, like wax, or a looking-glasse that receiue all formes: He is a Camelion, a *Polypus*: faine to praise or dispraise, and he will doe the like, accommodating himselfe to the minde of him hee flattereth. A friend is firme and constant. 3. Hee carrieth himselfe too violently and ambitiously in all that hee doth, in the view and knowledge of him hee flattereth, euer praising and offering his service. *Non*

4  
*The description and attributes of flattery and amitie.*

*Hh*

*imitatur*

*imitatur amicitiam, sed praterit. He doth not imitate friendship, but passe by it.* He hath no moderation in his outward actions, and contrariwise inwardly hee hath no affection, which are conditions quite contrarie to a true friend. 4. Hee yeeldeth and alwaies giueth the victorie to him hee flattereth, alwayes applauding him, hauing no other end than to please, in such sort that he commendeth al and more than all, yea sometimes to his owne cost, blaming and humbling himselfe like a wrestler, that stoopeth the better to ouerthrow his companion. A friend goes roundly to worke, cares not whether he haue the first or the second place; and respecteth not so much how hee may please, as how hee may profit, whether it bee by faire meanes, or by foule, as a good Physitian vseth to doe to cure his patient. 5. A flatterer sometimes vsurpeth the liberty of a friend to reprehend; but it is with the left hand and vntowardly. For he staies himselfe at small and light matters that are not worthy reprehension, faining want of knowledge of any greater; but yet he will be rude and rough enough in the censuring of the kindred and seruants of him he flattereth, as failing much in that duty they should doe vnto him. Or he faileth to haue vnderstood some light accusations against him, and that he could not be quiet vntill he knew the truth thereof; and if it fall out that he that is flattered deny them, or excuse himselfe, he taketh occasion to commend him the more. I was much astonished at it (saith he) and I could not beleuee it, for I see the contrarie. For how should I thinke that you will take from another man, when you giue all that is your owne, and take more care to giue than to take? Or at leastwise he will make his reprehension to serue his turne, that hee may flatter the better, telling him that he takes not care enough of himselfe, he is not sparing enough of his person and presence so necessarie to the common-weale, as once a Senatour did to *Tiberius* in a full Senat, but with an ill sent and a bad successe. 6. Finally, to conclude in a word, a friend alwayes respecteth, procureth, and attempteth that which is reason, and honestly, and dutie; the flatterer that which belongs to passion and pleasure, and that which is already a malady in the mind of him that is flattered. And therefore hee is a proper instrument for all things that belong to pleasure and

and licentious libertie, and not for that which is honest or painfull and dangerous. He is like an ape, who being vnfit for any other seruice, as other beasts are, serues for a play-game and to make sport.

A neere neighbour and allianceto flatterie is lying, a base vice; and therefore said an ancient Philosopher, That it was the part of slaues to lie, of freemen to speake the truth. For what greater wickednesse is there, than for a man to belie his owne knowledge? The first steppes to the corruption of good maners is the banishment of truth, as contrarily, saith *Pindarus*, To be true is the beginning of vertue. It is likewise pernicious to humane societie. We are not men, neither can we knit and ioine together in humane societie, as hath beene said, if this be wanting. Doubtlesse silence is more sociable, than vntrue speech. If a lie had but one visage as truth hath, there were some remedie for it; for we would take the contrarie to that which a lier speaketh to bee the certaine truth. But the contrary to truth hath a hundred thousand figures, and an indefinite and vnlimited field. That which is good, that is to say, vertue and veritie is finite and certaine, because there is but one way to the marke: That which is euill, that is to say, vice and errour, and lying is infinite and vncertaine, because there are a thousand waies to misse the marke. Doubtlesse if men knew the honour of lying, they would pursue it with sword and fire. And therefore such as haue the charge of youth are with all instance and diligence to hinder it, and to withstand the first birth and progresse of this vice, as likewise of opinatiue obstinacie, and that in time, for they neuer leaue growing.

There is likewise a cōdered and disguised lie, which is hypocrisie and dissimulation (a notable qualitie of Courtiers, and in as great credit amongst them as vertue) the vice of licentious and base mindes, for a man to disguise and hide himselfe vnder a maske, as not daring to shew himselfe to be that which he is, it is a cowardly and seruile humour.

Now hee that makes profession of this goodly mysterie, liues in great paine, for it is a great vnquietnesse for a man to endeavour to seeme other than that hee is, and to haue an eie vnto himselfe, for feare lest he should be discovered. It is a

5  
Of lying, the  
fowlenesse and  
hurt thereof.

6  
Of hypocrisie.

7  
The difficultie  
thereof.

torment for a man to hide his owne nature, to be discouered, and confusion. There is no such pleasure as to liue according to his nature, and it is better to be lesse esteemed and to liue openly, than to take so much paines to counterfaiit and liue vnder a canopie; so excellent and so noble a thing is freedom.

8

*The dissimulation;*

But the mysterie of these kind of men is but poore; for dissimulation continues not long vndiscouered, according to that saying, Things fained and violent dure not long, and the reward of such people is; that no man will trust them, nor giue them credit when they speake the truth, for whatsoever comes from them is held for apocryphall and mockerie.

9

*The counsell betwixt;*

Now there is need of indifferencie and wisdom. For if nature be deformed, vitious and offensive to another, it must bee constrained, and to speake better, corrected. There is a difference betwene liuing freely and carelesly. Againe, a man must not alwaies speake all hee knowes; that is a follie, but that which he speaketh, let it bee that which hee thinketh.

10

*Dissimulation befitting women.*

There are two sorts of people in whom dissimulation is excusable, yea sometimes requisite, but yet for diuers reasons, that is to say, in the Prince for the publike benefit, and the good and peace of himselfe or the state, as before hath been said; and in women for the conueniencie thereof, because an ouer free and bold libertie becomes them not, but rather inclines to impudencie. Those small disguisements, fained cariages, hypocrisies, which well besit their shamesfastnesse and modestie, deceiue none but fooles, becomie them well and defend their honors. But yet it is a thing which they are not to take great paines to learne, because hypocrisie is naturall in them. They are wholly made for it, and they all make vse of it, and too much, their visage, their vestments, their words countenance, laughter, weeping; and they practice it not only towards their husbands liuing, but after their death too. They faine great sorrow, and many times inwardly laugh. *Iactantius merent quia minus dolent. They mourne in shew, that grieue but little.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XI.

## Of Benefits, obligation and thankfulnessse.

**T**he science and matter of benefits or good turnes, and the thankfull acknowledgment of the obligation, active and passive is great, of great use, and very subtle. It is that wherein wee faile most. We neither know how to doe good, nor to be thankfull for it. It should seeme that the grace as well of the merit, as of the acknowledgement is decayed, and reuenge and ingratitude is wholly in request, so much more ready and ardent are wee therevnto. *Gratia oneri est, vltro in quaestum habetur: alius iniuria quam merita descendunt: Thankfulnessse is a burthen, reuenge is accounted for gaine: Injuries sinke deeper than deserts.* First then we will speake of merit and good deeds, where we will comprehend humanitie, liberalitie, almes deeds, and their contraries, inhumanitie, crueltie: and afterwards of obligation, acknowledgement, and forgetfulnessse, or ingratitude and reuenge.

Tacit.  
Senec.

God, nature and reason, doe invite vs to doe good, and to deserue well of another; God by his example, and his nature, which is wholly good; neither doe we know any better meanes how to imitate God, *nulla re proprius ad Dei naturam accedimus, quam beneficentia. Deus est mortalem succurrere mortali;* <sup>I</sup> *An exhortation to good works by diuers sons.* In nothing we come neerer to the nature of God, than in doing good. It is of God that one mortall man succoureth another. Nature, witnesse this one thing, that euery one delighteth to see him, to whom hee hath done good: it best agreeth with nature, *nihil tam secundum naturam, quam iuuare con'sortem naturam.* Nothing is more agreeable to nature, than to help him that partaketh of the same nature. It is the worke of an honest and generous man to doe good, and to deserue well of another, yea to seeke occasions therevnto, *liberalis etiam dandi causas querit.* <sup>Ambros.</sup> It is the part of a liberall man euen to seeke occasions of giuing. And it is said, that good bloud cannot lye, nor faile at a need. It is greatnesse to giue, basenesse to take, *Beatius est dare quam accipere.* It is better to giue then to receiue. He that giueth honoureth himselfe, makes himselfe master ouer the receiuer, he that



takes selles himselfe. He, saith one, that first inuented benefites or good turnes, made stockes and manacles to tie and captiuate another man. And therefore diuers haue refused to take, lest they should wound their libertie, especially from those whom they would not loue, and be beholding vnto, according to the counsell of the wise, which aduise a man not to receiue any thing from a wicked man, lest hee be thereby bound vnto him. *Cesar* was wont to say, that there came no sound more pleasing vnto his eares, than praiers and petitions : It is the mot of greatnesse, Aske mee. *Inuoca me in die tribulationis (e-ruam te) & honorificabis me: Call upon me in the day of tribulation (and I will deliuer thee) and thou shalt glorifie me.* It is likewise the most noble, and honourable vse of our meanes or substance, which so long as wee hold and possesse them priuately, they carrie with them base and abiect names, houses, lands, money, but being brought into light, and employed to the good and comfort of another, they are enobled, with new and glorious titles, benefits, liberalities, magnificences. It is the best, and most commodious imploiment that may be : *Argus tuosissima, optima negotiatio*, whereby the principall is assured, and the profit is very great. And to say the truth, a man hath nothing that is truly his owne, but that which hee giues, for that which hee retaines, and keepe to himselfe, benefits neither himselfe, nor another ; and if he employ them otherwise, they consume and diminish, passe thorow many dangerous accidents, and at last death it selfe. But that which is giuen, it can neuer perish, neuer wax old. And therefore *Marc. Antony* being beatendowne by fortune, and nothing remaining to him, but his power to die, cried out that hee had nothing, but that which hee had giuen : *Hoc habeo quodcumque dedi.* And therefore this sweet, debonaire, and readie will to doe good vnto all, is a right excellent and honorable thing in all respects ; as contrarily, there is not a more base and detestable vice, more against nature, than crueltie, for which cause it is called inhumanitie, which proceedeth from a contrary cause, to that of bountie and benefices, that is to say, daftardly cowardlinesse, as hath beene said.

2  
The distinction  
of benefits.

There is a two-fold maner of doing good vnto another, by profiting and by pleasing him : for the first a man is admired and



and esteemed; for the second beloved. The first is farre the better, it regardeth the necessitie and want of a man, it is to play the part of a father and true friend. Againe, there are two sorts of bounties or good turnes, the one are duties, that proceed out of a naturall or lawfull obligation; the other are merits and free, which proceed out of pure affection: These seeme the more noble, neuertheless if the other be done with attention and affection, though they bee duties, yet they are excellent.

The benefit and the merit is not properly that, that is given, is seen, is toucht; this is but the grosse matter, the marke, <sup>3</sup> the shew thereof, but it is the good will. That which is outward is many times but small, that which is inward very great; for this hath commonly with it a kind of hunger and affection, and is alwaies seeking occasions to doe good; It giueth so much as it can, and what is needfull, forgetting it owne benefit, *in beneficio hoc suspiciendum quod alteri dedit, ablatum sibi, utilitatis suae oblitus.* In a benefit this is to be considered, that what he giueth to another, he taketh away from himselfe, being forgetfull of his owne profit. Contrarily where the gift is great, the grace may be small; for it is commonly giuen with an ill will, with an expectation of much intreatie, and leasure enough to consider whether hee may giue it or no. This is to make too great preparation therevnto, and too great vse thereof, to giue it rather to himselfe, and his ambition, than to the good and necessitie of the receiuer. Againe that which is outward may incontinently vanish, that which is inward remaine firme: The libertie, health, honor, which is to bee giuen, may all at an instant, by some accident or other, be taken away, the benefit neuertheless remaining entire.

The aduiselements whereby a man should direct himselfe, in his bounties and benefits hee bestoweth, according to the <sup>4</sup> Rules of bene- rules and instruction of the wise, are these: First, to whom <sup>fit.</sup> must hee giue? to all? It seemeth that to doe good vnto the wicked and vnworthy, is at one instant to commit many faults, for it brings an ill name vpon the giuer, entertaineth and kindleth malice, giues that which belongs to vertue and merit, to vice also. Doubtlesse free and fauorable graces are not due, but to the good and worthy; but in a time of necessi- <sup>1. To whom.</sup>

tie, and in a generalitie all in common. In these two cases the wicked and vngratefull haue a part, if they be in necessitie, or if they be in such sort mingled with the good, that the one can hardly receiue with. out the other. For it is better to doe good to those that are vnworthy, for their sakes that are good, than to deprive the good for their sakes that are euill. So doth God good vnto all, he suffereth the sunne to shine, & the raine to fall indifferently vpon all. But yet his speciall gifts he giueth not but to those whom he hath chosen for his; *non est bonum sumere panem filiorum & proicere canibus: multum refert utrum aliquem non excludas an eligas. It is not good to take the childrens bread, and cast it vnto dogs: It is to little purpose whether thou exclude some one, or choose him.* At a neede therefore, in a time of affliction and necessitie we must do good vnto all, *hominibus prodesse natura iubet, vbiuq; homini beneficio locus. Nature commandeth to doe good vnto men, whensoever opportunity is offered to benefit them.* Nature, and humanitie teach vs, to regard and to offer our selues vnto them, that stretch out their armes vnto vs, and not vnto those that turne their backs towards vs; rather vnto those to whom we may doe good, than vnto those that are able to doe good vnto vs. It is the part of a generous mind to take part with the weaker side, to succor the afflicted, and to helpe to abate the pride and violence of the conquerour, as *Chelonis* once did, the daughter and wife of a king, whose father and husband being at variance and wars, one against the other, whensoever hir husband had got the better against hir father, like a good daughter shee followed and serued hir father in all things, in his afflictions; but the chance turning, and hir father getting the mastery, like a good wife, she turned to hir husband, and accompanied him in his hardest fortunes.

Secondly, he must doe good willingly and cheerefully, *non ex tristitia aut necessitate; hilarcm. datorcm diligit deus: Bis est gratum, quod opus est, si vltro offeras. Not with discontent, or out of necessitie; God loueth a cheerefull giuer: that is twice acceptable, that is needfull, and offered of thine owne accord, not suffering himselfe to be ouer-intreated, and importuned; otherwise it will neuer be pleasing; Nemo libenter debet quod non accepit, ed expressit: No man receiveth with that thankfulness when it is not willingly*

5  
2. willingly.

willingly giuen, but wrung out by importunity. That which is yeelded by force and intreatie and prayers is dearly sold; *non tulus gratis qui accepit rogans, imo nihil charius emitur, quam quod precibus.* He bath it not freely, which receiueth by intreaty; yea nothing is dearer bought, then that which is had by earnest suit. Hee that prayeth and intreateth; humbleth himselfe, confelleth himselfe an inferiour, couereth his face with shame honoreth him whom he intreateth: wherupon *Cesar* was wont to say, after he had ouercome *Pompey*. That he lent not his eares more willingly, nor took so much content in any thing, as to be intreated, wherby he gaue a kind of hope vnto all, euen his enemies, that they should obtain whatsoeuer they should request. Graces are silken vestments, transparent, free, and not constrained.

Thirdly, speedily and readily. This seemes to depend vpon the former, for benefits are esteemed according to the will wherewith they are bestowed; Now hee that stayes long before he succour and giue, seemes to haue benee a long time vnwilling to doe it, *qui tarde fecit, diu noluit.* As contrarily, a readinesse heerein dobleth the benefit: *bis dat, qui celeriter.* Hee giueth twice, that giueth quickly. That indifferency and carelesse regard, whether it be done, or not done, that is vsed heerein, is not approued by any, but impudent persons. Diligence must be vsed in all points. Heerein then there is a five-fold maner of proceeding, whercof three are reprobued; to refuse to doe a good turne, and that slowly too, is a double iniurie: to refuse speedily, and to giue slowly, are almost one; And some there are that are leile offended with a quick denial; *Minus decipitur uni negatur celeriter.* He is lesse deceiued that is soone denied. The best way then is, to giue speedily; but that which is most excellent, is, to anticipate the demand, to prevent the necessitie and the desire.

Fourthly, without hope of restitution, this is that wherein the force and vertue of a benefit doth principally consist. If it be a vertue, it is not mercenarie: *tunc est virtus dare beneficia non reditura.* Then it is vertue to bestow benefits, when they expect no requisall. A benefit is lesse richly bestowed, where there is a retogradation and reflexion; but when there is no place for requitall, yea it is not known from whence the good turne cometh, there it is in it true lustre and glorie. If a man looke  
after

6

3. Speedily.

7

4. Without hope of restitution.

after the like he will giue slowly and to few. Now it is farre better to renounce all such hopes of like returnes, than to cease to merit, and to do good; for whilest a man seeketh after that strange and accidentall payment, he depriueth himselfe of the true and naturall, which is that inward ioy and comfort he receiueth in doing good. Againe, he must not be twice intreated for one thing. To doe wrong, is in it selfe a base and abominable thing, and there needs no other thing to disswade a man from it: so to deserue well of another, is an excellent and honorable thing, and there needs no other thing to inflame a man to it. And in a word, it is not to do good to look after a like returne, it is to make merchandize & profit thereof: *Non est beneficium, quod in quantum mittitur. That is not a benefit that is giuen for gaine.* A man should not confound and mingle together actions so diuers: *demus beneficia, non facere. mus. Let vs giue benefis, but not for vsurie.* It is pitie but such men should be deceiued that hope after such requitals: *dignus est decipi qui de recipiendo cogitaret, cum daret. He is worthe to be deceiued, who looketh for a recompence of that he gaue.* She is no honest woman who either for feare, or the better to inflame, or to draw a man on, refuseth: *que quia non licuit non dedu, ipsa dedu. She who hath not giuen hir consent because shee could not sily doe it, hath notwithstanding consented.* So hee deserues nothing that doth good, to receiue good againe. Graces are pure virgins, without hope of returne, saith *Hesiodus.*

8  
*s. According to  
 the desire of the  
 receiuer.*

Fiftly, to do good in a proportion answerable to the desire of a man, and as it may be acceptable to him that receiueth it, to the end he may know and find, that it is truly intended and done vnto him. Concerning which point, you are to know, that there are two sorts of benefits, the one are honorable to the person that receiueth, and therefore they should be done publickly: The other are commodious, such as succour the want, weakenesse, shame, or other necessitie of the receiuer. These are to be done secretly yea if need bee, that hee only may take notice that receiueth them; and if it be fit, the receiuer should not know from whence they come (because it may bee hee is bashfull, and the knowledge thereof may discourage him from taking, though his needs bee great) it is good and expedient to conceale it from him, and to suffer the benefit

benefit to drop into his hand, as it were vnawares. It is enough the benefactor know it, and his owne conscience serue him for a witnesse, which is better than if he had a thousand lookers on.

Sixtly, without the hurt and offence of another, and the preiudice of iustice: to doe good not doing euill: To giue to one at the charge of another, is to sacrifice the sonne in the presence of the father, saith a wise man. 9

Seuenthly, wisely. A man may be sometimes hindered from answering demaunds and petitions, from refusing or yeelding vnto them. This difficultie proceedeth from the will nature of man, especially of the petitioner, who vexeth himselfe too much in the enduring of a repulse, be it neuer so iust and reasonable. And this is the reason why some promise and agree to all (a testimonie of weaknesse) yea, when they haue neither power, nor will to performe, and referring the auoiding of this difficultie to the very point of the execution, they hope that many things may happen that may hinder and trouble the performance of their promise, and so thinke to quit themselves of their obligation; or if it fall out there be question made thereof, they find excuses and auoidances, and so for that time content the petitioner. But none of all this is to be allowed, for a man ought not to promise or agree to any thing, but to that which he can, will, and ought to performe. And finding himselfe betweene these two straits and dangers, either of a bad promise, because it is either vniust, or ill besitting, or an absolute deniall, which may stirre vp some sedition, or misconceit, the counsell is, that hee salue this matter either by delaying the answer, or in such sort composing the promise in such generall and doubtfull termes, that they bind not a man precisely to the performance thereof. But heere is craft and subtiltie, farre different from true freedome, but this iniquitie of the petitioner is the cause thereof, and hee deserueth it. 10

Eightly, it must proceed from a manly heart, and hartie affection, *homo sum, humani à me nihil alienum puto, I am a man, and I think nothing belonging vnto man strange vnto me*, especially towards those that are afflicted and in want, and this is that which wee call mercie. They that haue not this affection, 11

*From a hartie affection.*

*Atropis & immanes* are inhumane, and carry the marks of dishonest men. But yet this must proceed from a strong, constant, and generous, not a soft, effeminate, and troubled minde: for that is a vitious passion, and which may fall into a wicked minde, whereof in this place wee haue already spoken: for there is a good and an euill mercie. A man must succour the afflicted, not afflicting himselfe, and applying the euill vnto himselfe, detract nothing from equitie, and honour; for God saith, that we must not haue pitie of the poore in iudgment: and so God and his Saints are said to be merciful and pitifull.

Ninthly, it must be without boasting, and shew, or publike proclamation thereof, for this is a kinde of reproch: These kinde of vaurts doe not onely take away the grace, but the credit, and make a benefit odious, *hoc est in odium beneficia perduncere*. And in this sense it is said, that a benefactor must forget his good deeds.

Hee must continuethem, and by new benefits confirme, and renewe the old, (this inuiceth the whole world to loue him, and to seeke his loue) and neuer repent himselfe of the old, howsoever it may seeme, that he hath cast his seed vpon a barraine and vnthankfull ground, *beneficij tui etiam infelicitas placeat, nusquam hac vox, vellem non fecisse*. Let euen the ill successe of thy good deeds please thee: neuer haue this in thy mouth, *I would I had not done it*. An vnthankfull man wrongs none but himselfe, and a good turne is not lost by his ingratitude; It is a holy consecrated thing that cannot be violated, nor extinguished by the vice of another. And it is no reason because another is wicked, that therefore a man should cease to bee good, or continue his office: and that which is more, the worke of a noble and generous heart is to continue to doe well, to breake and to vanquish the malice and ingratitude of another man, and to mend his manners, *optimi viri & ingentis animi est tamdiu ferre ingratum, donec feceris gratum: vincit malos pertinax bonitas*. The best men and generous mindes will beare so long with an ingratefull person, vntill with their goodnes they shall make him gratefull, persevering goodnes ouercometh the euill.

Lastly, not to trouble, or importune the receiuer in the fruition thereof, as they doe who hauing given an honor, or an office

12  
9 Without boasting.

13  
10. Continue them without repentance.

14  
11. Not to reuoke or trouble a good turne.

office to a man, will afterwards execute it themselves; or at leastwise procure them one good, that they may reape another themselves. He that is the receiuer, ought not to endure this, and therefore is not vnthankfull; and the benefactor defaceth the benefit, and cancelleth the obligation. One of our Popes denying a Cardinall an vniust boone which hee demanded, alleging vnto him that hee was the cause why hee was made Pope, answered him, Why then giue me leaue to be Pope, and take not that from me that thou hast giuen me.

After these rules and aduisements concerning good deeds, wee must know that there are some benefits more acceptable and welcome than others, and which are more or lesse binding. They are best welcome, that proceed from a friendly hand, from those whom a man is inclined to loue without this occasion; and contrarily it is a griefe to be obliged vnto him, whom a man likes not, and to whom hee would not willingly be indebted. Such benefits also are welcome, that come from the hand of him, that is any way bound to the receiuer: for heere is a kinde of iustice and they binde lesse. These good deeds that are done in necessities, and great extremities, carie with them a greater force, they make a man forget all iniuries and offences past, if there were any, and binde more strongly: as contrarily, the deniall in such cases is very iniurious, and makes a man forget all benefits past. Such benefits likewise, as may be requited with the like, are more gladly received, than their contraries, which ingender a kinde of hate; for he that findeth himself wholly bound, without any power or possibilitie of repaiment, as often as he seeth his benefactor, hee thinkes hee sees a testimonie of his inability or ingratitude, and it is irksome to his heart. There are some benefits, the more honest and gracious they are, the more burdensome are they to the receiuer, if hee be a man of credit, as they that tie the conscience and the will, for they locke faster, keepe a man in his right memorie, and some feare of forgetfulness, and failing his promise. A man is a safer prisoner vnder his word, than vnder locke and keie. It is better to be tied by ciuill and publike bands, than by the law of honestie, and conscience: two notaries are better than one. I trust your word and your faith, and conscience: heere is more honour done

15  
Distinctions  
of kinship.

done to the receiver; but yet constraint fastneth, soliciteeth, and presseth much more, and heere is more safetie to the lender; and a man carrieth himselfe more carelessly; because he doubteth not but that the law; and those outward ties will awaken him; when the time shall serue. Where there is constraint, the will is more loose, where there is lesse constraint, the will hath lesse libertie: *quod me ius cogit, vix à voluntate imperem.* I can hardly requeſt of my will, whis whigh the law constraineth me vnto.

16

*Obligation the  
mother and  
daughter of a  
benefit or good  
turne.*

From a benefit proceeds an obligation, and from it a benefit; and so it is both the child and the father; the effect, and the cause, and there is a twofold obligation; active and passive. Parents, princes and superiours, by the dutie of their charge, are bound to do good vnto those that are committed and commended vnto them, either by law or by nature; and generally al men that haue means are bound to releue those that are in want, or any affliction whatsoever, by the command of nature. Behold heere the first obligation; afterwards from benefits of good turnes; whether they be due, and springing from this first obligation, or free and pure merits, ariseth the second obligation; and discharge, whereby the receivers are bound to acknowledgements and thankfull requitall. All this is signified by *Megadon*, who hath made the Graces three in number; holding each other by the hands.

17

*The first obligation  
to mother.*

The first obligation is discharged by the good offices of every one that is in any charge, which shall presently bee discussed: of in the second part; which concerneth particular duties; but yet this obligation is strengthened; and weakened; and lessened accidentally by the conditions and actions of those that are the receivers. For their offences, ingratiitudes, and vnworthinesse doe in a manner discharge those, that are bound to haue care of them; and a man may almost say as much of their naturall defects too. A man may iustly with lesse affection loue that child, that kinsman, that subiect, that is not onely wicked and vnworthy, but foule, misshapen, crooked, vnfortunate; ill borne; God himselfe hath abated him much, from their naturall price and estimation; but yet a man must in this abatement of affection, keepe a iustice, and a moderation, for this concerneth not the helps and succors

of



of necessitie, and those offices that are due by publike reason, but onely that attention, and affection which is in the inward obligation.

The second obligation, which ariseth from benefits is that which we are to handle, and concerning which, we must at this time set down some rules: 1. the law of dutifull acknowledgement and thankfulness is naturall, witness beasts themselves, not only priuat and domestically, but cruel and sauage, among whom there are many excellent examples of this acknowledgement, as of the Lion towards the Roman slave. *Officium etiam fera sentiunt. Even wild beasts have a feeling of good offices done vnto them.* Secondly, it is a certaine act of vertue, and a testimonie of a good minde, and therefore it is more to bee esteemed than bountie or benefit, which many times procedes from abundance, from power, from love of a mans proper interest, and very seldome from pure vertue, whereas thankfulness springeth alwaies from a good heart; and therefore howsoever the benefit may be more to bee desired, yet kinde acknowledgement is farre more commendable. Thirdly, it is an easie thing, yea a pleasant, and that is in the power of every man. There is nothing more easie, than to doe according to nature, nothing more pleasing, than to bee free from bands, and to be at libertie.

18

The second obligation which is thankfulness.

By that which hath beene spoken, it is easie to see how base and villanous a vice forgetfulness and ingratitude is, how vnpleasing and odious vnto all men, *Dixeris maledicta cuncta, cum ingratum hominem dixeris, Thou speakest all the euill that may be said, when thou namest an vngratefull man.* It is against nature, and therefore Plato (speaking of his disciple Aristotle, calleth him an vngratefull mule. It is likewise without all excuse, and cannot come but from a wicked nature, *grauis vitium, intolerabile quod dissociat homines.* A Seneca. grieuous vice and intolerable which breaketh the societie of men. Reuenge which followeth an iniurie, as ingratitude a good turne, is much more strong and pressing (for an iniurie inforceth more than a benefit, *alius iniurie quam merita descendunt*) Iniuries sinke deeper into the minde, than deserts. It is a very violent passion, but yet nothing so base, so deformed

19

Of ingratitude.

med a vice as ingratitude. It is like those evils that a man hath, that are not dangerous, but yet are more grievous and painfull than they that are mortall. In reuenge there is some shew of iustice, and a man hides not himselfe, to worke his will therein; but in ingratitude there is nothing but base dishonnestie and shame.

20

R'o'is of thank-  
fulness.

Senec.

Idem.

Plin.

Thankfulnessse or acknowledgement that it may bee such as it should be, must haue these conditions. First he must graciously receiue a benefit, with an amiable and cheerefull visage and speech; *qui gratia beneficium accepit; primam eius pensionem soluit.* He which receiveth a benefit thankfully, discharge the first payment thereof. Secondly, he must neuer forget it, *Ingratissimus omnium qui oblitus, nusquam enim gratus fieri potest, cuius totum beneficium elapsum est.* He that forgetteth a benefit is of all other most ingratefull; for in no respect can he be made thankful, that hath utterly forgotten a good turne. The third office is to publish it; *ingenui pudoris est faceri per quos profecerimus, & hec quasi merces auctoris.* It is the part of an honest minde to confesse by whom we haue receiued profit, and this is as it were a reward to the author. As a man hath found the heart, and the hand of another, open to do good, so must he haue his mouth open to preach and publish it, and to the end the memorie thereof may be more firme and solemne, he must name the benefit, and that by the name of the benefactor. The fourth office is to make restitution, wherein hee must obserue these foure conditions: That it bee not too speedy, nor too curiously; for this carries an ill sent with it, and it bewraies too great an vnwillingnessse to be in debt, and too much haste to be quit of that band. And it likewise giueth an occasion to the friend or benefactor, to thinke that his curtesie was not kindly accepted of; for to be too carefull, and delirious to repay, is to incur the suspicion of ingratitude. It must therefore follow some time after, and it must not be too long neither, lest the benefit grow too ancient, (for the Graces are painted yong) and it must be vpon some apt & good occasion, which either offereth it selfe, or is taken, and that without noise and rumour. That it be with some vsurie, and surpasse the benefit, like fruitfull ground, *ingratus est, qui beneficium reddit sine usura,* He is unthankfull, who restoreth a benefit without profit, or at least

least equall it with all the shew and acknowledgement that may be, of great reason of a farther requittall, and that this is not to satish the obligation, but to give some testimonie that he forgetteth not how much he is indebted. That it bee willingly and with a good heart, *Ingratus est, qui metu gratus est; He is ungratefull, who is gratefull for feare.* For if it were so giuen, *eodem animo beneficium debetur, quo datur: errat si quis beneficium libentius accipit, quam reddit: A benefis ought to be restored with the same minde, wherewith it was giuen: he is to be blamed whosoever he be that receiveth a benefis more willingly than he restoreth it.* Lastly, if his inability be such, as that he cannot make present restitution, yet let his will bee forward enough, which is the first and principall part, and as it were the soule, both of the benefis and acknowledgement; though there be no other witnesse heereof than it selfe; and hee must acknowledge not onely the good hee hath received, but that likewise that hath bene offered, and might haue bene received, that is to say, the good will of the benefactor, which is, as hath bene said, the principall.

## The second part, which concerneth the

*speciall duties of certaine men, by certaine and speciall obligation.*

### THE PREFACE.

Being to speake of speciall and particular duties, differing according to the diuersitie of persons and their states, whether they be vnequall, as superiours and inferiours, or equall, we will beginne with married folkes, who are mixt, and hold with both equalitie and inequality. And so much the rather, because wee are first to speake of priuate and domestical iustice and duties, before publike, because they are before them; as families and houses are before common-weales, and therefore that priuate iustice which is obserued in a familie, is the image, and source, and modell of a common-weale. Now these priuate and domestical duties are three, that is to say, betwene the husband and the wife, parents and children, masters and seruants, and these are the parts of a house.

hold or familie, which taketh the foundation from the husband and the wife, who are the masters and authors thereof. And therefore first of married folke.

## CHAP. XII.

*The dutie of married folke.*

1  
*Common duties.*

According to those two diuers considerations that are in marriage, as hath been said, that is to say, equalitie and inequality, there are likewise two sorts of duties and offices of married folke, the one common to both, equally reciprocal of like obligation, though according to the custome of the world, the paine, the reproch, the inconvenience, be not equal: that is to say, an entire loyaltie, fidelitie, communitie, and communication of all things, and a care and authoritie over their familie, and all the goods of their house. Heereof we haue spoken more at large in the first booke.

2  
*Particular duties of the husband.*

The other are particular and different, according to that inequality that is betwixt them, for those of the husband are: 1. To instruct his wife with mildnesse in all things that belong vnto hir dutie, hir honor and good, whereof she is capable. 2. To nourish hir, whether she brought dowrie with hir or no. 3. To cloath hir. 4. To lie with hir. 5. To loue and defend hir: The two extremities are base and vitious, to hold hir vnder like a seruant, to make hir mistris by subiecting himselfe vnto hir. And these are the principall duties. These follow after, to comfort hir being sicke, to deliuer hir being captiue, to burie hir being dead, to nourish hir liuing, and to prouide for his children he hath had by hir, by his will and testament.

3  
*Of the wife.*

The duties of the wife, 1. are to giue honor, reuerence, and respect to hir husband, as to hir master and lord, for so haue the wisest women that euer were, termed their husbands, and the hebrew word *Baal* signifieth them both, husband and lord. She that dischargeth herselfe of this dutie honoreth hir selfe more than hir husband: and doing otherwise, wrongs none but hir selfe. 2. To giue obedience in all things iust and lawfull, applying and accommodating hir selfe to the maners and humours of hir husband, like a true looking-glasse, which faithfully

faithfully representeth the face, hauing no other particular delignement, loue, thought, but as the dimensions and accidents which haue no other proper action or motion, and neuer mooue but with the bodie, she applieth hir selfe in all things to hir husband. 3. Seruice, as to provide either by hir selfe or some other his viands, to wash his feet. 4. To keepe the house, and therefore she is compared to the Tortuis, and is painted hauing hir feet naked, and especially in the absence of hir husband. For hir husband being far from hir, she must be as it were invisible, and contrarie to the Moone (which appeareth in hir greatnes when she is farthest from the sunne) not appeare, but when she comes neere hir sunne. 5. To be silent, and not to speake but with hir husband, or by hir husband: and forasmuch as a silent woman is a rare thing and hardly found, she is said to be a pretious gift of God. 6. To

Ecclesiastes 16.

employ hir time in the practise and studie of huswifrie, which is the most commodious and honorable science and occupation of a woman, this is hir speciall mistris qualitie, and which a man of meane fortune should especially seeke in his marriage. It is the onely dowie that serueth either to ruinate, or preserue families, but it is very rare. There are diuers that are couetous, few that are good huswiues. Wee are to speake of them both, of household husbandrie presently by it selfe. In the priuat acquaintance and vse of marriage there must be a moderation, that is, a religious and deuout band, for that pleasure that is therein, must be mingled with some severitie; it must be a wise and conscionable delight. A man must touch his wife discretely and for honestie, as it is said, and for feare, as Aristotle saith, lest prouoking hir desires too wantonly, the pleasure thereof make hir to exceed the bounds of reason, and the care of health: for too hot and too frequent a pleasure altereth the seed, and hindreth generation. On the other side, to the end she be not ouer languishing, barraine, and subiect to other diseases, he must offer himselfe vnto hir though seldom. Solon saith thrice in a month; but there can no certaine law or rule be giuen heereof.

4  
An aduise-  
ment  
vpon the ac-  
quaintance of  
married folke.

Plutar. in Sa-  
lone.

The doctrine of household husbandrie doth willingly follow, and is annexed vnto marriage.

## CHAP. XIII.

## Household husbandrie.

1 **H**ousehold husbandrie is an excellent, iust, and profitable occupation. It is a happie thing saith *Plato*, for a man to goe through his priuate affaires without iniustice. There is nothing more beautifull than a household well and peaceably gouerned.

2 It is a profession which is not difficult, for he that is capable of any thing else, is not vncapable of this; but yet it is carefull, and painefull, and troublesome, by reason of the multitude of affaires, which though they be small and of no great importance, yet forasmuch as they are common & frequent, and neuer at an end, they doe much annoy and wearie a man. Domesticall thornes pricke, because they are ordinarie; but if they come from the principall persons of the familie, they gale and exulcerate, and grow remediless.

3 It is a great happinesse and a fit meane to liue at ease, to haue one whom a man may trust, and vpon whom he may repose himselfe, which that he may the better doe, he must choose one that is true and loyall, and afterwards bind him to doe well by that trust and confidence he putteth in him: *habita fides ipsam obligat fidem, multi fallere docuerunt, dum timent falli; & alijs in peccandi, suspicando dederunt.* Faith being giuen, bindes faith againe, many haue taught to deceiue, whilest they feare to be deceiued; and haue giuen occasion vnto others of offending, by suspecting them.

4 The principall precepts and counsels that belong to frugalitie, or good husbandrie are these: 1. To buy and sell all things at the best times and seasons, that is, when they are best and best cheape. 2. To take good heed lest the goods in the house bee spoiled or miscarrie, bee either lost or caried away; This doth especially belong to the woman, to whom *Aristotle* giues this authoritie and care. 3. To provide first and principally for these three, necessitie, cleanness, order: and againe, if there bee menes, some aduise to provide for these three too; but the wiser sort with no great paines to bee taken therein: *non ampli-*

*ter ſeconditer conſumunt: plus ſalis quàm ſumptus: A feaſt muſt not bee coſtly but cleanly; more worth than coſt.* Abundance, pompe, and preparation, exquisite and rich faſhion. The contrary is many times practiſed in good houſen, where you ſhall haue beds garniſhed with ſilke, embrodered with gold, and but one ſimple couerlid in winter, which were a commoditie farre more neceſſarie. And ſo of the reſt.

4. To rule and moderate his charge, which is done by taking away ſuperfluities, yet providing for neceſſitie, and that which is fit and beſeeming. A duckett in a mans purſe will doe a man more honour and honeſtie, than ten prodigally ſpent, ſaith one. Againe (but this requires induſtrie and good ſufficiencie) to make a great ſhew with a little charge, and aboue all, not to ſuffer the expence to grow aboue the receit and the income.

5. To haue a care and an eie ouer all; the vigilancie and preſence of the maſter, ſaith the prouerbe, fatteth the horſe and the land. And in any caſe the maſter and miſtreſſe muſt take a care to conceale their ignorance and inſufficiencie in the affaires of the houſe, and much more their careleſneſſe, making a ſhew as if they attended and thought of nothing elſe. For if officers and ſeruants haue an opinion that their maſters looke not vnto them, they may chance to make his haire grow thorow his hood.

### CHAP. XIII.

#### *The dutie of Parents and children.*

**T**He dutie of parents and children is reciprocall and reciprocally naturall: if that of children be more ſtrait, that of parents is more ancient, parents being the firſt authours and cauſe, and more important to a common-weale: for to people a ſtate, and to furniſh it with honeſt men and good citizens, the culture and good nourishment of youth is neceſſarie, which is the ſeed of a common-wealth. And there comes not ſo much euill to a weale publike by the ingratitude of children towards their parents, as by the careleſneſſe of parents in the inſtruction of their children: and therefore with great reaſon in Lacedemon and other good & politike ſtates,

there was a punishment and a penaltie laid vpon the parents when the children were ill conditioned. And *Plato* was wont to say, that he knew not in what a man should bee more carefull and diligent than to make a good sonne. And *Crates* cried out in choler, To what end doe men take so much care in heaping vp goods, and so little care of those to whom they shall leaue them? It is as much as if a man should take care of his shooe and not of his foot. What should he do with riches that is not wise and knowes not how to vse them? It is like a rich and beautifull saddle vpon a iades backe. Parents then are doubly obliged to this duty; both because they are their children, and because they are the tender plants, and hope of the Common-weale: This is to till his owne land together with that of the weale publicke.

2  
*The diuision of  
the office of pa-  
rents.*

Now this office or dutie hath foure successiue parts; according to those foure goods or benefits that a child ought to receiue successiue from his parents, life, nourishment, instruction, communication. The first regardeth the time, when the infant is in the wombe, vntill his comming into the world inclusiue: the second the time of his infancy in his cradle, vntill hee know how to goe and to speake: the third all his youth; this part must be handled more at large, and more seriously: the fourth concerneth their affection, communication and cariage towards their children now come to mansestate, touching their goods, thoughts, designments.

3  
*The first part,  
the office of pa-  
rents.*

The first, which regardeth the generation, and fruit in the wombe is not accounted of and obserued with such diligence as it ought, although it haue as much part in the good or euill of a child (as well of their bodies as their soules) as the education and instruction after they are borne and come to some growth. This is that that giueth the subsistence, the temper and temperature, the nature; the other is artificiall and acquired: and if there be a fault committed in this first part, the second and third can hardly repaire it, no more than a fault in the first concoction of the stomacke, cannot bee mended in the second nor third. We men go vnaduisedly and headlong to this copulation, only prouoked thereunto by pleasure, and a desire to disburthen our selues of that which tickleth and preisseth vs thereunto: if a conception happen thereby, it is

by



by chance, for no man goeth to it warily, and with such deliberation and disposition of bodie as hee ought, and nature doth require. Since then men are made at adventure, and by chance, it is no maruall if they seldome fall out to be beautiful, good, sound, wise and well composed. Behold then briefly, according to Philosophie the particular advisements touching this first point, that is to say, the begetting of male children, sound, wise and iudicious: for that which serueth for the one of these qualities, serues for the other. 1. A man must not couple himselfe with a woman that is of a vile, base and dissolute condition, or of a naughty and vicious composition of bodie. 2. Hee must abstaine from this action and copulation seuen or eight daies. 3. During which time he is to nourish himselfe with wholesome victuals, more hot and dry than otherwise, and such as may concoct well in the stomacke. 4. He must vse a more than moderate exercise. All this tendeth to this end and purpose, that the seed may be well concocted and seasoned, hot and dry, fit and proper for a masculine, sound and wise temperature. Vagabonds, idle and lazie people, great drinkers, who haue commonly an ill concoction, cuer beget effeminate, idle and dissolute children (as *Hippocrates* recounteth of the *Scythians*.) Againe a man must apply himselfe to this encounter after oue maner, a long time after his repast, that is to say, his belly being empty, and he fasting (for a full panch performes nothing good either for the mind or for the bodie) and therefore *Diogenes* reproched a licentious yong man, for that his father had begotten him being drunke. And the law of the *Carthaginians* is commended by *Plato*, which enioined a man to abstaine from wine that day that he lay with his wife. 6. And not neere the monthly tearmes of a woman, but six or seuen daies before, or as much after them. 7. And vpon the point of conception and retention of the seed, the woman turning and gathering herselfe together vpon the right side, let hir so rest for a time. 8. This direction touching the viands and exercise must bee continued during the time of hir burthen.

To come to the second point of this office after the birth of the infant, these foure points are to be obserued. 1. The infant must bee washed in warme water, somewhat brinish, to make

L. 1. de leg.

4  
The second part  
of the office of  
the parent.

Ezech. 16.

the members supple and firme, to cleanse and drie the flesh & the braine, to strengthen the sinewes, a very good custome in the Easterne parts & among the Iewes. 2. The nurse if she be to be chosen, let hir be young, of a temperature or complexion the least cold and moist that may be, brought vp in labour, hard lodging, slender diet, hardned against cold and heat. If say if she be to be chosen, because according to reason, and the opinion of the wisest, it should be the mother; and therefore they crie out against hir, when shee refuseth this charge, being inuited and as it were bound thereunto by nature, who to that end hath giuen hir milke and dugs, by the example of beasts, and that loue and iealousie that she ought to haue of hir little ones, who receiue a very great hurt by the change of their aliment, now accustommed in a stranger, and perhaps a bad one too, of a constitution quite contrarie to the former, whereby they are not to be accounted mothers but by halves. *Quod est hoc contra naturam, imperfectum, ac dimidium matris genus peperisse, & statim ab se abiicisse, aluisse in utero sanguine suo nescio quid quod non videret: non alere autem nunc suo lacte, quod videat iam viuentem, iam hominem, iam matris officia implorantem.*

Aul. Gell.  
L. 12. c. 1.

*It is a thing against nature imperfect and by halves, for a mother to bring forth a child, and presently to cast it from hir, to nourish in hir wombe with hir owne blood I know not what, which she saw not, and not nurse with hir milke that which she seeth already lining, a man, and imploring the duties of a mother.*

Galen. multis  
locis.  
Homer. 10.  
Iliad.  
Iliad. 7.

3. The nourishment besides the dug should be goates milke, or rather creame, the most subtile and aerie part of the milke, sod with honie and a little salt. These are things very fit for the bodie and the mind, by the aduice of all the wise and great Physitians, Greeks, and Hebrewes. *Butyrum, & mel comedet, ut sciat reprobare malum, & eligere bonum.* Let him eat butter and honie, untill hee be able to refuse the euill, and choose the good. The qualitie of milke or creame is very temperate, and full of good nourishment; the drinse of the honie and salt consumeth the too great humiditie of the braine, and disposeth it vnto wisdom. 4. The infant must by little and little be accustommed and hardned to the aire, to heat and cold: and we are not to be fearefull thereof; for in the Northern parts of the world they wash their children so soone as they come

OUT

out of the womb of their mothers in cold water, and are neuer the worse.

The two first parts of the office of parents we haue soone dispatched; whereby it appeareth, that they are not true fathers that haue not that care, affection and diligence in these matters that is fit; for they are the cause and occasion, either by carelesnelle or otherwise, of the death and vntimely birth of their children; and when they are born they care not for them, but expose them to their own fortunes, for which cause they are deuiued by law of that fatherly power ouer them that is due vnto them; and the children to the shame of their parents are made slaues by those that haue nourished them and brought them vp, who are farre from taking care to preserve them from fire and water, and all other croelles and afflictions that may light vpon them.

The third part which concerneth the instruction of children we are to handle more seriously. So soone as this infant is able to go and to speake, and shall begin to employ his mind and his bodie, and that the faculties thereof shall be awakened and shew themselves, the memory, imagination, reason, which begin at the fourth or fift yeare, there must be a great care and diligence vsed in the well forming thereof: for this first tincture and liquor wherewith the mind must be seasoned; hath very great power. It cannot be expressed how much this first impression and formation of youth preuaileth; euen to the conquering of nature it selfe. Nourture, saith one, excelleth nature. *Lycourus* made it plaine to all the world, by two little dogs of one litter, but diuersly brought vp, to whom presenting before them in an open place a pot of pottage and a hare, that which was brought vp tenderly in the house fell to the pottage; the other that had beene ever trained vp in hunting, forsooke the pottage and ranne after the hare. The force of this instruction proceeds from this, that it entereth easily, and departeth with difficultie: for being the first that entereth, it taketh such place and winneth such credit as a man will, there being no other precedent matter to contest with it, or to make head against it. This minde then wholly new and neat, soft and tender, doth easily receiue that impression that a man will giue vnto it, and afterwards doth not easily lose it.

Now

5

6

The third part  
of the office of  
parents.

An instruction  
very important.

Quint.  
Senec.

7

Now this is not a thing of small importance, but a man may rather say it is the most difficult and important that may be, For who seeth not that in a state all depends vpon this? Nevertheless (and it is the greatest, most dangerous and lamentable fault that is in our policies, noted by *Aristotle* and *Plutarch*) we see that the conduct and discipline of youth is wholly left vnto the charge and mercy of their parents what kind of men soeuer they be, many times carelesse, foolish, wicked, and the publicke state regardeth it not, cares not for it, whereby all goes to ruine. Almost the only states that haue giuen to the lawer the discipline of children, were that of Lacedæmon and Creet: But the most excellent discipline of the world for youth, was the Sparraine; and therefore *Ageslaus* perswaded *Xenophon* to send his children thither, for there, saith he, they may learne the most excellent science of the world; and that is to commaund and to obey well, and there are formed good Lawyers, Emperours at armes, Magistrates, Citizens. This youth and their instruction they esteemed a boue all things, and therefore *Aristotle* demanding of them ffirst children for hostages, they answered him, that they had rather giue him twice as many men at their ripest yeares.

Now before we enter into this matter, I will heere giue an aduertisement of some weight. There are some that take great paines to discover the inclinations of children, and for what imployment they shall be most fit; but this is a thing so obscure, and so uncertaine, that when a man hath bestowed what cost, and taken what paines he can, he is commonly deceived; And therefore not to tie our selues to these weake and light diuinations and prognostications, drawn from the motions of their infancie, lets vs indueor to giue them an instruction vniuersally good & profitable, whereby they are made capable, ready, and disposed to whatsoeuer. This is to goe vpon a sure ground, and to doe that which must alwayes be done. This shall be a good tincture, apt to receiue all others.

9

The diuision of  
this matter.

To make an entrance into this matter, we may referre it vnto three points, the forming of the spirit, the ordering of the bodie, the ruling of the manners. But before we giue any particular counsell touching these three, there are generall aduiselements that belong to the maner of proceeding in this businesse,

businesse, that shew vs how to cary our selues worthily and happily therein, which must be first known as a preamble to the rest.

The first is carefully to gard his soule, and to keepe it neat and free from the contagion and corruption of the world; that it receiue not any blot nor wicked attainture. And the better to doe this, hee must diligently keepe the gates, which are the eares especially, and then the eyes, that is to say, giue order, that not any, no not his owne father, come neere vnto him to buz into his eares any thing that is euill. There needs no more but a word, the least discourse that may be, to make an euill almost past reparation. Gard thine eares about all, and then thy eyes. And for this cause *Plato* was of opinion, that it was not fit that seruants and base persons should entertaine children with discourse, because their talke can bee no better than fables, vaine speeches and fooleries, if not worse. This were to traine vp and to feed those tender yeeres with follies and fooleries.

The second aduice concerneth not onely the persons that must haue charge of this childe; but the discourse and conference wherewith hee must be entertained; and the booke hee must reade. Touching the persons, they must be honest men, well borne, of a sweet and pleasing conuersation, hauing their head well framed, fuller of wisdom than of science, and that they agree in opinion together, lest that by contrarie counsels, or a different way in proceeding, the one by rigour, the other by flatterie, they hinder not one another, and trouble their charge and designements. Their booke and communication must not be of small, base, fortish, frivolous matters, but great and stridus, noble and generous; such as may role and enrich the vnderstanding, opinions, maners; as they that instruct a man in the knowledge of our humane condition; the motions and mysteries of our minds, to the end he may know himselfe and others. Such, I say, as may teach him what to feare, to shue, to desire; what passion is; what vertue, how hee may iudge betwixt ambition and avarice, sensitude and subiection, libertie and licentiousnesse. He is deceiued that thinketh that there is a greater proportion of spirit required to the vnderstanding of those excellent examples of *Valerius*

IO  
The first general aduice touching instruction.  
To gard the eares.

II  
The second general aduice touching the choice of instructors.  
Conference.  
Bookes.

*Maximus,*

*Maximus*, and all the Greeke and Romane histories (which is the most beautifull science and knowledge of the world) than to vnderstand *Amadis of Gaule*, and other like vaine and friuolous discourses. That childe that can know how many hennes his mother hath, and who are his vncles and his consens, will as easily cary away how many kings there haue been, and how many *Cesars* in *Rome*. A man must not distrust the capacitie and sufficiency of his minde, but know how to conduct and manage it.

12

The third gene  
rall aduert.  
Instruction  
milde and free.

The third is to ease himselfe towards him; and to proceed not after an austere, rude and seuerer maner, but sweetly, mildly, and cheerefully. And therefore wee doe heere altogether condemne that custome which is common in all places, to beat and to box, and with strange words and outcries, as the maner is in free-schools and colleges. For it is a custome too vniust, and as foule a fault, as when a Iudge or Physitian shall be moued to choler against an offender and patient: prejudiciall and quite contrary to that purpose that a man hath, which is to stir vp a desire in them; and to bring them in loue with vertue, wisdom, science, honestie. Now this imperious and rude cariage breeds in children a hatred, horreur and detestation of that they should loue; it prouoketh them, makes them head-strong, abateth and taketh away their courage, in such sort that their mindes become seruile, base and slauish, like their vsage; *Parentes ne provocetis ad iracundiam, filios vestros, ne despondeant animus.* Parents prouoke not your children to anger, lest they be discouraged. For seeing themselves thus handled, they neuer performe any thing of woorth, but curse their master and their apprenticeship. If they do that which is required at their hands, it is because the eye of the master is alwaies vpon them, it is for feare, and not cheerefully and nobly, and therefore not honestly. If they faile and performe not their taske, to save themselves from the rigour of the punishment, they haue recourse to base vnlawfull remedies, lies, false excuses, teares of despite, flights, triuings, all worse than the fault they haue committed.

Coloss. 3.

Terent.

*Dum id rescisum iri credis tantisper cauet; si sperat fore clam, rursus ad ingenuitatis:*

Ile,

*Ille, quem beneficium adiungat, ex animo facit;*

*Studet par referre, praesens, absensq; idem erit:*

*While he thinks twill be knowne, so long he will take heed:*

*He to his bias turnes, in hope 'tis knowne of none:*

*He whom you winne with loue, in deed will doe the deed,*

*Desirous to requite, present or absent one.*

My will is that they be handled freely and liberally, vsing therein reason, and sweet and milde perswasions, which ingender in their hearts the affections of honour and of shame. The first will serue them as a spur to what is good, the second as a bridle to checke and withdraw them from euill. There is something, I know not what, that is seruite and base in rigour and constraint, the enemy to honour and true libertie. Wee must cleane contrary fat their hearts with ingenuitie, libertie, loue, vertue and honour.

*Pudore & liberalitate liberos retinere*

*Satius esse credo, quam metu.*

*Hoc patrum est potius consuefacere filium*

*Sua sponte recte facere, quam alieno metu.*

*Hoc pater ac dominus interest, hoc qui nequis*

*Fateatur se ne scire imperare liberis.*

*I hold it better children vnto reare*

*With modestie and bonnie, than by feare.*

*T'enure a childe 'tis rather fathers law*

*To doe well of him selfe, than others awe.*

*A father and a master differ so;*

*So who can not, to rule sonnes doth not know.*

Terent.

Blowes are for bealls that vnderstand not reason: iniuries and brawles are for slaues. He that is once accustomed thereunto is mard for euer. But reason the beautie of action, the desire of honestie and honour, the approbation of all men, cheerefulness and comfort of heart, and the detestation of their contraries, as brutishnesse, basenesse, dishonour, reproch and the improbation of all men; these are the armes, the spurs and the bridles of children well borne, and such as a man would make honest men. This is that which a man should alwaies sound in their eares; and if these means cannot preuaile, all other of rigour and roughnesse shall neuer doe good. That which cannot be done with reason, wisdom, endeuour, shall neuer

neuer be done by force ; and if happily it be done, yet it is to small purpose. But these other meanes cannot be vnprofitable, if they be imploied in time, before the goodnesse of nature bespent and spilt. But yet for all this, let no man thinke that I approoue that loose and flattering indulgence, and foolish feare to giue children cause of discontent and sorrow, which is another extremitie as bad as the former. This were like the Iuie, to kill and make barren the tree which it embraceth, or the ape that killeth her yoong with culling them : or like those that feare to hold him vp by the haire of the head that is in danger of drowning, for feare of hurting him, and so suffer him to perish. Against this vice the wise Hebrew spake much. Youth must be held in obedience and discipline, not bodily like beasts and madmen, but spirituall, humane, liberrall according to reason.

Eccles. 30.

13  
Particular ad-  
uise-ments tou-  
ching the minde.

Wee come now to the particular and more expresse aduise-ments of this instruction. The first head of them is, as wee haue said, to exercise, sharpen and forme the minde. Whereupon there are diuers precepts, but the first principall and fundamentall of all others, which respecteth the end of instruction, and which I most desire to inculcate, because it is least embraced and followed, and euery man runneth after the contrarie, which is a common and ordinarie error, is, to haue much more, and the chiefe and principall care to exercise, to husband and manure, to vse the proper good, and much lesse to get and to endeavour the attainment of that which is strange ; to strue and study more for wisdom, than for science and Art ; rather well to forme the iudgement, and by consequence the will, and the conscience, than to fill the memorie, and to inflame the imagination. These are the three mistresse parts of a reasonable soule : But the first is the iudgement, as before hath bene discoursed, to which place I refend the Reader. Now the custome of the world is quite contrarie, which runneth wholly after Art, science, and what is acquired. Parents to the end they may make their children wise, are at great charge, and their children take great paines, *Ut omnium rerum, sic literarum intemperantia laboramus* : We are troubled with an immoderate desire of learning, as of all things else. And many times all is lost. But to make them wise, honest, apt and

L. 1. ca. 7.

T. 11.



and dexterious, which is a matter of small charge or labour, they take no care at all. What greater follie can there bee in the world, than more to admire science, that which is acquired, memorie, than wisdom, than nature? Now all commit northis fault with one and the same minde; some simply carried by custome, thinke that wisdom and science are not things different, or at leastwise, that they march alwaies together, and that it is necessarie a man haue the one to attaine the other; these kinde of men deserue to be taught: others goe out of malice, and they thinke they know well enough what they doe, and at what price soeuer it be they will haue Art and science: For this is a meane in these daies in the occidentall parts of Europe to get fame, reputation, riches. These kinde of people make of science an Art and merchandise, science mercenarie, pedanticall, base and mechanicall. They buy science to sell it againe. Let vs leaue these merchants as vncurable. Contrariwise, I cannot heere but blame the opinion and fashion of some of our gentlemen of France, (for in other nations this fault is not so apparent) who haue knowledge or Art in such disdain and contempt, that they do lesse esteeme of an honest man only for this, because he hath studied: they discard it as a thing that seemeth in some sort to impeach their nobilitie. Wherein they shew themselves what they are, ill borne, worse aduised, and truly ignorant of vertue and honour; which they likewise bewray in their cariage, their idlenesse, their impertinencies, their insufficiencie, in their insolencies, vanities, and barbarities.

To teach others, and to discouer the fault of all this, wee must make good two things; The one, that science and wisdom are things very different; and that wisdom is more worth than all the science or Art of the world; as heauen exceeds the price of the earth, gold of iron: The other, that they are not onely different, but that they seldome or neuer goe together, that they commonly hinder one another; hee that hath much knowledge or Art is seldome wise, and hee that is wise hath not much knowledge. Some exceptions there are heerein, but they are very rare, and of great, rich, and happie spirits. Some there haue beene in times past, but in these daies there are no more to be found.

14

*A comparison  
of science and  
wisdom.*

The

15  
The definition  
of science and  
wisedome.

The better to performe this, wee must first know what science and wisedome is. Science is a great heape, or accumulation and prouision of the good of another; that is, a collection of all that a man hath seen, heard and read in bookes, that is to say, of the excellent sayings and doings of great personages that haue beene of all nations. Now the garner or storehouse where this great prouision remaineth and is kept, the treasure of science and all acquired good, is the memorie. He that hath a good memorie, the fault is his owne if he want knowledge, because he hath the meane. Wisedome is a sweet and regular managing of the soule. He is wise that gouerneth himselfe in his desires, thoughts, opinions, speeches, actions, with measure and proportion. To be brieife, and in a word, wisedome is the rule of the soule: and that which manageth this rule is the iudgement, which seeth, iudgeth, esteemeth all things: rangeth them as they ought, giuing to euery thing that which belongs vnto it. Let vs now see their differences and how much wisedome excels the other.

16

Science is a small and barraine good in respect of wisedom, for it is not only not necessarie (for of three parts of the world two and more haue made little vse thereof) but it brings with it small profit, and serues to little purpose. 1. It is no way seruiceable to the life of a man: How many people rich and poore, great and small, liue pleasantly and happily, that haue neuer heard any speech of science? There are many other things more commodious and seruiceable to the life of man, and the maintenance of humane societie, as honor, glory, nobilitie, dignitie, which neuertheless are not necessarie. 2. Neither is it seruiceable to things naturall, which an ignorant sot may as well performe, as hee that hath best knowledge: Nature is a sufficient mistrisse for that. 3. Nor to honestie, and to make vs better, *paucis est opus literis ad bonam mentem*, Little learning is requisite for a good minde, nay, it rather hindreth it. He that will marke it well shall find not onely more honest people, but also more excellent in all kind of vertue amongst those that know little, than those that know most, witnesse Rome, which was more honest being yong and ignorant, than when it was old, craftie and cunning. *Simplex illa & aperta virtus in obscuram & solertem scientiam versa est.*  
That

That simple and open vertue is turned into obscure and craftie knowledge. Science serueth not for any thing, but to invent crafts and subtleties, artificiall cunning, deuises, and whatsoeuer is an enemie to innocencie, which willingly lodgerth with simplicitie and ignorance. Atheisme, errours, sects, and all the troubles of the world haue risen from the order of these men of arte and knowledge. The first temptation of the diuel, saith the scripture, and the beginning of all euil, and the ruine of mankind, was the opinion and the desire of knowledge: *Eritis sicut diu scientes bonum & malum. Yee shall bee as gods, knowing good and euill.* The Sirenes to deceiue and intrap *Vlysses* within their snares, offered vnto him the gift of science; and *S. Paul* adviseth you all to take heed, *ne quis vos seducat per philosophiam. Let no man seduce you through their philosophie.*

Solomon in  
his Ecclesiast.

One of the sufficientest men of knowledge that euer was, spake of Science, as of a thing not only vaine, but hurtfull, painfull, and tedious. To bee brieft, Science may make vs more humane and courteous, but not more honest. 4. Againe, it serueth nothing to the sweetning of our life, or the quitting vs of those euils that oppresse vs in the world; but contrarily it increaseth and sharpneth them, witneisse children and fooles, simple and ignorant persons, who measuring euery thing by the present taste, run thorow them with the lesse griefe, beare them with better content, than men of greatest learning and knowledge. Science anticipateth those euils that come vpon vs, in such sort that they are sooner in the soule of man by knowledge, than in nature. The wiseman said, that hee that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow: Ignorance is a more fit remedie against all euils, *iners malorum remedium ignorantia est. Ignorance is the idle remedie of euils.* From whence proceed those counsels of our friends. Thinke not of it, put it out of your head and memorie. Is not this to cast vs into the armes of ignorance, as into the best and safest sanctuarie that may be? But this is but a mockerie, for to remember and to forget is not in our power. But they would do as Chirurgions vse to doe, who not knowing how to heale a wound, yet set a good shew vpon it by allaying the paine and bringing it asleepe. They that counsell men to kill themselves in their extreame and remediless euils, do they not send a man

Ecclesiastes 1.  
13.

to ignorance, stupiditie, insensibilitie? Wisedome is a necessarie good, and vniuersally commodious for all things: it governeth and ruleth all: there is not any thing that can hide, or quit it selfe of the iurisdiction or knowledge thereof: It beareth sway euery where, in peace, in warre, in publike, in priuat: It ruleth and moderateth euen the insolent behauiours of men, their sports, their daunces, their banquets, and is as a bridle vnto them. To conclude, there is nothing that ought not to be done discreetly and wisely; and contrarily, without wisdom all things fall into trouble and confusion.

17 Secondly, Science is seruile, base, and mechanall in respect of wisdom, and a thing borrowed with paine. A learned man is like a crow deckt with the feathers that he hath stolen from other birds. He maketh a great shew in the world, but at the charge of another, and he had need to vaile his bonnet often, as a testimonie of that honour he giues to those from whom he hath borrowed his arte. A wise man is like him that liues vpon his owne reuenues; for wisdom is properly a mans owne; it is a naturall good well tilled and laboured.

18 Thirdly, the conditions are diuers, the one more beautifull and more noble than the other. Learning or Science is fierce, presumptuous, arrogant, opinatiue, indiscreet, querulous, *sentia insular: Knowledge puffeth vp.* 2. Science is talkatiue, desirous to shew it selfe, which neuertheless knowes not how to doe any thing, is not actiue, but only fit to speake and to discourse: wisdom acteth and governeth all.

Learning then and wisdom are things very different, and wisdom of the two the more excellent; more to be esteemed than science. For it is necessarie, profitable to all, vniuersall, actiue, noble, honest, gracious, cheerefull. Science is particular, vnnecessary, seldome profitable, not actiue, seruile, mechanall, melancholicke, opinatiue, presumptuous.

19  
Learning and  
wisdom meet  
not together.

We come now to the other point, and that is, that they are not alwaies together, but contrarily almost alwaies separated. The naturall reason, as hath been said, is, that their temperatures are contrarie. For that of science and memorie is moist, and that of wisdom and iudgement dry. This also is signified vnto vs, in that which happened to our first parents, who as soone as they cast their eyes vpon knowledge, they presently

sently desired it, and so were robbed of that wisdomewhere-  
withall they were indued from their beginning; whereof we  
every day see the like in common experience. The most  
beautifull and flourishing states, Common-weales, Empires,  
ancient and moderne, haue beene and are gouerned very  
wisely, both in peace and warre, without science. *Rome* the  
first five hundred yeeres, wherein it flourished in vertue and  
valour, was without knowledge; and so soone as it began to  
be learned, it began to corrupt, to trouble, and ruinate it selfe  
by ciuill warres. The most beautifull policie that euer was,  
the Lacedemonian built by *Lycorgus*, from whence haue  
sprung the greatest personages of the world, made no profes-  
sion of learning, and yet it was the schoole of vertue and wise-  
dome, and was euer victorious ouer *Athens*, the most learned  
citie of the world, the schoole of all science, the habitation of  
the Muses, the store-house of Philosophers. All those great  
and flourishing realmes of the east and west Indies, haue stood  
for many ages together without learning, without the know-  
ledge of bookes or writings. In these dayes they learne ma-  
ny things, by the good leaue and assistance of their new ma-  
sters, at the expence of their owne libertie, yea their vices  
and their subtilties too, whereof in former times they neuer  
heard speech. That great, and it may be the greatest and most  
flourishing state and Empire which is at this day in the world,  
is that of that great Lord, who like the Lion of the whole  
earth, makes himselfe to be feared of all the Princes and Mo-  
narks of the world; and euen in this state, there is not any pro-  
fession of science, nor schoole, nor permission or allowance to  
read, or teach publickly, no not in matters of religion. What  
guideth & gouerneth, and maketh this state to prosper thus?  
It is wisdom, it is prudence. But come wee to those states  
wherin learning and sciences are in credit. Who do gouerne  
them? Doubtlesse not the learned. Let vs take for example  
this our realme, wherein learning and knowledge haue greater  
honor than in all the world besides, and which seemeth to  
haue succeeded Greece it selfe: The principall officers of this  
croune, the Constable, Marshall, Admirall, the Secretaries of  
the state, who dispatch all affaires, are commonly men alto-  
gether illiterate. And doubtlesse, many great Lawyers, foun-

Wisdomewith-  
out science.

Science without  
wisdom.

Ad. 16

ders, and Princes haue banished science as the poyson and pe-  
rilence of a Common-wealth; *Licinius, Valentinian, Mahomet, Lycurgus.* And thus wee see what wisdom is without  
science. Let vs now see what science is without wisdom,  
which is not hard to doe. Let vs looke a little into those that  
make profession of learning, that come from Schooles and  
Vniuersities, and haue their heads full of *Aristotle, Cicero, Bur-*  
*tolus.* Are there any people in the world more vntoward,  
more sottish, more vnfit for all things? From hence com-  
meth that prouerbe, that when a man would describe a foole,  
or an vntowardly person, hee calleth him Clerke, Pedante:  
And to expresse a thing ill done, it is the manner to say, It is  
Cleark-like done. It should seeme that learning dorth inroxi-  
cate, and as it were hammer a mans braines, and makes him  
to turne for and foole, as king *Agrippa* said to *S. Paul*, *Mul-*  
*ta te litera ad insaniam adducunt.* Much learning maketh thee  
mad. There are diuers men that had they neuer been trained  
vp in schooles and colleges, they had been farre more wise:  
and their brethren that haue neuer applied themselves to lear-  
ning, haue prooued the wiser men: *Vromelius fuisse non didi-*  
*cisse: nam postquam docti prodierunt, boni desunt.* So that it had  
beene better they had neuer beene learned: for after they became  
learned, they left off from being good. Come to the practice, chuse  
me one of these learned schollers, bring him to the common  
counsell of a cittie, or any publike assembly, wherein the af-  
fares of the state are consulted of, or matter of policie, or  
household husbandrie, you neuer saw a man more astonished,  
he waxeth pale, bluseth, cougheth, and at last knowes not  
what to say. And if he chance to speake, he entrench into a long  
discourse of definitions, and diuisions of *Aristotle*; ergo pot-  
lead. Marke in the selfe-same counsell, a merchant, a burges,  
that neuer heard speake of *Aristotle*, he will yeeld a better rea-  
son, giue a sounder iudgement and more to purpose than these  
scholasticall doctors.

20  
There:son of  
this separation.

Now it is not enough to haue said, that wisdom and lear-  
ning seldom concurre and meet together, vnlesse wee seeke  
the reason and cause thereof, not doubting thereby but suffi-  
ciently to content and to satisfie those, that mislike what I  
haue said, or thinke me perhaps an euemie to erudition and  
learning.

learning. The question thereof is, from whence it cometh that learning and wisdom doe seldom encounter and mee together in one and the same man : And there is great reason why wee should mooue this question : for it is a strange thing and against reason, that a man the more learned hee is, should not be the more wise, learning and knowledge being a proper meanes, and instrument vnto wisdom. Behold therefore two men, the one a student, the other none ; hee that hath studied, is in some sort bound to be farre the wiser of the two, because hee hath all that the other hath, that is nature, reason, iudgement, spirit ; and besides these the counsels, discourses, iudgements of all the greatest men of the world, by reading their books. Is there not then great reason, he should be much more wise, more dexterious, more honest than the other, since that with these proper and naturall meanes, he attaineth so many extraordinarie on euery side ? For as one saith well, the naturall good cohering and concurring with the accidentall frameth an excellent composition : and yet neuer thelesse, we see the contrarie, as hath beene sayd.

Now the true reason and answer to all this, is the euill and sinister maner of studie and ill instruction. They learne out of bookes and schooles excellent knowledge, but with ill meanes, and as bad successe. Whereby it comes to passe, that all their studie profiteth them nothing at all, but they remaine indigent and poore, in the midst of their plentie and riches, and like *Tantalus*, die for hunger in the midst of their dainties : the reason is, because whilst they pore vpon their bookes, they respect nothing so much as to stuffe and furnish their memories with that which they read and vnderstand, and presently they thinke themselves wise : like him that put his bread into his pocket and not into his belly, when his pocket was full, died for hunger. And so with a memory fully stuffed, they continue fooles ; *Student non sibi & vite, sed alijs & schola. They studie not for themselves, and for the benefit of their life, but for others, and for the schooles.* They prepare themselves to bee reporters ; *Cicero* hath sayd it, *Aristotle*, *Plato* hath left it in writiug, &c. but they for their parts know nothing. These men commit a double

21

An answer to  
all discipline.



fault, the one in that they apply not that which they learne, to themselves, that so they may forme themselves vnto vertue, wisdom, resolution, by which meanes their knowledge is vnprofitable vnto them : the other is, that during all that time, which with great paines and charge they employ, to the heaping together and pocketing vp for another without any profit to themselves, whatsoever they can rob from other men, they suffer their owne proper good to fall to the ground, and neuer put it in practise. They on the other side that studie not, hauing no recourse vnto another, take a care to husband their naturall gifts, and so prooue many times the better, the more wise, & resolute, though lesse learned, lesse gainers, lesse glorious. One there is that hath sayd as much, though otherwise and more briefly ; That learning marreth weake wits and spirits, perfecteth the strong and naturall.

23

*Good discipline.*

Now hearken to that counsell that I giue heereupon ; A man must not giue himselfe to the gathering and keeping the opinions and knowledges of another, to the end hee may afterwards make report of them, or vse them for shew or ostentation, or some base and mercenary profit ; but he must vse them so, as that he may make them his owne. Hee must not onely lodge them in his minde, but incorporate and transubstantiate them into himselfe. He must not onely water his minde with the dew of knowledge, but hee must make it essentially better, wise, strong, good, courageous ; otherwise to what end serueth studie ? *Non paranda nobis solum, sed fructu sapientia est.* *Wisdom is not onely to bee gotten by vs, but to bee in-joyed.* Hee must not doe as it is the maner of those that make garlands, who picke heere and there whole flowers, and so carry them away to make nose-gaies, and afterwards presents, heape together out of that booke and out of this booke many good things, to make a faire and a goodly shew to others ; but he must do as bees vse to doe, who carie not away the flowers, but settle themselves vpon them, like a hen that couereth hir chicken, and draweth from them their spirit, force, vertue, quintessence, and nourishing themselves, turne them into their owne substance, and afterwards make good and sweet honie, which is all their owne ; and it is no more



more either thyme or sweet marjoram So must a man gather from bookes the marrow and spirit (neuer enthralling himselfe so much as to retaine the words by heart, as many vse to doe, much lesse the place, the booke, the chapter; that is a foolish and vaine superstition and vanitie, and makes him lose the principall) and hauing sucked and drawen the good, feed his minde therewith, informe his iudgement, instruct and direct his conscience and his opinions, rectifie his will; and in a word, frame vnto himselfe a worke wholly his owne, that is to say, an honest man, wise, aduised, resolute. *Non ad pompam nec Tacit. ad speciem, nec ut nomine magnifico sequi otium velis, sed quo firmiter aduersus fortuna rempublicam capeffas: Not for pompe, or ostentation, nor to the end thou wouldest follow ease with a glorious name, but that thereby thou maist more firmly take vpon thee the gouernment of the common-wealth against all accidents.*

And heereunto the choice of sciences is necessarie. Those that I commend aboue all others, and that best serue to that end, which I propose and whereof I am to speake, are naturall and morall, which teach vs to liue, and to liue well, nature and vertue; that which we are, and that which we should be: vnder the morall are comprehended, the Politicks, Oeconomickes, Histories. All the rest are vaine and frothie, and we are not to dwell vpon them, but to take them as passing by.

This end of the instruction of youth and comparison of learning and wisdom, hath held mee too long, by reason of the contestation. Let vs now proceed to the other parts and aduiselements of this instruction. The meanes of instructions are diuers, especially of two sorts; the one by word, that is to say, by precepts, instructions and lectures; or else by conference with honest and able men, filing and refining our wits against theirs, as iron is cleansed and beautified by the file; This meanes and manner is very pleasing and agreeable to nature.

The other by action, that is, example, which is gotten not onely from good men by imitation, and similitude, but also wicked, by disagreement in opinions; For some there are that learne better by the opposition and horror of that euill they see in another. It is a speciall vse of Iustice, to condemne one, that he may serue for an example vnto others. And old Cato

was wont to say, That wise men may learne more of fooles, than fooles of wise men. The Lacedemonians the better to dissuade their children from drunkennesse, made their seruants drunken before their faces, to the end that seeing how horrible a spectacle a drunken man was, they should the rather detest it.

*A comparison  
of these two.*

Now this second meanes or maner by example, teacheth vs with more ease and more delight. To learne by precepts is a long way, because it is a painefull thing to vnderstand well, and vnderstanding to retaine well, and retaining to vse and practisewell. And hardly can wee promise our selues to reape that fruit which they promise vnto vs. But example and imitation teach vs about the worke or action it selfe, inuite vs with much more ardour, and promise vnto vs that glory which wee learne to imitate. The seed that is cast into the earth draweth vnto it selfe in the end the qualitie of that earth whereunto it is transported, and becomes like vnto that which doth there naturally grow: So the spirits and maners of men conforme themselves to those with whom they commonly conuerse.

26

*From the liuing*

Now these two maners of profiting by speech and by example, are likewise twofold, for they are drawn from excellent personages, either liuing, by their sensible and outward frequentation and conference; or dead, by the reading of their bookes. The first, that is the commerce with the liuing, is more liuely and more naturall, it is a fruitfull exercise of life, which was much in vse amongst the ancients, yea the Greeks themselves, but it is casuall depending on another, and rare: It is a difficult matter to meete with such people, and more difficult to make vse of them. And this is practised either by keeping home, or by traueilling and visiting strange countries, not to be fed with vanities as the most doe, but to carie with them the knowledge and consideration especially of the humours and customes of those nations. This is a profitable exercise, the bodie is neither idle, nor tyred with labour, for this moderate agitation keepes a man in breath, the minde is in continuall exercise, by marking things knownen and new. There is not a better schoole to forme the life of man, than to see the diuersitie of so many other liues, and to taste a perpetuall

tuall varietie of the formes of our nature.

The other commerce with the dead by the benefite of their bookes, is more sure, and more neere vnto vs, more constant, and lesse chargeable. Hee that knowes how to make vse of them, receiueith thereby great pleasure, great comfort: It dischargeeth vs of the burthen of a tedious idlenesse, it withdraweth vs from fond imaginations, and other outward things, that vex and trouble vs: It counselleth vs, and comforteth vs in our griefes and afflictions: but yet it is onely good for the minde, whereby the bodie remaineth without action, altereth and languisheth.

27  
From the dead  
by bookes.

We must now speake of that order of proceeding and formalitie which a teacher of youth must keepe, that hee may happily arriue to his proposed end. It hath many parts; wee will touch some of them. First, hee must often examine his scholler, aske his iudgement and opinion of whatsoeuer shall present it selfe vnto him. This is quite contrarie to the ordinarie stile, which is that the matter doe alwaies speake and teach his child with authoritie, and worke into his head as into a vessell, whatsoeuer he will, in so much that children are onely auditors and receiuers, which maner of teaching I can not commend, *obest plerunq; is, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum qui docent. The authoritie of them which teach, hurteth for the most part those which would learne.* Their spirits must be awakened & inflamed by demands, make them first to giue their opinions, & then giue them the same libertie, to aske others, to inquire & to open the way at their owne wil. If without questioning with them a man speake wholly vnto them, it is a labor in a maner lost, the child is not profited thereby, because he thinks it belongs not vnto him, so long as he yeelds not an account thereof; he lends onely his eares and those coldly too; he sets not forward with so good a pace, as when he is a partie in the businesse. Neither is it enough to make them giue their iudgement, but that they maintaine it; and bee able to giue a reason of their saying, to the end that they speake not by rote, but that they be attentiu, and carefull of that they speake: and to giue them the better encouragement therevnto, a man must not seeme to neglect that they say, but commend at the least their good essay and indeuour. This forme of teaching

28  
To make the  
scholler to speake  
and so reason.

by

Math. 16. 22.  
Luk. 10. & 24.

by questions and demands is excellently obserued both by *Socrates* (the principall in this businesse) as wee see euery where in *Plato*, where by a long annexion and enfoldings of demands wittily and dexteriously made, hesweetly leadeth a man to the closet of verity; and also by the Doctor of veritie in his Gospell. Now these questions must not be onely of things touching science and memorie, as hath beene said, but matter of iudgement. For to this exercise all things may serue, euen the least that are, as the follies of a Laquey, the malice of a Page, a discourse at table: for the worke of iudgement is not to handle and to vnderstand great and high matters, but iustlie to weigh them, and consider of them whatsoeuer they bee. Questions therefore must bee mooued touching the iudgement of men and their actions, and by reason determined, to the end that thereby men may frame their iudgement and their conscience. The tutor or instructour of *Cyrus* in *Xenophon* for a lecture proposed this question; A great youth hauing a little coat or callocke, gaue it to one of his companions of a lesse stature, and tooke from him his callocke, which was the greater: vpon which fact he demanded his iudgement. *Cyrus* answered, that it was well, because both of them were thereby the better fitted. But his master reprehended him sharply for it, because hee considered onely the finesse and conueniencie thereof, and not the iustice, which should first and especially haue beene thought of, which was, that no man may be enforced in that which was his owne. And this no doubt is an excellent maner of instruction. And though a man may recite authorities out of bookes, the sayings of *Cicero* or *Aristotle*, yet it is not onely to recite them, but to iudge of them, and so to frame and fashion them to all vses, and to apply them to diuers subjects. It is not enough to report as a historie, that *Cato* kild himselfe at *Utique*, that heemight not fall into the hands of *Cesar*; and that *Brutus* and *Cassius* were the authours of the death of *Cesar*; for this is the least: but I will that he proceed and iudge, whether they did well heerein or no; whether they deserued well of the common-weale; whether they carried themselues therein according to wisdom, iustice, valour; and wherein they did ill, wherein well. Finally and generally,

nerally, in all these discourses, demands, answers, the convenience, order, veritie, must bee inquired into,, a worke of iudgment and conscience. These things a man by any means must not dissemble, but ever preesse them, and hold him subiect vnto them.

Secondly, he must accustome and frame him to an honest curiositie to know all things, whereby he must first haue his eyes vpon euery thing, the better to consider all that may bee said, done or attempted concerning himselfe, and nothing must passe his hands, before it passe and repasse his iudgment; and then hee must make an enquire into other matters, as well of right as of action. He that enquireth after nothing, knowes nothing, saith one; Hee that busieth not his minde, suffereth it to rust, and becomes a foole; and therefore hee must make profit of all, apply euery thing to himselfe, take advice and counsell, as well of what is past, the better to see the errour he hath committed, as of that which is to come, the better to rule and direct himselfe. Children must not be suffered to bee idle, to bring themselves asleepe, to entertaine themselves with their owne prattle; for wanting sufficiency to furnish themselves with good and worthy matter, they will feed vpon vanities; they must therefore be alwaies busied in some employment, and kept in breath, and this curiositie must be ingendred in them, the better to awaken them, and to spurre them forward, which being such as is said, shall be neither vaine in it selfe, nor tedious to another.

He must likewise fashion and mould his spirit to the general paterne and modell of the world and of nature, make it vniuersall, that is to say, represent vnto him in all things, the vniuersall face of nature: that the whole world may bee his booke: that of what subiect soeuer a man talke, hee cast his eye and his thought vpon the large immensitie of the world, vpon so many different fashions and opinions, which haue beene, and are in the world touching that subiect. The most excellent and noble mindes, are the more vniuersall and more free; and by this meanes the minde is contented, learneth not to be astonished at any thing, is formed to a resolution and stedfast constancie. To be brieue, such a man doth no more

39

5 An aduise-  
ment touching  
honest curiositie.

30

6 Advice.

more admire any thing, which is the highest and last point of wisdom. For whatsoever doth happen, or a man may report vnto him, he easily singeth that there is nothing in the world either new or strange; that the condition of man is capable of all things; that they haue come from others, and that elswhere diuers things passe more strange, more great. And in this sense it was that wise *Socrates* called himselfe a citizen of the world. And contrarily, there is not any thing that doth more depraue and enthrall the minde of man, than to make him taste and vnderstand but one certaine opinion, beleefe, and manner of life. What greater follie or weaknesse can there be, than to thinke that all the world walketh, beleeueth, speaketh, doth, liueth and dieth according to the maner of his countrey? like those harde block-heads, who when they heare one recite the maners and opinions of forraine countries, very different and contrary to theirs, they tremble for feare, and beleue them not, or else doe absurdly condemne them as barbarous, so much are they enthralled and tied to their cradell, a kinde of people brought vp (as they say) in a bottle, that neuer saw any thing but thorow a hole. Now this vniuersall spirit must bee attained by the diligence of the master or teacher, afterwards by travell, and communication with strangers, and the reading of bookes and the histories of all nations.

31.

Finally, he must teach him to take nothing vpon credit and by authoritie: this is to make himselfe a beast, and to suffer himselfe to be led by the nose like an ox; but to examine all things with reason, to propose all things, and then to giue him leaue to chuse. And if hee know not how to chuse, but doubt, which perhaps is the better, sounder, and surer course, to teach him likewise to resolute of nothing of himselfe, but rather to distrust his owne iudgement.

32.  
An aduise-  
ment  
touching the  
body.

After the minde comes the body, whereof there must likewise be a care taken, at one and the same instant with the spirit, not making two workes thereof. Both of them make an entire man. Now a master must endeouour to keepe his childe free from delicacie and pride in apparell, in sleeping, eating, drinking; he must bring him vp hardly to labour and paines, accustome him to heat and cold, winde and weather, yea and vnto hazards too; harden his muscles and his sinewes,

as well as his minde, to labour, and then to paine and griefe too; For the first disposeth to the second: *Labor calum obducit dolori*: Labour hardneth a man against griefe. To be briefe, he must endeavour to make him lustie and vigorous, indifferent to all kinde of viands. All this serueth not only for his health, but for publike affaires and seruices.

Wee come now to the third head which concerneth manner, wherein both body and soule haue a part. This is twofold; To hinder the euill, to ingraft and to nourish the good. The first is the more necessary, and therefore the greater care and heed must be taken. It must therefore be done in time, for there is no time too speedie, to hinder the birth and growth of all manner and conditions, especially these following, which are to be feared in youth.

33  
An aduise-  
ment touching  
manners.

To lie, a base vice of seruants and slaues, of ambitious and fearefull minde; the cause whereof ariseth many times from bad and rude instruction.

1  
Evill manners.

A sottish shame and weaknesse, whereby they seek to hide themselves; hold downe their heads, blush at every question that is proposed; cannot endure a correction, or a sharpe word, without a strange alteration of countenance. Nature doth many times beate a great sway heerein, but it must be corrected by studie.

2

All affectation and singularitie in habit, carriage, gate, speech, gesture, and all other things; this is a testimonye of vanitie and vaine-glory, and marreth all the rest, even that which is good. *Licet sapere sine pompa, sine inuidia*: A man may be wise without pompe, without enuie.

3

But aboue all, choler, fullennesse, obstinacie; and therefore it is very necessarie that a childe neuer haue his will by such froward meanes, and that hee learne and finde that these qualities are altogether vnprofitable and bootlesse, yea base and villancous; and for this cause hee must neuer be flattered, for that marreth and corrupteth him, teacheth him to be fullen and froward, if hee haue not his will, and in the end maketh him insolent, that a man shall neuer worke any good vpon him. *Nihil magis reddit iracundos, quam educatio mollis & blanda*: Nothing more maketh one prone to anger, than soft and coddling education.

4

By



34  
Good maner.

By the selfesame meanes a man must ingraft into him good and honest maners; And first instruct him to feare and reuerence God, to tremble vnder that infinite and inuisible maiestie, to speake seldome and soberly of God, of his power, eternitie, wisdom, will, and of his workes; not indifferently and vpon all occasions, but fearfully, with shame and reuerence. Not to be ouer scrupulous in the mysteries and points of religion, but to conforme himselfe to the gouernment and discipline of the church.

2 Secondly, to replenish and cherish his heart with ingenuitie, freedome, candor, integritie, and to teach him to be an honest man, out of an honorable and honest minde, not seruilly and mechanically for feare, or hope of any honour or profit, or other consideration, than vertue it selfe. These two are especially for himselfe.

3 For another and the company with whom hee conuerseth, he must worke in him a sweet kinde of affabilitie to accomodate himselfe to all kinde of people, to all fashions. *Omnis Aristippum decuit color, & status, & res: Emula comitenance, conditio and gestura became Aristippum.* Heerein Alcibiades was excellent. That he learne how to be able, and to know how to doe all things, yea excessse and licentious behauiours if neede be; but that he loue to doe only that which is good. That he refraine to doe euill, not for want of courage, nor strength, nor knowledge, but will. *Multum interest vtrum peccare quis nolit, aut nesciat: There is great difference in not being willing to sinne, and not being able.*

35  
See Lib. 2.  
cap. 9.

Modestly, whereby he contesteth not, nor tieth himselfe, either to all, as to the greatest and most respectiue persons, or such as are his inferiors either in condition or sufficiencie, nor defendeth any thing obstinately, with affirmatiue, resolute, commanding words, but sweet, submisse and moderate speeches. Heereof hath beene spoken elsewhere. And thus the three heads of the duties of parents towards their children are dispatched.

36  
The fourth part  
touching the du-  
tie of parents.

The fourth concerneth their affection and communicati-  
on with them, when they are great and capable of that where-  
unto they were instructed. Wee know that affection is reci-  
procall and naturall betwixt parents and their children, but  
that



that of parents towards their children is farre more strong and more naturall, because it is giuen by nature to loue those things that are comming on to the maintenance and continuance of the world, especially those in whom a man doth liue when he is dead. That of children towards their parents is retrograde, and therefore it goeth not so strongly, nor so naturally; and it seemeth rather to be the payment of a debt, and a thankfull acknowledgement of a benefit receiued, than a pure, free, simple, and naturall loue. Moreover, he that giueth and doth good, loueth more than he that receiueth and is indebted: And therefore a father and euery agent that doth good to another, loueth more than he is beloued. The reasons of this proposition are many. All loue to be (which being is exercised and demonstrated in motion and action.) Now hee that giueth, and doth good to another, is after a sort in him that receiueth. Hee that giueth and doth good to another, doth that which is honest and honourable; hee that receiueth doth none of this: honestie is for the first, profit for the second. Now honestie is farre more worthy, firme, stable, amiable, than profit, which in a moment vanisheth. Againe, those things are most beloued that cost vs most; that is dearest vnto vs, which we come more dearely by. Now to beget, to nourish, to bring vp, is a matter of greater charge, than to receive all these.

*The loue of parents greater than the loue of children.*

This loue of parents is twofold, though alwaies naturall, yet after a diuers maner: the one is simply and vniuersally naturall, and as a simple instinct which is common with beasts, according to which parents loue and cherish their children, though deformed, stammering, halting, milke-sops, and vse them like noppets, or little apes. This loue is not truly humane. Maie endued with reason, must not seruilely subiect himselfe vnto nature as beasts doe, but follow it more nobly with discourse of reason. The other then is more humane and reasonable, whereby a man loueth his children more or lesse, according to that measure wherein he seeth the feedes and sparkes of vertue, goodnesse, and towardlinesse to arise and spring vp in them. Some there are who being befoted and caried with the former kinde of affection, haue but little of this, and neuer complaining of the charge so long as their

37

*The loue of parents twofold.*

their children are but small, complaine thereof when they come to their growth, and beginne to profit. It seemeth that they are in a sort offended and vexed to see them to grow and set forward in honest courses, that they may become honest men: These parents are brutish and inhumane.

38  
Of the true fatherly love in communicating with his children being come to yeeres of discretion.

Now according to this second, true, and fatherly love in the well governing thereof, parents should receiue their children, if they be capable, into their societie and partnership in their goods, admit them to their counsell, intelligence, the knowledge and course of their domestickall affaires, as also to the communication of their designements, opinions and thoughts, yea consent and contribute to their honest recreations and pastimes, as the case shall require, alwaies reseruing their ranke and authoritie. For wee condemne the austere, lordlike, and imperious countenance and carriage of those that neuer looke vpon their children, nor speake vnto them but with authoritie, will not be called fathers but lords, though God himselfe refuse not this name of father, neuer caring for the hearty love of their children, so they may be feared, reuerenced, and adored. And for this cause they giue vnto them sparingly, keepe them in want, that they may the better keepe them in awe and obedience, euer threatening them some small pittance by their last will, when they depart out of this life. Now this is a sottish, vaine, and ridiculous foolerie; It is to distract their owne proper, true, and naturall authoritie, to get an artificiall; And it is the way to deceiue themselves, and to grow into contempt, which is cleane contrarie to that they pretend. It causeth their children to cary themselves cunningly with them, and to conspire and finde meanes how to deceiue them. For parents should in good time frame their mindes to dutie, by reason, and not haue recourse to these meanes more tyrannous than fatherly.

*Errat longe mea quidem sententia,*

*Qui imperium credis esse grauius aut stabilius*

*Es quod sit, quam illud quod amicitia adiungitur.*

*In my opinion he is much amisse,*

*Who thinkes more graue or firme that rule of his*

*That's wrought by force, than what of friendship is.*

is to follow the lawes & customes of the country. The lawes have better provided for it than we, and it is a safer course to suffer them to faile in something, than to adventure vpon our owne defects, in our owne proper choice. It is to abuse that libertie we haue therein, to seru our foolish fantasies and priuat passions, like those that suffer themselves to be caried by the vnwonted officious actions and flatteries of those that are present, who make vse of their last willes and testaments, either by gratifying or chastising the actions of those that pretend interest therein. A man must conforme himselfe to reason and common custome heerein, which is wiser than we are, and the surer way.

The vse of them in their last willes, according to the lawes.

We come now to the dutie of children towards their parents, so naturall and so religious, and which ought to be done vnto them not as vnto pure and simple men, but demi-gods, earthly, mortall, visible gods. And this is the reason why *Philo* the Jew said, that the commandement touching the dutie of children was written the one halfe in the first table, which contained the commandements that concerne our dutie towards God; and the other halfe in the second table, wherein are the commandements that concerne our neighbour, as being halfe diuine, and halfe humane. This dutie likewise is so certaine, so due and requisite, that it may not be dispensed withall by any other dutie or loue whatsoever, be it neuer so great. For, if it shall happen that a man see his father and his sonne so indangered at one and the same instant, as that he cannot rescue and succour them both, he must forsake his sonne, and goe to his father, though his loue towards his sonne be greater, as before hath been said. And the reason is because the dutie of a sonne towards his father is more ancient, and hath the greater priuiledge, and cannot be abrogated by any later dutie.

40  
Of the dutie of children towards their parents.

Now this dutie consisteth in foure points, comprehended in this word, *Honour thy father and thy mother*. The first is reuerence, not onely in outward gesture and countenance, but also inward, which is that high and holy opinion and esteeme, that a child ought to haue of his parents, as the authors and originall causes of his being, and of his good, a qualitie that makes them resemble God himselfe.

41  
This dutie consisteth in foure points.

Jer. 35.

2

The second is obedience, euen to the roughest and hardest commands of a father; according to the example of the *Rechabites*, who to obey the command of their father, neuer dranke wine in all their liues: Nay more than that, *Isaac* refused not to yeeld his neck to the sword of his father.

In exampl.

3

The third is to succour their parents in all their needs and necessities, to nourish them in their old age, their impotencie, and want, to giue them their assistance in all their affaires. We haue an example and paterne heereof euen in beasts. In the *Storke*, whose little ones (as *S. Basil* affirmeth) feed and nourish their old dams, couer them with their feathers, when they fall from them, and couple themselues together to carrie them vpon their backs. Loue furnisheth them with this arte. This example is so liuely and so significant, that the dutie of children towards their parents hath been signified by the qualitie of this creature, *inimicus patris, recitatoris*. And the Hebrewes call this bird for this cause, *chafida*, that is to say, the debonaire, the charitable bird. We haue likewise notable examples here amongst men. *Cymon* the sonne of great *Miltiades*, whose father dying in prison, as some say for debt, and not hauing wherewithall to burie his bodie, much lesse to redeem it being arrested for the debt, whilest it was caried to the buriall, according to the lawes of that countrie, *Cymon* sold himselfe and his libertie for money to prouide for his funeral. He with his plentie and goods relieved not his father, but with his libertie, which is deerer than all goods, yea and life too. He helped not his father liuing and in necessitie, but dead, and being no more a father nor a man. What had he done to succour his father liuing, wanting and requiring his helpe? This is an excellent president. Wee haue two the like examples, euen in the weake and feeble sex of women, of two daughters which haue nourished and giuen sucke the one to the father, the other to hir mother, being prisoners and condemned to die by famine; the ordinarie punishment of the ancients. It seemeth in some sort a thing against nature, that the mother should be nourished with the daughters milke; but this is truly according to nature, yea those first lawes, that the daughter should nourish her mother.

4

The fourth is, not to do, to attempt, or enterprise any thing  
of

of weight or importance, without the advice, consent and approbation of Parents, and especially in marriage.

The fifth is, mildly and gently to endure the vices, imperfections, and testie and impatient humors of Parents, their severitie and rigour. *Manlius* hath made good proofe heereof: for the Tribune *Pomponius* having accused the father of this *Manlius* in the presence of the people of many crimes, and amongst others, that he over cruelly handled his sonne, enforcing him to till the earth: the sonne goeth to the Tribune and finding him in his bedde, putting the point of his dagger to his throat, enforced him to sweare, that he should deuilt from that pursuit he made against his father, desiring rather to indure his fathers rigour, than to see him troubled for it.

A childe shall finde no difficultie in these five duties, if he consider how chargeable hee hath been to his parents; and with what care and affection he hath been brought vp. But he shall neuer know it well, vntill he haue children of his owne, as he that was found to ride vpon a hobbie-horse playing with his children, entreated him that so tooke him to hold his peace vntill he were himselfe a father; reputing him till then no indifferent iudge in this action.

## C H A P. XV.

*The duties of Masters and servants.*

**H**Eere commeth the third and last part of priuate and domesticall iustice, which is the duties of masters and servants. Touching which it is necessarie to know the distinction of seruants: for they are principally three sorts. That is to say, of slaues, whereof all the world hath beene full in former time, and is at this present, except a part of Europe, and no place more free than heere about France, they haue no power neither in their bodies nor goods, but are wholly their masters, who may glue, lend, sell, resell, exchange, and vse them as beasts of seruice. Of these hath beene spoken of at large. There are inferiour seruants, and seruants, free people, masters of their persons and goods, yea they cannot bargain, or otherwise doe any thing to the pre-

induce of their owne libertie. But they owe honor, obedience, and serue vntill such times, and vpon such conditions, as they haue promised, and their masters haue power to command, correct, and chastise them with moderation and discretion. There are also mercenaries, which are lesse subiect, they owe no seruite nor obedience, but onely worke and labour for money; and they haue no authoritie in commanding or correcting them.

Sener.

The duties of masters towards their seruants, as well of slaues as inferior seruants, are, not to handle them cruelly, remembering they are men, and of the same nature with vs; but onely fortune hath put a difference, which is euer variable and sporteth it selfe in making great men little, and little great. And therefore the difference is not so great, so much to contemne them. *Non tenentur, non differunt, vniuersales famuli, conserui, aequi fortuna subiecti.* They are men, dwellers with gber, humble friends, fellow seruants, equally the subiects of fortune. To handle seruants gently, seeking rather to be beloved than feared, is the testimonie of a good nature: to vse them roughly and too severely, proceedeth from a crabbd and cruell mind, and that he beareth the same disposition towards all other men, but want of power hindereth the execution thereof. They ought to instruct them with godly and religious counsell, and those things that are requisite for their health and safetie.

The duties of seruants are, to honour and feare their masters whatsoeuer they be, and to yeeld them obedience and fidelitie, seruing them not for gaine, or onely outwardly and for countenance, but heartily, seriously, for conscience sake, and without dissimulation. We read of most worthy, noble, and generous seruices performed in former times by some towards their masters, euen to the engaging and hazard of their liues, for their masters safegard and honour.

## CHAP. XVI.

*The dutie of Soueraignes and Subiects.*

OF Princes and Soueraignes, their descriptions, notes, humours, marks, and discommodities hath bene discoursed

discourfed in the firft booke, chap. 49. Their dutie to gouerne the common-wealth hath been fpoken at large in this prefent booke, chap. 2. and 3. which is of politike prudence: yet we will touch a little heere the heads and generall points of their dutie.

The Soueraigne as the meane between God and the people, and debtour to thefe two, ought alwaies remember that he is the liuely image, the officer, and lieutenant generall of the great God his foueraigne, and to the people a perfect mirrour, a bright beame, a cleere looking glaffe, an eleuated theater for every one to behold, a fountaine where all refresh themfelves, a fpurre to vertue, and who doth not any good, that is not famous, and put in the register of perpetuall memorie? He ought then firft of all to feare and honour God, to be devout, religious, to obferue pietie not only for himfelfe and for confcience fake, as every other man, but for his ftate, and as he is a foueraigne. The pietie which we heere require in a Prince, is the care heought to haue, and to fhew for the conseruation of religion and the ancient lawes and ceremonies of the countrey, providing by lawes, penalties and punishments that the religion be neither changed, troubled, nor innouated. This is a thing that highly redoundeth to his honour and securitie (for all doe reuerence, and more willingly obey, and more slowly attempt or enterprife any thing againft him whom they fee feareth God; and belecue to be in his protection and fafegard; *una custodia pietas: piuum virum. Mercur. Trifin.* *Neq; malus genius nec fatum deuincit. Deus enim eripit eum ab omni malo.*) The onely fafegard is pietie: neither the euill genius nor fate can overcome a godly man: For God deliuereth him out of all euill. And alfo to the good of the ftate, for as all the wifelt haue faid, Religion is the band and cement of humane focietic.

The Prince ought alfo to be fubieft, and inuiofable to obferue and caufe to be obferued the lawes of God, and nature, which are not to be difpenfed with: and he that infringeth them is not only counted a tyrant, but a monfter.

Concerning the people, he ought firft to keepe his covenants and promifes, be it with fubiefts or others with whom he is intereffed or hath to doe. This equitie is both naturall



and vniuersall. God himselfe keepeth his promise. Moreover, the prince is the pledge and formall warrant of the law and those mutuall bargaines of his subiects. He ought then aboue all to keepe his faith, there being nothing more odious in a prince than breach of promise and periury; and therefore it was well sayd, that a man ought to put it among those casual cases if the prince doe abiure or reuoke his promise, and that the contrary is not to be presumed. Yea he ought to obserue those promises and bargaines of his predecessours, especially if he be their heire, or if they be for the benefit and welfare of the common-wealth. Also he may relieue himselfe of his vnreasonable contracts and promises vnaduisedly made, euen as for the selfe-same causes priuat men are releued by the benefit of the prince.

4  
To observe the  
lawes.

He ought also to remember, that although he be aboue the law (I meane the ciuill and humane) as the Creatour is aboue the creature (for the law is the worke of the prince, and which he may change and abrogate at his pleasure, it is the proper right of the soueraignty) neuerthelesse though it bee in force and authority, he ought to keepe it : to liue, to conuerse and iudge according vnto it : and it would be a dishonour and a very euill example to contradict it, and as it were falsifie it. Great *Augustus* hauing done something against the law, by his owne proper act would needs die for griefe : *Lycurgus*, *Agessilaus*, *Selencus*, haue left three notable examples in this point, and to their cost.

5  
To doe iustice.

Thirdly, the prince oweth iustice to all his subiects; and hee ought to measure his puissance and power by the rule of iustice. This is the proper vertue of a prince truly royall and princelike, whereof it was rightly sayd, by an old man to King *Philip* that delayed him iustice, saying he had no leisure, That he should then desist and leaue off to be king. But *Demetrius* sped not so well; who was dispossest of his realme by his subiects, for casting from a bridge into the riuer many of their petitions, without answer, or doing them iustice.

3  
To take care &  
affect the com-  
mon good.

Finally, the prince ought to loue, cherish, to be vigilant and carefull of his state, as the husband of the wife, the father of his children, the shepheard of his flock, hauing alwaies before his eyes the profit and quiet of his subiects. The prosperity and



and welfare of the state is the end and contentment of a good Prince, *ut respub. opibus firma, copijs locuples, gloria ampla, virtute honesta sit.* That the common-wealth be strong in power, rich in plenty, abound in glory, honest in vertue. The Prince thatteth himselfe to himselfe abuseth himselfe: for he is not his owne man, neither is the state his, but he is the states. He is a Lord, not to dominere, but to defend. *Cui non civium servitus tradita, sed tutela:* To whom is committed not the servitude of the citizens, but their safeguard, to attend, to watch, to the end his vigilance may secure his sleeping subiects, his travell may giue them rest, his providence may maintaine their prosperitie, his industrie may continue their delights, his busines their leisure, their vacation, & that all his subiects may vnderstand and know that he is as much for them, as he is about them.

To be such and to discharge his dutie well, he ought to demean and carie himselfe as hath been said at large in the second and third chapter of this booke, that is to say, to furnish himselfe of good counsell, of treasure, and sufficient strength within his state to fortifie himselfe with alliance, and forraigne friends to be ready, and to command both in peace and war; by this means he may be both loved and feared.

And to containe all in a few words, he must loue God aboute all things, be advised in his enterprises, valiant in attempts, faithfull and firme in his word, wise in counsell, carefull of his subiects, helpfull to his friends, terrible to his enemies, pitifull to the afflicted, gentle and courteous to the good people, seuer to the wicked, and iust and vpriight towards all.

The dutie of subiects consisteth in three points, to yeeld due honor to their Princes, as to those that carry the image of God, ordeined and established by him; therefore they are most wicked, who detract or slander; such were the seed of *Chanaan* and *Chanaan*. 2. To be obedient, vnder which is contained many duties, as to goe to the warres, to pay tributes and imposts imposed vpon them by their authoritie. 3. To wish them all prosperitie and happinesse, and to pray for them.

But the question is, Whether a man ought to yeeld these three duties generally to all Princes, if they be wicked or tyrants. This controuersie cannot be decided in a word, and therefore

A double ty-  
rant.  
The entrance.

therefore we must distinguish. The prince is a tyrant and wicked either in the entrance, or execution of his government. If in the entrance, that is to say, that hee treacherously inuadeth, and by his owne force and powerfull authoritie gaines the soueraigntie without any right, be hee otherwise good or euill (for this cause he ought to be accounted a tyrant) without all doubt we ought to resist him either by way of iustice, if there be opportunity and place, or by surprize: and the Grecians, saith *Cicero*, ordeined in former times rewards and honors for those that deliuered the common-wealth from seruitude and oppression. Neither can it be said to be a resisting of the prince, either by iustice or surprize, since he is neither received, nor acknowledged to be a prince.

2  
In the execution  
three waies.

Heereoff see a-  
bout Ch. p. 4. in  
Chap. of tyrann-  
y & rebellion

If in the execution, that is to say, that his entrance be rightfull and iust, but that he carieth himselfe imperiously, cruelly and wickedly, and according to the common saying, tyrannically, it is then also to be distinguished; for it may be so three waies, and euery one requirerth particular consideration. The one is in violating the lawes of God and nature, that is to say, against the religion of the countrie, the commaundement of God, enforcing and constraining their consciences. In this case hee ought not to yeeld any duty or obedience, following those diuine axiomes, That we ought rather obey God than men, and feare him more than commaundeth the intire man, than those that haue power but ouer the least part. Yet hee ought not to oppose himselfe against him by violence or sinister meanes, which is another extremity, but to obserue the middle way, which is either to flie or suffer, *fugere, aut pati*; these two remedies named by the doctrine of veritie in the like extremities. 2. The other lesse euill, which concerneth not the consciences, but only the bodies and the goods, is an abuse to subiects, denying them iustice, imprisoning their persons, and depriuing them of their good. In the which case he ought with patience and acknowledgement of the wrath of God yeeld these three duties following, honour, obedience, vovues and prayers; and to be mindfull of three things, that all power and authoritie is from God, and whosoeuer resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: *principium* *potestatis* *inducitur* *diu* *dedecus*. *Subditis obsequij gloria reli-*

Tacit.

ita

*Est: honor principis voto expetere, qualescunque tolerare.* God hath given the soueraigne iudgement of affaires to the Prince. The glory of dutifull service is left to the subiects: to desire by prayer good princes, and to tolerate them whatsoever they be. And hee ought not to obey a superiour, because hee is worthe and worthily commaundeth, but because he is a superiour; not for that he is good, but because he is true and lawfull. There is great difference betweene true and good, every one ought to obey the law, not because it is good and iust, but simplie, because it is the law. 2. That God causeth an hypocrite to raigne for the sins of the people, though he reserve him for a day of his furie; that the wicked prince is the instrument of his iustice, the which we ought to indure as other evils, which the heauens doe send vs; *quomodo sterilitatem aut nimias imbres & cetera natura mala, sic luxum & auaritiā dominantium tolerare.* As when we suffer sterilitie or vnseasonable weather, and other evils of nature so must we endure the riot and conetousnesse of our rulers. 3. The examples of Saul, Nabuchodonasor, of many Emperours before Constantine, and others since him as cruell tyrants as might bee: towards whom neuerthelesse these three duties haue beene obserued by good men, and enioyned them by the Prophets and learned men of those daies, according to the oracle of the great Doctour of truth, which inferreth an obedience to them which sit in the seat of government, notwithstanding they oppresse vs with insupportable burthens, and their gouernment be euill.

Tacit.

The third concerneth the whole state, when hee would change or ruinate it, seeking to make it elective, hereditary, or of an Aristocracy, or Democracy, a Monarchy, or otherwise: And in this case he ought to withstand and hinder their proceedings, either by way of iustice or otherwise: for he is not master of the state; but only a gardian and a suerry. But these affaires belong not to all, but to the tutours and maintainers of the state, or those that are interestted therein, as Electours of elective states; or princes apparent in hereditary states; or states generall, that haue fundamentall lawes. And this is the only case wherein it is lawfull to resist a tyrant. And all this is said of subiects, who are neuer permitted to attempt any thing against a soueraigne Prince for what cause els.

*L. Cogitationis  
ff de par. l. Si  
quis non dicam  
c. de sacros. Es.*

foeuer,

locuer, and the lawes say that hee deserueth death, who attempteth, or giueth counsell, and which intendeth, or only thinketh it. But it is honourable for a stranger, yea, it is most noble and heroi call in a prince by warlike meanes to defend a people vniustly oppressed; and to free them from tyranny, as *Hercules* did, and afterward *Dion*, *Timoleon*, and *Tamberlaine* prince of the Tartars, who ouercame *Baiazeth* the Turkish Emperour, and besieged *Constantinople*.

12

*Examinations  
of Soueraignes  
after their  
death.*

These are the duties of subjects towards their living soueraignes: But it is a point of iustice to examineth their life after they are dead. This is a custome iust and very profitable, which benefiteth much those nations where it is obserued: and which all good Princes doe desire, who haue cause to complaine, that a man handleth the memory of the wicked as well as theirs. Soueraignes are companions if not masters of the lawes; for seeing iustice cannot touch their liues, there is reason, it taketh hold of their reputation, and the goods of their successours. We owe reuerence and duty equally to all kings, in respect of their dignity and office, but inward estimation and affection to their vertue. Wee patiently indure them, though vnworthy as they are: We conceale their vices; for their authority and publike order where we liue hath need of our common helpe: but after they are gone, there is no reason to reiect iustice, and the liberty of expressing our true thoughts; yea it is a very excellent and profitable example, that wee manifest to the posterity faithfully to obey a Master or Lord, whose imperfections are well known. They who for some priuat dutie commit a wicked prince to memory, doe priuat iustice to the publicke hurt. O excellent lesson for a successour if it were obserued!

## CHAP. XVII.

*The dutie of Magistrates*

1  
*For what cause  
Magistrates are  
allowed of.*

Good people in a common-wealth would loue better to Genioy ease of contentment, which good and excellent spirits know how to giue themselves in consideration of the goods of nature, and the effects of God, than to vndertake publicke charges, were it not that they feare to be ill gouerned, and

and by the wicked, and therefore they consent to be magistrates : but to hunt and follow publike charges, especially the iudgement seat is base and vile, and condemned by all good lawes, yea euen of the heathen, witnesse the law *Iulius de ambitu* : vnworthie a person of honour, and a man cannot better expresse his insufficiencie, than by seeking for it. But it is most base and vile by briberie or money to purchase them, and there is no merchandize more hatefull and contemptible than it : for it necessarily followeth, that hee which buieth in grosse, selleth by retaile : Whereupon the Emperour *Seneca* speaking against the like inconuenience, saith, That a man cannot iustly condemne him which selleth that he bought.

Lamprid.

Euen as a man apparelleth himselfe, and putteth on his best habit before hee departeth his house to appeare in publike : so before a man vndertake publike charges, he ought priuately to examine himselfe, to learne to rule his passions, and well to settle and establish his minde. A man bringeth not to the turney a raw vnmanaged horse, neither doth a man enter into affaires of importance, if he hath not bene instructed and prepared for it before : so, before a man vndertakes these affaires, and enters vpon the stage and theater of this world, hee ought to correct that imperfect and sauage part in vs, to bridle and restraine the libertie of affections, to learne the lawes, the parts, and measures thereof, wherewith it ought to be handled in all occasions. But contrarily it is a very lamentable and absurd thing, as *Socrates* saith, that although no man vndertaketh the profession of any mysterie or mechanicall Art, which formerly he hath not learned : yet in publike charges, in the skill to command and obey well, to gouerne the world, the deepest and difficultest mysterie of all, they are accepted, and vndertake it, that know nothing at all.

2  
How a mag-  
istrate ought to  
prepare him-  
selfe before he  
take the charge.

Magistrates are intermixed persons, placed betweene the soueraigne and priuate men, and therefore it behooueth them to know how to command, and to obey, how to obey their soueraigne, yeeld to the power of superiour magistrates, honour their equals, command their inferiours, defend the weake, make head against the great, and be iust to all :

3  
A generall de-  
scription of ma-  
gistrates.

4  
The dutie of  
magistrates as  
touching the  
Souveraigne.

all : and therefore it was well said, That magistracie descrieth a man, being to play in publike so many parts.

In regard of his soueraigne, the magistrate according to the diuersitie of the commands, ought diuersly to gouerne, or readily, or not at all to obey, or surcease his obedience. First, in those commands which yeeld vnto him acknowledgement and allowance, as are all the warrants of Iustice, and all other where this clause, or any equiualent vnto it (if it appeare vnto you) or which are without attribution of allowance, iust and indifferent of themselves, hee ought to obey, and hee may easily discharge himselfe without any scruple and danger.

2 In those commands which attribute vnto him no acknowledgement, but onely the execution, as are warrants of command, if they be against right and ciuill Iustice, and that haue in them clauses derogatorie, hee ought simply to obey : for the soueraigne may derogate from the ordinarie law, and this is properly that wherein soueraigntie consisteth.

3 To those which are contrary to right, and containe no derogatorie clause, but are wholly preiudiciall to the good and vtilitie of the common-wealth, what clause soeuer it hath, and though the magistrate knoweth it to be false, and enforced against right and by violence, hee ought not to yeeld readily in these three causes, but to hold them in suspence, and to make resistance once or twice, and at the second or third command to yeeld.

4 Touching those which are repugnant to the law of God, and nature ; he ought to dismisle and acquit himselfe of his office, yea to endure anything, rather than obey or consent : and hee need not say that the former commands may haue some doubt in them : because naturall Iustice is more cleere than the light of the Sunne.

5 All this is good to be done in respect of the things themselves ; But after they are once done by the soueraigne, how euill soeuer they be, it is better to dissemble them, and burie the memorie of them, than to stirre and lose all (as *Papinian* did.) *Frustra niri, & nihil aliud nisi odium querere, extrema demencie est : It is extreme follie to labour to no purpose, and to get nothing else but hatred.*

In

In respect of private justice, magistrates ought to remember, that the authority which they have over them, they have but at a second hand; and hold it of the four signs, who always remaineth absolute lord, and their authority is limited to a prefixed time.

¶ The magistrate ought to be of easie access, ready to heare and vnderstand all complaints and suits, having his gate open to all, and himselfe alway at hand, considering hee is not for himselfe, but for all, and seruant of the common weale. *Mag.*

for this cause the law of *Adversus* provided, that the judges and judgmenteers were hold in the faces of the cities, to the end every man might have call each of the charge, but the rest of them

He sought all or indifferently to succour and ease all, great and little, rich and poore, being open to all. This of a wife man compared to a good man, whether or a lover be pairtly blessing oppressed and afflicted, ex recelle succour and comfort.

But he ought not too to be free and be familiar with many, but with very few, and these very wise and advised, and that secretly: for he debaseth his dignity in familiarity, and loseth the grace and reputation thereof. When called to the government of the common wealth, assembled all his friends, and there renounced and disclaimed all libration or inward amitie with them, as a thing incompatible with his charge, for Cicero saith, hee beprueth himselfe of the person of a friend, that undertaketh that of a Iudge.

His office is especially in two things, to vphold and defend the honour, the dignitie, and the right of his foueraigne, and of the weale publike which he representeth: *ut supra posuimus, crinitate, eius dignitatem & decus sustinere, & representare* the person of the citie, to vphold the dignitie and glorie thereof, with authoritie and a milde feueritie.

Then is a good and loyall interpreter and officer of the Prince, hee ought exactly to see that his will be performed; that is to say the law, of which hee is the minister, and it is his charge to see it diligently executed towards all, therefore hee is called the living law, the speaking law.

Although the magistrate ought wisely to temper mildness with rigour, yet it is better for a magistrate to be severe

*As teaching  
p. in the room.*

Deut. 16.

5  
Cic. lib. 1  
Officior.



and cruell, than gentle, facill, and pitfull: and God forbid-  
 deth to be pitfull in iudgement. A severe Iudge holdeth sub-  
 iects in obedience of the lawes: a milde and pitfull maketh  
 them to contemne the lawes, the magistrates, and the Prince,  
 who made both. To be brieft, to discharge well his office, there  
 is required two things, honestie and courage. The first hath  
 need of the second. The first preserveth the magistrate free  
 from avarice, respect of persons, of bribes, which is the plague,  
 and smotherer of truth, (*Acceptatio munerum praeuersione est  
 veritatis: An accepting of gifts is a praeuersion of the truth.*) from  
 the corruption of iustice which *Plato* calleth an hallowed vir-  
 gin: Also from passions, of hatred, of floure, and others, all ene-  
 mies to right and equitie. But to carie himselfe well against  
 the thurwings of great men, the importunate intreaties of his  
 friends, the lamentations and teares of the poore distressed,  
 which are all violent and forcible things, and yet haue some  
 colour of reason and iustice; and which maketh sometimes  
 the most resolute to relent, he had need of courage. Firme and  
 inflexible constancie is a principall qualitie and vertue in a  
 magistrate, to the end he may not feare the great and mightie,  
 and be not shroued and mollified with the miserie of another,  
 though it carie with it some shew of goodnesse. But yet it is for-  
 bid to haue pitie of the poore in iudgement.

CHAP. XVIII.

The dutie of the great and small.

THE dutie of the great consisteth in two things, in ende-  
 uouring by all meanes, to spend their blood and abilitie  
 for the defence and conseruation of pietie, iustice, of the  
 Prince, of the state, and generally for the welfare and good of  
 the common-wealth; of which they ought to be the pillars and  
 supporters, and after in defending and protecting the poore  
 afflicted and oppressed, resisting the violence of the wicked;  
 and like good blood, to runne to the wounded part; accord-  
 ing to the proverbe, That good blood, that is to say, noble  
 and generous, cannot lie, that is to say, decyue where is need.  
 By this meanes *Moses* became the head of the Iewish nati-  
 on, vndertaking the defence of men injured and vniuallly  
 troad



tread vnder foot. *Hercules* was deified for delivering the oppressed from the hands of tyrants. Those that haue done the like, haue bene called Heroes and demi-gods, and to the like, all honours haue bene anciently ordained, that is, to such as deserued well of the common wealth, and were the deliverers of the oppressed. It is no greatnesse for a man to make himselfe to be feared, (except it be of his enemies) and to terrifie the world, as some haue done; which also haue procured them hate. *Oderint dum metuant*: They hate, whom they feare. It is better to be beloved than adored. This compass of a naturall pride, and inhumanitie, to contemne and disdaine other men as the ordure and excrements of the world, and as if they were not men; and from thence they grow cruell, and abuse both the bodies and goods of the weak, a thing wholly contrary to true greatnesse and honour, who ought to vndertake the defence thereof.

The dutie of inferiours towards their superiours, consisteth in two points, in honouring and reuerencing them, not only ceremoniously and in outward shew, which hee must doe as well to the good as the euill, but with loue and affection, if they deserue it, and are louers of the common wealth. These are two things, to honour, and to esteeme, which are due to the good and truly great: to others to bend the knee, to bow the body, not the heart, which is to esteeme and loue. Moreover to please them by humble and seruiceable duties, and to insinuate into their fauour.

*Principibus placuisse viros non ultima laus est*: The praise of the best, is not the least. To please men of the best.

And to make himselfe capable of their protection, which if he cannot procure them to be his friends, yet at the least not to make them his enemies, which must be done with measure and discretion: For not greedily to auoid their indignation, or to seek their grace and fauour, besides that it is a testimonie of weaknesse, it is silently to condemne them of iniustice and crueltie: *Non exprobrasse caueri aut fugere: nam quem quis fugit, damnat*: Not of set purpose to beare and auoid: for he whom any man shaueth, hee condemneeth: or to stirre vp in them a desire to execute their furie, seeing so base and fearefull a submission.

## Of Fortitude the third vertue.

## PREFACE.

**T**He two former precedent vertues rule and gouerne man in companie, or with another: these two following rule him in himselfe and for himselfe: respecting the two visages of fortune, the two heads and kindes of all accidents, Prospe- rity, and Adversitie: for fortitude armeth a man against ad- versitie; Temperance guideth him in prosperitie: moderating the two brutish partes of our soule, fortitude ruleth the ira- scible, temperance the concupiscible: These two vertues may wholly be comprised and understood by this word. Constan- cie, which is a right and equall staiednesse of the minde, in all accidents and outward things, whereby hee is not puffed vp in prosperitie, nor dejected in aduersitie. *Nec aduersus frangitur, nec prosperis 2 flectit.*

## C. v. XIX.

## Of Fortitude or Valour in generall.

I  
The description  
of valour.

**V**ALOUR, (for this vertue is more properly so called than fortitude) is a right and strong resolution, an equall, and vniforme staiednesse of the minde against all dangerous, diffi- cult, and dolorous accidents: in such sort, that difficultie and danger is the object and matter wherein it is exercised: to bee briefe, it is all that which humane weaknesse feareth. *Timendo- rum contemprix, qua terrubilia, & subitum libertatem nostram missentia, despiciit, pronocat, frangit: & contemnet things to be feared, despiseth, challengeth and destroyeth dreadfull things, and bringeth our libertie into bondage.*

2  
The praise  
thereof.

**O**f all the vertues in greatest estimation and honour, this is most renowned, who for the prerogative thereof is simply called a vertue. That is the more difficult, the more glorious, which produceth the greatest, famous, and most excellent effects, it containeth magnanimitie, patience, constancie, an inuincible resolution, heroicall veruies, whereupon many haue fought the inconueniences that belong thereto, with greedinesse to attaine so honourable imployment. This ver- tue

tue is an impregnable bulwarke, a compleat armour to encounter all accidents, *Minimatum imbecillitatis humana inexpugnabile: quod qui circumdedit sibi, securus in hac vita obsidione perdurat. An invincible fortress of humane weaknes, that who soever armeth himselfe with all, continueth secure in this siege of life.* Senec.

But because many do mistake, and in place of the only true vertue conceive the false and bastardy valours, I will in declaring more at large the nature and definition thereof, expell those popular errors that are heere intruded. We will note then in this vertue foure conditions; the first is generally and indifferently against all sorts of difficulties & dangers: wherefore they are deceiued that thinke there is no other valour than the militarie, which only they esteeme, because it may be it is most renowned and glorious, and carrieth greatest reputation and honour, which is the tongue and trumpeter of immortality; for to say truth, there is more fame and glory therein than paine and danger. Now this is but a small part and a littleraye or light of the true, entire, perfect, and vniuersall, whereby a man is one and the same, in companie, in bed with his griefes, as in the field, as little fearing death in his house; as in the army. This military valour is pure and naturall in beasts, with whom it is as well in females as in males; in men it is often artificiaall, gotten by feare and the apprehension of captiuitie, of death, of griefe, of pouerty; of which things beasts haue no feare. Humane valour is a wise cowardlinesse, a feare accompanied with foresight to avoid one euill by another; choler is the temper, and file thereof; beasts haue it simply. In men also it is attained by use, institution, example, custome, and it is found in base and slavish minds: of a seruant or slaue, or a factour, or fellow trained vp in merchandise, is made a good and valiant souldier, and often without any tincture or instruct of vertue and true philosophical valour.

The second condition; it presupposeth knowledge as well of the difficulty, paine, and danger, which there is in the action that is presented, as of the beaury, honesty, iustice, and duty required in the enterprise or support thereof. Wherefore they are deceiued that make valour an inconsiderate temeritie, or a senselesse brutish stupidity: *Non est inconsulta temeritas,* Seneca.

Senec.

3  
Of imperfect or false valours.

Military valor.

4  
Temeritie or stupidity.

*ruras, nec periculorum amor, nec formidabilium appetitio, diligentissima in tutela sui fortitudo est: Et eadem patientissima eorum, quibus falsa species malorum est: It is not an inconsiderate rashnesse, nor a love of danger, nor a desire of dreadful things, but fortitude is most diligent in the safeguard of a mans selfe, and most patient in those things wherein there is a false shew of evils. Vertue cannot bee without knowledge and apprehension, a man cannot truly contemne the danger which he knoweth not; if a man will also acknowledge this vertue in beasts. And indeed they that ordinarily attempt without any foresight or knowledge, when they come to the point of execution, the sent is their best intelligence.*

*5* The third condition, this is a resolution and staiednesse of  
*Bodily Strength.* the minde grounded vpon the dutie, and the honestie, and iustice of the enterprise, which resolution neuer slacketh, whatsoeuer hapneth, vntill hee haue valiantly ended the enterprise, or his life. Many offend against this condition, first and more grossely they that seeke this vertue in the body, and in the power and strength of the limmes. Now valour is not a qualitie of the bodie, but of the minde; a steeled strength, not of the armes and legs, but of the courage. The estimation and valour of a man consisteth in his heart and will: heere lieth his true honour: and the only aduantage and the true victorie ouer his enemy, is to terrifie him, and to arme himselfe against his constancie and vertue; all other helps are strange and borrowed: strength of armes and legs is the qualitie of a porter: to make an enemy to stoupe, to dazell his eyes at the light of the sunne, is an accident of fortune. He whose courage faileth not for any feare of death, quelleth not in his constancie, and resolution: and though he fall, is not vanquished of his aduersarie, who perhaps may in effect be but a base fellow, but of fortune: and therefore he is to accuse his owne unhappinesse, and not his negligence. The most valiant are oftentimes the most vnsfortunate. Moreover they are deceived, which disquiet themselves, and make account of those vaine Thra-sonicall brags of such swaggering Braggadochios, who by their loftie looks, and braue words, would win credit of those that are valiant and hardie, if a man would doe them so much fauour to beleue them.

Moreover

Moreover, they that attribute valour to subtiltie and craft, or to Art or industrie, doe much more prophane it, and make it play a base and abieſt part. This is to diſguiſe things, and to place a falſe ſtone for a true. The Lacedemonians permitted no Fencers nor maſter-wreſtlers in their cities: to the end their youth might attaine thereto by nature, and not by Art. Wee account it a bold and hardy thing to fight with a Lion, a Beare, a wilde Bore, which encounter a man onely according to nature: but not with Waſpes, for they uſe ſubtiltie. *Alexander* would not contēd in the Olympique games, ſaying, there was no equalitie: becauſe a priuate man might overcome, and a king be vanquiſhed. Moreover it is not fitting for a man of honour, to trie and aduenture his valour in a thing, wherein a baſe fellow inſtructed by rule may gaine the priſe. For ſuch victorie commeth not of vertue, nor of courage, but of certaine artificiall trickes and inuentions: wherein the baſeſt will doe that, which a valiant man knoweth not, neither ſhould he regard to doe it. Fencing is a trick of Art, which may be attained by baſe perſons, and men of no account. And although infamous and ruſſinlike fellowes are apt to fight or doe any thing in cities or townes, with the dexteritie of the ſword; if they ſee an enemy, would they not runne away? Euen ſo is it in that, which is attained by long habit and cuſtome, as builders, tumblers, mariners, who vndertake dangerous things, and more difficult than the moſt valiant, being trained and inſtructed therein from their youth.

Finally, they which conſider not ſufficiently the motive and circumſtance of actions, wrongly attribute to valour *P. 110.* and vertue, that which appertaineth and belongeth to ſome paſſion or particular intent. For as it is not properly vertue; nor iuſtice to be loyall and officious towards ſome, which a man particularly loueth; nor temperance, to abſtaine from the carnall pleaſure of his liſter, or of his daughter; nor liberalitie towards his wife and children: ſo is it not true valour to aduenture himſelfe to any danger, for his owne benefit and particular ſatiſfaction. Wherefore if it be for gaine, as ſpies, pions, traitors, merchants on the ſea, mercenarie ſouldiers; if for ambition or reputation to be eſteemed and accounted valiant, as the moſt part of our men of warre, who ſay, being

naturally caried thereunto, that if they thought they should lose their life, would not go; if wearie of his life through paine and griefe, as the souldier of *Antigonus*, who living in extreme torment by the meanes of a fistula he had, was hardie to attempt all dangers, being healed auoided them; if to preuent shame, captiuitie, or any other euill; if through furie and the heat of choler: to be brieft, if by passion or particular consideration, as *Aiax*, *Carilins*, it is neither valour nor vertue, *Sicut non martyrem pœna, sic nec fortem pugna, sed causa fecit*: As the torment maketh not a martyr, so doth not the conflict make a valiant man, but the cause.

8

Judicium.

The fourth condition. It ought to bee in the execution thereof wise and discreet, whereby many false opinions are iected in this matter, which are not to hide themselves from those euils and inconueniences that threaten them: neither to feare lest they surprize vs, nor to flie, yea not to feele the first blowes, as the noise of thunder or shot, or the fall of some great building. Now this is to vnderstand amisse: for so that the minde remaine firme and entire in it owne place and discourse, without alteration, hee may outwardly disquiet and make a stirre. He may lawfully, yea it is honourable, to ouerthrow, to vndoe; and to reuenge himselfe of euils, by all meanes and honest endeouours: and where there is no remedie, to carrie himselfe with a setled resolution, *Mens inmotâ manet: lachryma voluntur inanes*: Vaine teares flow apace, but the minde remaineth immoueable. *Socrates* mocked those that condemned flight: What, saith he, is it cowardlinesse to beat and vanquish them by giuing them place? *Homer* commendeth in his *Vlysses* the skill to flie: the *Lacedemonians* professors of valour in the iourney of the *Plateans*, retired, the better to breake and dissolue the *Persian* troupe, which otherwise they could not doe, and ouercame them. This hath bene practised by the most warlike people. In other places the *Stoickes* themselves allowed to wax pale, to tremble at the first sudden encounter, so that it proceed no farther into the minde and courage. And this is valour in grosse. There are things which are iustly to be feared and fled, as shipwracks, lightnings, and those where there is no remedie, neither place of vertue, prudence, valour.

of

## Of Fortitude or valour in particular.

**T**O diuide the matter and discourse of that which is heere to be said, this vertue is exercised and employed against all that which the world accounteth euill. Now this euill is two-fold, externall, and internall, the one proceedeth from without, it is called by diuers names, aduersitie, affliction, iniurie, unhappinesse, euill and sinister accidents: The other is inward in the minde, but caused by that which is outward: These are hatefull and hurtfull passions, of feare, sadnesse, choler, and diuers others. We must speake of them both; prescribe meanes and remedies to ouercome, suppress, and rule them. These are the arguments and counsels of our vertue, fortitude, and valour. It consisteth then here of two parts, the one of euils or ill accidents, the other of passions, which proceed thereof. The generall advice against all good and euill fortune hath been declared before: we will speake heere more specially and particularly thereof.

*The proposition  
and diuision of  
this matter.*

## CHAP. XX.

*The first part of outward euils.*

**W**E will consider these outward euils three waies, in their causes, which shall bee declared in this chapter; afterward in their effects; lastly in themselves distinctly, and particularly every kinde of them: And we will giue aduice and meanes in them all, by vertue to be armed against them.

*The distinction  
and comparison  
of euils by their  
causes.*

The cause of euill and hatefull accidents which happen to vs all, are either common and generall, when at the same instant they concerne many, as pestilence, famine, warre, tyrannie. And these euils are for the most part scourges sent of God, and from heauen, or at least the proper and neereff cause thereof we cannot easily know: Or particulars, and those that are knowen, that is to say, by the meanes of another. And so there are two sorts of euils; publike and priuate. Now the common euils, that is to say, proceeding of a publike cause, though they concerne every one in particu-



lar, are in diuers kinds, more or lesse grieuous, weighty, and dangerous, than the priuate, whose causes are knownen. More grieuous, for they come by flockes and troopes, they assaile more violently, with greater stire of vehemency and furie: they haue a greater concourse and traile: they are more tempestuous, they bring forth greater disorder and confusion. Lesse grieuous: because generality and communitie seemeth to mitigate, and lessen euery mans euill. It is a kinde of comfort not to be alone in miserie: it is thought to be rather a common vnhappynesse, where the course of the world, and the cause is naturall, than personall affliction. And indeed those wrongs which a man doth vs, torment vs more, wound vs to the quicke, and much more alter vs. Both these two haue their remedies and comforts.

2

The aduice a-  
gainst publicke  
evils.

Providence,  
Destinie.

Against publicke evils, a man ought to consider from whom, and by whom they are sent, and to marke their cause. It is God, his prouidence, from whence commeth and dependeth an absolute necessity, which gouerneth and ruleth all, whereunto all things are subiect. His prouidence, and destiny, or necessitie, are not, to say the truth, two distinct lawes in essence, *ueroque rei arduum*, neither are they one. The diuersitie is only in the consideration and different reason. Now to murmur, and to bee grieued at the contrary, is first of all such impietie, as the like is not elsewhere found: for all things do quietly obey, than only torments himselfe. And againe it is a folly, because it is vaine and to no purpose. If a man will not follow this soueraigne and absolute mistris willingly, it shall carry all by force: *id hoc sacramentum, adacti sumus ferre mor-*

*alia, nec perturbari his, que vitare nostra potestatis non est: in regno nati sumus, Deo parere libertas est.* We are brought to this necessity, to suffer mortall things, and not to bee troubled at those things which are not in our power to auoid: we are borne in a kingdom; it is freedom to obey God. *ut in eorum potestate non*

*Desine sara deum sibi sperare querendo.* *non bene* *bono*  
Sure ease to thinke what destiny.

Can by complaining be put by.

There is no better remedie, than to applie our willes to the will thereof; and according to the aduice of wisdom to make a vertue of necessity. *Non est aliud effugium necessitatis, quam*

vlla



*velle quod ipsa cogat.* There is no other avoiding of necessity, then so will that which is constraineth. In seeking to contend or dispute against it, we doe but sharpen and stirre the euill. *Leto animo ferre quicquid acciderit, quasi sibi uolueris accidere, de hisse enim velle, si seisses ex decreto Dei fieri.* To suffer with a cheerefull minde whatsoever shall happen, as if thou wouldest haue it happen vnto thee: for thou oughtest to be willing, if thou knowest it be done by the decree of God. Besides we shall better profit our selues, wee shall doe that which we ought to doe, which is to follow our generall and soueraigne, who hath so ordeined it. *Optimum pati, quod emendare non possis; & Deum, quo auctore cuncta proueniunt, sine murmuratione comitari.* Malus miles est qui imperatores gemens sequitur. It is an excellent thing patiently to suffer what thou canst not remedie; And to yeeld vnto God without murmuring, from whom as auctour all things proceed. He is an euill souldier that followeth his commander with grudging. And without contestation to allow for good whatsoeuer he will. It is magnanimity of courage to yeeld vnto him. *Magnus animus qui se Deo tradidit.* It is magnanimity to yeeld himselfe vnto God. It is effeminacie & dastardinesse to murmure or complain, *pusillum & degeuer, qui abluetur, de ordine mundi male existimat, & emendare manu. Deum quam se.* Hee is base and ignoble that strugleth against him, he iudgeth ill of the order of the world, and had rather amend God then himselfe.

Against those priuate euils, which do proceed from the act of another, and which pierce vs more, wee ought first well to distinguish them, lest we mistake them. There is displeasure, there is offence. We often conceiue all of another, who notwithstanding hath not offended vs neither in deed nor will, as when he hath either demanded, or refused any thing without reason, but yet was then hurtfull vnto vs: for such euilles it is too great simplicitie to bee offended, since that they are not offences. Now there are two sorts of offences, the one crosseth our affaires against equitie; this is to wrong vs; the others are applied to the person, who is contented by it, and handled otherwise than it ought, bee it in deed or in word. These are more grievous and harder to be iudged, than any other kind of affliction.

The first and generall advice against all these sorts of euils,

*The advice a-  
gainst them in  
generall.*

is to be firme and resolute, not to suffer himselfe to be lead by common opinion, but without passion to consider of what weight and importance things are, according to verity and reason. The world suffereth it selfe to be perswaded and lead by impression. How many are there that make lesse account to receiue a great wound, than a little blow? more account of a word, than of death? To be brieue, all is measured by opinion: and opinion offendeth more than the euill; and our impatiencie hurts vs more, than those of whom wee com-  
plaine.

*5  
Particular ad-  
uises drawn  
from our selues.*

The other more particular counsels and remedies are drawn first from our selues, (and this is that wee must first looke into.) These pretended offences may arise of our owne defects and weaknesse. This might bee a folly grounded vpon some defect, in our owne person, which any one in derision would counterfait. It is follie to greeue and vex himselfe for that which proceedeth not from his owne fault. The way to preuent others in their scoffes, is first to speake, and to let them know, that you know as much as they can tell you; if it bee that the iniury hath taken his beginning by our default, and that we haue given the occasion of this abuse, why should we be offended therewith? for it is not an offence, but a correction, which he ought to receiue, and make vse of as a punishment. 3. But for the most part it proceedeth of our owne proper weaknesse, which makes vs melancholy. Now he ought to quit himselfe of all those tender delicacies, which makes him liue vnquietly, but with a manly courage, strong and tooly to contemne, and tread vnder foote the indifferencies and follies of another. It is no signe that a man is sound, if he complaine when one toucheth him. Neuer shalt thou be arred if thou frame thy selfe to all that is presented.

*6.  
Of those who of-  
fend.*

They are also drawn from the person that offendeth. We represent in generall the manners and humours of those persons with whom we are to liue in the world. The most part of men take no delight but to doe euill, and measure their power by the disdain, and the iniury of another. So few there are which take pleasure to doe well. We ought then to make account, that whether soeuer we turne vs, we shall finde those that will harme, and offend vs. Where soeuer we shall finde  
men,

men, we shall finde injuries. This is so certaine and necessary, that the lawyers themselves, who rule the trafficke and affaires of this world, haue wincked at, and permitted in distributive and commutative iustice many escapes in law. They haue permitted deceit and hinderances even to the one halfe of the iust price. This necessity to hurt and offend, commeth first of the contrariety, and incompatibility of humours and willes, whercof it commeth that a man is offended without will to offend. Then from the concurrence and opposition of affaires, which inferreth that the pleasure, profit, and good of one, is the displeasure, dammage, and ill of others; and it cannot be otherwise, following this common & generall picture of the world, if he who offendeth thee is insolent, a foole, and rash (as he is, for an honest man neuer wrongeth any) wherefore complainest thou, since he is no more his owne man, than as a mad man? You can well indure a furious man without complaint, yea, you will pities him; an innocent, an infant, a woman, yee will laugh at them: a foole, a drunken man, a cholericke, an indiscreet man in like sort. Wherefore when these people assaile vs with words, we ought not to answer them: wee must hold our peace, and quit our selues of them. It is an excellent & worthie reuenge, and greuous to a foole, not to make any account of him; for it is to take away that pleasure which hee thinketh to haue in vexing vs, since ouer silence condemnes his simplicitie, and his owne temeritie, is smothered in his owne mouth: if a man answer him, hee makes him his equall, and by esteeming him too much, he wrongs himselfe. *Male loquuntur, quia bene loqui nesciunt, faciunt quod solent & sciunt, male quia mali, & secundum se.* They speake euill, because they know not how to speake well, they doe what they are used to, and what they know, euilly because they are euill, and according to themselves.

Behold then for conclusion the aduice and counsell of wisdom: we must haue respect vnto our selues, and vnto him that offendeth vs. As touching our selues, wee must take heed we doe nothing vnwoorthy and vnbecfitting our selues, that may giue another aduantage against vs. An vnwise man that distrusteth himselfe, growes into passion without cause and thereby giues encouragement to another to contradict him.

7  
The conclusion  
of these counsels  
with the rule of  
wisdom.

him. This is a weakenesse of the minde, not to know to contemne offence : an honest man is not subiect to iniurie : he is inuioleable : an inuioleable thing is not onely this, that a man cannot bear, but being beaten, neither receiueth wound nor hurt : This resolution is a more strong bulwarke against all accidents ; that wee can receive no euill, but of ourselues. If our iudgement be as it ought, we are inuulnerable. And therefore we alwaies say with wise *Socrates*, *Animu* and *Melium* may well put me to death, but they shall neuer enforce me to doe that I ought not. Moreouer, an honest man, as he neuer giueth occasion of iniurie to any man, so he cannot endure to receiue an iniurie. *Ladere enim ledique coniunctum est* : For to hurt, and to be hurt, are neere neighbours. This is a wall of brasce, which a man is not able to pierce ; scoffes and iniuries trouble him not. Touching him that hath offended vs, if you hold him vaine and vnwise, handle him accordingly, and so leaue him : if he be otherwise, excuse him ; Imagine that hee hath had occasion, and that it is not for malice, but by misconceit and negligence ; he is vexation enough to himselfe, and hee wisheth he had neuer done it. Moreouer, I say, that like good husbands we must make profit and commoditie, of the iniuries that are offered vs. Which we may doe at the least two waies, which respect the offender and the offended. The one, that they giue vs occasion to know those that wrong vs, to the end we may the better flie them at another time. Such a man hath slandered thee, conclude presently that he is malicious : and trust him no more : The other, that they discouer vnto vs our infirmitie, and the meanes whereby wee are easily beaten, to the end we should amend and repaire our defects, lest another take occasion to say as much or more. What better reuenge can a man take of his enemies, than to make profit of their iniuries, and thereby better and more securely to manage our affaires.

## C H A P. XXI.

*Of outward evils considered in their effects and fruits.*

Generall effects  
very profitable.

After the causes of evils wee come to the effects and fruits thereof, where are also found true preseruatives and remedies.

medies. The effects are many, are great, are generall and particular. The generall respect the good, maintenance and culture of the vniverse. First of all, the world would be extinguished, would perish, and bee lost, if it were not changed, troubled, and renewed by these great accidents of pestilence, famine, warre, mortallitie, which season, perfect and purifie it, to the end to sweeten the rest, and giue more libertie and ease to the whole. Without these a man could neither turne himselfe nor be settled. Morcouer besides the varietie and interchangeable course, which they bring both to the beautie and ornament of this vniverse, also all parts of the world are benefited thereby. The rude and barbarous are heereby polished and refined, Arts and sciences are dispersed and imparted vnto all. This is as a great nurserie, wherein certaine trees are transplanted from other stockes, others pruned and pulled vp by the roots, all for the good and beautie of the orchard. These good and generall considerations ought to remaine and resolue every honest and reasonable minde, and to hinder the curious inquisie of men into those great and turbulent accidents so strange and wonderfull, since they are the workes of God and nature, and that they doe so notable a seruice in the generall course of the world. For wee must thinke, that that which is a losse in one respect, is a gaine in another. And to speake more plainly, nothing is lost, but such is the course of the world; so it changeth, and so it is accommodated: *Vir sapiens nihil indignetur sibi accidere, scintque illa ipsa quibus leditur, ad conseruationem vniuersi pertinere, & ex his esse, quae cursum mundi officiumque consummant*: Let a wise man disdain nothing that shall happen vnto him, and let him know that those things that seeme hurtfull vnto him, pertaine to the preservation of the whole vniverse, and to be of the nature of those things that finish vp the course and office of the world.

The particular effects are diuers, according to the diuers spirits and states of those that receiue them: For they exercise the good, releuee and amend the fallen, punish the wicked. Of euery one a word, for heereof wee haue spoken elsewhere. These outward evils are in those that are good, a very profitable exercise, and an excellent schoole wherein (as Wrestlers and Fencers, Mariners in a tempest, Souldiers in dangers, Philosophers

Particular of  
effects diuers.  
1. Lib. of the  
three verities,  
cap. 11.

Philosophers in their Academies, and all other sorts of people in the serious exercise of their profession) they are instructed, made and formed vnto vertue, constancie, valour, the victorie of the world and of fortune. They learne to know themselves, to make triall of themselves, and they see the measure of their valour, the vttermost of their strength; how farre they may promise or hope of themselves, and then they encourage and strengthen themselves to what is best, accustomed and harden themselves to all, become resolute and invincible; whereas contrarily, the long calme of prosperitie mollifieth them, and maketh them wanton and effeminate. And therefore *Demetrius* was wont to say, That there were no people more miserable, than they that had never felt any crosses or afflictions, that had never beene miserable, calling their life a dead sea.

3  
*Medicine and chastisement.*

These outward evils to such as are offenders, are a bridle to stay them, that they stumble not, or a gentle correction and fatherly rod after the fall to put them in remembrance of themselves, to the end they make not a second revolt. They are a kinde of letting bloud, and medicine or preservative to direct faults and offences; or a purgation to void and purifie them.

4  
*Punishment.*

To the wicked and forlorne they are a punishment, a sickle to cut them off, and to take them away, or to afflict them with a long and miserable languishment. And these are their wholesome and necessarie effects, for which these outward evils are not only to be esteemed of, and quietly taken with patience and in good part, as the exploits of diuine iustice, but are to be embraced as tokens and instruments of the care, of the loue and prouidence of God, and men are to make a profitable vse of them, following the purpose and intention of him, who sendeth and disposeth them as pleaseth him.

*Of outward evils in themselves and particularly.*

#### AN ADVERTISEMENT.

ALL these evils, which are many and diuers, are priuations of their contrarie good, as likewise the name and nature of euill doth signifie. And therefore as many heads as there are

are of good, so many are there of euils, which may all be reduced and comprehended in the number of seuen; sicknesse, griefe; (I include the two in one) captiuitie, banishment, want, infancie, losse of friends, death, which are the punishments of health, libertie, home-dwelling, meanes or maintenance, honours, friends, life, whereof hath beene spoken before at large. *In the first booke.* We will heere inquire into the proper and particular remedies and medicines against these seven heads of euils, and that briefly without discourse.

## CHAP. XXII.

## Of Sicknesse and griefe.

**W**E haue said before that griefe is the greatest, and, to say the truth, the onely essentiall euill, which is most felt, and hath least remedies. Neuerthelesse, behold some few that regard the reason, iustice, vtilitie, imitation and resemblance with the greatest and most excellent.

It is a common necessitie to endure; there is no reason that for our sakes a miracle should be wrought; or that a man should be offended if that happen vnto him, that may happen vnto every man.

It is also a naturall thing; we are borne therewith; and to desire to be exempted from it is iniustice, we must quietly endure the lawes of our owne condition. We are made to be old, to be weake, to grieue, to be sicke, and therefore we must learne to suffer that which we cannot auoid.

If it be long, it is light and moderate, and therefore a shame to complaine of it: if it be violent, it is short, and speedily ends either it selfe or the patient, which comes all to one end. *Confide, summus non habet tempus dolor. Si grauis, breuis; Si longus, lenis.* Be hold of this, extreme paine hath no perpetuities. If it be greenous, it is soone gone; if long, then light.

And againe, it is the body that endureth: it is not our selues that are offended, for the offence diminisheth the excellencie and perfection of the thing, and sicknesse or griefe is so far from diminishing, that contrariely it serueth for a subiect and an occasion of a commendable patience, much more than



than health doth: And where there is more occasion of commendation, there is not lesse occasion of good. If the body be the instrument of the spirit, who will complaine when the instrument is imployed in the seruice of that whereunto it is destinated? The body is made to serue the soule: if the soule should afflict it selfe for any thing that hapneth to the body, the soule should serue the body. Were not that man ouer delicate & curiously, that would cry out & afflict himselfe, because some one or other had spoiled his apparell, somethorne had taken hold of it, or some man passing by had torne it? Some base broker perhaps would bee aggriued therewith, that would willingly make a commoditie thereof: But a man of ability and reputation would rather laugh at it, and account it as nothing in respect of that state and abundance that God hath bestowed on him. Now this body is but a borrowed garment, to make our spirits for a time to appeare vpon this lowe and troublesome stage, of which onely we should make account, and procure the honour and peace thereof. For from whence cometh it, that a man suffereth griefe with such impatience? It is because he accustomed not himselfe to seeke his content in his soule; *non assuerunt animae esse contenti, nimium illis cum corpore fuit.* They haue not accustomed themselves to be content in minde, their contentment was too much with the body. Men haue too great a commerce with their bodies; And it seemeth that griefe groweth proud, seeing vs to tremble vnder the power thereof.

It teacheth vs to distaste that which wee must needs leave, and to vwinde ourselues from the vanity and deceit of this world; an excellent peece of seruice.

The ioy and pleasure wee receiue by the recoverye of our health, after that our griefe or sicknesse hath taken his course, is a strange enlightning vnto vs, in such sort that it should seeme that nature hath giuen sicknesse for the greater honor and seruice of our pleasure and delight.

Now then if the griefe bee indifferent, the patience shall be easie: if it be great, the glory shall be as great: if it seeme ouerhard, let vs accuse our delicacy and nicenesse; and if there be few that can indure it, let vs bee of the number of those few. Let vs not accuse nature for hauing made vs too weak;

for



for that is nothing, but we are rather too delicate. If we flie it, it will follow vs; if we cowardly yeeld vnto it, and suffer our selues to be vanquished, it will handle vs the more roughlie, and the reproch will light vpon our selues. It would make vs afear'd; and therefore withstande vs vpon to take heart, and that when it cometh it finde vs more resolute than was imagined. Our yeelding makes that more eager and more fierce, *stare fidenter, non quia difficilia non audemus: sed quia non audemus, difficilia sunt.* To stand confidently, we doe not shrink at them because they be difficult; but they are difficult to endure, because we shrink at them.

But lest these remedies should seeme but faire words and meer imaginations, and the practise of them altogether impossible, wee haue examples both frequent and rich not only of men, but of women and children, who haue not only a long time indured long and grievous sicknesse with such constancy, that their griefe hath rather giuen them life than courage; but haue attended and borne even with ioy, yea haue sought after the greatest and most exquisite torments. In Lacedemon little children whipped one another, yea sometimes to the death, without any shew in their countenance of any griefe or smart that they felt, only to accustom themselves to suffer such their countrie. *Alexanders* page suffered himselfe to be burnt with a cole without crye or countenance of discontent, because hee would not interrupt the sacrifice: and a lad of Lacedemon suffered a foxe to gnaw his guts out of his belly before hee would discover his theft. *Pompey* being surprised by king *Centius*, who would haue constrained him to reueale the publicke affaires of Rome, to make knowne that no torment should make him to do it, did voluntarily put his finger into the fire, and suffered it to burne, vntill *Centius* himselfe tooke it out. The like before that had *Marius* done before another king, *Perseus*: and that good old *Regulus* of Carthage endured more than all these: and yet more than *Regulus*, *Anaxarchus*, who being halfe pounded in a mortar by the tyrant *Nicereon*, would neuer confesse that his minde was touched with any torment; Beat and pound the sacke of *Anaxarchus* till you be glazted, as for himselfe you shall neuer touch him.

8

Examples.

## CHAP. XXIII.

## Of captiuitie and imprisonment.

**T**His affliction is no more than nothing, and in respect of sicknesse and griefe it is an easie matter to vanquish it. For sicke folke are not without captiuitie in their beds, in their houses, for the time they lye in, yea, they ingrosse as it were affliction aboue captiuitie; neuertheless, a word or two thereof. There is nothing but the bodie, the cauer, the prison of the soule that is captiue, the soule it selfe remaineth alwaies free, and at libertie in despite of all; and therefore how should that man know or perceiue that he is in prison, who as freely, yea and more freely too, may walke and wander whither he will, than he that is abroad? The walls and dungeons of the prison are not strong enough to shue him vp, the body that toucheth him and is ioyned vnto him, cannot hold nor stay him. He that knoweth how to maintaine himselfe in his libertie, and to yse and hold his owne right, which is not to be thus vnder not in this world, will but laugh at these sleight and childish embarrments. *Christianus etiam extra carcerem saeculo renuntiauit: in carcere etiam carceri: nihil interest ubi sit in saeculo qui extra saeculum est; et an foras carceris nomen secessum vocemus, & si corpus inceditur, carnis detinetur, immo spiritus patitur, totum hominem animus circumspicit. Et quid vult transferri? ut Christianus man euen out of prison hath renounced the world: In prison also he hath renounced the prison: it mattereth nothing where thou art in the world, who art out of the world: Let vs take away the name of prison, and call it a quiet retiring place, and if the bodie be included, the flesh is prisoner, but the spirit is free to all things, the minde carrieth about the whole man; and whether he list it transporteth him.*

The prison hath gently receiued into the lap thereof many great and holy personages, it hath been the sanctuary, the haue of health, and a fortress to diuers that had been vterly vndone, if they had had their libertie, yea, that haue had recourse therevnto to be in libertie, haue made choice thereof, and espoused themselves vnto it, to the end they might liue at rest, and free themselves from the cares of the

world,

Ternul.

world, è carcere in custodiarium translati. That which is shut vp vnder locke and key is in safe custody : and it is better to be vnder the safegard of a key, than to be bound and enthrall'd with those fetters and stockes, whereof the world is full, that publicke places and courts of great princes, and the tumultuous affaires of this world bring with them, as iealousies, enuies, violent humours, and the like. *Si recogitamus ipsum magis mundum carcerem esse, exisse nos è carcere quàm in carcerem introisse intelligemus, maiores tenebras habet mundus quàm hominum, praeordia exteant, grauiore catenas indet, quae ipsas animas constringunt, peiores immunditias expirat, libidines hominum, plures postremo reos continet vniuersum genus hominum.* If we consider that the world is selfe in a prison, wee shall vnderstand that we are rather gone out of the world then entred into prison ; the world hath greater darknesse, wherewith the inward cogitations of the hearts of men are blinded ; it fethereth with more grievous irons, wherewith mens verie soules are shackled ; it breatheth forth worse uncleannes in the lusts and sensualities of men ; it containeth more guiltie persons, even whole mankind. Many haue escaped the hands of their enemies, and other great dangers and miseries by the benefit of imprisonment. Some haue there written books, & haue there bettered their knowledge. *Plus in carcere spiritus acquiris quàm caro amittit.* The spirit getteth more in prison, then the flesh loseth. Diuers there are whom the prison haming kept and preserued for a time, hath resent vnto their former soueraigne dignities, and mounted them to the highest places in the world ; others it hath yeelded vp vnto heauen, and hath not at any time receiued any that it restoreth not.

## CHAP. XXIIII

## Of banishment and exile.

**E**Xile is a change of place that brings no ill with it, but in opinion ; it is a complaint and affliction wholly imaginarie : for according to reason there is not any ill in it : In all places all is after one fashion, which is comprehended in two words, Nature, and Vertue. *Duo quae pulcherrima sunt, quocumque nos mouerimus, sequuntur, natura communis & propria virtus :*

N<sup>n</sup>

There

There are two excellent things, which will follow vs whither soeuer we goe, common Nature, and mans owne vertue.

2  
Nature.

In all places wee finde the selfesame common nature, the same heauens, the same elements. In all places the heauens and the starres appeare vnto vs in the same greatnes, extent, and that is it which principally wee are to consider, and not that which is vnder vs, and which wee trample vnder feete. Againe, at a kenning we cannot see of the earth aboue ten or twelue leagues: *Angustus animus quem terrena delectant. The minde is narrow and straight, whom earthly things delight.* But the face of the great azured firmament, decked and counterpointed with so many beautifull and shining diamonds, doth alwaies shew it selfe vnto vs; and to the end wee may wholly behold it, it continually whirleth about vs. It sheweth it selfe all vnto all, and in all respects in a day and a night. The earth which with the sea and all that it containeth, is not the hundredth and sixtie part of the greatnes of the sunne, sheweth not it selfe vnto vs but in that small proportion that is about the place where wee dwell: yea and that change of that earthlie floore that is vnder vs is nothing. What matter is it to be borne in one place and to liue in another? Our mother might haue layen in elsewhere, and it is a chance that we are borne heere or there. Againe, all Countries bring forth and nourish men, and furnish them with whatsoever is necessarie. All countries haue kindered: nature hath knit vs all together in blood and in charitie. All haue friends; there is no more to doe but to make friends, and to win them by vertue and wisdom. Euery land is a wise mans countrie, or rather no land is his particular countrie. For it were to wrong himselfe, and it were weaknesse and basenesse of heart, to thinke to cary himselfe as a wrangler in any place. He must alwaies vse his owne right and liberty, and liue in all places as with himselfe, and vpon his owne, *omnes terras tanquam suas videre, & suas tanquam omnium. To see all lands as their owne, and their owne as the land of all.*

3  
Vertue.

Moreouer what change or discommoditie doth the diuersitie of the place bring with it? Do we not alwaies cary about vs one and the same spirit and vertue? Who can forbid, saith *BRIM*, a banished man to cary with him his vertues? The spirit

spirit and vertue of a man is not shut vp in any place, but it is euery where equally and indifferently. An honest man is a citizen of the world, free, cheerfull, and content in all places, alwaies within himselfe, in his owne quarter, and euery one and the same, though his case of scabberd be removed and caried hither and thither: *animus sacer & eternus ubiq; est, dyi cognatus, omni mundo & aeo par.* The sacred and eternall soule is euery where, of neere affinitie with God, a like to all the world, and to all ages. A man in euery place is in his owne countrie where he is well. Now for a man to be well, it dependeth not vpon the place, but himselfe.

How many are there, that for diuers considerations haue willingly banished themselves? How many others banished by the violence of another, being afterwards called home, haue refused to returne, and haue found their exile not only tollerable but pleasant and delightfull, yea, neuer thought they liued vntill the time of their banishment, as those noble Romans *Rutius, Marcellus*? How many others haue beene led by the hand of good fortune out of their countrie, that they may grow great and puissant in a strange land?

4  
Examples.

## CHAP. XXV.

## Of Poueritie, want, losse of goods.

**T**His complaint is of the vulgar and miserable sottish sort of people, who place their soueraigne good in the goods of fortune, and thinke that pouertie is a very great euill. But to shew what it is, you must know that there is a two-fold pouertie, the one extreame, which is the want of things necessarie and requisite vnto nature; this doth seldome or neuer happen to any man, nature being so iust, and hauing formed vs in such a fashion, that few things are necessarie, and those few are not wanting, but are found euery where, *parabile est quod natura desiderat, & expulsum.* That which nature desireth is ready and easie to be had, yea in such a sufficiencie as being moderately vsed, may suffice the condition of euery one. *Ad modum est, quod satis est.* That which sufficeth is ready and at hand. If we will liue according to nature and reason, the desire and rule thereof, we shall alwaies finde that which is sufficient. If wee

Poueritie two-fold.

1. Want of things necessary

will liue according to opinion, whilest we liue wee shall neuer find it. *Si ad naturam viues nunquam eris pauper, si ad opinionem nunquam dives: exiguum natura desiderat, opinio immensum. If thou wilt liue according to nature thou shalt neuer be poore, if according to opinion, neuer rich: nature desireth little, opinion much and beyond measure.* And therefore a man that hath an arte or science to sticke vnto, yea, that hath but his armes at will, is it possible he should either feare or complaine of pouerty?

2

2. *Wine of things superfluous.*

Prouer. 30.

The praise of  
sufficiency.

1. Timot. 6.

The other is the want of things, that are more than sufficient required for pompe, pleasure and delicacy. This is a kind of mediocritie and frugallity: and to say the truth, it is that which we feare, to lose our riches, our moueables, not to haue our bed soft enough, our diet well drest, to be deprivied of these commodities, and in a word, it is delicatenes that holdeth vs, this is our true maladie. Now this complaint is vniust; for such pouertie is rather to be desired than feared: and therefore the wise man asked it of God, *mendicantem nec dimitis, sed necessaria. Neither pouerty nor riches, but things necessarie.* It is farre more iust, more rich, more peaceable and certaine, than abundance which a man so much desireth. More iust; for man came naked, *nemo nascitur dives; No man is borne rich;* & he returneth naked out of this world. Can a man tearm that truly his, that hee neither bringeth nor carieth with him? The goods of this world, they are as the moueables of an Inne. We are not to be discontented so long as we are heere; that wee haue need of them. More rich; It is a large signiory, a kingdom, *magna dinitis lege natura composita paupertas: magnus questus pietas enim sufficiens.* Moderate and quiet pouertie by the law of nature is great riches: Godliness is great gaine with sufficiency. More peaceable and assured, it searcheth nothing, and can defend it selfe against the enemies thereof, *etiam in obsessa via paupertas pax est. Pouertie hath peace euen in a besieged way.* A small body that may couer and gather it selfe vnder a buckler, is in better safetie than a great, which lieth open vnto euery blow. It is neuer subiect to great losses, nor charges of great labour and burthen. And therefore they that are in such an estate, are alwaies more cheerefull and comfortable, for they neither haue so much care, nor feare such tempests. Such kind of pouerty

is free, cheerefull, assured, it maketh vs truly masters of our owne liues; whereof the affaires, complaints, contentions that doe necessarily accompany riches, cary away the better part. Alas what goods are those, from whence proceed all our euils? That are the cause of all those iniuries that we indure, that makes vs slaues, trouble the quiet of our soules, bring with them so many ielousies, suspicions, feares, frights, desires? He that vexeth himselfe for the losse of these goods is a miserable man, for together with his goods hee loseth his spirit too. The life of poore men is like vnto those that saile neere the shore; that of the rich like to those that cast themselves into the maine Ocean. These cannot attaine to land, though they desire nothing more, but they must attend the wind and the tide; the other come aboard, passe and repasse as often as they will.

Finally, wee must endeavour to imitate those great and generous personages, that haue made themselves merrie with such kinde of losses, yea haue made aduantage of them, and thanked God for them, as *Zenon*, after his shipwracke, *Fabricius*, *Seranus*, *Curius*. It should seeme that pouerty is some excellent and diuine thing, since it agreeth with the gods who are imagined to be naked, since the wisest haue embraced it, or at least haue endured it with great contentment. And to conclude in a word, with such as are not ouer passionate it is commendable, with others insupportable.

## CHAP. XXVI.

## Of Infamie.

THIS affliction is of diuers kinds. If it be losse of honours and dignities, it is rather a gaine than a losse: Dignities are but honourable seruitudes, whereby a man by giving himselfe to the weale publicke, is deprived of himselfe. Honours are but the torches of enuy, ielousie, and in the end exile and pouertie. If a man shall call to minde the historie of all antiquitie, he shall finde that all they that haue liued, and haue caried themselves woorthily and vertuously, haue ended their course, either by exile, or poison, or some other violent death: witnesse amongst the Greekes, *Aristides*, *Themistocles*,



*Phocion, Socrates*; amongst the Romans, *Camillus, Scipio, Cicero, Papinian*; among the Hebrewes the Prophets: In such sort that it should seeme to be the lineage of the more honest men, for it is the ordinarie recompence of a publicke state to such kinde of people. And therefore a man of a gallant and generous spirit should contemne it, and make small account thereof, for he dishonoureth himselfe, and shewes how little he hath profited in the studie of wisdom that regardeth in any respect the censures, reports, and speeches of the people, be they good or euill.

## CHAP. XXVII.

## Of the lasse of Friends.

I Heere comprehend parents, children, and whatsoever is deere and deere vnto a man. First wee must know vpon what this pretended complaint or affliction is grounded, whether vpon the interest or good of our friends or our owne. Vpon that of our friends? I doubt wee shall say yea to that; but yet wee must not be too credulous to beleue it. It is an ambitious faining of pietie, whereby wee make a shew of sorrow and griefe for the hurt of another, or the hinderance of the weale publicke: but if wee shall withdraw the vail of dissimulation, and sound it to the quicke, wee shall finde that it is our owne particulargood that is hid therein, that toucheth vs nearest. Wee complaine that our owne candle burneth, and is consumed, or at least is in some danger. This is rather a kinde of enuie, than true pietie: for that which we so much complaine of touching the losse of our friends, their absence, their distance from vs, is their true and great good: *merere hoc quantum inuidi magis quam amici esset.* To moue for this enuie; rather the part of an enuious person then of a friend. The true vse of death is to quake an end of our miseries. If God had made our life more miserable, he had made it longer.

And therefore to say the truth, it is vpon our owne good that this complaint and affliction is grounded: now that becommeth vs not; it is a kinde of iniurie to be grieved with the rest and quiet of those that loue vs, because wee our selves are hurt thereby. *Suis incommodis angis non amicum, sed sapientum*

amantis



*amantis est. To be grieved for his owne discommodities, sheweth a man not to loue his friend, but himselfe.*

Againe, there is a good remedy for this, which fortune cannot take from vs, and that is, that suruiuing our friends, we haue meanes to make new friends. Friendship as it is one of the greatest blessings of our life, so it is most easily gotten. God makes men, and men make friends: Hee that wanteth not vertue, shall neuer want friends; It is the instrument wherewith they are made, and wherewith when hee hath lost his old, hee makes new. If fortune haue taken away our friends, let vs endeouour to make new; by this meanes wee shall not lose them, but multiply them.

## Of death.

WE haue spoken heereof so much at large and in all respects in the eleventh and last chapter of the second booke, that there remaineth not any thing else to spoken, and therefore to that place I referre the Reader.

*The second part of inward euils, tedious and trouble some passions.*

## THE PREFACE.

FROM all these aboue named euils, there spring and arise in vs diuers passions and cruell affections: for these being taken and considered simply as they are, they breed feare, which apprehendeth euils as yet to come, sorrow for present euils, and if they bee in another, pite and compassion. Being considered as comming and procured by the act of another, they stirre vp in vs the passions of choler, hatred, enuie, ieaousie, despite, reuenge, and all those that procure displeasure, or make vs to looke vpon another with an enuious eie. Now this vertue of fortitude and valour consisteth in the gouernment and receit of these euils according to reason, in the resolute and couragious cariage of a man, and the keeping of himselfe free and cleere from all passions that spring thereof. But because they sublist not, but by these euils, if by the meanes and help of so many aduilements and

remedies before deliuered, a man can vanquish and contemne them all, there can be no more place left vnto these passions. And this is the true meane to free himselfe, and to come to the end, as the best way to put out a fire is to withdraw the fuell that giues it nourishment. Neuerthelesse wee will yet adde some particular counsels against these passions, though they haue bin in such sort before deciphered, that it is a matter of no difficultie to bring them into hatred and detestation.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

## Against Feare.

**L**Et no man attend euils before they come, because it may bee they will neuer come : our feares are as likely to deceiue vs as our hopes; and it may be that those times that wee thinke will bring most affliction with them, may bring greatest comfort. How many vnexpected adventures may happen that may defend a man from that blow we feare ? Lightning is put by with the winde of a mans hatte, and the fortunes of the greatest states which accidents of small moment. The turne of a wheele mounteth him that was of lowest degree, to the highest step of honour ; and many times it falleth out that wee are preferued by that, which wee thought would haue beene our overthrow. There is nothing so easily deceived as humane foresight. That which it hopeth, it wanteth ; that which it feareth, vanisheth ; that which it expecteth, hapneth not. God hath his counsell by himselfe ; That which man determineth after one maner, he resolueth after another. Let vs not therefore make our selues vnfortunate before our time, nay when perhaps we are neuer likely to be so. Time to come which deceiueth so many, will likewise deceiue vs as soone in our feares, as in our hopes. It is a maxime commonly receiued in Physicke, that in sharp maladies the predictions are neuer certaine : and euen so is it in the most furious threatnings of fortune ; so long as there is life, there is hope, for hope continues as long in the body as the soule, *quandiu spero, spero.*

2

But forasmuch as this feare proceedeth not alwaies from the

the disposition of nature, but many time from an over-delicate education (for by the want of exercise and continuall travell and labour, even from our youth we many times apprehend things without reason) we must by a long practise accustom our selves vnto that, which may most scize vs, present vnto our selves the most fearefull dangers that may light vpon vs, and with cheerefulneise of heart attempt sometimes casuall adventures, the better to trie our courage, to prevent euill occurrents, and to sease vpon the armes of fortune. It is a matter of lesse difficulty to resist fortune by assailing it, than by defending our selves against it. For then wee haue leature to arme our selves, we take our advantages, wee provide for a retreat; whereas when it assaulteth vs, it surpriseth vs vnawares, and handleth vs at her owne pleasure. Wee must then whilest we assaile fortune learne to defend our selves, giue vnto our selves false alarums, by proposing vnto vs the dangers that other great personages haue past, call to mind that some haue auoided the greatest, because they were not astonished at them, others haue beene overthrowen by the least, for want of resolution.

## CHAP. XXIX.

*Against Sorrow.*

**T**He remedies against sorrow (set downe before as the most tedious, hurtfull, and vniust passion) are twofold: some are direct or straight, others oblique. I call those direct which Philosophie teacheth, which concerne the confronting and disdainig of euils accounting them not euils, or at least wise very small and light (though they be great and grievous) and that they are not worthy the least motion or alteration of our mindes; and that to bee sorrie for them, or to complaine of them, is a thing very vniust and ill befitting a man, so teach the *Stoicks*, *Peripateticks*, and *Platonists*. This maner of preserving a man from sorrow and melancholike passion, is as rare, as it is excellent, and belongs to spirits of the first ranke. There is likewise another kinde of Philosophicall remedy, although it be not of so good a stampe, which

which is easie and much more in vse, and it is oblique, this is by diuerting a mans minde and thought to things pleasant and delightfull, or at least indifferent from that that procurerth our sorrow; which is to deale cunningly; to decline and avoid an euill, to change the object. It is a remedie very common, and which is vsed almost in all euils, if a man marke it, as well of the body as of the minde. Physicians when they cannot purge a rheume, they turne it into some other part lesse dangerous. Such as passe by steepe and precipitate deepes and downefalls, that haue need of launcings, searings, irons, or fire, shut their eies, and turne their faces another way. Valiant men in warredoe neuer taste nor consider of death, their mindes being caried away by the desire of victorie: In so much that diuers haue suffered death gladly, yea haue procured it, and beene their owne executioners, either for the future glorie of their name, as many Greekes and Romans; or for the hope of another life, as Martyrs, the disciples of *Hegesius*, and others after the reading of *Plato* his booke to *Antiochus*, do morte conuenientia; or to auoid the miseries of this life, and for other reasons. All these are they not diuersions? Few there are that consider euils in themselves, that relish them as *Soffratid* did his death; and *Flanius* condemned by *Nero* to die by the hands of *Niger*. And therefore in sinister accidents and misadventures, and in all outward euils, wee must diuert our thoughts, and turne them another way. The vulgar sort can giue this aduice; Thinkenot of it. Such as haue the charge of those that are any way afflicted, should for their comfort furnish affrighted spirits with other objects. *Aducendum est animus ad alia studia, solitudines, curas, negetia; loci denique mutatione sepe curandus est: The minde is to be led away to other studies, cares, affaires; lastly by change of place it is often cured.*

## CHAP. XXX.

## Against mercie and compassion.

There is a two-fold mercie, the one good and vertuous, which is in God and in his saints, which is in will and in effect to succour the afflicted, not afflicting themselves, or diminishing

minishing any thing that concerneth honour or equitie, the other is a kinde of feminine passionate pitie, which proceedeth from too great a tendernesse, and weakenesse of the minde, whereof hath beene spoken before in the above named passion. Againe, this wisdom teacheth vs to succour the afflicted, but not to yeeld and to suffer with him. So is God said to be mercifull, as the Physitian to his patient; the aduocate to his client affordeth all diligence and industrie, but yet taketh not their euils and affaires to the heart; so doth a wise man, not entertaining any griefe, or darkning his spirit with the smoke thereof. God commandeth vs to aid, and to haue a care of the poore, to defend their cause; and in another place he forbids vs to pitie the poore in iudgement.

## CHAP. XXXL

## Against Choler.

**T**He remedies are many and diuers: wherewith the minde must before hand be armed and defended, like those that feare to be besieged; for afterwards it is too late. They may be reduced to three heads; The first is to cut off the way, and to stop all the passages vnto choler. It is an easier matter to withstand it, and to stay the passage thereof in the beginning, than when it hath seized vpon a man to carry himselfe well and orderly. He must therefore quit himselfe from all the causes and occasions of choler, which hitherto haue been produced in the description thereof, that is to say, 1. weakenesse and tendernesse; 2. a rigidity of the minde in hardning it selfe against whatsoeuer may happen; 3. too great delicatenesse; the loue of certaine things do accustom a man to facilitie and simplicitie, the mother of peace and quietnesse. *Ad omnia composui simus: quæ bona & paratiora sunt nobis meliora & graviora, letis habere, sed in alijs: letis habere, sed in alijs* it is the generall doctrine of the wise. King Cory hauing receiued for a present many beautifull and rich vessels, yet fraile and easie to be broken, brake them all, to the end hee might not be stirred to choler and furie when they should happen to be broken. This was a distrust in himselfe, and a bale kinde of feare

I  
The first head.

that

that prouoked him thereunto. 4. Curiositie according to the example of *Cesar*, who being a conquerour, and hauing recovered the letters, writings, and memorials of his enemies, burnt them all before he saw them. 5. Lightnesse of beleefe. 6. and about all; an opinion of being contemned, and wronged by another, which he must chafe from him as vnworthy a man of spirit: for though it seeme to be a glorious thing, and to proceed from too high an esteeme of himselfe (which neuertheless is a great vice) yet it commeth of basenesse and imbecillitie. For he that thinketh himselfe to be contemned by another, is in some sense his inferiour, iudgeth himselfe, or feares that in truth he is so, or is so reputed, and distrusteth himselfe. *Nemo non eo à quo se contemptum iudicat minor est: No man is less than he of whom he thinketh himselfe to be contemned.* A man must therefore think that it proceedeth rather from any thing than contempt, that is, sottishnesse, indiscretion, want of good manners. If this supposed contempt proceed from his friends, it is too great familiaritie: If from his subiects or seruants, knowing that their master hath power to chasten them, it is not to be beleued that they had any such thought. If from base and inferiour people, our honour or dignitie, or indignitie, is not in the power of such people: *Indignus Caesaris ira: vnworthie the wrath of Cesar.* *Agathocles* and *Antigonus* laughed at those that wronged them, and hurt them not hauing them in their power. *Cesar* excelled all in this point; and *Moyse*, *Dauid*, and all the greatest personages of the world have done the like. *Magnam fortunam magnus animus decet: A great mind becommeth a great fortune.* The most glorious conquest is for a man to conquer himselfe, not to be moued by another. To be stirred to choler is to confesse the accusation. *Conuicia si irascere agnita uidentur, spreta exolescunt: Reprochfull speeches if thou be angry at them, seeme acknowledged; if thou despise them, they vanish to nothing.* Hee can neuer bee great, that yeeldeth himselfe to the offence of another: If wee vanquish not our choler, that will vanquish vs. *Iniurias & offensiones supernis despicere: Highly to despise iniuries and offences.*

The second head is of those remedies that a man must imploy when the occasions of choler are offered, and that there is a likelihood that we may be moued thereunto, which are,  
first,

first, to keepe and containe our bodies in peace and quietnesse, without motion or agitation; which inflameth the bloud and the humours, and to keepe himselfe silent and solitarie. Secondly, delay in beleeuing and resoluing, and giuing leasure to the iudgement to consider. If wee can once discover it, wee shall easily stay the course of this feuer. A wise man counselled *Augustus* being in choler, not to be moued before he had pronounced the letters of the Alphabet. Whatsoeuer wee say or doe in the heat of our bloud, ought to be suspected. *Nil tibi liceat dum irasceris. Quare? Quia vis omnia licere. Nothing is lawfull for thee whilest thou art angrie. Why? Because thou wilt then haue all things lawfull for thee.* Wee must feare and bee doubtfull of our selues, for so long as we are moued, we can do nothing to purpose. Reason when it is hindered by passions, serueth vs no more than the wings of a bird being fastned to his feet. Wee must therefore haue recourse vnto our friends, and suffer our choler to die in the midst of our discourse. And lastly, diuersion to all pleasant occasions, as musicke, &c.

The third head consisteth in those beautifull considerations wherewith the minde must long before be seasoned. First, 3. in the consideration of the actions and motions of those that are in choler, which should breed in vs a hatred thereof, so ill doe they become a man. This was the maner of the wise, the better to dissuade a man from this vice, to counsell him to behold himselfe in a glasse. Secondly and contrarily, of the beautie which is in moderation; Let vs consider how much grace there is in a sweet kinde of mildnesse and clemencie, how pleasing and acceptable they are vnto others, and commodious to our selues: It is the adamant that draweth vnto vs the hearts and willes of men. This is principally required in those whom fortune hath placed in high degree of honour, who ought to haue their motions more remisse and temperate, for as their actions are of greatest importancie; so their faults are more hardly repaired. Finally, in the consideration of that esteeme and loue which wee should beare to that wisdom which wee heere studie, which especially sheweth it selfe in retaining and commanding it selfe, in remaining constant and invincible; a man must mount his minde from the earth, and frame it to a disposition, like to the highest region of the aire, which



which is neuer over-shadowed with cloudes, nor troubled with thunders, but in a perpetuall serenitie; so our minde must not be darkened with sorrow, nor mooued with choler, but flie all precipitation, imitate the highest planets that of all others are caried most slowlie. Now all this is to be vnderstood of inward choler and couered, which endureth being ioined with an ill affection, hatred, desire of reuenge; *quasi in sinu stulti re- quiescit, ut qui reponunt odia; quodq; sanæ cogitationis indicium est, secreto suo satiantur*: Which rest in the bosome of a foole, as bee that laith up haired; and which is a token of a cruell minde being inwardly glutted therewith. For the outward and open choler is short, a fire made of straw, without ill affection, which is only to make another to see his fault, whether in inferiours by reprehensious, or in others by shewing the wrong and indiscretion they commit, it is a thing profitable, necessarie, and very commendable. It is good and profitable both for himselfe and for another sometimes to be mooued to anger, but it must be with moderation and rule.

4  
To be angry  
when it is good  
and commodi-  
ous.

For himselfe.

There are some that smother their choler within, to the end it breake not forth, and that they may seeme wise and moderate; but they fret themselves inwardly, and offer themselves a greater violence than the matter is worth. It is better to chide a little, and to vent the fire, to the end it be not over-ardent and painfull within. A man incorporateth choler by hiding it. It is better that the point thereof should pricke a little without, than that it should be turned against it selfe. *Omnia vitia in aperto leniora sunt, & tunc perniciosissima, cum simulata sanitate subdunt*: All diseases that appeare openly are the lighter, and then are most dangerous when they rest hidden much against selfe health.

5  
For another  
with condi-  
tions.

Moreover, against those that vnderstand not, or seldome suffer themselves to be led by reason, as against those kinde of seruants that doe nothing but for feare, it is necessarie that choler either true or dissembled put life into them, without which there can be no rule or government in a familie. But yet it must be with these conditions: First, that it be not often, vpon all, or light occasions. For being too common, it growes into contempt, and workes no good effect. Secondly, not in the aire, murmuring and railing behinde their backes, or vpon vncertainties,



uncertainties, but be sure that hee feelethe smart that hath committed the offence. Thirdly, that it be speedily, to purpose and seriously, without any mixture of laughter, to the end it may be a profitable chastisement for what is past, and a warning for that which is to come. To conclude, it must be used as a medicine.

All these remedies may serue against the following passions.

## CHAP. XXXII.

## Against Hatred.

**T**HAT a man may the better defend himselfe against hatred, hee must hold a rule that is true, that all things haue two handles whereby hee may take them: by the one they seeme to be grieuous and burthen some vnto vs, by the other easie and light. Let vs then receiue things by the good handle, and we shall finde that there is something good and to be loued, in whatsoeuer we accuse and hate. For there is nothing in the world that is not for the good of man. And in that which offendeth vs, wee haue more cause to complaine thereof, than to hate it: for it is the first offence, and receiuerth the greatest damage, because it loseth therein the vse of reason, the greatest losse that may be. In such an accident then, let vs turne our hate into pite, and let vs labour to make those worthie to be beloued, which we would hate, as *Lycurgus* did vnto him, that had put out his eye, whom he made, as a chastisement of that wrong, an honest, vertuous, and modest citizen, by his good instruction.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

## Against Enuie.

**A**Gainst this passion, wee must consider that which wee esteeme and enuie in another. Wee willingly enuie in others riches, honours, fauours, and the reason is, because we know not how dearly they haue cost them. He that shall say, thou shalt haue as much at the same price, wee would rather refuse his offer, than thanke him for it. For before a man can attaine

attaine vnto them, he must flatter, endure afflictions, iniuries; to be brieft, lose his libertie, satisfie and accommodate himselfe to the pleasures and passions of another. Man hath nothing for nothing in this world. To thinke to attaine to goods, honours, states, offices otherwise, and to peruert the law or rather custome of the world, is to haue the money and wares too. Thou therefore that makest profession of honour and of vertue, why doest thou afflict thy selfe, if thou haue not these goods, which are not gotten but by a shamefull patience? Doe thou therefore rather pitie others, than enuie them. If it be a true good that is hapned to another, we should reioice thereat; for we should desire the good of one another: To be pleased with another mans prosperitie, is to increase our owne.

## CHAP. XXXIII.

## Against Reuenge.

**A**gainst this cruell passion, wee must first remember, that there is nothing so honourable, as to know how to pardon. Every man may prosecute the law to right that wrong that he hath receiued; but to giue grace, to remit and forgiue, belongeth to a soueraigne Prince. If then thou wilt be a king of kings themselves, and doe an act that may become a king, pardon freely, be gracious towards him that hath offended thee.

Secondly, there is nothing so great and so victorious, as hardinesse and a courageous insensibilitie in the suffering of iniuries, whereby they returne and rebound wholly vpon the wrongers, as heauie blowes vpon a hard and steeld anuill, which doe no other but wound and benumme the hand and arme of the striker: To meditate reuenge is to confesse himselfe wounded: to complaine is to acknowledge himselfe guiltie and inferiour. *Ultio doloris confessio est: non est magnus animus quem incuruat iniuria: ingens animus & verus estimator sui non vindicat iniuriam, quia non sentit: Reuenge is a confession of griefe, a high and generous minde is not subiect to iniurie: magnanimitie and true valour reuengeth not an iniurie, because it feeleth it not.*

But some will object, that it is irksome and dishonourable

to endure an offence; I agree thereto, and I am of opinion not to suffer, but vanquish and master it: but yet after a faire and honourable fashion, by scorning it and him that offered it, may more than that, by doing good vnto him. In both these *Cesar* was excellent. It is a glorious victorie to conquer, and make the enemie to sloop, by benefits, and of an enemie to make him a friend, be the iniurie neuer so great. Yea to thinke that by how much the greater the wrong is, by so much the more woorthie it is to be pardoned; and by how much more iust the reuenge is, by so much the more commendable is clemencie.

Again, it is no reason that a man should bee iudge and a partie too, as hee that reuengeth is. Hee must commit the matter to a third person, or at least take counsell of his friends, and of the wiser sort, not giuing credit vnto himselfe. *Iupiter* might alone dart out his fauourable lightnings; but when there grew a question of sending forth his reuenging thunder-bolts, hee could not doe it without the counsell and assistance of the twelue gods. This was a strange case that the greatest of the gods, who of himselfe had power to doe good to the whole world, could not hurt a particular person, but after a solemne deliberation. The wisdom of *Iupiter* himselfe feareth to erre, when there is a question of reuenge, and therefore he hath need of a counsell to deteine him.

We must therefore forme vnto our selues a moderation of the minde, this is the vertue of clemencie, which is a sweete mildnesse and gracioufnesse, which tempereth, retaineth, and represseth all our motions. It armeth vs with patience, it perswadeth vs that wee cannot be offended but with our selues; that of the wrongs of another nothing remaineth in vs, but that which we will retaine. It winneth vnto vs the loue of the whole world, and furnisheth vs with a modest carriage agreeable vnto all.

## CHAP. XXXV.

## Against Iealousie.

**T**He only meane to auoid it, is for a man to make himselfe woorthie of that hee desireth, for iealousie is nothing else  
O o but

bura distrust of our selues, and a testimonie of our little desert. The Emperour *Aurelius*, of whom *Fausline* his wife demanded what he would doe, if his enemy *Cassius* should obtaine the victorie against him in battell, answered, I serue not the gods so slenderly, as that they will send mee so hard a fortune. So they that haue any part in the affection of another, if there happen any cause of feare to lose it, should say, I honour not so little his loue, that he will deprive mee of it. The confidence wee haue in our owne merit, is a great gage of the will of another.

2 He that persecuteth any thing with vertue, is eased by hauing a companion in the pursuit; for hee serueth for a comfort, and a trumpet to his merit. Inbecillity only feareth the incounter, because it thinketh that being compared to another, the imperfection thereof will presently appeare. Take away emulation, you take away the glorie and spurre of vertue.

3 My counsell to men against this maladie, when it proceedeth from their wives, is, that they remember that the greatest part, and most gallant men of the world haue fallen into this misfortune, and haue beene content to beare it without stirring and molestation: *Lucullus*, *Caesar*, *Pompey*, *Cato*, *Augustus*, *Antonius*, and diuers others. But thou wilt say, the world knoweth it and speakes of it: and of whom speake they not in this sense, from the great to the least? how many honest men doe every day fall into the same reproch? and if a man stirre therein, the women themselves make a iest of it: the frequencie of this accident should moderate the bitterness thereof. Finally be thou such that men may complaine of thy wrong, that thy vertue extinguish thy hard fortune, that honest men may account neuertheless of thee, but rather curse the occasion.

4 As touching women, there is no counsell against this euill, for their nature is wholly composed of suspicion, vanitie, curiositie. It is true that they cure themselves at the charge of their husbands, turning their euill vpon them, and healing it with a greater. But if they were capable of counsell, a man would aduise them not to care for it, nor to seeme to perceiue it: which is a sweet mediocritie betweene this foolish ielousie,

sie, and that other opposite custome practised in the Indies and other nations, where women labour to get friends, and women for their husbands seeke above all things their honor and pleasure (for it is a testimonie of the vertue, valor, and reputation of a man in those countries to haue many wifes.) So did *Livia* to *Augustus*, *Stratonice* to King *Darius*, and for multiplication of stocke *Sara*, *Lea*, *Rachel* to *Abraham*, and *Jacob*.

## Of Temperancie, the fourth vertue.

## CHAP. XXXVI.

## Of Temperancie in generall.

**T**emperancie is taken two waies, generally for a moderation and sweet temper in all things. And so it is not a speciall vertue, but generall and common, the seasoning sauce of all the rest: and it is perpetually required, especially in those affaires where there is controuersie and contestation, troubles and diuisions. For the preservation thereof, there is no better way, than to be free from particular phantasies and opinions, and simply to hold himselfe to his owne deuoiere. All lawfull intentions or opinions are temperate, choler, hatred are inferior to dutie and to iustice, and serue only those that tie not themselves to their dutie by simple reason.

Specially, for a bridle and rule in things pleasant, delightful, which tickle our senses and naturall appetites. *Flabena* 2  
*voluptatis*, inter libidinem & stuporem natura posita, cuius due Speciall.  
*partes*; *verecundia* in fuga turpium, *honestas* in obseruatione decori: The bridle of pleasure is placed between desire and dulnesse of nature, of which there is two parts: *stom.* fastnesse in the anoyding of filthy dishonest things, and honestie in the obseruation of comelinsse and decentie. We will heere take it more at large, for a rule and dutie in all prosperitie, as fortitude is the rule in all aduersitie, and it shall be the bridle, as fortitude the spur. With these two we shall tame this brutish, sauage, vntoward part of our passions which is in vs, and we shall carry our selues well and wisely in all fortunes and accidents, which is a high point of wisdom.

3.  
The description  
of temperance.

Temperancie then hath for the subiect and generall object thereof all prosperity, pleasant and plausible things, but especially and properly pleasure, whereof it is the razor and the rule; the razor to cut off strange and vitious superfluities; the rule of that which is naturall and necessarie: *Voluptasibus imperat, alius odit & abigit, alias dispensat, & ad sanum modum redigit: nec unquam, ad illas propter illas venit, scit optimum esse modum cupitorum, non quantum velis sed quantum debeat.* It commandeth our pleasures, some it hateth and chafeth a way, others it setteth in order and bringeth to a sound mediocrity: neither doth it euer come vnto them for them, it knoweth that the best meane of things to be desired is not so much as thou wouldest, but so much as thou oughtest. This is the authoritie and power of reason ouer concupiscence and violent affections, which carrie our willes to delights and pleasures. It is the bridle of our soule, and the proper instrument to cleare those boyling tempests which arise in vs by the heat & intemperancie of our blood, that the soule may be alwaies kept one, and appliant vnto reason, that it applie not it selfe to sensible objects, but that it rather accommodate them vnto it selfe, and make them serue it. By this we weane our soule from the sweet milke of the pleasures of this world, and we make it capable of a more solid and soveraigne nourishment. It is a rule that sweetly accommodateth all things vnto nature, to necessitie, simplicitie, facility, health, constancy. These are things that goe willingly together, and they are the measures & bounds of wisdom, as contrarily arte, lust, & superfluous variety, and multiplicity, diffcultie, malady and delicatenesse keepe company together, following intemperancie and follie. *Sim plici cura constant necessaria, in delicijs laboratur. Ad parata nati sumus: nos omnia nobis difficilia facilius fastidio fecimus: There needs no great care for things necessarie, the labour is in delicacies. We are borne to things already prepared: but we haue made all things that were easie, diffcult vnto vs through loathsomenesse.*

## CHAP. XXXVII.

Of Prosperitie, and counsell thereupon.

I **T**Hat prosperitie which sweetly falles vpon vs, by the common course and ordinarie custome of the world, or by

by our owne wisdom and discreet cariage, is farre more firme and assured, and lesse enuied, than that which commeth from heauen, with fame and renowne beyond and against the opinion of all, and the hope euen of him that receiueth these bounties.

Prosperitie is very dangerous : whatsoeuer there is that is vaine and light in the soule of man, is raised and caried with the first fauourable winde. There is nothing that makes a man so much to love and forget himselfe, as great prosperitie, as corne lodgeth by too great abundance, and boughs overcharged with fruit breake asunder, and therefore it is necessary that a man looke to himselfe, and take heed, as if he went in a slipperie place, and especially of insolencie, pride, and presumption. There be some that swimme in a shallow water, and with the least fauour of fortune are puffed vp, forget themselues, become insupportable, which is the true picture of folly.

From thence it cometh that there is not any thing more fraile, and that is of lesse continuance than an ill aduised prosperitie, which commonly changeth great and ioyfull occurrences into heauy and lamentable, and fortune of a louing mother, is turned into a cruell step-dame.

Now the best counsell that I can giue to a man, to carrie himselfe heerein, is, not to esteeme too much of all sorts of prosperitie and good fortunes, and in any sort not to desire them : If they shall happen to come, out of their good grace and fauour, to receiue them willingly and cheerefully ; but as things strange and no way necessarie, but such as without which a man may passe his life, and therefore there is no reason hee should make account of them, or thinke himselfe the worser or better man for them. *Non est tuum, fortuna quod fecit tuum. Qui tuam vitam agere uolet, ista uiscata beneficia denitet, nil dignum putare quod speret. Quid dignum habet fortuna quod concupiscas ?* It is not thine, which fortune hath made thine. He that will lead a safe life, let him eschew those alluring benefites, & thinke nothing worthie that thou shouldst hope for. What worthy thing hath fortune that thou shouldst covet or desire.



## CHAP. XXXVIII.

## Of Pleasure, and aduice thereupon.

The description  
and distinction  
of pleasure.

PLeasure is an apprehension and sense of that which is agreeable to nature, it is a pleasant motion and tickling : as contrarily, griefe or sorrow is vnwelcome and vnpleasing to the senses ; neuerthelesse, they that place it in the highest degree, and make it the soueraigne good, as the Epicures, take it not so, but for a priuation of euill and displeasure, in a word Indolence. According to their opinion, the not hauing of any euill, is the happiest estate that man can hope for in this life. *Nimum bonest cui nihil est mali* : It is too much good which hath no euill. This is as a mid way or neutralitie betwixt pleasure taken in the first and common sense, and griefe ; it is as sometime the bosome of *Abraham* was said to be, betwixt paradise and the hell of the damned. This is a sweet and peaceable state and settling, a true, constant and staied pleasure, which resembleth in some sort the tranquillitie of the soule, accounted by Philosophers the chiefe and soueraigne good : the other first kind of pleasure is a tiue and in motion. And so there should be three estates, the two extreame opposites, Griefe and Pleasure, which are not stable nor durable, & both of them sickly : and that in the middle, stable, firme, sound, wherevnto the Epicures gaue the name of pleasure (as indeed it is in regard of griefe and sorrow) making it the chiefe and soueraigne good. This is that which hath so much defamed their schoole, as *Seneca* hath ingenuously acknowledged and said, that their euill was in the title and words, not in the substance, having neuer had either doctrine or life more sober, temperate, and enemie to wickednesse and vice than theirs. And it is not altogether without reason that they called this Indolence and peaceable state, Pleasure : for that tickling delight which seemeth to mount vs aboue indolence, aimeth at nothing else but indolence, or want of griefe, as it proper butte ; as for example, that appetite that rauisheth vs with desire of women, seeketh nothing else but to flie that paine that an ardent and furious desire to satisfie our lust bringeth with it, to quit our selues of this feuer, and to purchase our rest.

Pleasure



Pleasure hath diuersly beene spoken of, and more briefly and sparingly than was fit; some haue deified it, others detested it as a monster, and tremble at the very word, taking it alwaies in the worser part: They that doe wholly condemne it say; First, it is short, a fire of straw, especially if it be liuely and actiue. Secondly, fraile and tender, easily and with nothing corrupted and ended, an ounce of sorrow marres a whole sea of pleasure: It is called a choaked peece of artillery. Thirdly, base, shamefull; exercising it selfe by vilde instruments; in hidden corners, at least for the most part, for there likewise are magnificent and pompous pleasures. Fourthly, quickly subiect to satietie. A man knowes not how to continue long in his pleasures, he is impatient as well in his delights as his griefes, and it is not long ere repentance follow, which many times yeelds pernicious effects, the ouerthrow of men, families, common-weales. Fifthly, and aboue all they all edge against it, that when it is in his greatest strength, it mactreth in such a maner, that reason can haue no entertainment.

On the other side, it is sayd, to be naturall, created and established of God in the world, for the preservation and continuance thereof, as well by retails of the indiuiduall parts, as in grosse of the speciall kindes. Nature the mother of pleasure, in those actions that are for our need and necessitie, hath likewise mingled pleasure. Now to liue well is to consent vnto nature. God, saith *Moyse*, hath created pleasure, *Plantauit dominus paradisum voluptatis*. The Lord planted the paradise of pleasure; hath placed and established man in a pleasant estate, place and condition of life: and in the end, what is the last and highest felicitie, but certaine and perpetuall pleasure? *Inebriabuntur ab uertute domus tua, et torrens voluptatis tue potabis eos. Suis contenta finibus res est diuina voluptas*. They shall be made drunken with the plenty of thy house, and thou shalt make them drinke in the streames of thy pleasure. Diuine pleasure is a thing that is content with his bounds. And to say the truth, the most regular Philosophers, and the greatest professours of vertue, *Zeno*, *Cato*, *Scipio*, *Epaminondas*, *Plato*, *Socrates* himselfe haue beene in effect amorous, and drinkers, dancers, sporters, and haue handled, spoken, written of loue and other pleasures.

3  
Against it.

3  
For it, See Lib.  
2. ca. 6.

4  
The distinction  
of pleasures.

And therefore this matter is not decided in a word, but we must distinguish, for pleasures are diuers. There are naturall, and not naturall: This distinction as more important we will presently better consider of. There are some that are glorious, arrogant and difficult, others that are obscure, milde, easie and ready. Though to say the truth, Pleasure is a qualitie not greatly ambitious, it is accounted rich enough of it selfe, without the addition of any thing to the reputation thereof, and it is loued best in obscuritie. They likewise that are so easie and ready are cold and frozen, if there be no difficultie in them: which is as an inducement, a baite, a spurre vnto them. The ceremonie, shame and difficultie that there is in the attainment of the last exploits of loue, are the spurres, and matches that giue fire vnto it, and increase the price thereof. There are spirituall pleasures and corporall, not (to say the truth) because they are separated: for they all belong to the entire man, and the whole composed subiect: and the one part of our selues hath not any so proper, but that the other hath a feeling thereof, so long as the marriage and amorous band of the soule and bodie continueth in this world. But yet there are some wherein the soule hath a better part than the bodie, and therefore they better agree with men, than beasts; and are more durable, as those that enter into vs by the sense of seeing and hearing, which are the two gates of the soule, for hauing only their passage by them, the soule receiueth them, concocteth and digesteth them, feedeth & delighteth it selfe a long time, the bodie feedeth little. Others there are wherein the bodie hath the greater part, as those which belong to the taste and touch, more grosse and materiall, wherein the beasts beat vs companie, such pleasures are handled, tried, vsed and ended in the bodie it selfe, the soule hath onely the assistance and companie, and they are but short, like a fire of straw, soone in, soone out.

5  
Adiuicement  
thereupon.

The chiefest thing to be considered heerein, is to know how wee should carie and gouern our selues in our pleasures, which wisdome will teach vs, and it is the office of the vertue of temperance. We must first make a great and notable difference between the naturall, and not naturall. By the not naturall we doe not onely vnderstand those that are against nature,

ries, and the relief appointed by the laws; but also the naturall themselves, if they degenerate into too great an excellence and superfluitie, which is no part of nature, which contenteth it selfe with the supply of necessitie; wherevnto a man may likewise add decency and common honestie. It is naturall pleasure to be covered with a house and garments against the rigour of the elements, and the iniuries of wicked men; but that they should be of gold and silver, of Iasper or Porphyrie, it is not naturall: Or if they come vnto a man by other means than naturall; as if they be sought and procured by arte, by medicines, or other vnnaturall means: Or if they be first forged in the minde, stirred by passion; and afterwards from thence come vnto the bodie; which is a preposterous order: for the order of nature is, that pleasures enter into the bodie, and be desired by it, and so from thence ascend vnto the mind. And such as that laughter that is procured by tickling the arme-holes, is neither naturall nor pleasing, but rather a kind of convulsion; so that pleasure that is either sought or kindled by the soule, is not naturall; and is not to be desired.

which are naturall.

Now the first rule of wisdom concerning pleasure is this; to chase away, and altogether to condemne the vnnaturall, as vitious, and hardly: (for as they that come to a banquet vnbidden, are to be refused; so those pleasures that without the invitation of nature present themselves, are to be rejected) to admit and receive the naturall; but yet with rule and moderation: and this is the office of temperancie in generall, to drive away the vnnaturall, to rule the naturall.

6.

The first and general rule.

The rule of naturall pleasures consisteth in three points:

First, that it be without the offence, scandall, damage and prejudice of another; so that it be without the offence of another.

Rules for the naturall.

Secondly, that it be without the prejudice of himselfe; his honor, his health, his leisure, his dutie, his functions; it is not

Thirdly, that it be with moderation; that he take them no more to the heart, than against the heart, neither covet them, nor flee from them; but take and receive them, as men doe hony with the tip of the finger, not with a full hand; not to engage himselfe in them too far, nor to make them his principall businesse, and onely worke; much lesse to enthrall himselfe vnto them, and of recreations make them necessities,

which be

for

for that is the greatest in seruice of all others. Pleasure should be but as an accelerarie, a recreation for the time, that he may the better returne to his labour, as sleepe which strengtheneth the bodie, and giueth vs breath to returne the more cheerfully to our worke. It o be short, a man must vse them, not inioy them. But aboue all, hee must take heed of their treason: for some there are, that whilest we giue our selues vnto them, and loue them ouer dearely, returne euill for good, and more displeasure than delight: but this is treacherously. For they goe before to besot and decciue vs, and hiding from vs their taile, they tickle vs and embrace vs, to strangle vs. The pleasure of drinking goes before the paine of the head: such are the delights and pleasures of indiscreet and firy youth, wherewith they are made drunk. We plunge our selues into them; but in our old age they forsake vs, as it were drowned and ouerwhelmed, as the sea in his reflux ouer-runne the sandie bankes: That sweetnesse which wee haue swallowed so greedily, endeth with bitternesse and repentance, and filleth our soules with a venomous humour that infecteth and corrupteth it.

8

Want of govern-  
ment in pleasure  
preiudiciall.

Now as moderation and rule in pleasures is an excellent and profitable thing according vnto God, nature, reason: so excelsse and immoderate vnrulinesse is, of all others the most pernicious, both to the publicke and priuat good. Pleasure ill valued, softneth and weakeneth the wigour both of soule and body; *Dehiliatem inducere delitiae, blandissima domina: Deliciae hanc brought in debilitate, as a most alluring mistrie*: it besotteth and effeminateth the best courages that are, witnesse *Hannibal*: & therefore the Lacedaemonians that made profession of contemning all pleasure were called men, and the Athenians soft and delicate women. *Xerxes* to punish the revolt of the Babylonians, & to assure himselfe of them in time to come, tooke from them their armes, forbidding all painfull and difficult exercise, and permitting all pleasures and delicacies whatsoever. Secondly, it banisheth and driueth away the principall vertues, which cannot continue vnder so idle and effeminate an empire: *Maximas virtutes sacris oportet voluptatibus dominari*. The chiefeest vertues must be laid aside when pleasure beareth all the sway. Thirdly, it degenerateth very suddenly

suddenly into the contrary thereof, which is griefe, sorrow, repentance : for as the rivers of sweet water run their course to die in the salt sea, so the honey of pleasure endeth in the gall of griefe. *In precipiti est, ad dolorem vergit, in contrarium est, nisi modum teneat. Extrema gaudij luctus occupat. In utroque est sudden downefall, it inclineth towards griefe, is converted into the contrary, unless there be kept a mean. Sorrow occupieth extremities of ioy.* Finally, it is the seminarie of all evils, of all ruine. *Malorum est voluptas : Pleasure is the ban of evil.* From it come those close and secret intelligences, then treasons, and in the end eversions and ruines of Common-weales. Now wee will speake of pleasures in particular.

# CHAP. XXXIX.

## Of eating and drinking, Abstinence, and Sobriety.

**V**ICTUALS are for nourishment, to sustaine and repaire the infirmities of the bodie, the moderate, naturall, and pleasant vse thereof entertaineth it, maketh it a fit and apt instrument for the soule ; as contrarily an vn naturall excelsse weakeneth it, bringeth great and loathsome diseases, which are the naturall punishments of intemperancie. *Simplex ex simplici causa valetudo ; multos morbos supplicia luxuria, multa fercula fecerunt : A simple health proceeds from a single cause ; many diseases have caused many diseases, the punishments of excelsse.* A man complaineth of his brain for sending down so many rheumes, the foundation of all dangerous maladies, but the braine may well answer him, *Desine fundere, Ergo desinam fluere : Be thou sober in pouring downe, and I will be sparing in dropping downe.* But what, the excelsse and prouision, the multitude, diuersitie, and exquisite preparation of viands is come in request ; and it is our custome even in the greatest and most sumptuous superfluities, to craue pardon for not prouiding enough.

How preiudicall both to the minde and to the body a full diet, with digestiue, curiositie, exquisite and artificiall preparation in every man may finde in himselfe. Gluttonie and drunkenness are idle and vndecent vices ; they bewray themselves

1  
The vse of victuall.

selues sufficiently by the gestures and countenances of those that are therewith tainted; whereof the best and more honest is, to be dull and drowlie, vnprofitable and vnfit for any good: for there was neuer man that loured his belly too well, that did ever performe any great worke. Moreouer, it is the vice of brutish men, and of no worth, especially drunkennesse, which leadeth a man to all vnworthie actions; witnesse *Alexander*, otherwise a great Prince, being ouercome with this vice, killed his dearest friend *Clitus*; and being come to himselfe, would haue kild himselfe for killing *Clitus*. To conclude, it wholly robbeth a man of his sense, and peruerteth his vnderstanding. *Vinum clauo caret, dementat sapientos, facit roquerscere senes: Wine wanteth gouernment, it maketh wise men fooles, and old men become children againe.*

3  
Sobriety com-  
mended.

Hierom.

Sobriety though it be none of the greatest and more difficult vertues, and which is not painfull to any but fooles and mad-men, yet it is a way and a kinde of progresse to other vertues: It extinguisheth vice in the cradell, and stifleth it in the seed: It is the mother of health, and an assured medicine against all maladies, and that that lengthneth a mans life. *Socrates* by sobriety had alwaies a strong bodie and liued ever in health; *Mastissa* the soberest king of all the rest got children at 86. yeeres of age, and at 92. vanquished the Carthaginians; whereas *Alexander* by his drunkennesse died in the flowre of his age, though he were better borne and of a sounder constitution than them all. Many subiect to goutes and other diseases by Physicke incurable, haue recovered their health by diet. Neither is it seruicable to the body onely, but to the mind too, which thereby is kept pure, capable of wisdom and good counsell. *Salubrium consiliorum parens sobrietas: Sobriety is the mother of wholesome counsels.* All the greatest personages of the world haue beene sober, not onely the professors of singular vertue and austeritie of life, but all those that haue excelled in any thing, *Cyrus, Caesar, Iulian* the Emperour, *Mahomet: Epicurus* the great doctor of pleasure heerein excelled all men. The frugalitie of the Roman *Curius* and *Fabius* is more extolled than their great victories: The Lacedemonians as valiant as they were, made expresse profession of frugalitie and sobriety.

But

But a man must in time and from his youth embrace this part of temperancie, and not stay till the infirmities of old age come vpon him, lest that he be vtterly cast downe with varietie of diseases, as the Athenians, who were reproched for that they neuer demanded peace, but in their mourning garments, after they had lost their kindred and friends in warre, and were able to defend themselves no longer. This is to aske counsell when it is too late; *Sera in fundo parsimonia*; It is too late to spare when all is spent. It is to play the good husband when there is nothing left but bare walles, to make his market when the faire is ended.

It is a good thing for a man not to accustom himselfe to a delicate diet, lest when he shall happen to be depriued thereof, his bodie grow out of order, and his spirit languish and faint; and contrarily to vse himselfe to a grosser kind of sustenance, both because a man more strong and healthfull, and because they are more easily gotte.

## CHAP. XL.

*Of riot and excesse in apparell and ornaments,  
and of frugalitie.*

IT hath been said before that garments are not naturall, nor necessarie to a man; but artificiall, invented and vsed onely by him in the world. Now inasmuch as they are artificiall, (for it is the maner of things artificiall to varie and multiply, without end and measure, simplicitie being a friend vnto nature) they are extended and multiplied into so many inventions (for to what other end are thereso many occupations and traffiques in the world, but for the couering and decking of our bodies?) dissolutions and corruptions, insomuch that it is no more an excuse and couering of our defects and necessities, but a nest of all maner of vices, *vexillum superbiae, nidus luxurie*, The banner of pride, the nest of Luxurie, the tablett of riot and quarrels: for from hence did first begin the proprietie of things, mine and thine; and in the greatest communities or fellowships that are, apparell is alwaies proper, which is signified by this word disrobe.

It is a vice very familiar and proper vnto women (I meane  
excesse



excesse in apparell) a true testimonie of their weaknesse, being glad to winne credit and commendations by these small and slender accidents, because they know themselves to be too weak and ynable to purchase credit and reputation by better meanes: for such as are vertuous, care least for such vanities. By the lawes of the Lacedemonians it was not permitted to any to weare garments of rich and costly colours, but to common women: That was their part, as vertue and honour belonged ynto others.

Now the true and lawfull vse of apparell is to cover our selues against winde and weather, and the rigour of the aire, and should neuer be vsed to other end; and therefore as they should not be excessive nor sumptuous, so should they not be too base and beggerly. *Nec affectata sordes, nec exquisita munditie: Neither affected uncleannesse, nor exquisite pickednesse. Calpurnia* was as a laughing stocke to all that beheld him, by reason of the dissolute fashion of his apparell. *Augustus* was commended for his modellie.

# CHAP. XLII.

## *Carnall pleasure, Chastitie, Continencie.*

*See the chap. 24.* **C**ontinencie is a thing very difficult, and must haue a carefull and a painfull guard: It is no ealie matter wholly to resist nature, which in this is most strong and most ardent.

**3** And this is the greatest commendation that it hath, that there is difficultie in it; as for the rest, it is without action and without fruit, it is a priuation, a not doing, paine without profit; and therefore sterilitie is signified by virginitie. I speake heere of simple continencie, and onely in it selfe, which is a thing altogether barren and vnprofitable, and hardly commendable, no more than not to play the glutton, not to be drunken, and not of Christian continencie, which to make it a vertue hath two things in it, a deliberate purpose alwaies to keepe it, and that it be for Gods cause. *Non hoc in virginibus praeclarum, quod sint virgines, sed quod Dedicatae; We praise not this in virgins, for that they be virgins, but because they be dedicated to God: witnesse the Vestals, and the fiew foolish virgins*  
inut

*August.*



shut out of doores; and therefore it is a common error, and a vanitie, to call continent women honest women and honorable, as if it were a vertue, and there were an honour due vnto him that doth no euill, doth nothing against his dutie: Why should not continent men in like sort haue the title of honestie and honour? There is more reason for it, because there is more difficultie, they are more hot, more hardie, they haue more occasions, better meanes. So vnlikely is it that honour should be due vnto him that doth no euill, that it is not due vnto him that doth good, but only, as hath bene said, to him that is profitable to the weale publike, and where there is labour, difficultie, danger. And how many continent persons are there stuf with other vices, or at least that are not touched with vaine-glory and presumption, whereby tickling themselves with a good opinion of themselves, they are ready to iudge and condemne others? And by experience we see in many women how dearly they sell it vnto their husbands, for dislodging the diuell from that place where they row, and establishing the point of honour as in it proper throne, they make it to mount more high, and to appeare in the head, to make him beleue that it is not any lower else where. If neuertheless this flattering word, honour, serue to make them more careful of their dutie, I care not much if I allow of it. Vauitie it selfe serues for some vse, and simple incontinencie and sole in it selfe is none of the greatest faults; no more than others that are purely corporall; and which nature consisteth in her actions either by excelle or defect without malice. That which discrediteth it, and makes it more dangerous, is, that it is almost neuer alone, but is commonly accompanied and followed with other greater faults; infected with the wicked and base circumstances of prohibited persons, times, places, practised by wicked meanes, lies, impostures, subornations, treasons, besides the losse of time, distractions of those functions from whence it proceedeth by great and grievous scandals.

And because this is a violent passion and I keuise deceitfull, we must arme our selues against it, and be wary in describing the baits thereof, and the more it flattereth vs, the more distrust it; for it would willingly embrace vs to strangle vs, it pampereth vs with honey, to glur vs with gall; and therefore

Lib. 1. 24. 60.

An aduise.

fore let vs consider as much, that the beautie of another is a thing that is without vs, and that as soone it turneth to our euill as our good; that it is but a flower that passeth, a small thing and almost nothing but the colour of a bodie; and acknowledging in beautie the delicate hand of nature, wee must prise it as the sunne and moone for the excellencie that is in it: and comming to the fruition thereof by all honest meanes, alwaies remember that the immoderate vse of this pleasure consumeth the bodie, effeminateth the soule, weakneth the spirit; and that many by giuing themselves ouermuch thereunto, haue lost, some their life, some their fortune, some their spirit: and contrarily, that there is greater pleasure and glorie in vanquishing pleasure, than in possessing it: that the continencie of *Alexander* and of *Scipio* hath beene more highly commended, than the beautifull countenances of those yong damfels that they tooke captiues.

4

There are many kindes and degrees of continencie and incontinencie. The coniugall is that which importeth more than all the rest, which is most requisite and necessarie, both for the publike and particular good, and therefore should be by all in greatest account. It must be kept and retained within the chaste brest of that partie whom the destinies haue giuen for our companion. He that doth otherwise, doth not only violate his owne bodie, making it a vessell of ordure by all lawes; the law of God, which commandeth chastitie; of Nature, which forbiddeth that to be common which is proper to one, and imposeth vpon a man faith and constancie; of Countries, which haue brought in mariages; of families, transferring vnjustly the labour of another to a stranger; and lastly, Iustice it selfe, bringing in vncertainties, ialousies, and brawles amongst kindred, depriving children of the loue of their parents, and parents of the pietie and dutie of their children.

## CHAP. XLII

## Of Glorie and Ambition.

**A**mbition, the desire of glory and honor (whereof we haue already spoken) is not altogether and in all respects to be condemned. First, it is very profitable to the weale-publike

like as the world goeth, for it is it from whence the greatest of our honourable actions doth arise, that hartneth men to dangerous attempts, as we may see by the greatest part of our ancient heroicall men, who have not all been lead by a philosophicall spirit, as *Socrates, Phocion, Aristides, Epaminondas, Cato, and Scipio*, by the only true and liuely image of vertue; for many, yea the greatest number haue bene stirred thereunto by the spirit, of *Themistocles, Alexander, Caesar*: and although these honorable achievements and glorious exploits haue not bene with their authors and actors, true workes of vertue but ambition; neuerthelesse their effects haue bene very beneficiall to the publike state. Besides this consideration, according to the opinion of the wisest, it is excusable and allowable in two cases: the one in good and profitable things, but which are inferiour vnto vertue, and common both to the good and to the euill, as Arts and sciences: *Honos alit artes: incenduntur omnes ad studia gloria: Honour nourisheth the Arts: all are inflamed through glorie to studie*: inuentions, industrie, militarie valour. The other in continuing the good will and opinion of another. The wise doe teach, not to rule our actions by the opinion of another, except it be for the auoiding of such inconueniences as may happen by their contempt of the approbation and iudgement of another.

But that a man should be vertuous, and doe good for glorie, as if that were the salarie and recompence thereof, is a false and vaine opinion. Much were the state of vertue to be pitied, if she should fetch hir commendations and prise from the opinion of another, this coine were but counterfet, and this pay too base for vertue; Shee is too noble to begge such recompence. A man must settle his soule, and in such sort compose his actions, that the brightnesse of honour dazell not his reason, and strengthen his minde with braue resolutions, which serue him as barriers against the assaults of ambition.

Hee must therefore perswade himselfe, that vertue seeketh not a more ample and more rich theater to shew it selfe than hir owne conscience: The higher the Sunne is, the lesse shadow doth it make: The greater the vertue is, the lesse glorie doth it seeke. Glorie is truly compared to

a shadow, which followeth those that flie it, and flieeth those that follow it. Againe, he must neuer forget, that man cometh into this world as to a Comedie, where hee chuseth not the part that he is to play, but onely bethinkes himselfe how to play that part well that is giuen vnto him: or as a banquet, wherein a man feedes vpon that that is before him, not reaching to the farre side of the table, or snatching the dishes from the master of the feast. If a man commit a charge vnto vs, which wee are capable of, let vs accept of it modestly, and exercise it sincerely; making account that God hath placed vs there to stand sentinell, to the end that others may rest in safetie vnder our care. Let vs seeke no other recompence of our trauell, than our owne conscience to witness our well doing, and desire that the witness bee rather of credit in the court of our fellow-citizens, than in the front of our publike actions. To bee short, let vs hold it for a maxime, that the fruit of our honourable actions, is to haue acted them. Vertue cannot finde without it selfe a recompence worthie it selfe. To refuse and contemne greatnesse, is not so great a miracle, it is an attempt of no difficultie. Hee that loues himselfe, and iudgeth soundly, is content with an indifferent fortune. Magistracies very actiue and passiue are painfull, and are not desired but by feeble and sicke spirits. *Ctanes* one of the seuen that had title to the soueraigntie of *Persia*, gaue ouer vnto his companions his right, vpon condition, that hee and his might liue in that Empire free from all subiection and magistracie, except that which the ancient lawes did impose, being impatient to command, and to bee commanded. *Diocletian* renounced the Empire, *Celestinus* the Popedome.

## CHAP. XLIII.

Of Temperancie in speech, and of its fruit  
Eloquence.

His is a great point of wisedome: hee that ruleth his tongue well, in a word, is wise. *Qui in verbo non offendit*

*dit hic perfectus est* : The reason heereof is, because the tongue is all the world, in it is both good and euill, life and death, as hath beene said before. Let vs now see what aduice is to bee giuen to rule it well.

The first rule is, that speech be sober and seldome : To know how to bee silent is a great aduantage to speake well ; 1  
Rules of Speech.  
and he that knowes not well how to doe the one, knowes not the other.

To speake well and much, is not the worke of one man; and the best men are they that speake least, saith a wise man.

They that abound in words, are barraine in good speech and good actions ; like those trees that are full of leaues and yeeld little fruit, much chaffe, and little corne.

The Lacedemonians great professours of vertue and valour, did likewise professe silence, and were enemies to much speech : And therefore hath it euer beene commendable to bee sparing in speech, to keepe a bridle at the mouth : *Pone domine custodiam ori meo.* O Lord set a watch on my mouth. And in the law of *Moses* that vessell that had not his couering fastned to it, was vncleane. By speech a man is known and discerned : The wise man hath his tongue in his heart, the foole his heart in his tongue.

The second, that it be true : The vse of speech is to assist the troth, and to carrie the torch before it, to make it appeare ; and contrarily to discouer and reiect lying. Insomuch that speech is the instrument whereby wee communicate our willes and our thoughts : It had need bee true and faithfull, since that our vnderstanding is directed by the onely meanes of speech. He that falsifieth it, betrayeth publike societie, and if this meane faile vs and deceiue vs, there is an end of all, there is no liuing in the world. But of lying we haue al- 2  
Cap. 10.  
ready spoken.

The third, that it be naturall, modest, and chaste : not accompanied with vehemencie and contention, whereby it may seeme to proceed from passion ; not artificiall nor affected ; not wicked, immodest, licentious. 3

The fourth, that it bee serious and profitable, not vaine and vnprofitable. A man must not bee too attentue in re- 4

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lating what hath hapned in the market place or theater, or repeating of sonets and meriments, it bewrayes too great and vnprofitable leasure, *oris abundantis, & abtinentie. Of one abounding with ease and abusing it.* Neither is it good to enter into any large discourse of his owne actions and fortunes for others take not so much pleasure to heare them, as he to relate them.

5 But aboue all, it must neuer be offensiue, for 'speech is the instrument and fore-runner of charitie, and therefore to vse it against it, is to abuse it, contrarie to the purpose of nature. All kind of foule speech, detraction, mockerie, is vnwoorthy a man of wisdom and honour.

6 The sixth, to bee gentle and pleasing, not crabbed, harsh, and enuious; and therefore in common speech acute and subtile questions must be auoided, which resemble crasfishes, where there is more picking worke than meate to eate, and their end is nothing else but brawles and contentions.

7 Lastly, that it be constant, strong, and generous, not loose, effeminate, languishing, whereby wee auoid the maner of speech of Pedanties, pleaders, women.

8 To this point of Temperancy belongeth secrecy (whereof wee haue spoken in the Chapter of faith or fidelitie) not onely that which is committed vnto vs, and giuen vs to keepe, but that which wisdom and discretion telleth vs ought to be suppressed.

9 Now as speech makes a man more excellent then a beast, *Of eloquence & the commendation thereof.* so eloquence makes the professours thereof more excellent then other men. For this is the profession or art of speech, it is a more exquisite communication of discourse and of reason, the stearne or roother of our soules, which disposeth the hearts and affections like certaine notes to make a melodious harmony.

10 *The description.* Eloquence is not only a puritie and elegancy of speech, a discreet choice of words properly applied, ending in a true and a iust fall, but it must likewise bee full of ornaments, graces, motions; the words must bee liuely, first, by a cleare and distinct voyce, rayling it selfe, and falling by little and little; Afterwards by a graue and naturall action, wherein a man may see the visage, hands, and members of

of the Oratour to speake with mouth, follow with their motion that of the minde, and represent the affections: for an Oratour must first put on those passions which hee would stirre vp in others. As *Brasidas* drew from his owne wound the dart wherewith hee slew his enemie: So passion being conceived in our heart, is incontinently formed into our speech, and by it proceeding from vs, entreteth into another, and there giueth the like impression which wee our selues, haue, by a subtile and liuely contagion. Heereby wee see that a sweet and a mild nature is not so fit for eloquence, because it cannot conceiue strong and couragious passions, such as it ought, to giue life vnto the Oration; in such sort, that when he should display the master-saile of eloquence in a great and vehement action, hee commeth farre short thereof; as *Cicero* knew well how to reproch *Callidius*, who accused *Gallus* with a cold and ouer-mild voice and action, *in nisi fingeres, sic ageres? Thou thy selfe wouldest doe so, if thou diddest not counterfeite?* But being likewise vigorous, and furnished as hath beene sayd, it hath not lesse force and violence, then the commands of tyrants enuironed with their garbs and timberds; It doth not onely lead the hearer, but intangleth him, it raigneth ouer the people, and establisheth a violent empire ouer our soules.

A man may say against Eloquence that truth is sufficiently maintained and defended by it selfe, and that there is nothing more eloquent then it selfe: which I confesse is true, where the minds of men are pure, and free from passions: but the greatest part of the world, either by nature, or arte, and ill instruction is preoccupied, and ill disposed vnto vertue and verity, whereby it is necessary that men be handled like iron, which a man must soften with fire before hee temper it with water: So by the fire motions of eloquence, they must bee made supple and manageable, apt to take the temper of verity. This is that whereunto Eloquence especially tendeth; and the true fruit thereof is to arme vertue against vice, truth against lying and calumnies. The Orator, saith *Theophrastus*, is the true Physitian of the soule, to whom it belongeth to cure the biting of serpents by the musicke of the pipe, that is, the calumnies of wicked men by the harmonic of reason. Now

II  
Objections answered.

since no man can hinder, but that some there are that sease  
 vpon eloquence, to the end they may execute their pernicious  
 designments, how can a man do lesse than defend him-  
 selfe with the same armes; for if we present our selues naked  
 to the combat, do we not betray vertue and veritie? But many  
 haue abused eloquence to wicked purposes, and the ruine of  
 their country: It is true, but that is no reason why eloquence  
 should be despised, for that is common to it with all the ex-  
 cellent things of the world, to be vsed or abused, well or ill  
 applied, according to the good and bad disposition of  
 those that possesse them. Most men abuse their  
 vnderstanding, but yet we must not there-  
 fore conclude that vnderstanding  
 is not necessarie.

FIN IS.

*John elphinstone his booke 1688*



# ERRATA.

**P**Ag. 5. lin. 28. that most of the Athenians. p. 18. l. 9. In the society. p. 39. l. 27. that the ignorant. p. 53. l. 22. understands it not at all. p. 62. l. 7. the truth is: the spirit. p. 64. l. 4. agitation. p. 79. l. 20. courageously. p. 81. l. 20. strait and open. p. 86. l. 23. in it to the end. p. 104. l. 4. that it astonishes. p. 106. l. 1. man is neither. p. 119. l. 31. A man. p. 120. l. 23. the infirmities. p. 147. l. 11. we see it. p. 151. l. 12. in vulgar spirits. p. 158. l. 2. affaires. p. 166. l. 33. imprudence. p. 167. l. 22. And this is the reason. *ibid.* l. 23. religious. p. 182. l. 19. yea many times. *ibid.* l. 5. principium. p. 186. l. 9. Thus much is said. *ibid.* l. 32. flamed. p. 194. 4. extinction. p. 199. 21. Aurea. p. 208. 2. stimulatō. *ibid.* l. 3. every one hath his private spur, contemning. p. 218. l. 3. made slaves. p. 220. l. 17. It is the mark by which they are known. p. 244. l. 1. have. p. 251. l. 13. which may be. p. 264. 5. they alwaies hence it in the first place. p. 265. l. 20. which is not only. p. 273. l. 15. thus strageth the least. p. 278. l. 14. foundation and pillar. p. 279. l. 13. this commendation. p. 337. l. 1. his face open. p. 353. penult. Invi-  
ctum. p. 354. l. 23. and discern a far off. p. 367. l. 8. but yet he must be known. p. 386. l. 13. arms. p. 388. l. 32. that not onely nature. p. 416. l. 5. flagitia. p. 418. l. 14. omnes. p. 446. l. 16. of those that judge.